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https://github.com/mauriceboe/TREK.git
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a876fb2634
* feat(auth): passkey (WebAuthn) login — server endpoints, schema + admin toggle Add @simplewebauthn/server registration and primary (discoverable) login ceremonies under /api/auth/passkey, a webauthn_credentials + single-use webauthn_challenges schema (migration), the instance-wide passkey_login toggle (default off) enforced before auth by a guard, and require_mfa satisfaction via a verified passkey. RP ID/origin come only from server config (webauthn_rp_id/origins -> APP_URL), never request headers. * feat(auth): passkey enrolment, login button + admin settings UI PasskeysSection in account settings (add/rename/remove with a current-password step-up), a 'Sign in with a passkey' button on the login page, the admin enable + RP-ID/origins controls, and a per-user admin reset action. * i18n(auth): passkey strings across all locales Add login/settings/admin passkey keys to en and all 19 translated locales.
112 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
112 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
import { Request, Response, NextFunction } from 'express';
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import { db } from '../db/database';
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import { extractToken, verifyJwtAndLoadUser } from './auth';
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import { DEMO_EMAILS } from '../services/demo';
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/** Paths that never require MFA (public or pre-auth). */
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export function isPublicApiPath(method: string, pathNoQuery: string): boolean {
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if (method === 'GET' && pathNoQuery === '/api/health') return true;
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if (method === 'GET' && pathNoQuery === '/api/auth/app-config') return true;
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if (method === 'POST' && pathNoQuery === '/api/auth/login') return true;
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if (method === 'POST' && pathNoQuery === '/api/auth/register') return true;
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if (method === 'POST' && pathNoQuery === '/api/auth/demo-login') return true;
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if (method === 'GET' && pathNoQuery.startsWith('/api/auth/invite/')) return true;
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if (method === 'POST' && pathNoQuery === '/api/auth/mfa/verify-login') return true;
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// Unauthenticated passkey (primary) login ceremony.
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if (method === 'POST' && pathNoQuery === '/api/auth/passkey/login/options') return true;
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if (method === 'POST' && pathNoQuery === '/api/auth/passkey/login/verify') return true;
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if (pathNoQuery.startsWith('/api/auth/oidc/')) return true;
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return false;
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}
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/** Authenticated paths allowed while MFA is not yet enabled (setup + lockout recovery). */
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export function isMfaSetupExemptPath(method: string, pathNoQuery: string): boolean {
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if (method === 'GET' && pathNoQuery === '/api/auth/me') return true;
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if (method === 'POST' && pathNoQuery === '/api/auth/mfa/setup') return true;
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if (method === 'POST' && pathNoQuery === '/api/auth/mfa/enable') return true;
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// Allow enrolling a passkey as the second factor (a user-verified passkey
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// satisfies require_mfa), so a fresh user under the policy isn't stuck.
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if (method === 'POST' && pathNoQuery === '/api/auth/passkey/register/options') return true;
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if (method === 'POST' && pathNoQuery === '/api/auth/passkey/register/verify') return true;
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if (method === 'GET' && pathNoQuery === '/api/auth/passkey/credentials') return true;
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if ((method === 'GET' || method === 'PUT') && pathNoQuery === '/api/auth/app-settings') return true;
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return false;
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}
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/**
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* When app_settings.require_mfa is true, block API access for users without MFA enabled,
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* except for public routes and MFA setup endpoints.
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*/
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export function enforceGlobalMfaPolicy(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void {
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const pathNoQuery = (req.originalUrl || req.url || '').split('?')[0];
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if (!pathNoQuery.startsWith('/api')) {
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next();
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return;
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}
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if (isPublicApiPath(req.method, pathNoQuery)) {
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next();
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return;
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}
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// Accept both the httpOnly session cookie (regular SPA users) and the
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// Authorization header (MCP / API clients). Previously this only looked
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// at the header so every normal cookie-authenticated session sailed
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// past `require_mfa` unchecked.
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const token = extractToken(req);
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if (!token) {
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next();
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return;
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}
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// Use the shared verify helper so the `password_version` gate applies
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// here too — a JWT stolen before a password reset would otherwise
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// continue to satisfy this middleware until its natural 24h expiry.
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const verified = verifyJwtAndLoadUser(token);
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if (!verified) {
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next();
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return;
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}
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const userId = verified.id;
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const requireRow = db.prepare("SELECT value FROM app_settings WHERE key = 'require_mfa'").get() as { value: string } | undefined;
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if (requireRow?.value !== 'true') {
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next();
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return;
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}
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if (process.env.DEMO_MODE?.toLowerCase() === 'true' && verified.email && DEMO_EMAILS.has(verified.email)) {
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next();
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return;
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}
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const row = db.prepare('SELECT mfa_enabled FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(userId) as
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| { mfa_enabled: number | boolean }
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| undefined;
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if (!row) {
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next();
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return;
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}
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// A user-verified passkey is phishing-resistant and inherently two-factor, so
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// owning at least one satisfies the require_mfa policy exactly like TOTP does.
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// (All stored passkeys were registered with userVerification required.)
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const mfaOk = row.mfa_enabled === 1 || row.mfa_enabled === true;
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const passkeyOk = !!db.prepare('SELECT 1 FROM webauthn_credentials WHERE user_id = ? LIMIT 1').get(userId);
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if (mfaOk || passkeyOk) {
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next();
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return;
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}
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if (isMfaSetupExemptPath(req.method, pathNoQuery)) {
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next();
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return;
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}
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res.status(403).json({
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error: 'Two-factor authentication is required. Complete setup in Settings.',
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code: 'MFA_REQUIRED',
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});
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}
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