* fix(plugins): unknown column * fix(mcp): reuse MCP sessions instead of creating one per tool call The /mcp CORS layer never set exposedHeaders, so Access-Control-Expose-Headers was absent and browser-context MCP clients (Claude Desktop connectors, Claude.ai, MCP Inspector) could not read Mcp-Session-Id off the initialize response. Unable to echo it back, every request looked like a fresh initialize: one McpServer and one session per tool call, until the per-user cap returned a 429 and the integration died until the container was restarted. The idle sweep was not at fault — it expires on lastActivity with a 1h default, so sessions born seconds apart are nowhere near expiry, hence 'cleaned 0'. - expose Mcp-Session-Id, MCP-Protocol-Version and WWW-Authenticate - evict a user's least-recently-active session at the cap rather than refusing the request, so a client that cannot persist its session id (or a proxy that strips the header) can never wedge the server - close the McpServer/transport orphaned by every session-less non-initialize POST, which was leaked: never mapped, never swept, never closed - return the cap error as JSON-RPC so clients surface the real reason - warn on session-less POSTs to make a header-stripping proxy diagnosable * chore(deps): declare @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.29.0 Matches the version already resolved in the lockfile; no dependency-tree change. * docs(mcp): add the reverse proxy specs for MCP * fix(plugins): stop the row ⋯ menu being clipped by the sidebar The menu was an in-flow `absolute` div, and its ancestor (PageSidebar) is `overflow-hidden` — which clips absolutely-positioned descendants regardless of z-index. With enough plugins installed a row sits low enough that its menu runs past the sidebar's bottom edge and gets chopped, taking Delete with it, so the plugin could no longer be uninstalled from the UI. Portal the menu to <body> and position it `fixed` against the ⋯ button, flipping upward when the bottom is tight and re-anchoring on scroll/resize. A fixed child of <body> has no overflow ancestor, so nothing can clip it. Closes #1523 * feat(plugins): surface author-signature status and add a scoped re-trust override TREK has always verified an author's Ed25519 signature and TOFU-pinned the key on first install, but none of it was ever shown: a successfully-installed UNSIGNED plugin looked identical to a signed one, and a signature-refused update left the plugin quietly pinned at its old version with the reason dying in a toast. Give the four refusal conditions machine-readable codes (SIGNATURE_MISSING / _INCOMPLETE / _KEY_CHANGED / _INVALID), persist a refusal on the plugin row so the admin list keeps showing it, and badge Signed/Unsigned in the list and in Discover. Only SIGNATURE_KEY_CHANGED is overridable — an author can legitimately rotate a key; a signature that does not verify means the bytes are not what the author signed, and there is no story where waving that through is right. The override re-pins and updates in ONE call (POST :id/retrust): a re-pin that waited for a follow-up /update would leave the plugin pinned to a key no install had ever been verified against if that second call never came. The artifact must still verify under the new key, so a re-trust moves the pin from one verified key to another. assertRetrustable re-derives the condition server-side, so the UI hiding the button is a convenience, not the control, and it echoes back the full key the admin was shown so a re-key since the dialog rendered is refused. The rotation is written to the admin audit log with both fingerprints — after an incident, "which key did we move from, and to what?" is the question a single key cannot answer. * fix(plugins): let a plugin's frame reach the hosts an admin added for it The frame's connect-src was built from the manifest's http:outbound grants alone, but the child's egress guard is the UNION of those and the hosts an admin added after install for an operatorEgress plugin (a self-hosted Gotify, an ntfy — hosts the author cannot know in advance). So such a plugin WITH A UI could call the operator's host from its server and was CSP-blocked in its own iframe. Match the frame to the child. The admin consented to these hosts at install and the child already reaches them, so this widens no trust boundary that isn't already crossed. Both sources stay validated on the way in, and the interpolation filter is unchanged. * fix(plugins): report a rejected events.emit on the plugin's own log stream The host can reject an emit (an undeclared event name, a rate limit). The rejection must not escape — a detached rejection crashes the child and terminally disables the plugin over one bad emit — but swallowing it silently left an author with no way to discover that `emits` was missing from their manifest. Surface it as a warning instead. * feat(plugin-sdk): expose the raw request body for webhook signature checks A webhook author must run their HMAC over the exact bytes the sender signed. `body` is the PARSED value, and re-serializing it will not reproduce those bytes — key order, whitespace and unicode escaping all differ — so the signature never matches. Document `rawBodyBase64`, which the host already sets on auth:false routes. * fix(plugin-sdk): refuse to overwrite a released artifact, and keep the packed zip A released artifact is IMMUTABLE: the registry pins its sha256, so overwriting the bytes of a release already in the registry breaks the checksum for everyone who installed that version — they can no longer install or update it. The old code blanket-caught every `gh release create` failure (auth, network, a bad repo) and turned it into a --clobber upload. Probe for the release explicitly and refuse unless --force. Also stop deleting plugin.zip on the way out. It is the exact bytes the release and the entry's sha256 pin were computed from; a re-pack on another machine or SDK version can differ (CRLF, walk order), so anyone re-running `entry`/`sign` afterwards must hash THAT file, not a rebuild. * fix(plugin-sdk): don't fail submit when the fork already has an upstream remote `gh repo clone` of a fork may already have wired `upstream`, in which case a bare `remote add` exits non-zero and took the whole submit down. Set it either way. * fix(plugin-sdk): make the dev server behave like the host Three ways `dev` lied to an author about how their plugin would run in production: - ctx.db: one try/catch wrapped both the node:sqlite probe AND opening the database, so an mkdir/permission failure silently degraded to the in-memory stub — which swallows every write while reporting success. A db:own plugin "worked" in dev and persisted nothing. Probe separately: fail loudly on a real error, degrade only on old Node, and say plainly that the stub discards writes. - notificationChannel: the host fires it with no acting user and hands the recipient's decrypted settings in as a separate `config` argument — send(msg, config, ctx) / test(config, ctx). Firing it like an ordinary hook passed `ctx` where `config` belongs, so a channel plugin read its settings off ctx and was broken in production. - /preview pinned tripId 42 while the scaffold seeds trip 1, so the widget's first trek:invoke hit assertMember(42) and 500'd. Preview against a trip that exists. * fix(plugin-sdk): reject unknown flags, wire up create's new flags, and add --help `parse()` accepts any --x, so a flag a command does not read was silently dropped: `create --template notification-channel` cheerfully scaffolded a blank plugin. Silently ignoring an author's explicit instruction is worse than refusing it, so unknown flags are now an error, and create actually forwards --template/--egress/--required-addons. A bare --permissions used to split the string "true" into a permission literally named `true`; listFlag() now treats a valueless flag as absent. Since an unknown flag is now fatal, `--help` has to exist: it is intercepted before the flag check and prints usage on stdout with exit 0. * chore(plugins): drop three unused eslint-disable directives The no-console rule is not enabled for these files, so the directives were dead and eslint reports them as unused. * fix(plugin-sdk): bring preflight back in step with the registry's gates preflight exists to tell an author what TREK-Plugins' CI will say before they open the PR. The registry now verifies author signatures, and preflight didn't — so it drifted into the one failure mode it must never have: a false green. An author trusts a green. - Verify the signature against the artifact bytes. preflight already downloads them for the sha256 check, so this costs one call. Without it, signing with the wrong key (or re-packing after signing) sails through and is caught at review. - Check the signature SHAPE (checkSignatureShape): a key with no signed version, a signature with no key, a malformed key or signature. TREK refuses to install a half-signed entry, so such an entry is dead on arrival. - Default apiVersion to 1 before comparing. It is OPTIONAL in the manifest — install/ manifest.ts and `entry` both default it — so a manifest that legally omits it was failing preflight with "manifest apiVersion undefined != entry 1" while the registry passed it. A false RED, which teaches authors to ignore the tool. - Check requiredAddons/pluginDependencies parity, and operatorEgress without an http:outbound grant. The verifier is a port of the host's install/verify-signature.ts (the registry has its own port); sign.ts's verifyArtifact only understands the bare key/signature pair the SDK itself emits and cannot judge a minisign key. A test pins all three to the same verdicts. * feat(plugins): enforce compatibility range * chore: bump sdk version * test(e2e): repair the trip-creation specs create-trip and trip-planner have been failing for a while — long enough for three separate UI changes to drift past them, which nothing caught because CI runs vitest only and never invokes Playwright. Each failure was masking the next: - The release-notice modal greets a freshly seeded user and its backdrop swallowed the click on .add-trip-card. Added a shared dismissSystemNotices() helper (the X only shows on the notice's last page, so it has to page through first). - .modal-backdrop no longer exists — the class was namespaced to .trek-modal-backdrop so content blockers stop hiding it. - input[type=text].first() is no longer the Title field: the cover-image search inputs now sit above it, so the specs were typing the trip name into the photo search box and creating an untitled trip that never matched getByText(title). * fix(planner): gate drag & drop on pointer type, not viewport width (#1432) The 3.2.1 fix disabled drag on "mobile", but nothing in the client has ever detected touch — "mobile" was inferred from viewport width, at four independent breakpoints. A tablet is a coarse-pointer device at a *desktop* width, so an iPad (820-1366px) fell on the wrong side of all four, which is why iPhone was fixed and iPad was not: - useTripPlanner's isMobile (<768px) is what disarmed `draggable`, so on iPad rows stayed draggable and a scroll swipe became an HTML5 drag. - TripPlannerPage hardcoded isMobile={false} on the desktop PlacesSidebar, so its drop handlers and the drop-to-import overlay could never be disabled — that overlay is the reported symptom. - The arrow-button reorder fallback was revealed only below 767px, leaving iPad with no drag *and* no fallback. - touchDragPolyfill loaded drag-drop-touch at >=1024px, synthesising drags from touchmove — on a landscape iPad that re-armed the very gesture hijack 3.2.1 removed. Adds useIsTouch() ((pointer: coarse)) as a signal separate from isMobile: layout stays width-driven, so the iPad keeps the desktop two-pane planner, while every drag affordance is gated on isMobile || isTouch. The reorder arrows now show on coarse pointers, and the polyfill loads only on hybrid laptops ((pointer: fine) and (any-pointer: coarse)), which also removes the #1440 phantom-dblclick map zoom on tablets. Guarded by unit tests plus an e2e spec on real WebKit in an iPad Pro 11 context — the engine matters, since every browser on iPadOS is WebKit underneath, which is why the reporter hit this in all three they tried. * test(planner): guard the day-plan reorder arrows against phantom clicks The hover rule that reveals the reorder arrows had been dead since the TypeScript migration: it targeted `.place-row:hover .reorder-btns`, and neither class exists — the component renders `.reorder-buttons` inside an unclassed row. The buttons sat at opacity:0 on desktop with nothing to reveal them. That was not merely invisible. opacity:0 still hit-tests, so every itinerary row and day note carried an invisible, fully clickable target that silently reordered the trip: opacity: "0", visibility: "visible", pointerEvents: "auto" elementFromPoint(centre) -> BUTTON, inside .reorder-buttons The repair — pointer-events: none while hidden, plus a working .dp-row:hover/:focus-within reveal (focus-within so the buttons are also reachable by keyboard, which the file's JS-hover pattern cannot do) — lives in index.css and DayPlanSidebar.tsx. Both files also carry the #1432 drag gating, so they went with that commit rather than being split mid-file; this commit is the regression guard for them. E2E rather than unit, because jsdom does not evaluate :hover. Against the old CSS it fails on exactly the right assertion: "hidden arrows must not swallow clicks" — expected false, received true. * fix(pdf): keep the header gap on day-header overflow pages (#1531) The repeated <thead> day header (#1471) carried no gap before the first card on overflow pages: the 12px sat in .day-body's block-start padding, which a fragmented box only paints on its first fragment. Move it to the thead cell so it repeats with the header; the day's first page renders pixel-identically. * fix(budget): keep "no one paid yet" when editing an expense (#1533) The ExpenseModal payer initializer fell back to the current user whenever the edited item had no payer, so reopening an expense saved with "no one paid yet" silently reselected "You" — and re-saving then recorded the current user as the payer, corrupting the balances. An absent payer on an existing expense is a deliberate value, so only a brand-new expense defaults to me.
A self-hosted, real-time collaborative travel planner — with maps, budgets, packing lists, a journal, and AI built in.
What you get
See all features
🧭 Trip planning
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🧳 Travel management
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👥 Collaboration
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📱 Mobile & PWA
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🧩 Addons (admin-toggleable)
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🤖 AI / MCP
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⚙️ Admin & customisation
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Get started in 30 seconds
ENCRYPTION_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32) docker run -d -p 3000:3000 \
-e ENCRYPTION_KEY=$ENCRYPTION_KEY \
-v ./data:/app/data -v ./uploads:/app/uploads mauriceboe/trek
Open http://localhost:3000. On first boot TREK seeds an admin account — if you set ADMIN_EMAIL/ADMIN_PASSWORD those are used, otherwise the credentials are printed to the container log (docker logs trek).
Tech stack
Real-time sync via WebSocket (ws). Backend on NestJS 11. State with Zustand. Auth via JWT + OAuth 2.1 + OIDC + Passkeys (WebAuthn) + TOTP MFA. Weather via Open-Meteo (no key required). Maps with Leaflet and Mapbox GL.
Docker Compose (production)
Full compose example with secure defaults
services:
app:
image: mauriceboe/trek:latest
container_name: trek
read_only: true
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
cap_drop:
- ALL
cap_add:
- CHOWN
- SETUID
- SETGID
tmpfs:
- /tmp:noexec,nosuid,size=64m
ports:
- "3000:3000"
environment:
- NODE_ENV=production
- PORT=3000
- ENCRYPTION_KEY=${ENCRYPTION_KEY:-} # generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
- TZ=${TZ:-UTC}
- LOG_LEVEL=${LOG_LEVEL:-info}
- ALLOWED_ORIGINS=${ALLOWED_ORIGINS:-}
- APP_URL=${APP_URL:-} # required for OIDC + email links
# - FORCE_HTTPS=true # behind a TLS-terminating proxy
# - TRUST_PROXY=1
# - OIDC_ISSUER=https://auth.example.com
# - OIDC_CLIENT_ID=trek
# - OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=supersecret
# - OIDC_DISPLAY_NAME=SSO
# - OIDC_ADMIN_CLAIM=groups
# - OIDC_ADMIN_VALUE=app-trek-admins
volumes:
- ./data:/app/data
- ./uploads:/app/uploads
restart: unless-stopped
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "-qO-", "http://localhost:3000/api/health"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 10s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
Then:
docker compose up -d
HTTPS notes: FORCE_HTTPS=true is optional — it adds a 301 redirect, HSTS, CSP upgrade-insecure-requests, and forces the secure cookie flag. Only use it behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy. TRUST_PROXY=1 tells the server how many proxies sit in front so real client IPs and X-Forwarded-Proto work.
Helm (Kubernetes)
helm repo add trek https://mauriceboe.github.io/TREK
helm repo update
helm install trek trek/trek
See charts/README.md for values.
Install as App (PWA)
TREK works as a Progressive Web App — no App Store needed.
- Open TREK in the browser (HTTPS required)
- iOS: Share ▸ Add to Home Screen
- Android: Menu ▸ Install app (or Add to Home Screen)
TREK then launches fullscreen with its own icon, just like a native app.
Updating
Docker Compose:
docker compose pull && docker compose up -d
Docker run — reuse the original volume paths:
docker pull mauriceboe/trek
docker rm -f trek
docker run -d --name trek -p 3000:3000 -v ./data:/app/data -v ./uploads:/app/uploads --restart unless-stopped mauriceboe/trek
Not sure which paths you used?
docker inspect trek --format '{{json .Mounts}}'before removing the container.
Your data stays in the mounted data and uploads volumes — updates never touch it.
Important
Mount only the data and uploads directories —
-v ./data:/app/data -v ./uploads:/app/uploads. Never mount a volume at/app. Doing so hides the application code shipped in the image and the container fails to start withCannot find module 'tsconfig-paths/register'. If you previously mounted/app, switch to the two mounts above; your data indata/anduploads/is preserved.
Rotating the Encryption Key
If you need to rotate ENCRYPTION_KEY (e.g. upgrading from a version that derived encryption from JWT_SECRET):
docker exec -it trek node --import tsx scripts/migrate-encryption.ts
The script creates a timestamped DB backup before making changes and prompts for old + new keys (input is not echoed).
Reverse Proxy
For production, put TREK behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy. TREK uses WebSockets for real-time sync, so the proxy must support WebSocket upgrades on /ws.
If you use the MCP addon, the proxy must also pass the Mcp-Session-Id header through in both directions on /mcp — Nginx and Caddy do this by default, but a proxy that strips it makes every tool call open a new session instead of reusing one. See the Reverse Proxy wiki page for details.
Nginx
server {
listen 80;
server_name trek.yourdomain.com;
return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
}
server {
listen 443 ssl http2;
server_name trek.yourdomain.com;
ssl_certificate /etc/ssl/fullchain.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /etc/ssl/privkey.pem;
# 500 MB covers backup-restore uploads (capped at 500 MB server-side).
client_max_body_size 500m;
location / {
proxy_pass http://localhost:3000;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
location /ws {
proxy_pass http://localhost:3000;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_read_timeout 86400;
}
# Only needed if you use the MCP addon. Responses are Server-Sent Events,
# so buffering must be off or tool results arrive late.
location /mcp {
proxy_pass http://localhost:3000;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_buffering off;
proxy_read_timeout 3600s;
}
}
Caddy
trek.yourdomain.com {
reverse_proxy localhost:3000
}
Caddy handles TLS and WebSockets automatically.
Environment variables
Full reference
| Variable | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Core | ||
PORT |
Server port | 3000 |
NODE_ENV |
Environment (production / development) |
production |
ENCRYPTION_KEY |
At-rest encryption key for stored secrets (API keys, MFA, SMTP, OIDC). Recommended: generate with openssl rand -hex 32. If unset, falls back to data/.jwt_secret (existing installs) or auto-generates a key (fresh installs). |
Auto |
TZ |
Timezone for logs, reminders and cron jobs (e.g. Europe/Berlin) |
UTC |
LOG_LEVEL |
info = concise user actions, debug = verbose details |
info |
DEFAULT_LANGUAGE |
Default language on the login page for users with no saved preference. Browser/OS language is auto-detected first; this is the fallback. Supported: de, en, es, fr, hu, nl, br, cs, pl, ru, zh, zh-TW, it, ar, id, tr, ja, ko, uk, gr |
en |
ALLOWED_ORIGINS |
Comma-separated origins for CORS and email links | same-origin |
FORCE_HTTPS |
Optional. When true: 301-redirects HTTP to HTTPS, sends HSTS, adds CSP upgrade-insecure-requests, forces the session cookie secure flag. Useful behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy. Requires TRUST_PROXY. |
false |
HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS |
When true: adds the includeSubDomains directive to the HSTS header, extending HTTPS enforcement to all subdomains. Only effective when HSTS is active (FORCE_HTTPS=true or NODE_ENV=production). Leave false if you run other services on sibling subdomains over plain HTTP. |
false |
COOKIE_SECURE |
Controls the secure flag on the trek_session cookie. Auto-derived: on when NODE_ENV=production or FORCE_HTTPS=true. Escape hatch: set false to allow session cookies over plain HTTP. Not recommended in production. |
auto |
SESSION_DURATION |
How long a login session stays valid when "Remember me" is unchecked (the default): sets the trek_session JWT exp and issues a browser-session cookie (cleared when the browser closes). Accepts ms-style strings: 1h, 12h, 7d, 30d, 90d. Invalid values warn at startup and fall back to the default. |
24h |
SESSION_DURATION_REMEMBER |
Session length when "Remember me" is ticked at login: a longer-lived JWT plus a persistent trek_session cookie that survives browser restarts. Same format and startup-fallback behaviour as SESSION_DURATION. |
30d |
TRUST_PROXY |
Number of trusted reverse proxies. Tells the server to read client IP from X-Forwarded-For and protocol from X-Forwarded-Proto. Defaults to 1 in production; off in dev unless set. |
1 |
ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK |
Allow outbound requests to private/RFC-1918 IPs (e.g. Immich on your LAN). Loopback and link-local addresses remain blocked. | false |
APP_URL |
Public base URL of this instance (e.g. https://trek.example.com). Required when OIDC is enabled; used as base for email notification links. |
— |
| OIDC / SSO | ||
OIDC_ISSUER |
OpenID Connect provider URL | — |
OIDC_CLIENT_ID |
OIDC client ID | — |
OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET |
OIDC client secret | — |
OIDC_DISPLAY_NAME |
Label shown on the SSO login button | SSO |
OIDC_ONLY |
Force SSO-only mode: disables password login + registration, regardless of Admin > Settings. The first SSO login becomes admin. | false |
OIDC_ADMIN_CLAIM |
OIDC claim used to identify admin users | — |
OIDC_ADMIN_VALUE |
Value of the OIDC claim that grants admin role | — |
OIDC_SCOPE |
Space-separated OIDC scopes. Fully replaces the default — always include openid email profile. |
openid email profile |
OIDC_DISCOVERY_URL |
Override the auto-constructed OIDC discovery endpoint (e.g. Authentik: .../application/o/trek/.well-known/openid-configuration) |
— |
| Initial setup | ||
ADMIN_EMAIL |
Email for the first admin on initial boot. Must be set together with ADMIN_PASSWORD. If either is omitted a random password is printed to the server log. No effect once a user exists. |
admin@trek.local |
ADMIN_PASSWORD |
Password for the first admin on initial boot. Pairs with ADMIN_EMAIL. |
random |
| Other | ||
DEMO_MODE |
Enable demo mode (hourly data resets) | false |
UNSPLASH_ACCESS_KEY |
Optional Unsplash Access Key for trip-cover and place-image search. Without one, TREK uses Unsplash's unauthenticated endpoint, which some datacenter/VPS IPs are blocked from. Get a free key at unsplash.com/developers. Overrides any per-admin key set in Admin > Settings (where it can also be configured instead). | — |
MCP_RATE_LIMIT |
Max MCP API requests per user per minute | 300 |
MCP_MAX_SESSION_PER_USER |
Max concurrent MCP sessions per user. At the cap, the least-recently-active session is closed to make room | 20 |
Data & Backups
- Database — SQLite, stored in
./data/travel.db - Uploads — stored in
./uploads/ - Logs —
./data/logs/trek.log(auto-rotated) - Backups — create and restore via Admin Panel
- Auto-Backups — configurable schedule and retention in Admin Panel
Data sources
The Atlas map's country and sub-national (province/county) boundaries come from geoBoundaries (Runfola et al., 2020), licensed CC BY 4.0. See NOTICE.md for full third-party attributions.
License
TREK is AGPL v3. Self-host freely for personal or internal company use. If you modify and offer TREK as a network service to third parties, your modifications must be open-sourced under the same licence.








