chore(workflow): single workflow that runs the test AND the sonar gate (#2046)

This commit is contained in:
jubnl
2026-08-25 21:54:31 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 981a634dfb
commit b98363b2b0
5 changed files with 272 additions and 819 deletions
-234
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@@ -1,234 +0,0 @@
name: SonarQube
permissions:
contents: read
# SonarQube Cloud analysis: pushes to dev and main produce branch analysis,
# pull requests get PR analysis with decoration on the PR itself (the scanner
# picks the context up from the Actions environment). Fork PRs are skipped —
# they don't receive SONAR_TOKEN, so the guard on the coverage jobs stops the
# whole run (the scan job follows through `needs:`) instead of failing it.
# Automatic Analysis must stay disabled on sonarcloud.io — it is mutually
# exclusive with CI-based analysis, and it cannot import the lcov coverage
# this workflow produces.
#
# Coverage is generated by four parallel jobs (same split as test.yml) instead
# of one serial `npm run test:cov` — the serial run takes ~30 minutes, the
# fan-out about half that. The scan job then drops each package's lcov into
# the path sonar.javascript.lcov.reportPaths expects and runs the scanner.
on:
push:
branches: [main, dev]
pull_request:
branches: [main, dev]
# Same code filter as test.yml (plus the sonar config itself): a PR that
# touches none of these can't change the analysis, so don't spend the
# ~15-minute coverage fan-out on it. Pushes stay unfiltered so the branch
# view is always refreshed from the merge result.
paths:
- 'server/**'
- 'client/**'
- 'shared/**'
- 'plugin-sdk/**'
- 'package.json'
- 'package-lock.json'
- 'sonar-project.properties'
- '.github/workflows/sonarqube.yml'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
server-coverage:
name: Server Coverage
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# Fork PRs don't get SONAR_TOKEN, so the scan at the end could never run —
# skip the coverage work too rather than produce artifacts nothing reads.
# (Same guard on all four coverage jobs; the scan job inherits the skip
# through `needs:`.)
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
node-version: 24
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: package-lock.json
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci
- name: Ensure @swc/core's Linux binary for unplugin-swc
# The lockfile was generated on Windows and omits @swc/core's Linux
# optional native binary, so npm ci/install skips it on the runner.
# Install the matching version explicitly so the server's SWC transform
# (server/vitest.config.ts) can load.
run: |
SWC_VERSION=$(node -p "require('@swc/core/package.json').version")
npm install --no-save --legacy-peer-deps "@swc/core-linux-x64-gnu@$SWC_VERSION"
- name: Build shared
run: npm run build --workspace=shared
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: cd server && npm run test:coverage
- name: Upload coverage
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-server-coverage
path: server/coverage/
retention-days: 1
client-coverage:
name: Client Coverage
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
node-version: 24
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: package-lock.json
# Only the shared and client workspaces — a full root npm ci is not
# needed, and the scoped install keeps @testing-library/dom (a peer of
# @testing-library/react) in the tree without the re-resolution dance
# the folded coverage job used to need.
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci --workspace shared && npm ci --workspace client
- name: Build shared
run: npm run build --workspace=shared
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: cd client && npm run test:coverage
- name: Upload coverage
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-client-coverage
path: client/coverage/
retention-days: 1
shared-coverage:
name: Shared Coverage
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
node-version: 24
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: package-lock.json
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci --workspace shared
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: cd shared && npm run test:coverage
- name: Upload coverage
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-shared-coverage
path: shared/coverage/
retention-days: 1
plugin-sdk-coverage:
name: Plugin SDK Coverage
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository
defaults:
run:
working-directory: plugin-sdk
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
# 22 matches the TREK server runtime and has node:sqlite, which the
# dev-server tests exercise (same choice as test.yml and
# publish-plugin-sdk.yml).
node-version: 22
# plugin-sdk is standalone (own lockfile, not a root workspace), so it
# installs from its own directory.
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: npm run test:coverage
- name: Upload coverage
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-plugin-sdk-coverage
path: plugin-sdk/coverage/
retention-days: 1
scan:
name: Scan
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# Coverage jobs failing must stop the scan: a missing lcov file would make
# every line of that package report as uncovered, and the dashboard would
# show a collapse that did not happen.
needs: [server-coverage, client-coverage, shared-coverage, plugin-sdk-coverage]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
# Sonar reads git blame to date each issue and to decide what counts
# as new code. A shallow clone leaves it blind to both.
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Download server coverage
uses: actions/download-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-server-coverage
path: server/coverage/
- name: Download client coverage
uses: actions/download-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-client-coverage
path: client/coverage/
- name: Download shared coverage
uses: actions/download-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-shared-coverage
path: shared/coverage/
- name: Download plugin-sdk coverage
uses: actions/download-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-plugin-sdk-coverage
path: plugin-sdk/coverage/
- name: Scan
uses: SonarSource/sonarqube-scan-action@v8
env:
# SonarQube Cloud is the scan action's default host, so no
# SONAR_HOST_URL — the token is a sonarcloud.io token for the
# liketrek org.
SONAR_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SONAR_TOKEN }}
with:
# New Code is configured as "previous version", so this string is what
# draws that line — changing it re-bases every "new code" metric.
# Pinned rather than read from package.json on purpose: package.json is
# still on 3.4.1 while the project has been analysed as 4.0.0 all along,
# and taking the lower number would silently move the baseline. Bump it
# here as part of the release, together with the version bump.
#
# Everything else — sources, tests, exclusions, the documented
# false-positive list — lives in sonar-project.properties so it stays
# reviewable in a PR rather than buried in workflow YAML.
args: -Dsonar.projectVersion=4.0.0
+265 -124
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@@ -1,46 +1,84 @@
name: Tests
name: Tests & SonarQube
permissions:
contents: read
# The repo's test/quality CI and SonarQube Cloud analysis in one workflow, so
# each test suite runs once per event instead of once for the old test.yml and
# once more for Sonar's coverage. Pushes to dev and main produce branch
# analysis; pull requests get PR analysis with decoration on the PR itself
# (the scanner picks the context up from the Actions environment).
#
# Job layout — three tiers:
# - Preflight: plugin-facts, i18n-parity and the quality jobs
# (server-quality, client-quality, plugin-sdk-quality) hold the cheap
# generated-code/typecheck/lint/smoke gates. Every test job `needs:` all
# of them, so a gate failure stops the run before the expensive coverage
# fan-out spends ~15 runner-minutes on a result the gates already sank.
# - Tests: the *-coverage jobs run the suites and upload lcov; s3-contract
# runs the MinIO contract suite. Coverage jobs run tests only — with the
# gates cleared in preflight, they can only fail because tests failed.
# - Scan `needs:` exactly the four coverage jobs. A coverage job failing
# must stop the scan — a missing lcov file would make every line of that
# package report as uncovered, and the dashboard would show a collapse
# that did not happen. (The preflight gates stop it transitively.)
# - Fork PRs don't receive secrets, so the two jobs that need them skip
# themselves: s3-contract (MINIO_LICENSE_KEY) and scan (SONAR_TOKEN).
# Everything else runs on fork PRs so outside contributors still get the
# full test signal.
#
# Automatic Analysis must stay disabled on sonarcloud.io — it is mutually
# exclusive with CI-based analysis, and it cannot import the lcov coverage
# this workflow produces.
on:
push:
branches: [main, dev]
pull_request:
branches: [main, dev]
# A PR that touches none of these can't change the tests or the analysis,
# so don't spend the coverage fan-out on it. Pushes stay unfiltered so the
# branch view is always refreshed from the merge result.
paths:
- 'server/**'
- 'client/**'
- 'shared/**'
- 'plugin-sdk/**'
# npm workspaces hoist every dependency into the single root lockfile, so
# a dependency bump touches none of the four directories above — and a
# native binding like better-sqlite3 is exactly what needs the suite.
# npm workspaces hoist every dependency into the single root lockfile,
# so a dependency bump touches none of the four directories above — and
# a native binding like better-sqlite3 is exactly what needs the suite.
- 'package.json'
- 'package-lock.json'
- 'Dockerfile'
- 'docker-compose.yml'
- '.github/workflows/test.yml'
- 'sonar-project.properties'
- '.github/workflows/sonarqube.yml'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
plugin-facts:
name: Plugin Permission Facts
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v4
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
# 22 matches the TREK server runtime (same choice as the plugin-sdk
# jobs and publish-plugin-sdk.yml).
node-version: 22
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: package-lock.json
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci --workspace server
# The plugin permission facts live once, in
# server/src/nest/plugins/protocol/envelope.ts. Every other copy - the SDK's
# generated/host-facts.ts and shared's plugin-permissions.ts - is generated from it
# and checked in, because publish-plugin-sdk builds from a standalone checkout with
# no server present. This fails the PR if a copy drifts, if a new permission has no
# admin.plugins.perm.* translation, or if the CLI has no hint for it.
# server/src/nest/plugins/protocol/envelope.ts. Every other copy — the
# SDK's generated/host-facts.ts and shared's plugin-permissions.ts — is
# generated from it and checked in, because publish-plugin-sdk builds
# from a standalone checkout with no server present. This fails the run
# if a copy drifts, if a new permission has no admin.plugins.perm.*
# translation, or if the CLI has no hint for it.
- name: Check the generated plugin facts are in sync
run: cd server && npm run check:plugin-facts
@@ -58,75 +96,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Check i18n key parity
run: node shared/scripts/i18n-parity.mjs --strict
shared-contracts:
name: Shared Contracts (Zod)
server-quality:
name: Server Types & Lint
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
node-version: 24
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: package-lock.json
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci --workspace shared
- name: Typecheck
run: cd shared && npm run typecheck
- name: Run tests
run: cd shared && npm run test:coverage
- name: Upload coverage
if: success()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: shared-coverage
path: shared/coverage/
retention-days: 7
plugin-sdk-tests:
name: Plugin SDK Tests
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
defaults:
run:
working-directory: plugin-sdk
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
# 22 matches the TREK server runtime and has node:sqlite, which the
# dev-server tests exercise (same choice as publish-plugin-sdk.yml).
node-version: 22
# plugin-sdk is standalone (own lockfile, not a root workspace), so it
# installs from its own directory.
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci
- name: Typecheck
run: npm run typecheck
- name: Run tests
run: npm run test:coverage
- name: Upload coverage
if: success()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: plugin-sdk-coverage
path: plugin-sdk/coverage/
retention-days: 7
server-tests:
name: Server Tests
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
@@ -139,18 +111,15 @@ jobs:
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci
- name: Ensure @swc/core's Linux binary for unplugin-swc
# The lockfile was generated on Windows and omits @swc/core's Linux
# optional native binary, so npm ci/install skips it on the runner.
# Install the matching version explicitly so the server's SWC transform
# (server/vitest.config.ts) can load.
run: |
SWC_VERSION=$(node -p "require('@swc/core/package.json').version")
npm install --no-save --legacy-peer-deps "@swc/core-linux-x64-gnu@$SWC_VERSION"
- name: Build shared
run: npm run build --workspace=shared
- name: Typecheck shared
# Rides along here rather than in shared-coverage: this job already
# pays the root install and shared build, and a coverage job may only
# fail because tests failed (it gates the scan).
run: cd shared && npm run typecheck
- name: Build server (tsc -> dist)
run: cd server && npm run build
@@ -166,30 +135,73 @@ jobs:
- name: Typecheck tests
# tests/ is outside the build tsconfig, so a service that grows a
# constructor parameter does not break its hand-wired call sites at
# compile time: the argument arrives as undefined and throws at runtime,
# if anything reads it at all. This is the step that catches it.
# compile time: the argument arrives as undefined and throws at
# runtime, if anything reads it at all. This is the step that
# catches it.
run: cd server && npm run typecheck:tests
- name: Lint
run: cd server && npm run lint:check
- name: Run tests
run: cd server && npm run test:coverage
client-quality:
name: Client Types & Lint
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
- name: Upload coverage
if: success()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
name: backend-coverage
path: server/coverage/
retention-days: 7
node-version: 24
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: package-lock.json
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci --workspace shared && npm ci --workspace client
- name: Build shared
run: npm run build --workspace=shared
- name: Typecheck
run: cd client && npm run typecheck
- name: Lint
run: cd client && npm run lint:check
- name: Page pattern check
run: cd client && npm run lint:pages
plugin-sdk-quality:
name: Plugin SDK Types
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
defaults:
run:
working-directory: plugin-sdk
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
node-version: 22
# plugin-sdk is standalone (own lockfile, not a root workspace), so it
# installs from its own directory.
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci
- name: Typecheck
run: npm run typecheck
s3-contract:
name: S3 Driver Contract (MinIO)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# Fork PRs don't get repo secrets, so MINIO_LICENSE_KEY would be empty
# and the AIStor container would fail to boot.
if: github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository
needs: [plugin-facts, i18n-parity, server-quality, client-quality, plugin-sdk-quality]
# Fork PRs don't get repo secrets, so MINIO_LICENSE_KEY would be empty and
# the AIStor container would fail to boot. Pushes and manual dispatches do
# have secrets, so only fork PRs are filtered out. (The implicit success()
# on this expression also keeps the job skipped when a preflight fails.)
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
@@ -253,14 +265,10 @@ jobs:
TREK_TEST_S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: trekci-secret
run: cd server && npx vitest run tests/unit/nest/storage/s3.driver.contract.test.ts
client-quality:
# Split out of client-tests: the suite takes ~11 minutes, and having the
# gates in front of it meant a single lint finding threw away the whole test
# signal for that run. Both jobs pay the install/build, which is cheap next
# to running the two in series.
name: Client Types & Lint
server-coverage:
name: Server Coverage
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [plugin-facts, i18n-parity, server-quality, client-quality, plugin-sdk-quality]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
@@ -271,24 +279,34 @@ jobs:
cache-dependency-path: package-lock.json
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci --workspace shared && npm ci --workspace client
run: npm ci
- name: Ensure @swc/core's Linux binary for unplugin-swc
# The lockfile was generated on Windows and omits @swc/core's Linux
# optional native binary, so npm ci/install skips it on the runner.
# Install the matching version explicitly so the server's SWC transform
# (server/vitest.config.ts) can load.
run: |
SWC_VERSION=$(node -p "require('@swc/core/package.json').version")
npm install --no-save --legacy-peer-deps "@swc/core-linux-x64-gnu@$SWC_VERSION"
- name: Build shared
run: npm run build --workspace=shared
- name: Typecheck
run: cd client && npm run typecheck
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: cd server && npm run test:coverage
- name: Lint
run: cd client && npm run lint:check
- name: Upload coverage
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-server-coverage
path: server/coverage/
retention-days: 1
- name: Page pattern check
run: cd client && npm run lint:pages
client-tests:
name: Client Tests
client-coverage:
name: Client Coverage
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [plugin-facts, i18n-parity, server-quality, client-quality, plugin-sdk-quality]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
@@ -298,19 +316,142 @@ jobs:
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: package-lock.json
# Only the shared and client workspaces — a full root npm ci is not
# needed, and the scoped install keeps @testing-library/dom (a peer of
# @testing-library/react) in the tree without the re-resolution dance
# the folded coverage job used to need.
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci --workspace shared && npm ci --workspace client
- name: Build shared
run: npm run build --workspace=shared
- name: Run tests
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: cd client && npm run test:coverage
- name: Upload coverage
if: success()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: frontend-coverage
name: sonar-client-coverage
path: client/coverage/
retention-days: 7
retention-days: 1
shared-coverage:
name: Shared Coverage
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [plugin-facts, i18n-parity, server-quality, client-quality, plugin-sdk-quality]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
node-version: 24
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: package-lock.json
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci --workspace shared
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: cd shared && npm run test:coverage
- name: Upload coverage
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-shared-coverage
path: shared/coverage/
retention-days: 1
plugin-sdk-coverage:
name: Plugin SDK Coverage
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [plugin-facts, i18n-parity, server-quality, client-quality, plugin-sdk-quality]
defaults:
run:
working-directory: plugin-sdk
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
# 22 matches the TREK server runtime and has node:sqlite, which the
# dev-server tests exercise (same choice as publish-plugin-sdk.yml).
node-version: 22
# plugin-sdk is standalone (own lockfile, not a root workspace), so it
# installs from its own directory.
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci
- name: Run tests with coverage
run: npm run test:coverage
- name: Upload coverage
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-plugin-sdk-coverage
path: plugin-sdk/coverage/
retention-days: 1
scan:
name: Scan
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# Fork PRs don't receive SONAR_TOKEN — skip the scan rather than fail it.
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository
# Coverage jobs failing must stop the scan: a missing lcov file would make
# every line of that package report as uncovered, and the dashboard would
# show a collapse that did not happen. The preflight gates already stop it
# transitively through these four, so they aren't repeated here.
needs: [server-coverage, client-coverage, shared-coverage, plugin-sdk-coverage]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
# Sonar reads git blame to date each issue and to decide what counts
# as new code. A shallow clone leaves it blind to both.
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Download server coverage
uses: actions/download-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-server-coverage
path: server/coverage/
- name: Download client coverage
uses: actions/download-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-client-coverage
path: client/coverage/
- name: Download shared coverage
uses: actions/download-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-shared-coverage
path: shared/coverage/
- name: Download plugin-sdk coverage
uses: actions/download-artifact@v6
with:
name: sonar-plugin-sdk-coverage
path: plugin-sdk/coverage/
- name: Scan
uses: SonarSource/sonarqube-scan-action@v8
env:
# SonarQube Cloud is the scan action's default host, so no
# SONAR_HOST_URL — the token is a sonarcloud.io token for the
# liketrek org.
SONAR_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SONAR_TOKEN }}
with:
# New Code is configured as "previous version", so this string is what
# draws that line — changing it re-bases every "new code" metric.
# Pinned rather than read from package.json on purpose: package.json is
# still on 3.4.1 while the project has been analysed as 4.0.0 all along,
# and taking the lower number would silently move the baseline. Bump it
# here as part of the release, together with the version bump.
#
# Everything else — sources, tests, exclusions, the documented
# false-positive list — lives in sonar-project.properties so it stays
# reviewable in a PR rather than buried in workflow YAML.
args: -Dsonar.projectVersion=4.0.0
+2 -1
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ A self-hosted, real-time collaborative travel planner — with maps, budgets, pa
 
<a href="https://hub.docker.com/r/mauriceboe/trek"><img alt="Docker" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Docker-ready-2496ED?style=for-the-badge" /></a>
&nbsp;
<a href="https://sonarcloud.io/project/overview?id=liketrek_TREK"><img alt="Sonar Quality Gate" src="https://img.shields.io/sonar/quality_gate/liketrek_TREK?server=https%3A%2F%2Fsonarcloud.io&style=for-the-badge" /></a>
&nbsp;
<a href="https://discord.gg/NhZBDSd4qW"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?style=for-the-badge" /></a>
&nbsp;
<a href="https://kanban.pakulat.org/shared/I4wxF6inOOMB0C6hH6kQm3efyNxFjwyI"><img alt="Roadmap" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Roadmap-view-0EA5E9?style=for-the-badge" /></a>
@@ -33,7 +35,6 @@ A self-hosted, real-time collaborative travel planner — with maps, budgets, pa
<a href="https://github.com/liketrek/TREK/releases"><img alt="Latest Release" src="https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/liketrek/trek?include_prereleases&style=flat-square&color=6B7280" /></a>
<a href="https://hub.docker.com/r/mauriceboe/trek"><img alt="Docker Pulls" src="https://img.shields.io/docker/pulls/mauriceboe/trek?style=flat-square&color=6B7280" /></a>
<a href="https://github.com/liketrek/TREK"><img alt="Stars" src="https://img.shields.io/github/stars/liketrek/trek?style=flat-square&color=6B7280" /></a>
</div>
---
+5 -1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,11 @@ export default defineConfig({
reporter: ['lcov', 'text'],
reportsDirectory: './coverage',
include: ['src/**/*.{ts,tsx}'],
exclude: ['src/main.tsx', 'src/vite-env.d.ts'],
// All .d.ts, not just vite-env: declaration files carry no executable
// code, and their lcov entries can't resolve on the Sonar side (its
// **/*.d.ts exclusion removes them from analysis), which surfaced as
// "Could not resolve 2 file paths" warnings in every scan.
exclude: ['src/main.tsx', 'src/**/*.d.ts'],
// Without these the Client Tests job produced a report, uploaded it and
// passed no matter what the number was — which is how coverage drifted
// down to ~48% unnoticed. 85 across the board is the floor we do not want
-459
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@@ -1,459 +0,0 @@
# Server modernization roadmap
Written 2026-07-28, after the budgetService migration and the domain-coherence audit.
Companion docs: `migrate.md` (service wave list), `migration-graph.md` (dependency-honest
order, regenerated 2026-07-28), `audit_report/domain-coherence-audit.md` (the 73 verified
coherence findings — IDs like `auth-1` below refer to it), `server/src/nest/README.md`
(the per-domain migration recipe), `server/src/nest/plugins/DI-MIGRATION.md` (plugin host,
Option B), `guards-audit.md` (request-pipeline guard audit, 2026-08-01 — authorization
before the Zod pipe; see the "Request-pipeline guards" stream below).
> **Status 2026-08-10 — the migration itself is finished.** Phases 0–5 all landed:
> `src/services/` was deleted (`49652816`) and `server/eslint.config.mjs` now errors
> on any import of it; every wave domain has a Nest module; the body-contract
> allow-list is empty; the guards capstone (default-deny `GlobalAuthGuard` +
> `@Public()` + boot ratchet) shipped. The "deliberately late" plugin RPC decorator
> registry (Option B) and the backupService fold also landed. Still open below:
> guard slices 1/3 and their parked decisions, the last three tokenization
> registries, the operational-hardening items (all but the CI de-flake), and the
> bridge endgame — see the re-checked "Definition of done" at the bottom.
## Sequencing principles (learned from what already worked)
1. **Cross-cutting seams migrate early and cheap** — the permissions + auditLog precedent:
a small injectable + module-scoped cache + a bridge for legacy callers, swept through
consumers. Do this for anything imported by "nearly everything" *before* the big domains.
2. **Coherence fixes ride their domain's migration** — the exchangeRate→budget precedent:
misplaced code moves into its true domain *as part of* that domain's fold (parity first,
quirk fixes in a trailing `fix(server)` commit), not as a separate big-bang project.
Only the fixes that reshape the migration graph itself go first.
3. **Parity is law, ratchets stay on** — every migration is byte-identical relocation +
DTO adoption (the boot gate enforces allow-list shrinkage), verified by the full suite.
4. **Wrap globals behind injectables before replacing them** — the DatabaseService
precedent: an `@Injectable` facade first (mechanical sweep), transport swap later,
invisible behind the facade.
---
## Phase 0 — cross-cutting quick wins (before more domain migrations)
- [x] **`getAppUrl()` / `getMcpSafeUrl()` → `src/app-config`** (done 2026-07-28; findings `auth-2`,
`notifications-1`, `admin-3`, `mcp-1` — four auditors independently). Two functions,
near-zero risk. Deletes the fake `→ notifications` edges for auth, oidc, webauthn,
plugin-oauth, maps, transit, the MCP issuer and `index.ts`. Do first: it shrinks the
notifications cluster before Phase 2 migrates it.
- [x] **Extract addons from adminService** (done 2026-07-28; findings `admin-1`;
permissions-style: DI `AddonsService` methods + `addons.bridge.ts` for legacy callers —
the module-scoped cache was deliberately skipped: the legacy reads were uncached per-call
queries and `updateAddon` (still in adminService) has no invalidation hook, so a cache
would change admin-toggle visibility; revisit when `updateAddon` moves in Wave 5).
`isAddonEnabled` was imported by nearly every domain incl. every `.mcp.ts` `when:` gate.
Removed the biggest fan-in from the Wave-5 admin god-service.
- [x] **Injectable `RealtimeService` over the ws singleton** (done 2026-07-29: `@Global`
RealtimeModule, call-time delegation so the 106 `vi.mock('src/websocket')` suites keep
intercepting, arity-preserving pass-through; all 17 `nest/` importers + 9 bridges swept;
typed against the registry in a follow-up commit) (DatabaseService pattern:
`@Injectable` wrapping `broadcast`/`broadcastToUser`, module-scoped so bridge instances
share it). Sweep migrated `nest/` services to inject it instead of
`import { broadcast } from '../../websocket'`. This is step 1 of the WebSocket goal —
the actual `@WebSocketGateway` transport swap comes much later, invisibly, behind this
facade. Do NOT rewrite the ws server itself (auth/rooms/heartbeat/rate-limiting is
production-grade; audit says extend, don't rewrite). Pair with the **WS event contract
registry** (see "Tokenization & registries") — the facade is the choke point where the
typed event signature lands.
## Phase 1 — tripService migration (done 2026-07)
The hub: no blockers left, six bridge consumers die (budget/collab/days/packing/
reservations/vacay bridges become injections). Includes, per the standard recipe:
- MCP: port the trips registrar (+ prompts/resources seams) to `trips.mcp.ts`.
- DTOs: trips controller adopts shared-schema DTOs, allow-list entries removed.
- Coherence fixes to fold in (trailing fix commits): `trip-1` (ICS engine → own module),
`collections-3` (guest-erasure ownership), `collections-7` (cover-file reclamation
helper out of the trips god-file), and the registrar drift findings `mcp-5`
(update_trip hand-wired rebase ordering) die with the MCP port.
## Phase 2 — notifications cluster → notificationService (+ scheduler) (done 2026-08)
Smaller after Phase 0. Unblocks the maps chain and the admin corner.
- Migrate `notifications.ts` + `notificationService` + prefs + inApp + channelRegistry as
one unit (they are one concept in five files — see notifications section of the audit).
- Migrated domains then replace the lazy `import('...notificationService')` sends with the
injected service.
- **Scheduler** — **done 2026-08-10**: `src/scheduler.ts` is deleted; every cron is
a provider in its owning domain, registered through `CronRegistrarService`
(`src/nest/scheduling/` — `@nestjs/schedule` + a NODE_ENV=test gate so the
shared `buildApp()` harness never ticks). `notifications.bridge` and
`admin.bridge` died with it, `SchedulerDeps`/`setSchedulerDeps` too, and
`node-cron` left `package.json` (the plugin host's job scheduler moved to the
`cron` package). Reminder enable-gates are per-tick now — a settings change
takes effect at the next run without a restart.
## Phase 3 — geo chain: maps → transit → place → transitItinerary (done 2026-07/08)
- Fold `placeEnrichment` into places (the helper-fold pattern).
- Pull third-party API-key ownership into the maps/integrations domain: authService's
`updateMapsKey`/`updateApiKeys`/`validateKeys` probes and the duplicated admin-maps-key
SQL (`auth-4`) — maps becomes sole owner of key resolution.
- `airportService` can go any time; when it does, move the db-boot backfill (a WRITE into
`reservation_endpoints` at module-eval time, finding `places-1`) into Nest bootstrap.
## Phase 4 — the Wave-5 corner, restructured by the audit (done 2026-08-09)
Order inside the corner: **atlas → auth-split → admin → oauth** (oidc/passkey ride auth).
- **atlas** first, and it takes `getTravelStats` out of authService with it (the original
archetype finding) — the `auth → atlas` edge is deleted, not bridged.
- **authService is migrated as a three-way split**, not as one domain (`auth-1`, `auth-3`,
`auth-4`, `auth-5`):
- `nest/auth` — credentials, sessions, MFA, tokens, password reset (dependency-clean,
crown-jewel code: relocate, don't rework);
- a **users/profile domain** — getCurrentUser/stripUserForClient, avatar (+ multer
wiring out of the auth controller), settings, user directory, account lifecycle
(deleteAccount + userCleanup seams);
- **admin instance settings out of `/api/auth`** — getAppSettings/updateAppSettings
(SMTP, channels, webhooks, the scheduler restart) belong to nest/admin; route parity
can keep the URL, ownership moves. `getAppConfig` becomes a platform aggregator
composing per-domain accessors (`auth-5`).
- MCP-token CRUD (`mcp-3`) moves toward the MCP domain; invite-token triplication
(`auth-7`/`admin-10`) gets one owner.
- **admin** (already slimmed by Phase 0 addons + packing-template relocation `admin-2`/
`collections-1` — templates belong to packing and can move whenever packing-side work
happens), then **oauth**, merging the diverged `mcp/oauthProvider.ts` half into the one
OAuth domain (`mcp-2`).
## Phase 5 — remainder (done 2026-08-09/10 — `src/services/` deleted in `49652816`)
- memories/ cluster → journeyService → journeyShareService; collectionsService any time
(its notificationService edge is lazy; fix `collections-2`'s cross-domain place writes
during its fold).
- Leaves any time: weatherService, wikiService, airportService (see Phase 3 note).
- backupService last by design (owns the closeDb/reinitialize lifecycle).
## Seam-ownership decisions to make (before the code that touches them)
From the audit's "shared concepts owned in halves" theme — each needs a single-owner
decision, ideally settled when the neighboring migration opens the files anyway:
- [ ] **reservation↔budget link lifecycle** (`budget-1`, `budget-2`, `days-2`): today split
across budget (`syncReservationPrice` writes reservations), reservations
(syncBudgetOn* + raw budget_items SQL) and days. Likely owner: reservations orchestrates,
budget/days expose domain methods.
- [x] **accommodations** (`days-1`): SQL+MCP in days, REST in reservations — pick one home.
(done 2026-08-10, `3d522be0` "Give accommodations one home instead of two halves" —
`nest/accommodations/` is the single owner.)
- [ ] **per-domain user erasure** (`collections-4`, `collections-5`): domain-owned erasure
methods vs the central userCleanupService — pick a convention before the users domain
exists (Phase 4 forces this).
- [ ] **todo riding packing's addon + permission** (`collections-6`): decide if that's a
product decision (document it) or an accident (give todo its own addon/permission).
## Tokenization & registries — kill the string contracts
Several security- and sync-critical contracts are typo-prone free strings today, even where
a registry already exists but isn't enforced. The repo already has the right precedents:
`SCOPES` (`mcp/scopes.ts`, `as const` + derived `Scope` type), `ADDON_IDS` (`addons.ts`),
plugin `KNOWN_PERMISSIONS` (`plugins/protocol/envelope.ts`, shared host+child, sdk-mirrored
with parity tests), the notifications `channelRegistry`, and the boot-time fail-closed
ratchet (`validateBodyContracts`). The pattern to replicate: **one `as const` registry, a
derived union type at every call site, and a boot gate that refuses unknown tokens.**
Ordered by value:
- [x] **WS event contract registry in `@trek/shared`** (done 2026-07-29: authoritative
count is **65 trip + 29 user = 94** events, not 52; `TREK_WS_EVENTS` +
`TrekWsPayload<E>`; RealtimeService overloads enforce registry keys at compile time
(`plugin:` namespace is the escape hatch); client switches became enumerable lookups
with a registry-parity test — 46 handled, 29 handled via dedicated listeners,
19 explicitly ignored; payload schemas are loose scaffolding, tighten opportunistically;
8 payload-drift shapes documented as unions in the schema's DRIFT comments) — Today
**52 distinct event names** are broadcast server-side but only **33 appear** in the
client's `remoteEventHandler` switch, and the budget migration just proved payload-shape
drift is real (the MCP `{item}` payloads were silent client no-ops — audit finding, fixed
2026-07-28). Mechanism: `shared/src/realtime/events.schema.ts` with event-name constants
+ a Zod payload schema per event; server `broadcast()`/`RealtimeService` typed against it
(event name must be a registry key, payload must satisfy its schema), client handler
switching exhaustively over the same union (unhandled event = compile-time or test-time
error, not silence). Do it **with Phase 0's `RealtimeService`** — the facade is the
natural choke point to introduce the typed signature; migrate events opportunistically.
- [x] **Typed MCP access groups + boot validation** (done 2026-07-28: `ScopeGroup`
derived from `SCOPES`, `McpAccessGroupRegistry` augmentation types every
`access.group`, `trekMcpValidateAccess` boot gate refuses unknown group/mode
combos incl. `write` on read-only `geo`/`weather`; legacy `canRead`/`canWrite`
now take `ScopeGroup`) — `access: { group: 'vacay', mode:
'write' }` appears ~100+ times across `.mcp.ts` files as free strings. A typo'd group
never matches a real scope: scoped tokens get denied (fail closed) but `scopes: null`
sessions pass (fail open) — silent scope-model drift either way. Mechanism: derive a
`ScopeGroup` union from `SCOPES` and type the decorator's `access.group` against it
(originally a `declare module '@trek/nest-mcp'` augmentation; since the 2026-08-22 fold
the registries live directly in `server/src/nest-mcp/types.ts`); plus a **boot gate in
the MCP registry**: at discovery
time, refuse to boot on an `access.group`/tool-name/`when` combination that doesn't
resolve against `SCOPES` — the body-contract ratchet pattern applied to the MCP surface.
The registry the user-facing scopes UI reads (`SCOPE_INFO`) then serves decorators, the
legacy `canRead/canWrite`, and the OAuth consent screen from one source.
- [ ] **Permission-action tokens** — `checkPermission('budget_edit', …)` /
`hasTripPermission('packing_edit', …)` at 90+ call sites; the actions are already
defined once as data in `permissions.service.ts` (key + defaultLevel + allowedLevels)
but nothing types the call sites against that table. Mechanism: export
`PERMISSION_ACTIONS as const` + `PermissionAction` union from the permissions domain and
type `checkPermission`/`hasTripPermission`/the bridge against it. Candidate for
`@trek/shared` if the client's permission store uses the same keys (verify — if yes,
it's the same single-source rule as the Zod contracts).
- [ ] **Audit-action tokens** — 73 `writeAudit('admin.addon_update' …)`-style call sites
with dotted free strings; a typo silently mis-files audit rows forever. Low effort:
`AUDIT_ACTIONS as const` in `nest/audit/`, typed `writeAudit`. Opportunistic — sweep a
domain's actions whenever a migration touches it.
- [ ] **`app_settings` key registry** — keys are scattered (partial `ADMIN_SETTINGS_KEYS`
in authService, OIDC rows in adminService, 14 inline reads in `getAppConfig`) with
ownership split across auth/admin (findings `auth-1`, `auth-5`). Fold the registry into
the Phase 4 admin-settings relocation: one typed key catalog, per-domain accessors, no
raw `app_settings` string queries outside the owning module.
- [ ] **Verify, don't rebuild, the good ones** — `ADDON_IDS` (ensure every `when:` gate
and client addon check derives from it, no re-typed literals), plugin
`KNOWN_PERMISSIONS`/`HOOK_PERMISSION` (already parity-tested against plugin-sdk — the
model the others should follow), i18n keys (already typed via `TranslationStrings`).
Small constants worth a home while passing by: `trek_session` cookie name,
`X-Socket-Id` / `X-Idempotency-Key` headers.
## Request-pipeline guards — authorization before validation (audited 2026-08-01)
Full audit with call sites, error-string parity landmines, do-not-guard list and
sequencing: **`guards-audit.md`**. The finding in one line: authentication is already a
guard (runs before the global `ZodValidationPipe`), but authorization — trip access 404s,
`checkPermission` 403s, admin/demo/addon gates — is almost entirely inline in
handlers/services, so unauthorized callers with invalid bodies see Zod 400s before
access errors. Same strangler discipline as the DI migration: each conversion is a
wire-behavior change (400↔403/404 ordering), one focused commit per slice, ordering
pinned by tests.
- [ ] **Slice 1 — trivial toggle guards** (mostly open 2026-08-10): `PluginsEnabledGuard`
(9 duplicated 503 blocks), `DevLinkEnabledGuard`, `McpEnabledGuard` (7 call sites,
keep 403), the two drop-in `AdminGuard` conversions (guards-audit.md §2.2–2.5, §5.1)
— all still inline. Two items resolved differently: `DemoUploadGuard` was
**deliberately rejected as a guard** — guards run before the multipart parser, so
throwing yields ECONNRESET instead of 403 (PROFILE-015); the dedup landed as the
shared `nest/common/demo-write.ts` helper instead. And the three hand-written addon
guards collapsed into one `AddonGuard` + `@RequireAddon` (`22d178d2`).
- [x] **Slice 2 — `TripAccessGuard` + `@RequirePermission`** (landed 2026-08-09,
`8c0280e2` + `94221a6d`; the decorator shipped as `@RequirePermission` with a
`@Trip()` param decorator, not the planned `@RequireTripPermission`): 13 controllers
on `TripAccessGuard`, 81 `@RequirePermission` sites, **zero** inline `checkPermission`
left in controllers. Remaining tail (as predicted, the bespoke-string domains):
**trips** (7 bespoke 403 strings), **share**, **trip-invite**, **feeds** (still
hand-rolled trip-access SQL, §4.7), and partial conversions in **files** (guard
per-handler but permissions inline — one class-level decorator can't express
upload/edit/delete; upload stays off the guard for the multipart reason),
**places** and **collab** (old `requireTrip` helpers still present).
- [ ] **Slice 3 — per-resource guards** (1 of 3 done 2026-08-10): `TripOwnerGuard` is
done (`45611e25`-era; applied to the 4 trip-members routes, deliberately skipping
`PermissionsService` so admins can't transfer trips). Still open: `JourneyRoleGuard`
(16 inline `Not allowed` 403s remain; + align its 403-for-invisible enumeration
signal to the collections 404-first idiom) and `PhotoAccessGuard` (memories
cross-user access still inline `canAccessUserPhoto`) (§2.6–2.8).
- [x] **Capstone ratchet — global `APP_GUARD` `JwtAuthGuard` + `@Public()` decorator**
(done 2026-08-10, `ffb73fac` "Turn protection from opt-in into default-deny" +
`be8081c3` MFA guard): `GlobalAuthGuard` + `MfaPolicyGuard` as `APP_GUARD`s,
`@Public()`/`@OptionalAuth()` decorators, and the boot-time
`validate-route-guards.ts` ratchet (`PUBLIC_ROUTE_ALLOW_LIST`). One deviation from
§6's plan: instead of sweeping the per-controller `@UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard)` sites,
the global guard *stands down* for any route with a declared guard chain (reads
`GUARDS_METADATA`, resolves `req.user` without throwing so MFA still sees the
caller) — that solves the addon-404-before-401 ordering caveat. MFA middleware
folded (one intended behavior change: public `/api` routes no longer 403 MFA-less
logged-in users); all four dead middleware files deleted (`939452f9`, `9814480a`,
`be8081c3` — `src/middleware/` now holds only `globalMiddleware.ts`).
- [ ] **Decisions parked in the audit** (still open 2026-08-10): the missing server-side
`documents` addon gate (only ungated addon without a load-bearing parity comment,
§4.2 — `/api/trips/:tripId/files` still serves with the addon off); rate-limit
unification (§4.4 — **half done**: one shared `RateLimitService`/`RateLimitModule`
now serves 5 modules, but `transit.mcp.ts`, backup, `mcp/index.ts` and the plugin
host still roll their own, and no `@RateLimit` decorator exists). Do NOT guard the body-dependent
checks (collections owner checks, `PUT /trips/:id`'s body-derived permission key,
vacay) or the fail-soft plugin contribution routes — the audit's §3 list is load-bearing.
## Continuous streams (not phases)
- **DTO ratchet**: every migration includes its domain's DTOs; remaining allow-list entries
for already-migrated domains are independent hour-scale filler tasks. The boot gate keeps
this honest.
- **MCP decorator ports**: every migration moves its legacy registrar to `<domain>.mcp.ts`;
registrar-drift findings (`mcp-4`, `mcp-5`, `mcp-6`) die as their domains port.
- **Quirk-fix trailing commits**: parity migration first, verified-defect fixes in a
separate `fix(server)` commit (established pattern).
## Deliberately late
- **Option B decorator RPC registry** (DI-MIGRATION.md §3) — **done 2026-08-09**
(`7b11680c` decorator kit → `f72aba0c` full rollout; `PluginsModule` split into
four with per-domain coverage gates, `6680bc7c`).
- **True `@WebSocketGateway` transport swap**: behind the Phase 0 `RealtimeService` facade,
whenever — it becomes an implementation detail.
- **`index.ts` boot dismantling**: the scheduler went with Phase 2 (2026-08-10 —
Nest lifecycle owns every cron); MCP/ws wiring migrate into Nest lifecycle hooks
opportunistically; the db `reinitialize` Proxy retires only with backupService,
last.
## Operational hardening — will bite soonest (verified 2026-07-28)
Not architecture, but the things most likely to hurt before the phases above finish:
- [x] **De-flake the CI gate.** (done — see the Status block below; the checkbox lagged
the work.) `test:coverage` is the merge gate (test.yml) and it can
exit 1 spuriously: reproduced 2026-07-28 — an `EnvironmentTeardownError` from
`vacay.service.test.ts`, caused by a fire-and-forget dynamic
`import('services/notificationService')` resolving after the vitest environment tore
down. A flaky main gate trains everyone to re-run, and then real failures slip. Fix the
race (await/guard the lazy sends in tests — and note Phase 2's injected notifications
removes the pattern entirely), sweep the expected-error stderr noise (SQLITE_ERROR spam
makes real failures invisible in logs), and watch the coverage run's cost (~11 min of
module imports under istanbul instrumentation and growing with every migration).
- **Status 2026-07-28** (commits `c7dc38a5` + `80f39585`, test-side only, zero `src/`
changes):
- *Race*: defensively closed — global `afterEach` drain in `tests/setup.ts` settles
the unawaited import/`.then` chains while DB + worker env are alive, plus vacay-style
`beforeAll` warm-ups in the cold suites (unit trips.service, integration
vacay/collab/packing/trips). Mechanism verified against vitest 4.1.9 source (the
dynamic import's host-RPC fetch is what teardown rejects; warmed URLs skip the RPC);
NOT reproduced locally in ~110 stress runs (fast machine — CI's 2-core runner is
where the window is wide), so keep an eye on the gate before calling it dead.
- *Noise*: swept — green `test:unit` stderr went 8,249 → ~195 lines
(`tests/setup.console-noise.ts`, two exact-pattern filters: migrations
duplicate-column replay artifact + the vitest-only airportService backfill require
failure). Remaining follow-up if wanted: ~168 stdout `[DB] Running migration N/M`
lines per test file.
- *Cost* (watch item, unchanged): two clean gate runs at 52s wall on a 16-thread dev
box, but cumulative import time ~657s vs ~97s actual test time — instrumented
module imports are ~6.6× the tests themselves and scale with migrated-module count,
not test count. Phase 2's injected notifications still deletes the send pattern
entirely.
- [ ] **Migration-identity safety.** `schema_version` is a single integer and a step's
identity is its array position; append-only is enforced only by convention plus a
hygiene test, and failed steps log "Non-fatal migration step failed" and continue.
The bite: two branches each appending "step N" merge cleanly, and instances migrated at
different times silently diverge. Add: a named/checksummed applied-migrations ledger
(keep positional order, record identity), a boot-time collision check, and an automatic
pre-migration snapshot (backupService already knows how) before any pending step runs.
- [ ] **Swallowed cross-domain side-effect failures.** 11 `catch → console.error` sites in
`nest/**` services alone — mostly the sync seams (reservation↔budget item creation,
price sync, booking-import costs). These silently lose user-visible data: a booking
saves, its expense doesn't, nobody is told. Define one policy (at minimum: audit-log the
failure + emit a client-visible warning event; ideally a small retry queue for the
money-adjacent ones) and sweep the seams — pairs naturally with the seam-ownership
decisions above, since each seam gets one owner anyway. The client-side rule already
exists ("optimistic writes must reconcile — no silent catch"); this is its server twin.
- [ ] **Dependency currency.** No automation visible for dependency updates (better-sqlite3
ABI bumps, Nest majors, the Express adapter). Pick a cadence or a bot (Renovate/
dependabot) before the gap gets expensive; the plugin-sdk's standalone lockfile doubles
the surface.
## Definition of done (so "finished" is checkable, not vibes)
The migration/modernization is complete when all of these hold — each is grep- or
gate-verifiable, worth re-checking after every phase:
- `server/src/services/` contains only the deliberate plain-module helpers listed in
`migration-graph.md`'s classification (no domain service files).
- Zero `*.bridge.ts` files remain (bridge deletion notes in each file say when).
- The `db` Proxy is imported only by `DatabaseModule`/`database.ts` internals and
backupService's lifecycle code; every other consumer injects `DatabaseService`.
- `index.ts` is thin: no hand-booted scheduler/ws/MCP wiring (Nest lifecycle owns them);
the db-boot airport backfill is gone (`places-1`).
- `src/mcp/tools.ts` fan-out is empty (registry attach only); `src/mcp/resources.ts` gone.
- `body-contract-allow-list.ts` is empty and deleted (gate removed with it).
- Tests: no `vi.mock('src/db/database')` outside DatabaseService's own tests — the
through-line promise in `migrate.md`.
- The tokenization boot gates (MCP access groups, WS events) are on and non-empty.
**Re-checked 2026-08-10** (after the `src/services/` deletion):
- ✅ `src/services/` gone — deleted outright, plus the ESLint wall.
- ✅ No `vi.mock('src/db/database')` outside DatabaseService's own tests.
- ✅ `src/mcp/tools.ts` is registry-attach-only (3 live lines); all 24 domains on
`<domain>.mcp.ts`, prompts included.
- ✅ Tokenization boot gates on (`nest-mcp-policy.ts`, `validateBodyContracts`,
`validate-route-guards.ts`).
- 🟡 `body-contract-allow-list.ts` is **empty** (`ba7d55f9` cleared the last 17) but
the file + boot gate still exist — arguably keep the gate as the ratchet.
- ✅ (2026-08-10) The scheduler is Nest-owned: `src/scheduler.ts` deleted, every
cron a domain provider on `CronRegistrarService` (`src/nest/scheduling/`),
`node-cron` out of `package.json`. `index.ts` no longer boots any cron and its
`shutdown()` rides `nestApp.close()`. The db-boot airport backfill was already
gone (`9c46f31c`). (2026-08-11: the ws gateway binds inside `buildApp()` and
/mcp is a Nest controller — `index.ts`'s only MCP touch left is the
`closeMcpSessions()` housekeeping call in `shutdown()`.)
- ✅ (2026-08-11, MCP/OAuth mount migration) **Zero** `*.bridge.ts` files
remain. The one remaining seam died: /api/health, OAuth discovery, the
consent COOP override, /oauth/authorize + /oauth/register (SDK routers via
`OauthModule.configure`) and /mcp (`nest/mcp-transport/`) all moved behind
the container, so `oauth`/`audit`/`addons`/`auth`/`permissions` bridges
became ordinary injections and were deleted, along with
`mcp/registry-handoff.ts` (the transport injects `McpRegistryService`).
`_shared.ts`'s impure guards became the injectable `McpToolGuardsService`
(`nest/mcp-shared/`). Pre-init Express now carries only global middleware,
uploads, the DI-built discovery metadata middleware, static assets, api-docs
and the named body-parser wrappers (which keep `/mcp` bodies raw for the
SDK).
- 🟡 (historical — the 2026-08-11 morning state this replaced) 5 bridges
remained after the bridge fold, all pinned by the pre-`app.init()` mount.
The 2026-08-10 endgame executed and then some:
the 4 dead ones deleted (`8e4261ed`); `journey.bridge` +
`src/mcp/resources.ts` retired with the journey-resource migration;
`budget.bridge` deleted (UserCleanupService injects BudgetService);
the backup-restore / systemNotices in-container edges folded
(`permissions-cache.ts`, threaded `addonEnabled`); and the three
"verified-permanent" cycle-dodges eliminated by restructuring rather than
forwardRef — `trips.bridge` via leaf TripMembership reads + prompt
relocation, `assignments.bridge` via an `AssignmentsDomainModule` split,
`airtrail.bridge` via `ReservationsReadRepository` + `AirtrailLinkService`
in `AirtrailCoreModule`. `notifications.instance.ts` died with the last of
them.
- ✅ (2026-08-11) `src/mcp/resources.ts` gone — the 4 journey resources are
decorator-registered on `journey.mcp.ts`; `journey.bridge` died with it.
- 🟡 (re-checked 2026-08-11, after the mount migration) The `db` proxy is
imported outside DatabaseModule by exactly four files: `backup.impl.ts`
(the backup lifecycle the DoD explicitly allows), `auth/jwt-verify.ts`
(the canonical pre-init token verifier the uploads route shares),
`platform.routes.ts` (the guarded /uploads/photos route) and
`places/place-image.ts`. Nothing under `src/mcp/` touches it anymore —
`oauthProvider.ts` is the injectable `oauth-sdk.provider.ts`, `_shared.ts`
is pure, and every bridge is gone.
## Keep in mind — ORM / data-layer swap (not scheduled, just recorded)
An ORM move is under consideration but deliberately NOT a roadmap phase. What to remember
when the time comes (discussed 2026-07-28):
- **The sync/async decision dominates everything.** better-sqlite3 being synchronous is
load-bearing: `db.transaction()` cannot contain an `await` (the budget FX-freeze design
exists because of this), controllers return without racing broadcasts, and there are no
async gaps inside multi-statement writes. Prisma/TypeORM/MikroORM/Kysely are all
Promise-based — adopting one is a rewrite of the concurrency model, not a data-layer
swap. **Drizzle** is the mainstream option that keeps sync semantics over
better-sqlite3; its schema-as-code + migration generator would also address the
migration-identity item in "Operational hardening". Decide sync-vs-async first, via a
short spike with hard criteria: sync preserved? byte-parity strategy for the documented
SQL quirks (COALESCE/CASE sentinels, INSERT OR IGNORE, lastInsertRowid)? migration story
vs the positional `schema_version`?
- **Do NOT pre-build an abstract DatabaseService or hand-rolled repository interfaces.**
Abstraction at the `prepare/get/all/run` level is the wrong seam (no ORM can be
implemented behind it), and interfaces designed before the target is chosen get shaped
around today's implementation — every ORM imposes its own repository/entity idioms.
Premature abstraction here is negative work.
- **The migration IS the ORM prep.** Each fold consolidates a domain's SQL into one
injectable class — that's most of what a repository layer provides. The table-ownership
seam decisions (see "Seam-ownership decisions") are the true ORM prerequisites: entities
need one owner per table.
- **Cheap conventions worth adopting when convenient** (no parity risk):
large NEW folds may split into `<domain>.service.ts` (logic/permissions/broadcasts) +
`<domain>.repository.ts` (SQL, still over the concrete `DatabaseService`, byte-identical)
— tripService is the natural first candidate; and per-domain typed row types
(`SettlementRow` pattern → a `rows.ts` per domain) as proto-entities. Don't retrofit
finished domains until the target is chosen.
## Known not-covered (future audits)
- **Client-side coherence**: this audit was server-only; client CLAUDE.md notes the
files bypassing the store→repo→api layering — a parallel audit + ratchet is its own
project. **The debt is growing**: ~137 files at the 2026-07 count, **~190** at a
2026-08-10 recount (components 98, mobile 55, pages 31, plus sync/services/hooks),
with no lint/CI ratchet holding the line.
- Low-severity audit findings not scheduled above remain valid opportunistic fixes — see
`audit_report/domain-coherence-audit.md` per-domain sections.