* feat(config): put the operator-owned surfaces behind TREK_MANAGED The switch landed last release with nothing behind it. This is what it turns off, plus the four fixes that came out of walking every one of these surfaces. Nothing here changes anything for an install that does not set the flag. That is not a hope, it is what managed-inert.test.ts asserts: the mode stays off for any unparseable value, no other variable can turn it on, every settings key stays writable, and splitManagedKeys hands back the same object rather than a copy so no write path can quietly diverge on self-hosted installs only. WHAT THE MODE WITHHOLDS Fourteen routes carry @ManagedForbidden: key validation, static MCP tokens, JWT rotation, the OIDC admin pair, restore and auto-backup, plugin sideload and reload, the Ollama model list and pull, and the SMTP test send. Each names the reason it is not the instance admin's, and the reason is mandatory. Eighteen settings keys are filtered instead of refused. SMTP, the OIDC toggles and the WebAuthn pair share one handler with keys the admin does own, and the llm_* family is reachable through per-user settings, the instance defaults and the addon config alike, so a route-level refusal would be both too coarse and incomplete. A locked key is skipped and reported as managed_keys; the rest of the save goes through. Refusing the request would take the registration toggles down with the SMTP block. GET /api/auth/me/settings stops returning the three API keys in the clear. It is the only endpoint that decrypts a stored credential back to the caller, which is fine when the admin pasted it in and wrong when the operator supplied it. Two multipart routes check in the handler rather than the guard: a guard throws before the parser drains the body and the client gets an ECONNRESET instead of the 403 (PROFILE-015). They still carry the marker so the boot gate sees them. WHAT KEEPS IT FROM DRIFTING validate-managed-routes.ts refuses to boot on a marking that is not on the reviewed list, a list entry whose route lost its marking, or a marking with no reason. The third case has no equivalent in the guard gate next door and is the one that matters most: a blank reason destroys the only record of why a control was taken away, and nothing recovers that later. It found two wrong entries in my own list while I was writing this. managed-keys.test.ts asserts that every key in ADMIN_SETTINGS_KEYS and DEFAULTABLE_USER_SETTING_KEYS belongs to exactly one of two sets. A key added to either list belongs to neither until somebody decides, and that is the failure this prevents: the lists grow, the mode does not. PLACES_API_BASE AND PLACES_API_KEY The nine Places endpoints spell out googleapis.com, so an install that wants those calls to leave through something of its own has no way to say so. One variable, substituted where every call already funnels through. A second one supplies the key, and when it is set the users table is not consulted at all — a per-user key would route around whatever the endpoint counts, and those columns are readable by any admin of the instance. FOUR FIXES THAT ARE NOT ABOUT THE MODE An admin setting somebody's password now bumps password_version and clears their MCP tokens. An admin sets a password for one reason, and until now verifyJwtAndLoadUser kept accepting every cookie the intruder already had: the one action taken to lock them out was the one action that did not. The four OIDC provider calls go through the SSRF guard. Three are worse than they look — the token, userinfo and JWKS URLs come out of the discovery response, so they are chosen by the other end, not by an admin. safeFetchLlm is renamed safeFetchAdminConfigured and keeps its old name as an alias, because it is the variant that allows loopback and LAN: a self-hoster with Authentik on localhost:9000 must keep working. The token exchange follows no redirect at all, since one would hand client_secret to a second host. DELETE /api/admin/users/:id/mfa clears another account's TOTP. The passkey half has existed since passkeys landed; the TOTP half never did, which left "somebody on the trip lost their phone" with no answer short of an operator in the database. Never for the caller themselves. TREK_PLUGIN_PERMISSIONS=off refuses to boot when the install is centrally administered. A warning is right for a machine its owner chose to trust; where the person who set the flag and the people whose data is in the database are not the same person, fail closed. TEXTS Four strings lose the phrase "self-hosted" because they describe somebody else's software — an Ollama endpoint, an AirTrail instance, a service a plugin talks to — and read better without it in both modes. The one string that describes TREK itself keeps it, and the mode picks a second key instead, so self-hosters lose nothing. A grep gate in shared/ keeps the canonical locale honest, because the parity check compares the file set and the top-level keys and never looks at a value: re-wording a string is invisible to CI today, and so is putting it back. * feat(maps): supply the map credential with the instance when centrally administered MAPBOX_ACCESS_TOKEN joins PLACES_API_KEY as an operator-supplied value. SettingsService injects it when the settings are read, and picks GL as the provider if the reader is still on Leaflet, since a token is always present. The key moves from the customer set to the locked set. It is the one locked key whose value is public by design — a pk.* token has to reach the browser to be useful — so this is not about secrecy: a per-user save landing on top of the instance token would only break the map for that user. Both settings fields for it go away with it. * fix(auth): count the operator key when reporting whether Google features work has_maps_key only looked at the users table, but getMapsKey prefers the PLACES_API_KEY env over anything stored there. On an install that supplies the key that way and has an empty column, every lookup worked while the client was told there was no key and hid the search, the autocomplete and the place photos. Found by walking the running instance rather than the code: the map came up, the search box did not. * feat(admin): hide the settings a centrally administered install cannot act on A control that answers 403 is worse than no control: the AI section rendered the refusal as "Request failed with status code 403", which tells an admin they broke something rather than that the decision is not theirs. So the surfaces go rather than being disabled in place: - AI parsing and AirTrail leave the addon list, and the AI addon route now refuses outright. The endpoint, the model and what a document costs come with the instance, so there is no instance decision left — not even whether it runs. - Immich and Synology Photos leave it too. Both connect to a server the reader runs at home, and there is no route from here to one. - The SMTP block, the admin webhook and ntfy targets, and the passkey RP ID and origins follow the same rule: they configure something the operator owns, and a wrong RP ID on a shared parent domain reaches past this instance entirely. - The About tab goes. It is about the project — what TREK is, where to file a bug, where to support it — and is aimed at the person running the software. The version and the link to the source move to the sidebar footer, on both the desktop page and the mobile twin, because AGPL 13 wants that offer wherever people reach the software over a network. - The update check stops asking GitHub and reports nothing available. Separately, the version footers lose the "self-hosted" suffix everywhere, not just here. It read as a label on the software rather than on the install, and the version alone says what it needs to. * feat(config): refuse to boot centrally administered without an at-rest key Measured on a running instance rather than assumed: with ENCRYPTION_KEY unset, the at-rest key falls back to a file in the data volume, and backupService bundles that file into every archive it builds. The archive is downloadable by any instance admin, so the encryption ships with its own key in the same zip. The skip in backupService already handles this — it only omits the file when the key came from the env — but nothing made sure the env actually carried one. Provisioning sets it; forgetting it was silent. validateEnvAtBoot now carries a second kind of check next to the schema: cross- field rules that only apply with the flag set, for combinations where every value is individually valid and the result is wrong. Empty without the flag, so an install that never asked to be centrally administered cannot meet it. * feat(client): add an attachment point for install-specific screens Two empty exports on the client, an empty module on the server, and the four places that read them. Nothing here adds a route, a nav entry or an endpoint — the arrays are empty and the module contributes nothing, which managed-ext.test pins so it stays that way. Read unconditionally, never behind a flag. On the server a conditional import would tie the module graph to an environment variable, and the graph is built once per app while the flag is read live; on the client an empty array costs nothing to spread, so every build walks the same path instead of one build walking a path nobody tests. Anything attached here follows the same rules as the rest of src/nest and src/components: a real module with a controller and a provider, bodies through the Zod pipe, routes under the global guards, tests. * test(shared): move the wording gate out of src so shared typechecks again CI installs shared with its own dependencies only (npm ci --workspace shared), so there is no @types/node and the `node:fs` import inside src/ failed to compile. The tests passed the whole time — vitest supplies the module — which is why this only showed up in the typecheck step. The walk moves to scripts/, next to i18n-parity.mjs, and the spec imports it the same way that one does. It also runs on its own now (`node scripts/i18n-selfhost-wording.mjs`), which is what you want when CI names a line you have to go find. * test(server): repair the call sites typecheck:tests caught tests/ sits outside the build tsconfig, so none of this showed up in a green test run — which is exactly the gap `npm run typecheck:tests` exists to close. Three kinds, all mine: - Seven `import type` paths for RuntimeEnvService carried one `../` too many. Type-only imports are erased, so vitest never resolved them and nothing failed. - VersionCheckJob and PluginsController grew a constructor parameter and eleven hand-wired `new` calls kept passing the old count. The argument arrived as undefined and no assertion happened to read it. - ConditionContext grew `managed`, and the shared context object in the conditions suite did not. The condition also had no test of its own, so it has one now: both directions, since the registry uses `is: false` to keep a notice away and a notice that only belongs on a centrally administered install would use `is: true`.
A self-hosted, real-time collaborative travel planner — with maps, budgets, packing lists, a journal, and AI built in.
What you get
See all features
🧭 Trip planning
|
🧳 Travel management
|
👥 Collaboration
|
📱 Mobile & PWA
|
🧩 Addons (admin-toggleable)
|
🤖 AI / MCP
|
⚙️ Admin & customisation
|
|
AI usage
We use LLM-assisted coding tools across parts of this codebase. Nothing ships that a maintainer has not read and understood: every change goes through a pull request, is reviewed and tested, and has a human who can answer for it. "The AI wrote that" is not an answer any of us would accept from ourselves.
See How we use AI in TREK for the details.
Get started in 30 seconds
ENCRYPTION_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32) docker run -d -p 3000:3000 \
-e ENCRYPTION_KEY=$ENCRYPTION_KEY \
-v ./data:/app/data -v ./uploads:/app/uploads mauriceboe/trek
Open http://localhost:3000. On first boot TREK seeds an admin account — if you set ADMIN_EMAIL/ADMIN_PASSWORD those are used, otherwise the credentials are printed to the container log (docker logs trek).
Tech stack
Real-time sync via WebSocket (ws). Backend on NestJS 11. State with Zustand. Auth via JWT + OAuth 2.1 + OIDC + Passkeys (WebAuthn) + TOTP MFA. Weather via Open-Meteo (no key required). Maps with Leaflet and Mapbox GL.
Docker Compose (production)
Full compose example with secure defaults
services:
app:
image: mauriceboe/trek:latest
container_name: trek
read_only: true
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
cap_drop:
- ALL
cap_add:
- CHOWN
- SETUID
- SETGID
tmpfs:
- /tmp:noexec,nosuid,size=64m
ports:
- "3000:3000"
environment:
- NODE_ENV=production
- PORT=3000
- ENCRYPTION_KEY=${ENCRYPTION_KEY:-} # generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
- TZ=${TZ:-UTC}
- LOG_LEVEL=${LOG_LEVEL:-info}
- ALLOWED_ORIGINS=${ALLOWED_ORIGINS:-}
- APP_URL=${APP_URL:-} # required for OIDC + email links
# - FORCE_HTTPS=true # behind a TLS-terminating proxy
# - TRUST_PROXY=1
# - OIDC_ISSUER=https://auth.example.com
# - OIDC_CLIENT_ID=trek
# - OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=supersecret
# - OIDC_DISPLAY_NAME=SSO
# - OIDC_ADMIN_CLAIM=groups
# - OIDC_ADMIN_VALUE=app-trek-admins
volumes:
- ./data:/app/data
- ./uploads:/app/uploads
restart: unless-stopped
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "-qO-", "http://localhost:3000/api/health"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 10s
retries: 3
start_period: 15s
Then:
docker compose up -d
HTTPS notes: FORCE_HTTPS=true is optional — it adds a 301 redirect, HSTS, CSP upgrade-insecure-requests, and forces the secure cookie flag. Only use it behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy. TRUST_PROXY=1 tells the server how many proxies sit in front so real client IPs and X-Forwarded-Proto work.
Helm (Kubernetes)
helm repo add trek https://chart.liketrek.com
helm repo update
helm install trek trek/trek
See charts/README.md for values.
Install as App (PWA)
TREK works as a Progressive Web App — no App Store needed.
- Open TREK in the browser (HTTPS required)
- iOS: Share ▸ Add to Home Screen
- Android: Menu ▸ Install app (or Add to Home Screen)
TREK then launches fullscreen with its own icon, just like a native app.
Updating
Docker Compose:
docker compose pull && docker compose up -d
Docker run — reuse the original volume paths:
docker pull mauriceboe/trek
docker rm -f trek
docker run -d --name trek -p 3000:3000 -v ./data:/app/data -v ./uploads:/app/uploads --restart unless-stopped mauriceboe/trek
Not sure which paths you used?
docker inspect trek --format '{{json .Mounts}}'before removing the container.
Your data stays in the mounted data and uploads volumes — updates never touch it.
Important
Mount only the data and uploads directories —
-v ./data:/app/data -v ./uploads:/app/uploads. Never mount a volume at/app. Doing so hides the application code shipped in the image and the container fails to start withCannot find module 'tsconfig-paths/register'. If you previously mounted/app, switch to the two mounts above; your data indata/anduploads/is preserved.
Rotating the Encryption Key
If you need to rotate ENCRYPTION_KEY (e.g. upgrading from a version that derived encryption from JWT_SECRET):
docker exec -it trek node --import tsx scripts/migrate-encryption.ts
The script creates a timestamped DB backup before making changes and prompts for old + new keys (input is not echoed).
Reverse Proxy
For production, put TREK behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy. TREK uses WebSockets for real-time sync, so the proxy must support WebSocket upgrades on /ws.
If you use the MCP addon, the proxy must also pass the Mcp-Session-Id header through in both directions on /mcp — Nginx and Caddy do this by default, but a proxy that strips it makes every tool call open a new session instead of reusing one. See the Reverse Proxy wiki page for details.
Nginx
server {
listen 80;
server_name trek.yourdomain.com;
return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
}
server {
listen 443 ssl http2;
server_name trek.yourdomain.com;
ssl_certificate /etc/ssl/fullchain.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /etc/ssl/privkey.pem;
# 500 MB covers backup-restore uploads (capped at 500 MB server-side).
client_max_body_size 500m;
location / {
proxy_pass http://localhost:3000;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
location /ws {
proxy_pass http://localhost:3000;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_read_timeout 86400;
}
# Only needed if you use the MCP addon. Responses are Server-Sent Events,
# so buffering must be off or tool results arrive late.
location /mcp {
proxy_pass http://localhost:3000;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_buffering off;
proxy_read_timeout 3600s;
}
}
Caddy
trek.yourdomain.com {
reverse_proxy localhost:3000
}
Caddy handles TLS and WebSockets automatically.
Environment variables
Note
Variables are validated at startup (fail-fast). An unset or blank variable always falls back to its default, but a variable set to a malformed value (e.g.
PORT=abc,SESSION_DURATION=bogus,DEMO_MODE=maybe) aborts boot with a report listing every offending variable. Boolean switches accepttrue/false,1/0,on/offandyes/no(any casing).
Full reference
| Variable | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Core | ||
PORT |
Server port | 3000 |
NODE_ENV |
Environment (production / development) |
production |
ENCRYPTION_KEY |
At-rest encryption key for stored secrets (API keys, MFA, SMTP, OIDC). Recommended: generate with openssl rand -hex 32. If unset, falls back to data/.jwt_secret (existing installs) or auto-generates a key (fresh installs). |
Auto |
TZ |
Timezone for logs, reminders and cron jobs (e.g. Europe/Berlin) |
UTC |
LOG_LEVEL |
info = concise user actions, debug = verbose details |
info |
TREK_WIKI_DIR |
Where the in-app Help pages (/help) read their content from. TREK ships its wiki and serves it from disk, so Help always matches the version you are running — you should not need to set this. Point it at your own directory to serve custom docs. If the path does not exist, Help falls back to fetching the public GitHub wiki (needs outbound network, and tracks the latest release). |
bundled wiki/ |
DEFAULT_LANGUAGE |
Default language on the login page for users with no saved preference. Browser/OS language is auto-detected first; this is the fallback. Supported: de, en, es, fr, hu, nl, br, cs, pl, ru, zh, zh-TW, it, ar, id, tr, ja, ko, uk, gr |
en |
ALLOWED_ORIGINS |
Comma-separated origins for CORS and email links | same-origin |
FORCE_HTTPS |
Optional. When true: 301-redirects HTTP to HTTPS, sends HSTS, adds CSP upgrade-insecure-requests, forces the session cookie secure flag. Useful behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy. Requires TRUST_PROXY. |
false |
HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS |
When true: adds the includeSubDomains directive to the HSTS header, extending HTTPS enforcement to all subdomains. Only effective when HSTS is active (FORCE_HTTPS=true or NODE_ENV=production). Leave false if you run other services on sibling subdomains over plain HTTP. |
false |
COOKIE_SECURE |
Controls the secure flag on the trek_session cookie. Auto-derived: on when NODE_ENV=production or FORCE_HTTPS=true. Escape hatch: set false to allow session cookies over plain HTTP. Not recommended in production. |
auto |
SESSION_DURATION |
How long a login session stays valid when "Remember me" is unchecked (the default): sets the trek_session JWT exp and issues a browser-session cookie (cleared when the browser closes). Accepts ms-style strings: 1h, 12h, 7d, 30d, 90d. Invalid values warn at startup and fall back to the default. |
24h |
SESSION_DURATION_REMEMBER |
Session length when "Remember me" is ticked at login: a longer-lived JWT plus a persistent trek_session cookie that survives browser restarts. Same format and startup-fallback behaviour as SESSION_DURATION. |
30d |
TRUST_PROXY |
Number of trusted reverse proxies. Tells the server to read client IP from X-Forwarded-For and protocol from X-Forwarded-Proto. Defaults to 1 in production; off in dev unless set. |
1 |
ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK |
Allow outbound requests to private/RFC-1918 IPs (e.g. Immich on your LAN). Loopback and link-local addresses remain blocked. | false |
APP_URL |
Public base URL of this instance (e.g. https://trek.example.com). Required when OIDC is enabled; used as base for email notification links. |
— |
| OIDC / SSO | ||
OIDC_ISSUER |
OpenID Connect provider URL | — |
OIDC_CLIENT_ID |
OIDC client ID | — |
OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET |
OIDC client secret | — |
OIDC_DISPLAY_NAME |
Label shown on the SSO login button | SSO |
OIDC_ONLY |
Force SSO-only mode: disables password login + registration, regardless of Admin > Settings. The first SSO login becomes admin. | false |
OIDC_ADMIN_CLAIM |
OIDC claim used to identify admin users | — |
OIDC_ADMIN_VALUE |
Value of the OIDC claim that grants admin role | — |
OIDC_SCOPE |
Space-separated OIDC scopes. Fully replaces the default — always include openid email profile. |
openid email profile |
OIDC_DISCOVERY_URL |
Override the auto-constructed OIDC discovery endpoint (e.g. Authentik: .../application/o/trek/.well-known/openid-configuration) |
— |
| Initial setup | ||
ADMIN_EMAIL |
Email for the first admin on initial boot. Must be set together with ADMIN_PASSWORD. If either is omitted a random password is printed to the server log. No effect once a user exists. |
admin@trek.local |
ADMIN_PASSWORD |
Password for the first admin on initial boot. Pairs with ADMIN_EMAIL. |
random |
| Other | ||
TREK_MANAGED |
Marks the install as centrally administered: the operator owns the configuration, credentials and upgrades, so the instance admin is not offered settings the operator sets. Leave unset when you run TREK yourself. | false |
PLACES_API_KEY |
Places credential supplied by whoever operates the install. When set, it is used for every lookup and the per-user keys in Admin > Settings are ignored. Leave unset to keep the stored keys. | — |
PLACES_API_BASE |
Send the Places calls to this origin instead of https://places.googleapis.com (an egress proxy, a cache, a gateway holding the key). Path and query are unchanged, so it has to speak the same API. |
— |
DEMO_MODE |
Enable demo mode (hourly data resets) | false |
UNSPLASH_ACCESS_KEY |
Optional Unsplash Access Key for trip-cover and place-image search. Without one, TREK uses Unsplash's unauthenticated endpoint, which some datacenter/VPS IPs are blocked from. Get a free key at unsplash.com/developers. Overrides any per-admin key set in Admin > Settings (where it can also be configured instead). | — |
MCP_RATE_LIMIT |
Max MCP API requests per user per minute | 300 |
MCP_MAX_SESSION_PER_USER |
Max concurrent MCP sessions per user. At the cap, the least-recently-active session is closed to make room | 20 |
Data & Backups
- Database — SQLite, stored in
./data/travel.db - Uploads — stored in
./uploads/ - Logs —
./data/logs/trek.log(auto-rotated) - Backups — create and restore via Admin Panel
- Auto-Backups — configurable schedule and retention in Admin Panel
Data sources
The Atlas map's country and sub-national (province/county) boundaries come from geoBoundaries (Runfola et al., 2020), licensed CC BY 4.0. See NOTICE.md for full third-party attributions.
License
TREK is AGPL v3. Self-host freely for personal or internal company use. If you modify and offer TREK as a network service to third parties, your modifications must be open-sourced under the same licence.








