import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common'; import bcrypt from 'bcryptjs'; import crypto from 'crypto'; import fs from 'fs'; import path from 'path'; import { ADDON_IDS } from '../../addons'; import { readEnv } from '../../app-config'; import { updateJwtSecret } from '../../config'; // Import from sessionManager directly, NOT the ../../mcp barrel — the direct // path keeps this module's graph minimal, and the split predates the barrel's // shrink to process-wide state. The invalidateMcpSessions barrel import below // is deliberately separate: it is only reached from the controller, never from // the cron path. import { revokeUserSessions, revokeUserSessionsForClient } from '../../mcp/sessionManager'; import { invalidateMcpSessions } from '../../mcp'; import { emitUserDeleted } from '../../plugin-user-lifecycle'; import type { User, Addon } from '../../types'; import { maybe_encrypt_api_key, decrypt_api_key } from '../common/crypto/apiKeyCrypto'; import { avatarUrl } from '../common/avatarUrl'; import { prepareLlmAddonConfigForWrite, maskLlmAddonConfig } from '../llm-parse/llm-config'; import { getPhotoProviderConfig } from '../memories/memories.helpers'; import { validatePassword } from '../common/passwordPolicy'; import { UserCleanupService } from '../auth/user-cleanup.service'; import { DatabaseService } from '../database/database.service'; import { AddonsService } from '../addons/addons.service'; import { RealtimeService } from '../realtime/realtime.service'; import { PasskeyService } from '../auth/passkey.service'; import { AuthService } from '../auth/auth.service'; import { PermissionsService } from '../permissions/permissions.service'; import { PERMISSION_ACTIONS } from '../permissions/permissions.service'; import { NotificationsService } from '../notifications/notifications.service'; import { BCRYPT_COST, compareVersions, isDocker, readVersionCache, utcSuffix, writeVersionCache, type VersionInfo, } from './admin.helpers'; import { MANAGED_FORBIDDEN_ERROR } from '../common/managed'; /** Outbound GitHub calls: hard timeout and response-size cap (server/CLAUDE.md). */ const GITHUB_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000; const GITHUB_MAX_BYTES = 2_000_000; /** Failed version checks cache briefly so an outage isn't refetched per page load. */ const VERSION_FAILURE_TTL = 60_000; /** * Admin domain service — owns the admin SQL (folded from the legacy * services/adminService.ts with the 2026-08 migration): user CRUD, instance * stats, the permission matrix, the audit-log read side, OIDC settings, the * demo baseline, GitHub release/version checks, invite tokens, the three * places feature toggles, addons + photo providers, MCP tokens, OAuth sessions * and JWT rotation. * * Every quirk relocated byte-for-byte: the `||` falsy defaults (never `??`), * post-insert/post-update re-selects instead of RETURNING, the COALESCE partial * update, the #1362 guest exclusions and the exact error strings. The legacy * `{ error, status }` envelope is the return contract — the controller's `ok()` * helper turns it into an HttpException, so nothing here throws. * * The bag-tracking/collab-feature toggles, user defaults, passkey reset and * packing templates delegate to the services that own those tables. The pure * and module-scoped pieces (compareVersions, isDocker, the version cache) live * in admin.helpers.ts. */ @Injectable() export class AdminService { constructor( private readonly db: DatabaseService, private readonly addons: AddonsService, private readonly passkeys: PasskeyService, private readonly auth: AuthService, private readonly permissions: PermissionsService, private readonly notifications: NotificationsService, private readonly userCleanup: UserCleanupService, private readonly realtime: RealtimeService, ) {} // ── User CRUD ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── listUsers() { // Guests (#1362) are accountless trip participants, not real users — keep them out // of admin user management entirely. const users = this.db.all< Pick & { avatar?: string | null; } >( 'SELECT id, username, email, role, avatar, created_at, updated_at, last_login FROM users WHERE COALESCE(is_guest, 0) = 0 ORDER BY created_at DESC', ); let onlineUserIds = new Set(); try { // The catch stays here rather than in the facade: an admin list that shows // everyone as offline is a better answer than a 500, and that judgement // belongs to this caller, not to every future one. onlineUserIds = this.realtime.getOnlineUserIds(); } catch { /* */ } return users.map((u) => ({ ...u, avatar_url: avatarUrl(u), created_at: utcSuffix(u.created_at), updated_at: utcSuffix(u.updated_at as string), last_login: utcSuffix(u.last_login), online: onlineUserIds.has(u.id), })); } createUser(data: { username: string; email: string; password: string; role?: string }) { const username = data.username?.trim(); const email = data.email?.trim(); const password = data.password?.trim(); if (!username || !email || !password) { return { error: 'Username, email and password are required', status: 400 }; } const pwCheck = validatePassword(password); if (!pwCheck.ok) return { error: pwCheck.reason, status: 400 }; if (data.role && !['user', 'admin'].includes(data.role)) { return { error: 'Invalid role', status: 400 }; } // Guests (#1362) live in a reserved synthetic namespace; never let one block a real account. const existingUsername = this.db.get('SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = ? AND COALESCE(is_guest, 0) = 0', username); if (existingUsername) return { error: 'Username already taken', status: 409 }; const existingEmail = this.db.get('SELECT id FROM users WHERE email = ? AND COALESCE(is_guest, 0) = 0', email); if (existingEmail) return { error: 'Email already taken', status: 409 }; const passwordHash = bcrypt.hashSync(password, BCRYPT_COST); const result = this.db.run( 'INSERT INTO users (username, email, password_hash, role) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)', username, email, passwordHash, data.role || 'user', ); const user = this.db.get( 'SELECT id, username, email, role, created_at, updated_at FROM users WHERE id = ?', result.lastInsertRowid, ); return { user, insertedId: Number(result.lastInsertRowid), auditDetails: { username, email, role: data.role || 'user' }, }; } updateUser(id: string, data: { username?: string; email?: string; role?: string; password?: string }) { const username = typeof data.username === 'string' ? data.username.trim() : data.username; const email = typeof data.email === 'string' ? data.email.trim() : data.email; const { role, password } = data; const user = this.db.get('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?', id); if (!user) return { error: 'User not found', status: 404 }; if (role && !['user', 'admin'].includes(role)) { return { error: 'Invalid role', status: 400 }; } // An empty string used to fall through `username || null` into COALESCE and // silently mean "leave unchanged". Say so instead of pretending it worked. if (username === '') return { error: 'Username cannot be empty', status: 400 }; if (email === '') return { error: 'Email cannot be empty', status: 400 }; if (username && username !== user.username) { const conflict = this.db.get('SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = ? AND id != ? AND COALESCE(is_guest, 0) = 0', username, id); if (conflict) return { error: 'Username already taken', status: 409 }; } if (email && email !== user.email) { const conflict = this.db.get('SELECT id FROM users WHERE email = ? AND id != ? AND COALESCE(is_guest, 0) = 0', email, id); if (conflict) return { error: 'Email already taken', status: 409 }; } if (password) { const pwCheck = validatePassword(password); if (!pwCheck.ok) return { error: pwCheck.reason, status: 400 }; } const passwordHash = password ? bcrypt.hashSync(password, BCRYPT_COST) : null; // Don't let the admin UI demote the last remaining admin — that would leave the // instance with no one able to manage it (and on OIDC-only setups, no recovery). #1274 if (role && role !== 'admin') { const current = this.db.get<{ role?: string }>('SELECT role FROM users WHERE id = ?', id); if (current?.role === 'admin') { const adminCount = this.db.get<{ count: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM users WHERE role = 'admin'")!.count; if (adminCount <= 1) return { error: 'Cannot remove the last admin', status: 400 }; } } // An admin sets a password for exactly one reason: the account is believed // compromised. Without bumping password_version, verifyJwtAndLoadUser keeps // accepting every cookie the intruder already holds, so the one action taken // to lock them out was the one action that did not. Both self-service paths // (changePassword, resetPassword) have always done this; this one had not. const newPv = password ? ((user as User & { password_version?: number }).password_version ?? 0) + 1 : null; this.db.transaction(() => { this.db.run( ` UPDATE users SET username = COALESCE(?, username), email = COALESCE(?, email), role = COALESCE(?, role), password_hash = COALESCE(?, password_hash), password_version = COALESCE(?, password_version), updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id = ? `, username || null, email || null, role || null, passwordHash, newPv, id, ); if (password) { // The version bump only invalidates JWT cookies. These two stores carry // their own credentials and are revoked separately, exactly as the // self-service paths do it. this.db.run('DELETE FROM mcp_tokens WHERE user_id = ?', id); try { this.db.run( 'UPDATE oauth_tokens SET revoked_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE user_id = ? AND revoked_at IS NULL', id, ); } catch { /* very old installs predate oauth_tokens */ } } }); if (password) { try { revokeUserSessions(Number(id)); } catch { /* best-effort, same as elsewhere */ } } const updated = this.db.get('SELECT id, username, email, role, created_at, updated_at FROM users WHERE id = ?', id); const changed: string[] = []; if (username) changed.push('username'); if (email) changed.push('email'); if (role) changed.push('role'); if (password) changed.push('password'); return { user: updated, previousEmail: user.email, changed, }; } deleteUser(id: string, currentUserId: number) { if (Number.parseInt(id) === currentUserId) { return { error: 'Cannot delete own account', status: 400 }; } const userToDel = this.db.get<{ id: number; email: string }>('SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE id = ?', id); if (!userToDel) return { error: 'User not found', status: 404 }; this.userCleanup.deleteUserCompletely(userToDel.id); emitUserDeleted(userToDel.id); // let plugins erase their own per-user data return { email: userToDel.email }; } resetUserPasskeys(id: string) { return this.passkeys.adminResetPasskeys(Number(id)); } /** * Clear another account's TOTP so its owner can enrol again. * * The passkey half of this has existed since passkeys landed; the TOTP half * never did, which left one ordinary event with no answer: somebody on a trip * loses their phone. Without this the only ways out are an operator reaching * into the database or the account being deleted and rebuilt. * * Never for the caller themselves. An admin who wants their own MFA gone * disables it through Settings, where the current password is required — * making that reachable from here would turn a stolen admin session into a * way to strip the second factor off the very account it came from. */ resetUserMfa(id: string, actingUserId: number): { error?: string; status?: number; success?: boolean; email?: string } { const targetId = Number(id); if (targetId === actingUserId) { return { error: 'Use Settings to change your own two-factor setup', status: 400 }; } const target = this.db.get<{ id: number; email: string; mfa_enabled: number | boolean }>( 'SELECT id, email, mfa_enabled FROM users WHERE id = ?', targetId, ); if (!target) return { error: 'User not found', status: 404 }; // Same three columns disableMfa clears, so an admin reset and a self-service // disable leave the account in exactly one state rather than two. this.db.run( 'UPDATE users SET mfa_enabled = 0, mfa_secret = NULL, mfa_backup_codes = NULL, updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id = ?', targetId, ); return { success: true, email: target.email }; } // ── Stats ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── getStats() { const totalUsers = this.db.get<{ count: number }>('SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM users WHERE COALESCE(is_guest, 0) = 0')!.count; const totalTrips = this.db.get<{ count: number }>('SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM trips')!.count; const totalPlaces = this.db.get<{ count: number }>('SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM places')!.count; const totalFiles = this.db.get<{ count: number }>('SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM trip_files')!.count; return { totalUsers, totalTrips, totalPlaces, totalFiles }; } // ── Permissions ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── getPermissions() { const current = this.permissions.getAllPermissions(); const actions = PERMISSION_ACTIONS.map((a) => ({ key: a.key, level: current[a.key], defaultLevel: a.defaultLevel, allowedLevels: a.allowedLevels, })); return { permissions: actions }; } savePermissions(permissions: Record) { const { skipped } = this.permissions.savePermissions(permissions); return { permissions: this.permissions.getAllPermissions(), skipped }; } // ── Audit Log ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── getAuditLog(query: { limit?: string; offset?: string }) { const limitRaw = Number.parseInt(String(query.limit || '100'), 10); const offsetRaw = Number.parseInt(String(query.offset || '0'), 10); const limit = Math.min(Math.max(Number.isFinite(limitRaw) ? limitRaw : 100, 1), 500); const offset = Math.max(Number.isFinite(offsetRaw) ? offsetRaw : 0, 0); type Row = { id: number; created_at: string; user_id: number | null; username: string | null; user_email: string | null; action: string; resource: string | null; details: string | null; ip: string | null; }; const rows = this.db.all( ` SELECT a.id, a.created_at, a.user_id, u.username, u.email as user_email, a.action, a.resource, a.details, a.ip FROM audit_log a LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = a.user_id ORDER BY a.id DESC LIMIT ? OFFSET ? `, limit, offset, ); const total = this.db.get<{ c: number }>('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM audit_log')!.c; const entries = rows.map((r) => { // Unparseable details fall back to the raw string rather than the old // { _parse_error: true } sentinel, which the admin UI rendered literally. let details: Record | string | null = null; if (r.details) { try { details = JSON.parse(r.details) as Record; } catch { details = r.details; } } const created_at = r.created_at && !r.created_at.endsWith('Z') ? r.created_at.replace(' ', 'T') + 'Z' : r.created_at; return { ...r, created_at, details }; }); return { entries, total, limit, offset }; } // ── Demo Baseline ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── saveDemoBaseline(): { error?: string; status?: number; message?: string } { if (!readEnv().demo.enabled) { return { error: 'Not found', status: 404 }; } try { // Lazy require: demo-reset is a demo-only module. const { saveBaseline } = require('../../demo/demo-reset'); saveBaseline(); return { message: 'Demo baseline saved. Hourly resets will restore to this state.' }; } catch (err: unknown) { console.error(err); return { error: 'Failed to save baseline', status: 500 }; } } // ── GitHub Integration ───────────────────────────────────────────────────── /** * GitHub fetch with the timeout + size cap the outbound-fetch rule requires * (server/CLAUDE.md). Returns null on any failure; callers decide the fallback. */ private async fetchGithub(url: string): Promise { try { const resp = await fetch(url, { headers: { Accept: 'application/vnd.github.v3+json', 'User-Agent': 'TREK-Server' }, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(GITHUB_TIMEOUT_MS), }); if (!resp.ok) return null; const text = await resp.text(); if (text.length > GITHUB_MAX_BYTES) { console.error(`[admin] GitHub response exceeded ${GITHUB_MAX_BYTES} bytes, ignoring`); return null; } return JSON.parse(text); } catch (err: unknown) { console.error(`[admin] GitHub request failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`); return null; } } async getGithubReleases(perPage: string = '10', page: string = '1') { // The query arrives as raw strings from the admin UI; clamp to what the // GitHub API accepts instead of interpolating them into the URL as given. const per = Math.min(Math.max(Number.parseInt(perPage, 10) || 10, 1), 100); const pg = Math.max(Number.parseInt(page, 10) || 1, 1); const qs = new URLSearchParams({ per_page: String(per), page: String(pg) }); const data = await this.fetchGithub(`https://api.github.com/repos/liketrek/TREK/releases?${qs}`); return Array.isArray(data) ? data : []; } async checkVersion(): Promise { // Lazy require, re-anchored for nest/admin/ (was ../../package.json in services/). const currentVersion: string = readEnv().app.appVersion || require('../../../package.json').version; const isPrerelease = currentVersion.includes('-pre.'); // Answered rather than refused on a centrally administered install: the admin // page calls this on open, and a 403 there would be an error message where a // quiet surface belongs. The operator decides when to upgrade, so from inside // the instance there is nothing available. if (readEnv().managed.enabled) { return { current: currentVersion, latest: currentVersion, update_available: false, is_docker: isDocker, is_prerelease: isPrerelease, }; } const cached = readVersionCache(); if (cached) return cached; const fallback: VersionInfo = { current: currentVersion, latest: currentVersion, update_available: false, is_docker: isDocker, is_prerelease: isPrerelease, }; // Failures cache too (on a shorter TTL), so a GitHub outage doesn't mean a // live fetch on every admin page load — the legacy code only cached success. const fail = () => { writeVersionCache(fallback, VERSION_FAILURE_TTL); return fallback; }; let result: VersionInfo; if (isPrerelease) { // Fetch release list and find the newest prerelease const data = await this.fetchGithub('https://api.github.com/repos/liketrek/TREK/releases?per_page=100') as | Array<{ tag_name?: string; html_url?: string; prerelease?: boolean }> | null; if (!data) return fail(); const prereleases = Array.isArray(data) ? data.filter((r) => r.prerelease) : []; if (!prereleases.length) return fail(); // Pre-compute stripped versions, then sort descending const tagged = prereleases.map((r) => ({ r, v: (r.tag_name || '').replace(/^v/, '') })); tagged.sort((a, b) => compareVersions(b.v, a.v)); const latest = tagged[0].v; const update_available = !!latest && latest !== currentVersion && compareVersions(latest, currentVersion) > 0; result = { current: currentVersion, latest, update_available, release_url: tagged[0].r.html_url || '', is_docker: isDocker, is_prerelease: true, }; } else { const data = await this.fetchGithub('https://api.github.com/repos/liketrek/TREK/releases/latest') as | { tag_name?: string; html_url?: string } | null; if (!data) return fail(); const latest = (data.tag_name || '').replace(/^v/, ''); const update_available = !!latest && latest !== currentVersion && compareVersions(latest, currentVersion) > 0; result = { current: currentVersion, latest, update_available, release_url: data.html_url || '', is_docker: isDocker, is_prerelease: false, }; } writeVersionCache(result); return result; } async checkAndNotifyVersion(): Promise { try { const result = await this.checkVersion(); if (!result.update_available) return; const lastNotified = this.db.get<{ value: string }>( 'SELECT value FROM app_settings WHERE key = ?', 'last_notified_version', )?.value; if (lastNotified === result.latest) return; this.db.run( 'INSERT OR REPLACE INTO app_settings (key, value) VALUES (?, ?)', 'last_notified_version', result.latest, ); await this.notifications.send({ event: 'version_available', actorId: null, scope: 'admin', targetId: 0, params: { version: result.latest }, }); } catch { // Silently ignore — version check is non-critical } } // ── Addons ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── listAddons() { const addons = this.db .all('SELECT * FROM addons ORDER BY sort_order, id') // Hidden rather than shown-and-refused, because a toggle that answers 403 // is worse than no toggle. // // AI parsing: the endpoint, the model and what a document costs all belong // to the operator, so there is no instance decision left to make — not even // whether it runs. // // AirTrail: the addon exists to reach a server the admin runs themselves, // and a managed instance has no route to one. .filter( (a) => !( readEnv().managed.enabled && (a.id === ADDON_IDS.LLM_PARSING || a.id === ADDON_IDS.AIRTRAIL) ), ); const providers = this.db.all<{ id: string; name: string; description?: string | null; icon: string; enabled: number; sort_order: number; }>(` SELECT id, name, description, icon, enabled, sort_order FROM photo_providers ORDER BY sort_order, id `) // Immich and Synology Photos are servers the admin runs at home. A managed // instance cannot reach one (its egress does not go there, and it should // not), so offering the connection would only produce a timeout. .filter(() => !readEnv().managed.enabled); const fields = this.db.all<{ provider_id: string; field_key: string; label: string; input_type: string; placeholder?: string | null; required: number; secret: number; settings_key?: string | null; payload_key?: string | null; sort_order: number; }>(` SELECT provider_id, field_key, label, input_type, placeholder, required, secret, settings_key, payload_key, sort_order FROM photo_provider_fields ORDER BY sort_order, id `); const fieldsByProvider = new Map(); for (const field of fields) { const arr = fieldsByProvider.get(field.provider_id) || []; arr.push(field); fieldsByProvider.set(field.provider_id, arr); } return [ ...addons.map((a) => ({ ...a, enabled: !!a.enabled, config: a.id === ADDON_IDS.LLM_PARSING ? maskLlmAddonConfig(JSON.parse(a.config || '{}')) : JSON.parse(a.config || '{}'), })), ...providers.map((p) => ({ id: p.id, name: p.name, description: p.description, type: 'photo_provider', icon: p.icon, enabled: !!p.enabled, config: getPhotoProviderConfig(p.id), fields: (fieldsByProvider.get(p.id) || []).map((f) => ({ key: f.field_key, label: f.label, input_type: f.input_type, placeholder: f.placeholder || '', required: !!f.required, secret: !!f.secret, settings_key: f.settings_key || null, payload_key: f.payload_key || null, sort_order: f.sort_order, })), sort_order: p.sort_order, })), ]; } updateAddon(id: string, data: { enabled?: boolean; config?: Record }) { type ProviderRow = { id: string; name: string; description?: string | null; icon: string; enabled: number; sort_order: number }; const addon = this.db.get('SELECT * FROM addons WHERE id = ?', id); const provider = this.db.get('SELECT * FROM photo_providers WHERE id = ?', id); if (!addon && !provider) return { error: 'Addon not found', status: 404 }; // The whole addon, not just its config: on a centrally administered install // the operator owns the endpoint, the model and the per-document cost, so // there is nothing here for an instance admin to set — including whether it // runs at all. listAddons hides the row; this closes the route behind it. if (readEnv().managed.enabled && id === ADDON_IDS.LLM_PARSING) { return { error: MANAGED_FORBIDDEN_ERROR.error, status: 403 }; } this.db.transaction(() => { if (addon) { if (data.enabled !== undefined) this.db.run('UPDATE addons SET enabled = ? WHERE id = ?', data.enabled ? 1 : 0, id); if (data.config !== undefined) { // The AI-parsing addon holds an API key — encrypt it at rest and preserve // the stored key when the client echoes the mask sentinel (see llmConfig.ts). const configToStore = id === ADDON_IDS.LLM_PARSING ? prepareLlmAddonConfigForWrite(data.config, JSON.parse(addon.config || '{}')) : data.config; this.db.run('UPDATE addons SET config = ? WHERE id = ?', JSON.stringify(configToStore), id); } } else { if (data.enabled !== undefined) this.db.run('UPDATE photo_providers SET enabled = ? WHERE id = ?', data.enabled ? 1 : 0, id); } }); const updatedAddon = this.db.get('SELECT * FROM addons WHERE id = ?', id); const updatedProvider = this.db.get('SELECT * FROM photo_providers WHERE id = ?', id); const updated = updatedAddon ? { ...updatedAddon, enabled: !!updatedAddon.enabled, config: updatedAddon.id === ADDON_IDS.LLM_PARSING ? maskLlmAddonConfig(JSON.parse(updatedAddon.config || '{}')) : JSON.parse(updatedAddon.config || '{}'), } : updatedProvider ? { id: updatedProvider.id, name: updatedProvider.name, description: updatedProvider.description, type: 'photo_provider', icon: updatedProvider.icon, enabled: !!updatedProvider.enabled, config: getPhotoProviderConfig(updatedProvider.id), sort_order: updatedProvider.sort_order, } : null; // Only these addons gate MCP tool/resource/prompt registration (see // registerTools/registerResources) — and only a real enabled-flip changes // what a session would register. Config-only saves, photo providers and // MCP-irrelevant addons must not tear down every live session (#1414). const MCP_RELEVANT_ADDONS = new Set([ ADDON_IDS.MCP, ADDON_IDS.PACKING, ADDON_IDS.BUDGET, ADDON_IDS.COLLAB, ADDON_IDS.ATLAS, ADDON_IDS.VACAY, ADDON_IDS.JOURNEY, ]); const enabledChanged = !!addon && data.enabled !== undefined && (data.enabled ? 1 : 0) !== addon.enabled; return { addon: updated, mcpAffected: enabledChanged && MCP_RELEVANT_ADDONS.has(id), auditDetails: { enabled: data.enabled !== undefined ? !!data.enabled : undefined, config_changed: data.config !== undefined, }, }; } // ── JWT Rotation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── rotateJwtSecret(): { error?: string; status?: number } { const newSecret = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex'); // Re-anchored one directory deeper for nest/admin/ (was '../../data' in services/). const dataDir = path.resolve(__dirname, '../../../data'); const secretFile = path.join(dataDir, '.jwt_secret'); try { if (!fs.existsSync(dataDir)) fs.mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(secretFile, newSecret, { mode: 0o600 }); } catch { return { error: 'Failed to persist new JWT secret to disk', status: 500 }; } updateJwtSecret(newSecret); return {}; } invalidateMcpSessions() { invalidateMcpSessions(); } // ── Settings + notification preference helpers (non-admin-service modules) ── }