fix(plugins): security hardening from the PR #1415 audit

Remediates the findings from the adversarial audit (threat model: malicious
plugin author + malicious artifact). Highlights:

Critical
- proxy: force nosniff + Content-Disposition: attachment on every proxied reply
  and drop location/content-disposition + non-2xx from the passthrough, so a
  plugin can't serve an HTML document at TREK's origin (sandbox-escape → account
  takeover) or an open redirect.

High
- db:own runs synchronously in the host: cap the plugin DB (max_page_count) and
  row-cap query() via iterate() so a recursive CTE / huge blob can't stall the
  event loop, OOM, or exhaust the shared volume.
- supervisor: measure child RSS host-side (/proc/<pid>/statm) instead of trusting
  the spoofable heartbeat; add an activation timeout so a stuck onLoad can't hang
  activate() or peg a core unreaped.
- safe-extract: enforce entry-count + cumulative-size limits INSIDE readZip
  before inflating (decompression-bomb OOM).
- re-consent: activate() never widens granted permissions without explicit
  consent (409 CONSENT_REQUIRED); the row toggle + "Update All" route through the
  consent dialog, which now queues instead of overwriting.

Medium/low
- egress: gate dgram hostnames through the IP-vetting resolver; block the
  low-level socket escape (process.binding) + lock the wrapped prototypes;
  canonicalize IPv6 in isBlockedIp (hex-mapped/compressed metadata); reject
  degenerate `*.` / whole-TLD / spaced outbound hosts in the manifest + CSP.
- ws:broadcast is membership-gated to the acting user's trips / own connections;
  users.getById is scoped to users the acting user can see (no enumeration).
- safe-fetch streams + aborts at the byte cap (chunked codeload OOM); isPrivateIp
  reuses the canonicalizing check.
- native-scan throws instead of silently passing past its entry cap.
- SDK: dev serves binary assets as raw buffers + handles EADDRINUSE; manifest
  validator gains the reserved-id + outbound-host checks; wikis corrected.

Tests updated for the new membership-gated behaviour + regression tests added
(IPv6 canonicalization, wildcard hardening, outbound-host validation, ws/user
scoping). 234 plugin tests + 24 SDK tests green.
This commit is contained in:
Maurice
2026-07-04 18:32:26 +02:00
committed by Maurice
parent 16e27926c5
commit 64136484ee
25 changed files with 442 additions and 85 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ export const adminApi = {
pluginBrowse: () => apiClient.get('/admin/plugins/registry').then(r => r.data),
pluginDetail: (id: string) => apiClient.get(`/admin/plugins/registry/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`).then(r => r.data),
pluginInstall: (id: string, version?: string) => apiClient.post('/admin/plugins/install', { id, version }).then(r => r.data),
pluginActivate: (id: string) => apiClient.post(`/admin/plugins/${id}/activate`).then(r => r.data),
pluginActivate: (id: string, consent?: boolean) => apiClient.post(`/admin/plugins/${id}/activate`, consent ? { consent: true } : {}).then(r => r.data),
pluginDeactivate: (id: string) => apiClient.post(`/admin/plugins/${id}/deactivate`).then(r => r.data),
pluginUpdate: (id: string) => apiClient.post(`/admin/plugins/${id}/update`).then(r => r.data),
pluginUninstall: (id: string, deleteData: boolean) => apiClient.post(`/admin/plugins/${id}/uninstall`, { deleteData }).then(r => r.data),