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jubnl ebc98f0a3f v3.4.0 (#1527) 
* fix(plugins): unknown column

* fix(mcp): reuse MCP sessions instead of creating one per tool call

The /mcp CORS layer never set exposedHeaders, so Access-Control-Expose-Headers
was absent and browser-context MCP clients (Claude Desktop connectors,
Claude.ai, MCP Inspector) could not read Mcp-Session-Id off the initialize
response. Unable to echo it back, every request looked like a fresh initialize:
one McpServer and one session per tool call, until the per-user cap returned a
429 and the integration died until the container was restarted.

The idle sweep was not at fault — it expires on lastActivity with a 1h default,
so sessions born seconds apart are nowhere near expiry, hence 'cleaned 0'.

- expose Mcp-Session-Id, MCP-Protocol-Version and WWW-Authenticate
- evict a user's least-recently-active session at the cap rather than
  refusing the request, so a client that cannot persist its session id (or a
  proxy that strips the header) can never wedge the server
- close the McpServer/transport orphaned by every session-less non-initialize
  POST, which was leaked: never mapped, never swept, never closed
- return the cap error as JSON-RPC so clients surface the real reason
- warn on session-less POSTs to make a header-stripping proxy diagnosable

* chore(deps): declare @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.29.0

Matches the version already resolved in the lockfile; no dependency-tree change.

* docs(mcp): add the reverse proxy specs for MCP

* fix(plugins): stop the row ⋯ menu being clipped by the sidebar

The menu was an in-flow `absolute` div, and its ancestor (PageSidebar) is
`overflow-hidden` — which clips absolutely-positioned descendants regardless
of z-index. With enough plugins installed a row sits low enough that its menu
runs past the sidebar's bottom edge and gets chopped, taking Delete with it,
so the plugin could no longer be uninstalled from the UI.

Portal the menu to <body> and position it `fixed` against the ⋯ button,
flipping upward when the bottom is tight and re-anchoring on scroll/resize.
A fixed child of <body> has no overflow ancestor, so nothing can clip it.

Closes #1523

* feat(plugins): surface author-signature status and add a scoped re-trust override

TREK has always verified an author's Ed25519 signature and TOFU-pinned the key on
first install, but none of it was ever shown: a successfully-installed UNSIGNED
plugin looked identical to a signed one, and a signature-refused update left the
plugin quietly pinned at its old version with the reason dying in a toast.

Give the four refusal conditions machine-readable codes (SIGNATURE_MISSING /
_INCOMPLETE / _KEY_CHANGED / _INVALID), persist a refusal on the plugin row so the
admin list keeps showing it, and badge Signed/Unsigned in the list and in Discover.

Only SIGNATURE_KEY_CHANGED is overridable — an author can legitimately rotate a key;
a signature that does not verify means the bytes are not what the author signed, and
there is no story where waving that through is right. The override re-pins and
updates in ONE call (POST :id/retrust): a re-pin that waited for a follow-up /update
would leave the plugin pinned to a key no install had ever been verified against if
that second call never came. The artifact must still verify under the new key, so a
re-trust moves the pin from one verified key to another.

assertRetrustable re-derives the condition server-side, so the UI hiding the button
is a convenience, not the control, and it echoes back the full key the admin was
shown so a re-key since the dialog rendered is refused. The rotation is written to
the admin audit log with both fingerprints — after an incident, "which key did we
move from, and to what?" is the question a single key cannot answer.

* fix(plugins): let a plugin's frame reach the hosts an admin added for it

The frame's connect-src was built from the manifest's http:outbound grants alone, but
the child's egress guard is the UNION of those and the hosts an admin added after
install for an operatorEgress plugin (a self-hosted Gotify, an ntfy — hosts the author
cannot know in advance). So such a plugin WITH A UI could call the operator's host from
its server and was CSP-blocked in its own iframe.

Match the frame to the child. The admin consented to these hosts at install and the
child already reaches them, so this widens no trust boundary that isn't already crossed.
Both sources stay validated on the way in, and the interpolation filter is unchanged.

* fix(plugins): report a rejected events.emit on the plugin's own log stream

The host can reject an emit (an undeclared event name, a rate limit). The rejection must
not escape — a detached rejection crashes the child and terminally disables the plugin
over one bad emit — but swallowing it silently left an author with no way to discover
that `emits` was missing from their manifest. Surface it as a warning instead.

* feat(plugin-sdk): expose the raw request body for webhook signature checks

A webhook author must run their HMAC over the exact bytes the sender signed. `body` is
the PARSED value, and re-serializing it will not reproduce those bytes — key order,
whitespace and unicode escaping all differ — so the signature never matches. Document
`rawBodyBase64`, which the host already sets on auth:false routes.

* fix(plugin-sdk): refuse to overwrite a released artifact, and keep the packed zip

A released artifact is IMMUTABLE: the registry pins its sha256, so overwriting the bytes
of a release already in the registry breaks the checksum for everyone who installed that
version — they can no longer install or update it. The old code blanket-caught every
`gh release create` failure (auth, network, a bad repo) and turned it into a --clobber
upload. Probe for the release explicitly and refuse unless --force.

Also stop deleting plugin.zip on the way out. It is the exact bytes the release and the
entry's sha256 pin were computed from; a re-pack on another machine or SDK version can
differ (CRLF, walk order), so anyone re-running `entry`/`sign` afterwards must hash THAT
file, not a rebuild.

* fix(plugin-sdk): don't fail submit when the fork already has an upstream remote

`gh repo clone` of a fork may already have wired `upstream`, in which case a bare
`remote add` exits non-zero and took the whole submit down. Set it either way.

* fix(plugin-sdk): make the dev server behave like the host

Three ways `dev` lied to an author about how their plugin would run in production:

- ctx.db: one try/catch wrapped both the node:sqlite probe AND opening the database, so
  an mkdir/permission failure silently degraded to the in-memory stub — which swallows
  every write while reporting success. A db:own plugin "worked" in dev and persisted
  nothing. Probe separately: fail loudly on a real error, degrade only on old Node, and
  say plainly that the stub discards writes.
- notificationChannel: the host fires it with no acting user and hands the recipient's
  decrypted settings in as a separate `config` argument — send(msg, config, ctx) /
  test(config, ctx). Firing it like an ordinary hook passed `ctx` where `config` belongs,
  so a channel plugin read its settings off ctx and was broken in production.
- /preview pinned tripId 42 while the scaffold seeds trip 1, so the widget's first
  trek:invoke hit assertMember(42) and 500'd. Preview against a trip that exists.

* fix(plugin-sdk): reject unknown flags, wire up create's new flags, and add --help

`parse()` accepts any --x, so a flag a command does not read was silently dropped:
`create --template notification-channel` cheerfully scaffolded a blank plugin. Silently
ignoring an author's explicit instruction is worse than refusing it, so unknown flags are
now an error, and create actually forwards --template/--egress/--required-addons.

A bare --permissions used to split the string "true" into a permission literally named
`true`; listFlag() now treats a valueless flag as absent.

Since an unknown flag is now fatal, `--help` has to exist: it is intercepted before the
flag check and prints usage on stdout with exit 0.

* chore(plugins): drop three unused eslint-disable directives

The no-console rule is not enabled for these files, so the directives were dead and
eslint reports them as unused.

* fix(plugin-sdk): bring preflight back in step with the registry's gates

preflight exists to tell an author what TREK-Plugins' CI will say before they open the
PR. The registry now verifies author signatures, and preflight didn't — so it drifted
into the one failure mode it must never have: a false green. An author trusts a green.

- Verify the signature against the artifact bytes. preflight already downloads them for
  the sha256 check, so this costs one call. Without it, signing with the wrong key (or
  re-packing after signing) sails through and is caught at review.
- Check the signature SHAPE (checkSignatureShape): a key with no signed version, a
  signature with no key, a malformed key or signature. TREK refuses to install a
  half-signed entry, so such an entry is dead on arrival.
- Default apiVersion to 1 before comparing. It is OPTIONAL in the manifest — install/
  manifest.ts and `entry` both default it — so a manifest that legally omits it was
  failing preflight with "manifest apiVersion undefined != entry 1" while the registry
  passed it. A false RED, which teaches authors to ignore the tool.
- Check requiredAddons/pluginDependencies parity, and operatorEgress without an
  http:outbound grant.

The verifier is a port of the host's install/verify-signature.ts (the registry has its
own port); sign.ts's verifyArtifact only understands the bare key/signature pair the SDK
itself emits and cannot judge a minisign key. A test pins all three to the same verdicts.

* feat(plugins): enforce compatibility range

* chore: bump sdk version

* test(e2e): repair the trip-creation specs

create-trip and trip-planner have been failing for a while — long enough for
three separate UI changes to drift past them, which nothing caught because CI
runs vitest only and never invokes Playwright.

Each failure was masking the next:

- The release-notice modal greets a freshly seeded user and its backdrop
  swallowed the click on .add-trip-card. Added a shared dismissSystemNotices()
  helper (the X only shows on the notice's last page, so it has to page through
  first).
- .modal-backdrop no longer exists — the class was namespaced to
  .trek-modal-backdrop so content blockers stop hiding it.
- input[type=text].first() is no longer the Title field: the cover-image search
  inputs now sit above it, so the specs were typing the trip name into the photo
  search box and creating an untitled trip that never matched getByText(title).

* fix(planner): gate drag & drop on pointer type, not viewport width (#1432)

The 3.2.1 fix disabled drag on "mobile", but nothing in the client has ever
detected touch — "mobile" was inferred from viewport width, at four independent
breakpoints. A tablet is a coarse-pointer device at a *desktop* width, so an
iPad (820-1366px) fell on the wrong side of all four, which is why iPhone was
fixed and iPad was not:

- useTripPlanner's isMobile (<768px) is what disarmed `draggable`, so on iPad
  rows stayed draggable and a scroll swipe became an HTML5 drag.
- TripPlannerPage hardcoded isMobile={false} on the desktop PlacesSidebar, so
  its drop handlers and the drop-to-import overlay could never be disabled —
  that overlay is the reported symptom.
- The arrow-button reorder fallback was revealed only below 767px, leaving iPad
  with no drag *and* no fallback.
- touchDragPolyfill loaded drag-drop-touch at >=1024px, synthesising drags from
  touchmove — on a landscape iPad that re-armed the very gesture hijack 3.2.1
  removed.

Adds useIsTouch() ((pointer: coarse)) as a signal separate from isMobile: layout
stays width-driven, so the iPad keeps the desktop two-pane planner, while every
drag affordance is gated on isMobile || isTouch. The reorder arrows now show on
coarse pointers, and the polyfill loads only on hybrid laptops
((pointer: fine) and (any-pointer: coarse)), which also removes the #1440
phantom-dblclick map zoom on tablets.

Guarded by unit tests plus an e2e spec on real WebKit in an iPad Pro 11 context
— the engine matters, since every browser on iPadOS is WebKit underneath, which
is why the reporter hit this in all three they tried.

* test(planner): guard the day-plan reorder arrows against phantom clicks

The hover rule that reveals the reorder arrows had been dead since the
TypeScript migration: it targeted `.place-row:hover .reorder-btns`, and neither
class exists — the component renders `.reorder-buttons` inside an unclassed row.
The buttons sat at opacity:0 on desktop with nothing to reveal them.

That was not merely invisible. opacity:0 still hit-tests, so every itinerary row
and day note carried an invisible, fully clickable target that silently
reordered the trip:

  opacity: "0", visibility: "visible", pointerEvents: "auto"
  elementFromPoint(centre) -> BUTTON, inside .reorder-buttons

The repair — pointer-events: none while hidden, plus a working
.dp-row:hover/:focus-within reveal (focus-within so the buttons are also
reachable by keyboard, which the file's JS-hover pattern cannot do) — lives in
index.css and DayPlanSidebar.tsx. Both files also carry the #1432 drag gating,
so they went with that commit rather than being split mid-file; this commit is
the regression guard for them.

E2E rather than unit, because jsdom does not evaluate :hover. Against the old
CSS it fails on exactly the right assertion: "hidden arrows must not swallow
clicks" — expected false, received true.

* fix(pdf): keep the header gap on day-header overflow pages (#1531)

The repeated <thead> day header (#1471) carried no gap before the first
card on overflow pages: the 12px sat in .day-body's block-start padding,
which a fragmented box only paints on its first fragment. Move it to the
thead cell so it repeats with the header; the day's first page renders
pixel-identically.

* fix(budget): keep "no one paid yet" when editing an expense (#1533)

The ExpenseModal payer initializer fell back to the current user whenever the
edited item had no payer, so reopening an expense saved with "no one paid yet"
silently reselected "You" — and re-saving then recorded the current user as the
payer, corrupting the balances. An absent payer on an existing expense is a
deliberate value, so only a brand-new expense defaults to me.
2026-07-13 12:40:00 +02:00

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# Environment Variables
Complete reference for all environment variables TREK reads.
## How to Set Variables
- **Docker Compose** — use the `environment:` block or a `.env` file alongside `docker-compose.yml`
- **Docker run** — pass each variable with `-e VARIABLE=value`
- **Helm** — use `env:` for plain values and `secretEnv:` for sensitive values in `values.yaml`
- **Unraid** — set in the container template editor
- **Proxmox Community Script** — set in `/opt/trek/server/.env`
---
## Core
| Variable | Description | Default |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| `PORT` | Server port | Sources: `3001`, Docker: `3000` |
| `HOST` | Bind address for the HTTP server (e.g. `127.0.0.1`, `10.0.0.72`). **Source / Proxmox installs only** — do not set this in Docker or any containerized deployment. See note below. | all interfaces |
| `NODE_ENV` | Environment (`production` / `development`) | `production` |
| `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | At-rest encryption key — see resolution order below | auto |
| `TZ` | Timezone for logs, reminders, and cron jobs (e.g. `Europe/Berlin`) | `UTC` |
| `LOG_LEVEL` | `info` = concise user actions; `debug` = verbose details | `info` |
| `DEFAULT_LANGUAGE` | Default language on the login page — see supported codes below | `en` |
| `SESSION_DURATION` | How long a login session stays valid before re-login is required. Used when **"Remember me" is unchecked** on the login form (the default): applies to the `trek_session` JWT `exp` claim, and the cookie is issued as a **browser-session cookie** (no `maxAge`, cleared when the browser closes). Accepts `ms`-style strings: `1h`, `12h`, `7d`, `30d`, `90d`. Invalid values warn at startup and fall back to the default. Does not affect the short-lived MFA challenge token or MCP OAuth tokens (those keep their own TTL). | `24h` |
| `SESSION_DURATION_REMEMBER` | Session length used when the user **ticks "Remember me"** on login: a longer-lived JWT `exp` claim plus a **persistent** `trek_session` cookie whose `maxAge` matches, so the session survives browser restarts. Same `ms`-style format and startup-fallback behaviour as `SESSION_DURATION`. | `30d` |
| `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` | Comma-separated origins for CORS and email notification links | same-origin |
| `ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK` | Allow outbound requests to private/RFC-1918 IPs. Set `true` if Immich or other integrated services are on your local network. Loopback (`127.x`) and link-local (`169.254.x`) addresses remain blocked regardless. | `false` |
| `APP_URL` | Public base URL (e.g. `https://trek.example.com`). Required when OIDC is enabled — must match the redirect URI registered with your IdP. Also used as the base URL for email notification links and subscribable calendar feed URLs (the `webcal://`/`https://` links the Subscribe dialog hands to Google/Apple/Outlook). | — |
### `HOST` — Source and Proxmox installs only
By default TREK binds to all network interfaces (`0.0.0.0`), which is the correct behaviour inside a container because
Docker handles port exposure at the host level. Setting `HOST` overrides the bind address at the Node.js level.
**When to use it:** only when running TREK directly on a host (git sources or
the [Proxmox community script](Install-Proxmox)) and you need to restrict which interface the server listens on — for
example, to expose TREK only on a LAN interface while keeping it off the public-facing one.
**Never set `HOST` in Docker, Docker Compose, Helm, or Unraid deployments.** Use Docker's
`-p <host-ip>:<host-port>:<container-port>` syntax or your orchestrator's port binding instead.
```
# .env — source / Proxmox installs only
HOST=10.0.0.72 # bind only on this LAN interface
PORT=3001
```
When `HOST` is set, the startup banner includes a `Host:` line confirming the bound address.
### `ENCRYPTION_KEY` — Resolution Order
`server/src/config.ts` resolves the encryption key in this order:
1. **`ENCRYPTION_KEY` env var** — explicit value, always takes priority. Persisted to `data/.encryption_key`
automatically.
2. **`data/.encryption_key` file** — present on any install that has started at least once.
3. **`data/.jwt_secret` file** — one-time fallback for existing installs upgrading without a pre-set key. The value is
immediately persisted to `data/.encryption_key` so JWT rotation cannot break decryption later.
4. **Auto-generated** — fresh install with none of the above; persisted to `data/.encryption_key`.
Setting `ENCRYPTION_KEY` explicitly is recommended so you can back it up independently of the data volume.
### `DEFAULT_LANGUAGE` — Supported Codes
You can set `DEFAULT_LANGUAGE` to any of the 22 languages TREK ships. The currently supported codes are:
| Code | Language |
|---------|--------------------|
| `en` | English |
| `de` | Deutsch |
| `es` | Español |
| `fr` | Français |
| `hu` | Magyar |
| `nl` | Nederlands |
| `br` | Português (Brasil) |
| `cs` | Česky |
| `pl` | Polski |
| `ru` | Русский |
| `zh` | 简体中文 |
| `zh-TW` | 繁體中文 |
| `it` | Italiano |
| `tr` | Türkçe |
| `ar` | العربية |
| `id` | Bahasa Indonesia |
| `ja` | 日本語 |
| `ko` | 한국어 |
| `uk` | Українська |
| `gr` | Ελληνικά |
| `sv` | Svenska |
| `vi` | Tiếng Việt |
If you set a code that isn't supported, TREK falls back to English (`en`). This list grows as new
translations are added to TREK.
---
## HTTPS / Proxy
These three variables work together behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy. See [Reverse-Proxy](Reverse-Proxy) for the
full explanation.
| Variable | Description | Default |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| `FORCE_HTTPS` | When `true`: 301-redirects HTTP→HTTPS, sends HSTS (`max-age=31536000`), adds CSP `upgrade-insecure-requests`, forces cookie `secure` flag. Only useful behind a TLS proxy. Requires `TRUST_PROXY`. | `false` |
| `HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS` | When `true`: adds the `includeSubDomains` directive to the HSTS header, extending HTTPS enforcement to all subdomains. Only effective when HSTS is active (`FORCE_HTTPS=true` or `NODE_ENV=production`). Leave `false` if you run other services on sibling subdomains over plain HTTP. | `false` |
| `TRUST_PROXY` | Number of trusted proxy hops. Tells Express to read the real client IP from `X-Forwarded-For` and protocol from `X-Forwarded-Proto`. Defaults to `1` automatically in production. Required for `FORCE_HTTPS` to detect the forwarded protocol. | `1` (production) |
| `COOKIE_SECURE` | Controls the `secure` flag on the `trek_session` cookie. Auto-derived as `true` when `NODE_ENV=production` or `FORCE_HTTPS=true`. Set to `false` only as an escape hatch for LAN testing without TLS — not recommended in production. | auto |
> **Warning:** `FORCE_HTTPS=true` without `TRUST_PROXY` set causes a redirect loop.
---
## OIDC / SSO
For setup instructions, see [OIDC-SSO](OIDC-SSO).
| Variable | Description | Default |
|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| `OIDC_ISSUER` | OpenID Connect provider URL (e.g. `https://auth.example.com`) | — |
| `OIDC_CLIENT_ID` | OIDC client ID | — |
| `OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET` | OIDC client secret | — |
| `OIDC_DISPLAY_NAME` | Label shown on the SSO login button | `SSO` |
| `OIDC_ONLY` | Force SSO-only mode: disables password login and registration, overrides Admin > Settings toggles, cannot be changed at runtime. First SSO login becomes admin on a fresh instance. | `false` |
| `OIDC_ADMIN_CLAIM` | OIDC claim used to identify admin users (e.g. `groups`) | — |
| `OIDC_ADMIN_VALUE` | Value of the OIDC claim that grants admin role (e.g. `app-trek-admins`) | — |
| `OIDC_SCOPE` | Space-separated OIDC scopes to request. **Fully replaces** the default — always include `openid email profile` plus any extra scopes (e.g. add `groups` when using `OIDC_ADMIN_CLAIM`) | `openid email profile` |
| `OIDC_DISCOVERY_URL` | Override the auto-constructed OIDC discovery endpoint. Required for providers with a non-standard path (e.g. Authentik) | — |
---
## WebAuthn / Passkeys
Passkey (WebAuthn) login is configured from the Admin panel, but the two cryptographically
sensitive values can be pinned via environment variables. Env vars take priority over the
corresponding database settings. These values are **only** ever derived from server-side config —
never from request `Host` / `X-Forwarded-Host` headers (mirroring OIDC redirect-URI handling).
| Variable | Description | Default |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| `WEBAUTHN_RP_ID` | Relying-Party ID — the registrable domain passkeys are bound to (e.g. `trek.example.com`). Overrides the `webauthn_rp_id` DB setting. When unset, it is derived from the hostname of `APP_URL`. Bare IP literals (IPv4/IPv6) are rejected. If it cannot be resolved, passkeys are disabled. | derived from `APP_URL` |
| `WEBAUTHN_ORIGINS` | Comma-separated list of allowed origins for passkey ceremonies (e.g. `https://trek.example.com`). Overrides the `webauthn_origins` DB setting; trailing slashes are stripped. When unset and the RP ID is not `localhost`, a single origin is derived from `APP_URL`. In dev (RP ID `localhost`) `http://localhost:5173` and `http://localhost:3001` are added automatically. | derived from `APP_URL` |
---
## Email / SMTP
SMTP settings can be configured via the Admin panel or overridden with environment variables. Env vars take priority
over the database values.
| Variable | Description | Default |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| `SMTP_HOST` | SMTP server hostname (e.g. `smtp.example.com`) | — |
| `SMTP_PORT` | SMTP server port. Port `465` enables implicit TLS (`secure: true`); all other ports use STARTTLS or plain. | — |
| `SMTP_USER` | SMTP authentication username | — |
| `SMTP_PASS` | SMTP authentication password | — |
| `SMTP_FROM` | Sender address for outbound emails (e.g. `TREK <noreply@example.com>`) | — |
| `SMTP_SKIP_TLS_VERIFY` | Set `true` to disable TLS certificate validation. Useful for self-signed certs on internal SMTP relays — not recommended in production. | `false` |
`SMTP_HOST`, `SMTP_PORT`, and `SMTP_FROM` are all required for email delivery to work. `SMTP_USER` and `SMTP_PASS` are
optional (for unauthenticated relays).
---
## Initial Setup
These variables only take effect on first boot, before any user exists.
| Variable | Description | Default |
|------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|
| `ADMIN_EMAIL` | Email for the first admin account | `admin@trek.local` |
| `ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Password for the first admin account | random |
Both variables must be set together. If either is omitted, the account is created with email `admin@trek.local` and a
randomly generated password that is printed to the server log. Once any user exists, these variables have no effect.
---
## MCP
For setup instructions, see [MCP-Overview](MCP-Overview).
| Variable | Description | Default |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| `MCP_RATE_LIMIT` | Max MCP API requests per user per minute | `300` |
| `MCP_MAX_SESSION_PER_USER` | Max concurrent MCP sessions per user. At the cap the user's least-recently-active session is closed to make room — requests are not rejected. | `20` |
| `MCP_SESSION_TTL` | Session idle timeout in seconds (max 86400) | `3600` |
| `MCP_SSE_KEEPALIVE` | SSE keep-alive ping interval in seconds — keeps the stream alive through reverse proxies. `0` disables the pings; an open stream still refreshes the session's idle timeout. | `25` |
---
## API Docs
| Variable | Description | Default |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| `TREK_API_DOCS_ENABLED` | Serve interactive OpenAPI/Swagger docs at `/api/docs` (raw spec at `/api/docs-json`). The spec enumerates every route including the admin surface, so it is off by default. | `false` |
With the flag on, `/api/docs` lists every REST endpoint with try-it-out; authorize with a session JWT
via the Bearer button (the API accepts `Authorization: Bearer <jwt>` everywhere as the cookie fallback).
Request bodies validated with Zod are documented automatically from the same schemas.
---
## Booking Import (KDE Itinerary)
| Variable | Description | Default |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| `KITINERARY_EXTRACTOR_PATH` | Full path to the `kitinerary-extractor` binary. When unset, TREK searches `/usr/lib/*/libexec/kf6/kitinerary-extractor` and then `PATH`. Set this if you install the binary to a non-standard location. | auto-detected |
The official TREK Docker image bundles the binary automatically: on amd64 it downloads the static release from
`https://cdn.kde.org/ci-builds/pim/kitinerary/`; on arm64 it installs `libkitinerary-bin` via apt (Debian trixie). When
running TREK from source, install `libkitinerary-bin` (Debian trixie / Ubuntu 25.04+) or download the static binary
directly and place it anywhere on `PATH`. The `GET /api/health/features` endpoint returns `{ "bookingImport": true }`
when the binary is found, and the Import button in the Reservations panel is hidden when it is not.
Booking import can also fall back to an AI model for documents KDE Itinerary can't read. That feature (the **AI Parsing** addon) is configured entirely in the UI and needs no environment variables — see [AI-Booking-Import](AI-Booking-Import).
---
## Public Transit (Transitous)
Public-transit routing in the planner is powered by [Transitous](https://transitous.org/), a free community MOTIS service — no API key is required. See [Transport: Flights, Trains, Cars](Transport-Flights-Trains-Cars) for the feature itself.
| Variable | Description | Default |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| `TRANSIT_API_URL` | Base URL of the transit routing API. TREK's server proxies requests to it. Point this at your own self-hosted [MOTIS](https://github.com/motis-project/motis) instance if you want zero third-party egress. A trailing slash is stripped. | `https://api.transitous.org` |
When left at the default, using the transit feature makes the TREK **server** send outbound HTTPS requests to `api.transitous.org` (with an identifying User-Agent, as the Transitous usage policy asks). No transit request is made until a user actually searches for a journey.
---
## Image Search (Unsplash)
TREK can search [Unsplash](https://unsplash.com/) for **trip cover images** and **place images**. By default the server queries Unsplash's public web endpoint **without an API key**, so no configuration is needed on most installs.
Some hosting environments — commonly VPS and datacenter IP ranges (and many Kubernetes clusters) — are **blocked or rate-limited** by that unauthenticated endpoint, which surfaces in the UI as **"Unsplash search unavailable"**. Configuring a free Unsplash Access Key switches the server to Unsplash's official, authenticated API (`api.unsplash.com`), which is not subject to that block. See [issue #1449](https://github.com/mauriceboe/TREK/issues/1449).
| Variable | Description | Default |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| `UNSPLASH_ACCESS_KEY` | Unsplash **Access Key** used to authenticate cover/place image search against `https://api.unsplash.com`. When set, it takes priority over any key configured per-admin in **Admin → Settings**. When unset, the server falls back to the unauthenticated endpoint (which some datacenter/VPS IPs are blocked from). Get a free key at [unsplash.com/developers](https://unsplash.com/developers). | unauthenticated endpoint |
**Two ways to configure it** — pick one; the env var wins if both are present:
1. **Environment variable** (this page) — instance-wide, ideal for Docker/Helm/Unraid where you already manage config as env.
2. **Admin → Settings → API Keys** — paste the key into the **Unsplash API Key** field. Stored encrypted at rest and used as a fallback for every user when no env var is set. This is the better option if you'd rather not restart the container to change it.
To get a key: create a free account at [unsplash.com/developers](https://unsplash.com/developers), register a new application, and copy its **Access Key** (not the Secret Key). The Unsplash free tier (demo) allows 50 requests/hour, which is ample for cover search.
---
## Storage & Paths
| Variable | Description | Default |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| `TREK_PLACE_PHOTO_DIR` | Directory where cached Google place photos are stored. Created recursively on boot. Set this to point photo storage at a dedicated mounted volume. | `uploads/photos/google` |
| `BACKUP_UPLOAD_LIMIT_MB` | Maximum **compressed** size (in MB) of a restore-backup archive that may be uploaded. Raise it if your backups (which include the `uploads/` directory) exceed the default. Non-positive or invalid values log a warning and fall back to the default. | `500` |
---
## Advanced / Tuning
| Variable | Description | Default |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|
| `IDEMPOTENCY_TTL_SECONDS` | How long (in seconds) stored idempotency keys are kept before garbage collection. The offline client replays queued mutations with their `X-Idempotency-Key` on reconnect, so this must exceed the longest expected offline window or a replay could create a duplicate. Invalid values silently fall back to the default. | `2592000` (30 days) |
| `OVERPASS_URL` | Custom [Overpass API](https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Overpass_API) endpoint(s) used by the map's POI "explore" search, comma-separated. When set it **replaces** the bundled public mirrors — point it at an internal or self-hosted Overpass instance when the public mirrors are unreachable from your network (e.g. firewalled/locked-down egress in a Kubernetes cluster). Entries that aren't valid `http(s)` URLs are ignored. If you don't run your own Overpass but the public mirrors throttle TREK, first make sure `APP_URL` (or `ALLOWED_ORIGINS`) is set: that alone gives outbound Overpass/Nominatim requests a unique User-Agent, which the public mirrors rate-limit far less. | bundled public mirrors |
| `OVERPASS_TIMEOUT_MS` | Per-endpoint timeout (in milliseconds) for Overpass POI requests. Endpoints race in parallel and one that hasn't answered within this window is abandoned so a faster mirror can win. Raise it if you run a slow self-hosted Overpass instance. Invalid values fall back to the default. | `12000` |
---
## Demo Mode
Demo mode runs TREK as a public, self-resetting sandbox. Not intended for regular deployments.
| Variable | Description | Default |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| `DEMO_MODE` | Enable demo mode: seeds example data, resets the database hourly, exposes the demo-login endpoint, and blocks destructive mutations (password change, account deletion, uploads) for demo users. Logs a security warning at startup if combined with `NODE_ENV=production`. | `false` |
| `DEMO_ADMIN_USER` | Username of the seeded demo admin account. | `admin` |
| `DEMO_ADMIN_EMAIL` | Email of the seeded demo admin account. | `admin@trek.app` |
| `DEMO_ADMIN_PASS` | Initial password for the seeded demo admin (bcrypt-hashed at seed time). | `admin12345` |
The `DEMO_ADMIN_*` variables only take effect when `DEMO_MODE=true`, and only at the moment the demo data is first
seeded.
---
## Plugins
The plugin system is **on by default**. The runtime and the Admin → Plugins panel are available out of the box, but installed plugins still have to be activated one by one — so no third-party code runs until an admin turns a specific plugin on. Set `TREK_PLUGINS_ENABLED=false` to switch the whole system off. See [Plugins](Plugins) for the full system and [Plugin-Permissions](Plugin-Permissions) for the isolation model.
| Variable | Description | Default |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `TREK_PLUGINS_ENABLED` | Master switch for the plugin system. Enabled unless set to `false` (also accepts `0`, `off`, `no`, case-insensitive). Turning it off is a kill switch — installed plugins stay on disk but nothing runs. | enabled |
| `TREK_PLUGINS_DIR` | Directory where installed plugin **code** is stored. Persist it as a volume if you use plugins. | `<data>/plugins` |
| `TREK_PLUGINS_DATA_DIR` | Directory for each plugin's own **data** (its private SQLite file). Kept separate from the code tree; persist it as a volume too. | `<data>/plugins-data` |
| `TREK_PLUGIN_REGISTRY_URL` | Override the plugin registry index the *Discover* tab browses. Point it at your own fork or mirror of the registry. | `https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mauriceboe/TREK-Plugins/main/dist/index.json` |
| `TREK_PLUGIN_MAX_RSS_MB` | Per-plugin memory ceiling in MB. A plugin process that exceeds it is stopped. | `300` |
| `TREK_PLUGIN_PERMISSIONS` | Set to `off` to opt **out** of the Node.js OS-level permission sandbox for plugin child processes (not recommended). Any other value keeps the sandbox on. | `on` |
| `TREK_PLUGIN_ALLOW_PRIVATE_EGRESS`| Set to `on` to let a plugin's declared outbound hosts resolve to private/internal addresses (e.g. a service on your LAN). By default connections to private, loopback, link-local and metadata addresses are refused. | off (private egress blocked) |
| `TREK_PLUGINS_DEV_LINK` | **Development only.** Set to exactly `1` to enable *dev-link*: registering a plugin from a local build directory and hot-reloading it against a live instance's data. Dev-linked code bypasses the install-time signature/integrity checks and (under `npm run dev`) runs with the OS permission jail off, so it must never be reachable in production — any value other than `1` (including absent) keeps it off. Data access is still fully gated by the capability host. | off (disabled) |
| `TREK_PLUGIN_AI_PER_DAY` | Per-plugin **daily** cap on shared-LLM broker calls (`ai.complete` / `ai.extract`). Bounds how much a single plugin can spend on the admin's LLM quota per UTC day, independent of its granted permissions. Counts persist across restarts within the same day; set to `0` to disable the AI broker entirely. Generous by design — only bites a runaway plugin. | `200` |
| `TREK_PLUGIN_NOTIFY_PER_DAY` | Per-plugin **daily** cap on user-notification broker calls (`notify.send`), so one plugin can't spam a user. Same UTC-day window and restart-safe counting as `TREK_PLUGIN_AI_PER_DAY`; set to `0` to disable the notify broker. | `100` |
| `TREK_PLUGIN_RPC_PER_SEC` | Sustained rate limit (calls **per second**) for a plugin's host RPC calls (`ctx.*`) once its burst allowance is spent. Prevents a tight-loop plugin from starving the single-threaded host. | `20` |
| `TREK_PLUGIN_RPC_BURST` | Burst allowance — how many host RPC calls a plugin may fire back-to-back before the per-second limit applies. | `60` |
| `TREK_PLUGIN_RPC_INFLIGHT` | Max concurrent host→plugin RPC dispatches allowed for a single plugin at once (concurrency cap). | `16` |
| `TREK_PLUGIN_AUDIT_MAX_ROWS` | Per-plugin retention cap for the capability audit log (kept in the shared `trek.db`). The newest N rows per plugin are retained and older ones pruned; the retained window stays tamper-evident. Set to `0` to disable pruning. | `20000` |
All of these are optional — the defaults are safe. Set `TREK_PLUGINS_ENABLED=false` if you want to switch the plugin system off entirely.
---
## Related Pages
- [Reverse-Proxy](Reverse-Proxy) — HTTPS proxy setup and the `FORCE_HTTPS` / `TRUST_PROXY` / `COOKIE_SECURE` trio
- [OIDC-SSO](OIDC-SSO) — complete OIDC configuration guide
- [MCP-Overview](MCP-Overview) — MCP server setup and rate limiting
- [Encryption-Key-Rotation](Encryption-Key-Rotation) — rotating the `ENCRYPTION_KEY` without losing data
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