Files
TREK/server/src/nest/admin/admin.service.ts
T
Maurice 2c2d008dc2 fix: clear every open Sonar security issue, and half the reliability ones (#2037)
* fix(security): mint idempotency keys properly, and resolve the extractor by path

Three findings out of a sweep of every open Sonar security issue. The other 49
turned out to be false positives and are documented in sonar-project.properties
rather than changed — each entry scoped to a file, never a whole rule, so a
future Math.random() on an auth path still fails.

The idempotency key is the one that can lose data. Both producers fell back to
Math.random when crypto.randomUUID was missing, and randomUUID needs a secure
context — TREK's own quickstart is http://localhost:3000 and LAN installs run on
http://192.168.x.x, so on the deployments the README documents the fallback is
what actually runs. The axios one was
`Math.random().toString(36).slice(2)`, which is not length-stable: 0.5 yields a
single character and 0 yields the empty string, which the interceptor reads as
"no key" and skips deduplication for entirely. Two writes sharing a key collapse
into one — the second gets the first one's cached response and the edit is gone
with no error anywhere. Both now come from utils/randomId, which has the
getRandomValues rung that works in insecure contexts too.

The extractor probe stored the bare binary name, so every extraction re-resolved
it through whatever PATH held at that moment. The official image sets
KITINERARY_EXTRACTOR_PATH and never reaches that branch, but a bare-metal install
without it ran an unqualified name from a PATH it does not control. It now walks
the search path itself and keeps the absolute path of the file it verified;
execFileSync also drops the /bin/sh hop the old probe needed. PATH comes through
app-config because process.env is walled off in src/.

* fix: four tests and sorts that were not doing what they claimed

Sonar reported 43 high-impact reliability issues. Reading all of them, four are
real; the rest are cosmetic or would be made worse by the suggested change.

budget.test.ts hand-built `paid: true`, but both emitters send `paid: body.paid
? 1 : 0` and the handler stores the value verbatim — the test asserted a payload
the server never sends. The line below it already used a number.

admin.controller.test.ts had a `.resolves` assertion with no await. The promise
was dropped, so that line could not fail the test.

The two to-do category lists sorted with a bare .sort(), which is byte order:
every accented name files behind the whole ASCII range, so in a German trip
"Übernachtung" lands after "Zelt". TREK ships 23 locales, so this is real data.
One side effect worth knowing: katColor picks a category's dot colour by its
index, so re-sorting can move which category shows which colour — it already
moves whenever a category is added, and the colour carries no meaning.

Deliberately not changed: the two `| 0` truncations (Math.trunc is not
equivalent — `| 0` wraps at 32 bits and these carry millisecond timestamps), the
two .map() callbacks whose second parameter is declared and used, and the sha1
in thumbnail.service (its own comment says a swap would orphan every existing
thumbnail).

* refactor: give every button a type, and prefer the Number statics

Two mechanical sweeps, no behaviour change intended in either.

A <button> with no type attribute is type="submit" per the HTML spec. Outside a
form that does nothing today, but it turns into a surprise the moment the markup
is wrapped in one, which is what Sonar's S9011 is warning about. 870 buttons get
an explicit type="button". Two things were left alone on purpose: buttons that
take a {...spread}, because the spread may carry a type and the merge order
decides which wins, and anything inside a <form> — there the answer is a
judgement call, and checking all eleven form files found every real submit button
already carrying type="submit".

The Number sweep covers only the three globals that are exactly equivalent to
their Number twin: parseInt, parseFloat and NaN. isNaN is NOT in it — the global
coerces its argument, so isNaN('abc') is true where Number.isNaN('abc') is false,
and renaming it would change what the code does. It reaches server and plugin-sdk
as well as the client; both copies of egress-policy.ts got the identical edit, so
the mirror the SDK's parity test guards stays intact.
2026-08-25 15:22:38 +02:00

736 lines
30 KiB
TypeScript

import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import bcrypt from 'bcryptjs';
import crypto from 'crypto';
import fs from 'fs';
import path from 'path';
import { ADDON_IDS } from '../../addons';
import { readEnv } from '../../app-config';
import { updateJwtSecret } from '../../config';
// Import from sessionManager directly, NOT the ../../mcp barrel — the direct
// path keeps this module's graph minimal, and the split predates the barrel's
// shrink to process-wide state. The invalidateMcpSessions barrel import below
// is deliberately separate: it is only reached from the controller, never from
// the cron path.
import { revokeUserSessions, revokeUserSessionsForClient } from '../../mcp/sessionManager';
import { invalidateMcpSessions } from '../../mcp';
import { emitUserDeleted } from '../../plugin-user-lifecycle';
import type { User, Addon } from '../../types';
import { maybe_encrypt_api_key, decrypt_api_key } from '../common/crypto/apiKeyCrypto';
import { avatarUrl } from '../common/avatarUrl';
import { prepareLlmAddonConfigForWrite, maskLlmAddonConfig } from '../llm-parse/llm-config';
import { getPhotoProviderConfig } from '../memories/memories.helpers';
import { validatePassword } from '../common/passwordPolicy';
import { UserCleanupService } from '../auth/user-cleanup.service';
import { DatabaseService } from '../database/database.service';
import { AddonsService } from '../addons/addons.service';
import { RealtimeService } from '../realtime/realtime.service';
import { PasskeyService } from '../auth/passkey.service';
import { AuthService } from '../auth/auth.service';
import { PermissionsService } from '../permissions/permissions.service';
import { PERMISSION_ACTIONS } from '../permissions/permissions.service';
import { NotificationsService } from '../notifications/notifications.service';
import {
BCRYPT_COST,
compareVersions,
isDocker,
readVersionCache,
utcSuffix,
writeVersionCache,
type VersionInfo,
} from './admin.helpers';
import { MANAGED_FORBIDDEN_ERROR } from '../common/managed';
/** Outbound GitHub calls: hard timeout and response-size cap (server/CLAUDE.md). */
const GITHUB_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
const GITHUB_MAX_BYTES = 2_000_000;
/** Failed version checks cache briefly so an outage isn't refetched per page load. */
const VERSION_FAILURE_TTL = 60_000;
/**
* Admin domain service — owns the admin SQL (folded from the legacy
* services/adminService.ts with the 2026-08 migration): user CRUD, instance
* stats, the permission matrix, the audit-log read side, OIDC settings, the
* demo baseline, GitHub release/version checks, invite tokens, the three
* places feature toggles, addons + photo providers, MCP tokens, OAuth sessions
* and JWT rotation.
*
* Every quirk relocated byte-for-byte: the `||` falsy defaults (never `??`),
* post-insert/post-update re-selects instead of RETURNING, the COALESCE partial
* update, the #1362 guest exclusions and the exact error strings. The legacy
* `{ error, status }` envelope is the return contract — the controller's `ok()`
* helper turns it into an HttpException, so nothing here throws.
*
* The bag-tracking/collab-feature toggles, user defaults, passkey reset and
* packing templates delegate to the services that own those tables. The pure
* and module-scoped pieces (compareVersions, isDocker, the version cache) live
* in admin.helpers.ts.
*/
@Injectable()
export class AdminService {
constructor(
private readonly db: DatabaseService,
private readonly addons: AddonsService,
private readonly passkeys: PasskeyService,
private readonly auth: AuthService,
private readonly permissions: PermissionsService,
private readonly notifications: NotificationsService,
private readonly userCleanup: UserCleanupService,
private readonly realtime: RealtimeService,
) {}
// ── User CRUD ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
listUsers() {
// Guests (#1362) are accountless trip participants, not real users — keep them out
// of admin user management entirely.
const users = this.db.all<
Pick<User, 'id' | 'username' | 'email' | 'role' | 'created_at' | 'updated_at' | 'last_login'> & {
avatar?: string | null;
}
>(
'SELECT id, username, email, role, avatar, created_at, updated_at, last_login FROM users WHERE COALESCE(is_guest, 0) = 0 ORDER BY created_at DESC',
);
let onlineUserIds = new Set<number>();
try {
// The catch stays here rather than in the facade: an admin list that shows
// everyone as offline is a better answer than a 500, and that judgement
// belongs to this caller, not to every future one.
onlineUserIds = this.realtime.getOnlineUserIds();
} catch {
/* */
}
return users.map((u) => ({
...u,
avatar_url: avatarUrl(u),
created_at: utcSuffix(u.created_at),
updated_at: utcSuffix(u.updated_at as string),
last_login: utcSuffix(u.last_login),
online: onlineUserIds.has(u.id),
}));
}
createUser(data: { username: string; email: string; password: string; role?: string }) {
const username = data.username?.trim();
const email = data.email?.trim();
const password = data.password?.trim();
if (!username || !email || !password) {
return { error: 'Username, email and password are required', status: 400 };
}
const pwCheck = validatePassword(password);
if (!pwCheck.ok) return { error: pwCheck.reason, status: 400 };
if (data.role && !['user', 'admin'].includes(data.role)) {
return { error: 'Invalid role', status: 400 };
}
// Guests (#1362) live in a reserved synthetic namespace; never let one block a real account.
const existingUsername = this.db.get('SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = ? AND COALESCE(is_guest, 0) = 0', username);
if (existingUsername) return { error: 'Username already taken', status: 409 };
const existingEmail = this.db.get('SELECT id FROM users WHERE email = ? AND COALESCE(is_guest, 0) = 0', email);
if (existingEmail) return { error: 'Email already taken', status: 409 };
const passwordHash = bcrypt.hashSync(password, BCRYPT_COST);
const result = this.db.run(
'INSERT INTO users (username, email, password_hash, role) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)',
username, email, passwordHash, data.role || 'user',
);
const user = this.db.get(
'SELECT id, username, email, role, created_at, updated_at FROM users WHERE id = ?',
result.lastInsertRowid,
);
return {
user,
insertedId: Number(result.lastInsertRowid),
auditDetails: { username, email, role: data.role || 'user' },
};
}
updateUser(id: string, data: { username?: string; email?: string; role?: string; password?: string }) {
const username = typeof data.username === 'string' ? data.username.trim() : data.username;
const email = typeof data.email === 'string' ? data.email.trim() : data.email;
const { role, password } = data;
const user = this.db.get<User>('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?', id);
if (!user) return { error: 'User not found', status: 404 };
if (role && !['user', 'admin'].includes(role)) {
return { error: 'Invalid role', status: 400 };
}
// An empty string used to fall through `username || null` into COALESCE and
// silently mean "leave unchanged". Say so instead of pretending it worked.
if (username === '') return { error: 'Username cannot be empty', status: 400 };
if (email === '') return { error: 'Email cannot be empty', status: 400 };
if (username && username !== user.username) {
const conflict = this.db.get('SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = ? AND id != ? AND COALESCE(is_guest, 0) = 0', username, id);
if (conflict) return { error: 'Username already taken', status: 409 };
}
if (email && email !== user.email) {
const conflict = this.db.get('SELECT id FROM users WHERE email = ? AND id != ? AND COALESCE(is_guest, 0) = 0', email, id);
if (conflict) return { error: 'Email already taken', status: 409 };
}
if (password) {
const pwCheck = validatePassword(password);
if (!pwCheck.ok) return { error: pwCheck.reason, status: 400 };
}
const passwordHash = password ? bcrypt.hashSync(password, BCRYPT_COST) : null;
// Don't let the admin UI demote the last remaining admin — that would leave the
// instance with no one able to manage it (and on OIDC-only setups, no recovery). #1274
if (role && role !== 'admin') {
const current = this.db.get<{ role?: string }>('SELECT role FROM users WHERE id = ?', id);
if (current?.role === 'admin') {
const adminCount = this.db.get<{ count: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM users WHERE role = 'admin'")!.count;
if (adminCount <= 1) return { error: 'Cannot remove the last admin', status: 400 };
}
}
// An admin sets a password for exactly one reason: the account is believed
// compromised. Without bumping password_version, verifyJwtAndLoadUser keeps
// accepting every cookie the intruder already holds, so the one action taken
// to lock them out was the one action that did not. Both self-service paths
// (changePassword, resetPassword) have always done this; this one had not.
const newPv = password ? ((user as User & { password_version?: number }).password_version ?? 0) + 1 : null;
this.db.transaction(() => {
this.db.run(
`
UPDATE users SET
username = COALESCE(?, username),
email = COALESCE(?, email),
role = COALESCE(?, role),
password_hash = COALESCE(?, password_hash),
password_version = COALESCE(?, password_version),
updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE id = ?
`,
username || null, email || null, role || null, passwordHash, newPv, id,
);
if (password) {
// The version bump only invalidates JWT cookies. These two stores carry
// their own credentials and are revoked separately, exactly as the
// self-service paths do it.
this.db.run('DELETE FROM mcp_tokens WHERE user_id = ?', id);
try {
this.db.run(
'UPDATE oauth_tokens SET revoked_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE user_id = ? AND revoked_at IS NULL',
id,
);
} catch { /* very old installs predate oauth_tokens */ }
}
});
if (password) {
try { revokeUserSessions(Number(id)); } catch { /* best-effort, same as elsewhere */ }
}
const updated = this.db.get('SELECT id, username, email, role, created_at, updated_at FROM users WHERE id = ?', id);
const changed: string[] = [];
if (username) changed.push('username');
if (email) changed.push('email');
if (role) changed.push('role');
if (password) changed.push('password');
return {
user: updated,
previousEmail: user.email,
changed,
};
}
deleteUser(id: string, currentUserId: number) {
if (Number.parseInt(id) === currentUserId) {
return { error: 'Cannot delete own account', status: 400 };
}
const userToDel = this.db.get<{ id: number; email: string }>('SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE id = ?', id);
if (!userToDel) return { error: 'User not found', status: 404 };
this.userCleanup.deleteUserCompletely(userToDel.id);
emitUserDeleted(userToDel.id); // let plugins erase their own per-user data
return { email: userToDel.email };
}
resetUserPasskeys(id: string) { return this.passkeys.adminResetPasskeys(Number(id)); }
/**
* Clear another account's TOTP so its owner can enrol again.
*
* The passkey half of this has existed since passkeys landed; the TOTP half
* never did, which left one ordinary event with no answer: somebody on a trip
* loses their phone. Without this the only ways out are an operator reaching
* into the database or the account being deleted and rebuilt.
*
* Never for the caller themselves. An admin who wants their own MFA gone
* disables it through Settings, where the current password is required —
* making that reachable from here would turn a stolen admin session into a
* way to strip the second factor off the very account it came from.
*/
resetUserMfa(id: string, actingUserId: number): { error?: string; status?: number; success?: boolean; email?: string } {
const targetId = Number(id);
if (targetId === actingUserId) {
return { error: 'Use Settings to change your own two-factor setup', status: 400 };
}
const target = this.db.get<{ id: number; email: string; mfa_enabled: number | boolean }>(
'SELECT id, email, mfa_enabled FROM users WHERE id = ?',
targetId,
);
if (!target) return { error: 'User not found', status: 404 };
// Same three columns disableMfa clears, so an admin reset and a self-service
// disable leave the account in exactly one state rather than two.
this.db.run(
'UPDATE users SET mfa_enabled = 0, mfa_secret = NULL, mfa_backup_codes = NULL, updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id = ?',
targetId,
);
return { success: true, email: target.email };
}
// ── Stats ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
getStats() {
const totalUsers = this.db.get<{ count: number }>('SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM users WHERE COALESCE(is_guest, 0) = 0')!.count;
const totalTrips = this.db.get<{ count: number }>('SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM trips')!.count;
const totalPlaces = this.db.get<{ count: number }>('SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM places')!.count;
const totalFiles = this.db.get<{ count: number }>('SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM trip_files')!.count;
return { totalUsers, totalTrips, totalPlaces, totalFiles };
}
// ── Permissions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
getPermissions() {
const current = this.permissions.getAllPermissions();
const actions = PERMISSION_ACTIONS.map((a) => ({
key: a.key,
level: current[a.key],
defaultLevel: a.defaultLevel,
allowedLevels: a.allowedLevels,
}));
return { permissions: actions };
}
savePermissions(permissions: Record<string, string>) {
const { skipped } = this.permissions.savePermissions(permissions);
return { permissions: this.permissions.getAllPermissions(), skipped };
}
// ── Audit Log ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
getAuditLog(query: { limit?: string; offset?: string }) {
const limitRaw = Number.parseInt(String(query.limit || '100'), 10);
const offsetRaw = Number.parseInt(String(query.offset || '0'), 10);
const limit = Math.min(Math.max(Number.isFinite(limitRaw) ? limitRaw : 100, 1), 500);
const offset = Math.max(Number.isFinite(offsetRaw) ? offsetRaw : 0, 0);
type Row = {
id: number;
created_at: string;
user_id: number | null;
username: string | null;
user_email: string | null;
action: string;
resource: string | null;
details: string | null;
ip: string | null;
};
const rows = this.db.all<Row>(
`
SELECT a.id, a.created_at, a.user_id, u.username, u.email as user_email, a.action, a.resource, a.details, a.ip
FROM audit_log a
LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = a.user_id
ORDER BY a.id DESC
LIMIT ? OFFSET ?
`,
limit, offset,
);
const total = this.db.get<{ c: number }>('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM audit_log')!.c;
const entries = rows.map((r) => {
// Unparseable details fall back to the raw string rather than the old
// { _parse_error: true } sentinel, which the admin UI rendered literally.
let details: Record<string, unknown> | string | null = null;
if (r.details) {
try {
details = JSON.parse(r.details) as Record<string, unknown>;
} catch {
details = r.details;
}
}
const created_at =
r.created_at && !r.created_at.endsWith('Z') ? r.created_at.replace(' ', 'T') + 'Z' : r.created_at;
return { ...r, created_at, details };
});
return { entries, total, limit, offset };
}
// ── Demo Baseline ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
saveDemoBaseline(): { error?: string; status?: number; message?: string } {
if (!readEnv().demo.enabled) {
return { error: 'Not found', status: 404 };
}
try {
// Lazy require: demo-reset is a demo-only module.
const { saveBaseline } = require('../../demo/demo-reset');
saveBaseline();
return { message: 'Demo baseline saved. Hourly resets will restore to this state.' };
} catch (err: unknown) {
console.error(err);
return { error: 'Failed to save baseline', status: 500 };
}
}
// ── GitHub Integration ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* GitHub fetch with the timeout + size cap the outbound-fetch rule requires
* (server/CLAUDE.md). Returns null on any failure; callers decide the fallback.
*/
private async fetchGithub(url: string): Promise<unknown | null> {
try {
const resp = await fetch(url, {
headers: { Accept: 'application/vnd.github.v3+json', 'User-Agent': 'TREK-Server' },
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(GITHUB_TIMEOUT_MS),
});
if (!resp.ok) return null;
const text = await resp.text();
if (text.length > GITHUB_MAX_BYTES) {
console.error(`[admin] GitHub response exceeded ${GITHUB_MAX_BYTES} bytes, ignoring`);
return null;
}
return JSON.parse(text);
} catch (err: unknown) {
console.error(`[admin] GitHub request failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
return null;
}
}
async getGithubReleases(perPage: string = '10', page: string = '1') {
// The query arrives as raw strings from the admin UI; clamp to what the
// GitHub API accepts instead of interpolating them into the URL as given.
const per = Math.min(Math.max(Number.parseInt(perPage, 10) || 10, 1), 100);
const pg = Math.max(Number.parseInt(page, 10) || 1, 1);
const qs = new URLSearchParams({ per_page: String(per), page: String(pg) });
const data = await this.fetchGithub(`https://api.github.com/repos/liketrek/TREK/releases?${qs}`);
return Array.isArray(data) ? data : [];
}
async checkVersion(): Promise<VersionInfo> {
// Lazy require, re-anchored for nest/admin/ (was ../../package.json in services/).
const currentVersion: string = readEnv().app.appVersion || require('../../../package.json').version;
const isPrerelease = currentVersion.includes('-pre.');
// Answered rather than refused on a centrally administered install: the admin
// page calls this on open, and a 403 there would be an error message where a
// quiet surface belongs. The operator decides when to upgrade, so from inside
// the instance there is nothing available.
if (readEnv().managed.enabled) {
return {
current: currentVersion,
latest: currentVersion,
update_available: false,
is_docker: isDocker,
is_prerelease: isPrerelease,
};
}
const cached = readVersionCache();
if (cached) return cached;
const fallback: VersionInfo = {
current: currentVersion,
latest: currentVersion,
update_available: false,
is_docker: isDocker,
is_prerelease: isPrerelease,
};
// Failures cache too (on a shorter TTL), so a GitHub outage doesn't mean a
// live fetch on every admin page load — the legacy code only cached success.
const fail = () => {
writeVersionCache(fallback, VERSION_FAILURE_TTL);
return fallback;
};
let result: VersionInfo;
if (isPrerelease) {
// Fetch release list and find the newest prerelease
const data = await this.fetchGithub('https://api.github.com/repos/liketrek/TREK/releases?per_page=100') as
| Array<{ tag_name?: string; html_url?: string; prerelease?: boolean }>
| null;
if (!data) return fail();
const prereleases = Array.isArray(data) ? data.filter((r) => r.prerelease) : [];
if (!prereleases.length) return fail();
// Pre-compute stripped versions, then sort descending
const tagged = prereleases.map((r) => ({ r, v: (r.tag_name || '').replace(/^v/, '') }));
tagged.sort((a, b) => compareVersions(b.v, a.v));
const latest = tagged[0].v;
const update_available = !!latest && latest !== currentVersion && compareVersions(latest, currentVersion) > 0;
result = {
current: currentVersion,
latest,
update_available,
release_url: tagged[0].r.html_url || '',
is_docker: isDocker,
is_prerelease: true,
};
} else {
const data = await this.fetchGithub('https://api.github.com/repos/liketrek/TREK/releases/latest') as
| { tag_name?: string; html_url?: string }
| null;
if (!data) return fail();
const latest = (data.tag_name || '').replace(/^v/, '');
const update_available = !!latest && latest !== currentVersion && compareVersions(latest, currentVersion) > 0;
result = {
current: currentVersion,
latest,
update_available,
release_url: data.html_url || '',
is_docker: isDocker,
is_prerelease: false,
};
}
writeVersionCache(result);
return result;
}
async checkAndNotifyVersion(): Promise<void> {
try {
const result = await this.checkVersion();
if (!result.update_available) return;
const lastNotified = this.db.get<{ value: string }>(
'SELECT value FROM app_settings WHERE key = ?', 'last_notified_version',
)?.value;
if (lastNotified === result.latest) return;
this.db.run(
'INSERT OR REPLACE INTO app_settings (key, value) VALUES (?, ?)',
'last_notified_version', result.latest,
);
await this.notifications.send({
event: 'version_available',
actorId: null,
scope: 'admin',
targetId: 0,
params: { version: result.latest },
});
} catch {
// Silently ignore — version check is non-critical
}
}
// ── Addons ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
listAddons() {
const addons = this.db
.all<Addon>('SELECT * FROM addons ORDER BY sort_order, id')
// Hidden rather than shown-and-refused, because a toggle that answers 403
// is worse than no toggle.
//
// AI parsing: the endpoint, the model and what a document costs all belong
// to the operator, so there is no instance decision left to make — not even
// whether it runs.
//
// AirTrail: the addon exists to reach a server the admin runs themselves,
// and a managed instance has no route to one.
.filter(
(a) =>
!(
readEnv().managed.enabled &&
(a.id === ADDON_IDS.LLM_PARSING || a.id === ADDON_IDS.AIRTRAIL)
),
);
const providers = this.db.all<{
id: string;
name: string;
description?: string | null;
icon: string;
enabled: number;
sort_order: number;
}>(`
SELECT id, name, description, icon, enabled, sort_order
FROM photo_providers
ORDER BY sort_order, id
`)
// Immich and Synology Photos are servers the admin runs at home. A managed
// instance cannot reach one (its egress does not go there, and it should
// not), so offering the connection would only produce a timeout.
.filter(() => !readEnv().managed.enabled);
const fields = this.db.all<{
provider_id: string;
field_key: string;
label: string;
input_type: string;
placeholder?: string | null;
required: number;
secret: number;
settings_key?: string | null;
payload_key?: string | null;
sort_order: number;
}>(`
SELECT provider_id, field_key, label, input_type, placeholder, required, secret, settings_key, payload_key, sort_order
FROM photo_provider_fields
ORDER BY sort_order, id
`);
const fieldsByProvider = new Map<string, typeof fields>();
for (const field of fields) {
const arr = fieldsByProvider.get(field.provider_id) || [];
arr.push(field);
fieldsByProvider.set(field.provider_id, arr);
}
return [
...addons.map((a) => ({
...a,
enabled: !!a.enabled,
config:
a.id === ADDON_IDS.LLM_PARSING
? maskLlmAddonConfig(JSON.parse(a.config || '{}'))
: JSON.parse(a.config || '{}'),
})),
...providers.map((p) => ({
id: p.id,
name: p.name,
description: p.description,
type: 'photo_provider',
icon: p.icon,
enabled: !!p.enabled,
config: getPhotoProviderConfig(p.id),
fields: (fieldsByProvider.get(p.id) || []).map((f) => ({
key: f.field_key,
label: f.label,
input_type: f.input_type,
placeholder: f.placeholder || '',
required: !!f.required,
secret: !!f.secret,
settings_key: f.settings_key || null,
payload_key: f.payload_key || null,
sort_order: f.sort_order,
})),
sort_order: p.sort_order,
})),
];
}
updateAddon(id: string, data: { enabled?: boolean; config?: Record<string, unknown> }) {
type ProviderRow = { id: string; name: string; description?: string | null; icon: string; enabled: number; sort_order: number };
const addon = this.db.get<Addon>('SELECT * FROM addons WHERE id = ?', id);
const provider = this.db.get<ProviderRow>('SELECT * FROM photo_providers WHERE id = ?', id);
if (!addon && !provider) return { error: 'Addon not found', status: 404 };
// The whole addon, not just its config: on a centrally administered install
// the operator owns the endpoint, the model and the per-document cost, so
// there is nothing here for an instance admin to set — including whether it
// runs at all. listAddons hides the row; this closes the route behind it.
if (readEnv().managed.enabled && id === ADDON_IDS.LLM_PARSING) {
return { error: MANAGED_FORBIDDEN_ERROR.error, status: 403 };
}
this.db.transaction(() => {
if (addon) {
if (data.enabled !== undefined)
this.db.run('UPDATE addons SET enabled = ? WHERE id = ?', data.enabled ? 1 : 0, id);
if (data.config !== undefined) {
// The AI-parsing addon holds an API key — encrypt it at rest and preserve
// the stored key when the client echoes the mask sentinel (see llmConfig.ts).
const configToStore =
id === ADDON_IDS.LLM_PARSING
? prepareLlmAddonConfigForWrite(data.config, JSON.parse(addon.config || '{}'))
: data.config;
this.db.run('UPDATE addons SET config = ? WHERE id = ?', JSON.stringify(configToStore), id);
}
} else {
if (data.enabled !== undefined)
this.db.run('UPDATE photo_providers SET enabled = ? WHERE id = ?', data.enabled ? 1 : 0, id);
}
});
const updatedAddon = this.db.get<Addon>('SELECT * FROM addons WHERE id = ?', id);
const updatedProvider = this.db.get<ProviderRow>('SELECT * FROM photo_providers WHERE id = ?', id);
const updated = updatedAddon
? {
...updatedAddon,
enabled: !!updatedAddon.enabled,
config:
updatedAddon.id === ADDON_IDS.LLM_PARSING
? maskLlmAddonConfig(JSON.parse(updatedAddon.config || '{}'))
: JSON.parse(updatedAddon.config || '{}'),
}
: updatedProvider
? {
id: updatedProvider.id,
name: updatedProvider.name,
description: updatedProvider.description,
type: 'photo_provider',
icon: updatedProvider.icon,
enabled: !!updatedProvider.enabled,
config: getPhotoProviderConfig(updatedProvider.id),
sort_order: updatedProvider.sort_order,
}
: null;
// Only these addons gate MCP tool/resource/prompt registration (see
// registerTools/registerResources) — and only a real enabled-flip changes
// what a session would register. Config-only saves, photo providers and
// MCP-irrelevant addons must not tear down every live session (#1414).
const MCP_RELEVANT_ADDONS = new Set<string>([
ADDON_IDS.MCP,
ADDON_IDS.PACKING,
ADDON_IDS.BUDGET,
ADDON_IDS.COLLAB,
ADDON_IDS.ATLAS,
ADDON_IDS.VACAY,
ADDON_IDS.JOURNEY,
]);
const enabledChanged = !!addon && data.enabled !== undefined && (data.enabled ? 1 : 0) !== addon.enabled;
return {
addon: updated,
mcpAffected: enabledChanged && MCP_RELEVANT_ADDONS.has(id),
auditDetails: {
enabled: data.enabled !== undefined ? !!data.enabled : undefined,
config_changed: data.config !== undefined,
},
};
}
// ── JWT Rotation ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
rotateJwtSecret(): { error?: string; status?: number } {
const newSecret = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
// Re-anchored one directory deeper for nest/admin/ (was '../../data' in services/).
const dataDir = path.resolve(__dirname, '../../../data');
const secretFile = path.join(dataDir, '.jwt_secret');
try {
if (!fs.existsSync(dataDir)) fs.mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(secretFile, newSecret, { mode: 0o600 });
} catch {
return { error: 'Failed to persist new JWT secret to disk', status: 500 };
}
updateJwtSecret(newSecret);
return {};
}
invalidateMcpSessions() { invalidateMcpSessions(); }
// ── Settings + notification preference helpers (non-admin-service modules) ──
}