7 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Maurice	a876fb2634	feat: Passkey (WebAuthn) login (#1111) ... * feat(auth): passkey (WebAuthn) login — server endpoints, schema + admin toggle Add @simplewebauthn/server registration and primary (discoverable) login ceremonies under /api/auth/passkey, a webauthn_credentials + single-use webauthn_challenges schema (migration), the instance-wide passkey_login toggle (default off) enforced before auth by a guard, and require_mfa satisfaction via a verified passkey. RP ID/origin come only from server config (webauthn_rp_id/origins -> APP_URL), never request headers. * feat(auth): passkey enrolment, login button + admin settings UI PasskeysSection in account settings (add/rename/remove with a current-password step-up), a 'Sign in with a passkey' button on the login page, the admin enable + RP-ID/origins controls, and a per-user admin reset action. * i18n(auth): passkey strings across all locales Add login/settings/admin passkey keys to en and all 19 translated locales.	2026-06-05 18:54:13 +02:00
Julien G.	1f5deeba6c	Bug fixes - April 27th 2026 (#907) ... * fix: clean up dangling FK references before deleting a user Resolves FOREIGN KEY constraint failed (500) on DELETE /api/admin/users/:id and DELETE /api/auth/me when the target user had rows in trip_members.invited_by, share_tokens.created_by, budget_items.paid_by_user_id, journeys.user_id, journey_entries.author_id, journey_contributors.user_id, or journey_share_tokens.created_by — none of which had ON DELETE clauses. Introduces deleteUserCompletely() in userCleanupService.ts which wraps all cleanup and the final DELETE FROM users in a single transaction. Both adminService.deleteUser and authService.deleteAccount now call it instead of the bare DELETE. Tests ADMIN-005b and AUTH-040 cover all reference types including notification sender/recipient and notice dismissals. * test: extend FK deletion tests to cover journeys, files, and photos ADMIN-005b and AUTH-040 now also seed and assert: - owned journey with entries (cascade-deleted via journeys.user_id cleanup) - trip_files.uploaded_by (SET NULL — file survives, attribution cleared) - trek_photos.owner_id (SET NULL — photo record survives, owner cleared) - trip_photos.user_id (CASCADE — photo association removed) * test: extend user deletion tests to cover all FK relationships ADMIN-005b and AUTH-040 now seed and assert every user FK relationship: CASCADE (row deleted): trips, trip_members, tags, mcp_tokens, oauth_tokens, oauth_consents, vacay_plans, vacay_plan_members, bucket_list, visited_countries, visited_regions, packing_templates, invite_tokens, collab_notes, settings, password_reset_tokens, notification_channel_preferences SET NULL (row survives, column nulled): categories, todo_items.assigned_user_id, packing_bags, audit_log Caught and fixed: notification_preferences was dropped in migration 72; correct table is notification_channel_preferences. * fix: preserve URL hash and OIDC redirect target through login flow - Include location.hash in redirect param at all three producer sites (ProtectedRoute, axios 401 interceptor, OAuthAuthorizePage) so hash fragments survive the login bounce - Stash redirectTarget in sessionStorage before any OIDC provider redirect and restore it after the code exchange, since the IdP strips the original ?redirect= param during the roundtrip - Clear sessionStorage on OIDC error to avoid stale state - Add tests covering sessionStorage stash on mount, navigate to saved redirect after OIDC exchange, fallback to /dashboard, and cleanup on error * fix: use day position instead of ID for accommodation date range clamping Math.min/Math.max over raw day IDs breaks the start/end picker when a trip's day IDs are non-monotonic relative to day_number (normal after repeated generateDays extend/shrink cycles). Replaced with findIndex lookups so clamping is always based on positional order. Closes #889 * fix: normalize env var comparisons to be case-insensitive All NODE_ENV, DEMO_MODE, OIDC_ONLY, FORCE_HTTPS, COOKIE_SECURE, and ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK checks now use .toLowerCase() so values like 'Production' or 'True' behave identically to their lowercase forms. Also adds APP_VERSION to the startup banner. * fix: delete surplus days when shortening a trip When shrinking a trip's date range, surplus days are now deleted along with their assignments, notes, and accommodations (cascade). Places remain in the trip pool; reservations keep their day reference nulled by the existing ON DELETE SET NULL constraint (issue #909). Updates TRIP-SVC-011 to reflect the new behaviour; adds TRIP-SVC-016 as a regression test for the empty-day case. * fix: auto-backup retention deletes itself and manual backups on Docker Two bugs in cleanupOldBackups: 1. Filter was .endsWith('.zip') — swept manual backup-*.zip files too. Now restricted to auto-backup-* prefix. 2. Age was derived from stat.birthtimeMs, which is 0 on overlayfs (Docker default), making every backup appear epoch-old and get deleted immediately. Age is now parsed from the filename timestamp and falls back to mtimeMs (reliable on overlayfs). Also converts inline require('./services/auditLog') calls to a static import throughout scheduler.ts, and adds 8 unit tests covering the fixed retention logic including the overlayfs regression case. * test: update TRIP-024 to match delete behavior on trip shrink * feat: add bypass-branch-check label to skip branch enforcement	2026-04-28 05:17:20 +02:00
Maurice	292e443dbe	security: address silent-failure review findings on top of batch 1 ... Second-pass fixes caught by a self-review after the initial commit — each one would have undermined a fix from the previous commit. - mfaPolicy now goes through `verifyJwtAndLoadUser` too. Without this, a JWT stolen before a password reset still satisfied `require_mfa` until its natural 24h expiry, defeating the whole point of the password_version bump. - Drop the `?? keys[0]` fallback in OIDC JWKS key selection. When the token carries a `kid` that is not in the current JWKS, refuse outright instead of picking an arbitrary key and letting the signature check produce a generic failure — the real failure mode deserves a specific error code. - Tighten OAuth DCR custom-scheme rule so `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, `blob:`, `about:`, `chrome:` are all rejected. Previously the catch-all "not http/https" check admitted them; the authorize flow later 302s the browser to whatever is registered, which with a `javascript:` URI would execute attacker script on redirect. Also require the private-use scheme body to be reverse-DNS (contain a dot), matching RFC 8252 §7.1. - permanentDeleteFile / emptyTrash only delete the trip_files row when the on-disk unlink actually succeeded. Previously Promise.all swallowed individual unlink failures and DELETE ran unconditionally, so a permission / ENOSPC failure would orphan bytes on disk. - restoreFromZip also invalidates the permissions cache in the outer catch. If extraction threw before the DB swap even started, the cache wasn't stale, but belt-and-braces is cheap and guarantees no failed-restore path leaves stale cache behind.	2026-04-20 20:44:57 +02:00
Maurice	2d0414b4a3	security: internal audit — batch 1 ... Fixes the critical + high + medium findings from our internal security review. Bundled into one PR because the changes overlap heavily (JWT verification unifies across three call sites; backup-code hashing and demo-email handling cross-cut several services); splitting them out would mean redundant reviews of the same files. Critical - CI-C1 — .github/workflows/test.yml: restore actions/{checkout,setup- node,upload-artifact} to @v4. The @v6 refs don't exist, so the test workflow was errorring before a single test ran. - SEC-C1 — mfaPolicy now extracts the token via extractToken() (cookie- first, Bearer fallback). Previously it only read Authorization, so every cookie-authenticated SPA session bypassed require_mfa entirely. - SEC-C2/C4/C6 — all JWT verification paths (MCP bearer, file download, photo route) now go through the shared verifyJwtAndLoadUser that checks password_version. resetPassword additionally deletes every mcp_tokens row and marks outstanding oauth_tokens revoked, so a password reset invalidates ALL credential classes — not just the cookie JWT. High - SEC-H2 — reset email URL is built from server-side APP_URL / ALLOWED_ORIGINS (via existing getAppUrl()), not request headers. Closes the host-header-injection vector into reset links. - SEC-H3 — OIDC findOrCreateUser wraps the invite-redemption UPDATE + user INSERT in a transaction. The UPDATE is the capacity check; if a concurrent callback takes the last slot, the whole transaction aborts with registration_disabled instead of double-creating users. - SEC-H4 — new verifyIdToken() performs full JWT signature verification via the provider's JWKS (Node's crypto.createPublicKey accepts JWK directly — no extra dependency), plus iss/aud/exp checks. The callback also rejects the login when userinfo.sub does not match id_token.sub. - SEC-H5 — OAuth DCR now validates redirect_uris against an allowlist of schemes: https, http-loopback, or a private custom scheme. Plain http://non-loopback is rejected. - SEC-H6 — oauthService audience defaults to mcpResource when the `resource` parameter is missing, so tokens are always audience-bound to /mcp instead of being issued with audience=null. - SEC-H7 — HSTS is enabled any time NODE_ENV=production (previously required FORCE_HTTPS=true), includeSubDomains defaults on and can be disabled with HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS=false. - SEC-H8 — trek_session cookie Secure flag is also driven by req.secure (which Express resolves from X-Forwarded-Proto once trust proxy is set), so instances behind a TLS-terminating proxy get Secure cookies without needing FORCE_HTTPS. Medium - SEC-M1 — permanentDeleteFile / emptyTrash / avatar unlink now use fs.promises.rm with { force: true } (one async op vs the previous existsSync + unlinkSync pair per file). - SEC-M2 — invalidatePermissionsCache() is called inside restoreFromZip so a restored DB with different permission rows is honoured immediately. - SEC-M3 + C1 — idempotency store bounds the key at 128 chars, caches only responses ≤ 256 KiB, and scopes the lookup by (key, user_id, method, path) rather than (key, user_id). Same key replayed against a different endpoint no longer returns a stale unrelated body. - SEC-M4 — share_tokens gets an expires_at column; new tokens default to 90-day TTL, expired tokens are denied at lookup. Existing tokens stay NULL = no expiry so already-published links don't break. - SEC-M5 — /uploads/photos/:filename now resolves the photo to its trip_id and requires the share token to cover THAT trip. Previously any share token for any trip would unlock any photo filename. - SEC-M6 — BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS is the single source of truth shared between fileService and collab uploads. The '*' allowed_file_types wildcard now still rejects executables/scripts. - SEC-M7 — single DEMO_EMAILS constant (services/demo.ts) used by demoUploadBlock, mfaPolicy, and every demo-mode guard in authService. The old demoUploadBlock only matched 'demo@nomad.app' so the seed 'demo@trek.app' could in fact upload in demo mode. - SEC-M8 — MFA backup codes are now bcrypt-hashed at rest (hashBackupCodeBcrypt). matchBackupCode accepts both bcrypt and legacy SHA-256 hex hashes, so existing installs keep working until the user regenerates codes via enableMfa. - SEC-M9 — document the "security via UUID v4 filename" model for /uploads/avatars|covers|journey. Requires no code change but captures the decision so future reviewers don't re-flag it. - SEC-M10 — already covered by the resetPassword revocation logic above: mcp_tokens DELETE + oauth_tokens UPDATE … SET revoked_at. Performance - PERF-H1 — new migration adds the indexes flagged in the audit: trips(user_id), trips(created_at DESC), photos(day_id), photos(place_id), reservations(day_id), share_tokens(token), plus conditional day_accommodations and notifications indexes depending on which columns are present. Tests - tests/integration/oidc.test.ts now mocks verifyIdToken and passes an id_token in the exchangeCodeForToken stub for the three flows that exercise a successful callback. The three remaining failures tests pointed out were all pre-existing (file-upload flakes + notificationPreferences event_types count drift), none introduced by this PR.	2026-04-20 20:36:52 +02:00
Julien G.	905c7d460b	Add comprehensive backend test suite (#339) ... * add test suite, mostly covers integration testing, tests are only backend side * workflow runs the correct script * workflow runs the correct script * workflow runs the correct script * unit tests incoming * Fix multer silent rejections and error handler info leak - Revert cb(null, false) to cb(new Error(...)) in auth.ts, collab.ts, and files.ts so invalid uploads return an error instead of silently dropping the file - Error handler in app.ts now always returns 500 / "Internal server error" instead of forwarding err.message to the client * Use statusCode consistently for multer errors and error handler - Error handler in app.ts reads err.statusCode to forward the correct HTTP status while keeping the response body generic	2026-04-03 13:17:53 +02:00
Claude	fedd559fd6	fix: pin JWT algorithm to HS256 and harden token security ... - Add { algorithms: ['HS256'] } to all jwt.verify() calls to prevent algorithm confusion attacks (including the 'none' algorithm) - Add { algorithm: 'HS256' } to all jwt.sign() calls for consistency - Reduce OIDC token payload to only { id } (was leaking username, email, role) - Validate OIDC redirect URI against APP_URL env var when configured - Add startup warning when JWT_SECRET is auto-generated https://claude.ai/code/session_01SoQKcF5Rz9Y8Nzo4PzkxY8	2026-03-31 00:33:53 +00:00
fgbona	66f5ea50c5	feat(require-mfa): #155 enforce MFA via admin policy toggle across app access ... Add an admin-controlled `require_mfa` policy in App Settings and expose it via `/auth/app-config` so the client can enforce it globally. Users without MFA are redirected to Settings after login and blocked from protected API/WebSocket access until setup is completed, while preserving MFA setup endpoints and admin recovery paths. Also prevent enabling the policy unless the acting admin already has MFA enabled, and block MFA disable while the policy is active. Includes UI toggle in Admin > Settings, required-policy notice in Settings, client-side 403 `MFA_REQUIRED` handling, and i18n updates for all supported locales.	2026-03-30 17:42:40 -03:00