feat(plugins): zero-config L1 hardening — SSRF egress, RSS reaper, capability audit, no popups

Security that ships from the install itself, no self-hoster setup:

- Egress SSRF/rebinding backstop: the net.Socket connect guard now RESOLVES the
  destination and refuses private/loopback/link-local/metadata/CGNAT/ULA
  addresses, pinning the resolved IP (a declared host that re-resolves to an
  internal address is blocked). Pure policy in egress-policy.ts + tests.
  TREK_PLUGIN_ALLOW_PRIVATE_EGRESS=on opts back into internal targets.
- RSS memory reaper: the supervisor now kills a child that blows a real RSS
  ceiling (TREK_PLUGIN_MAX_RSS_MB, default 300) — --max-old-space-size only
  bounds the V8 heap, so Buffers could OOM the box under it.
- Hash-chained capability audit log (migration 159): every core-data / broadcast
  call is recorded at the RPC boundary with the host-bound acting user and a
  per-plugin hash chain, so wide grants stay attributable + tamper-evident.
  Admin endpoint GET /api/admin/plugins/:id/audit.
- Drop allow-popups from the plugin frame (sandbox + CSP): window.open ignores
  connect-src, so it was an egress/phishing bypass.

Server suite 207 green, client + migration reconciliation green.

client/src/api/client.ts

@@ -469,6 +469,7 @@ export const adminApi = {
   pluginUninstall: (id: string, deleteData: boolean) => apiClient.post(`/admin/plugins/${id}/uninstall`, { deleteData }).then(r => r.data),
   pluginRescan: () => apiClient.post('/admin/plugins/rescan').then(r => r.data),
   pluginErrors: (id: string) => apiClient.get(`/admin/plugins/${id}/errors`).then(r => r.data),
+  pluginAudit: (id: string) => apiClient.get(`/admin/plugins/${id}/audit`).then(r => r.data),
   // Local LLM (Ollama) management for the AI-parsing addon.
   llmLocalModels: (baseUrl: string): Promise<{ models: { name: string; size: number }[] }> =>
     apiClient.get('/admin/llm/local/models', { params: { baseUrl } }).then(r => r.data),

client/src/components/Plugins/PluginFrame.tsx

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ export default function PluginFrame({ pluginId, tripId = null, className, title
     <iframe
       ref={frameRef}
       src={`/plugin-frame/${pluginId}/index.html`}
-      sandbox="allow-scripts allow-forms allow-popups"
+      sandbox="allow-scripts allow-forms"
       referrerPolicy="no-referrer"
       loading="lazy"
       title={title || pluginId}

server/src/db/migrations.ts

@@ -3377,6 +3377,27 @@ function runMigrations(db: Database.Database): void {
     () => {
       try { db.exec("ALTER TABLE plugins ADD COLUMN author_pubkey TEXT;"); } catch (err) { console.warn('[migrations] Non-fatal migration step failed:', err); }
     },
+    // Migration 159: hash-chained capability audit log (#plugins, L1 hardening).
+    // Every host-mediated capability call the plugin makes is recorded at the RPC
+    // boundary (where the plugin provably can't reach) with the host-bound acting
+    // user and a per-plugin hash chain, so wide data grants stay attributable +
+    // tamper-evident + user-visible.
+    () => {
+      try {
+        db.exec(`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS plugin_capability_audit (
+          id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+          plugin_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+          acting_user_id INTEGER,
+          method TEXT NOT NULL,
+          resource TEXT,
+          code TEXT NOT NULL,
+          ts TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
+          prev_hash TEXT,
+          hash TEXT NOT NULL
+        );`);
+        db.exec('CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_plugin_audit_plugin ON plugin_capability_audit (plugin_id, id);');
+      } catch (err) { console.warn('[migrations] Non-fatal migration step failed:', err); }
+    },
   ];
 
   if (currentVersion < migrations.length) {

server/src/nest/plugins/host/create-rpc-host.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { db, canAccessTrip } from '../../../db/database';
 import { broadcast, broadcastToUser } from '../../../websocket';
 import { PluginDataDb } from './plugin-data.service';
 import { PluginRpcHost } from './rpc-host';
+import { appendAudit } from './plugin-audit';
 
 /**
  * Wires a plugin's capability host to the REAL privileged modules (#plugins,
@@ -33,5 +34,6 @@ export function createRealRpcHost(id: string, granted: ReadonlySet<string>): Plu
     canAccessTrip: (tripId, userId) => canAccessTrip(tripId, userId),
     broadcastToTrip: (tripId, event, payload) => broadcast(tripId, `plugin:${id}:${event}`, payload),
     broadcastToUser: (userId, payload) => broadcastToUser(userId, { type: `plugin:${id}`, ...payload }),
+    audit: (entry) => appendAudit(db, entry),
   });
 }

server/src/nest/plugins/host/plugin-audit.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+import crypto from 'node:crypto';
+
+/**
+ * Host-side, hash-chained capability audit (#plugins, L1 hardening).
+ *
+ * Every host-mediated core-data / broadcast call a plugin makes is recorded at
+ * the RPC boundary — the one place the plugin provably can't reach — with the
+ * HOST-bound acting user (not a value the plugin supplies) and a per-plugin hash
+ * chain (hash = sha256(prev_hash + row)). That makes wide data grants
+ * attributable, tamper-evident, and user-visible, which is exactly what lets
+ * TREK grant broad reads to large addons without raising risk.
+ */
+
+interface AuditDb {
+  prepare(sql: string): {
+    get(...args: unknown[]): unknown;
+    run(...args: unknown[]): unknown;
+    all(...args: unknown[]): unknown[];
+  };
+}
+
+export interface AuditEntry {
+  pluginId: string;
+  actingUserId?: number;
+  method: string;
+  resource?: string | null;
+  code: string;
+}
+
+/** The methods worth auditing: core-data reads + broadcasts, not own-db noise. */
+export function auditResource(method: string, params: Record<string, unknown>): string | null {
+  if (method.startsWith('trips.')) return `trip:${params.tripId ?? '?'}`;
+  if (method === 'users.getById') return `user:${params.id ?? '?'}`;
+  if (method === 'ws.broadcastToTrip') return `trip:${params.tripId ?? '?'}`;
+  if (method === 'ws.broadcastToUser') return `user:${params.userId ?? '?'}`;
+  return null;
+}
+
+/** True for calls we record (core data + ws); a plugin's own-db calls are skipped. */
+export function isAuditable(method: string): boolean {
+  return method.startsWith('trips.') || method.startsWith('users.') || method.startsWith('ws.');
+}
+
+/** Append one entry to the per-plugin hash chain. Synchronous (better-sqlite3). */
+export function appendAudit(db: AuditDb, e: AuditEntry): void {
+  const prev =
+    (db.prepare('SELECT hash FROM plugin_capability_audit WHERE plugin_id = ? ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1').get(e.pluginId) as
+      | { hash: string }
+      | undefined)?.hash ?? '';
+  const ts = new Date().toISOString();
+  const row = JSON.stringify([e.pluginId, e.actingUserId ?? null, e.method, e.resource ?? null, e.code, ts]);
+  const hash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(prev + row).digest('hex');
+  db.prepare(
+    'INSERT INTO plugin_capability_audit (plugin_id, acting_user_id, method, resource, code, ts, prev_hash, hash) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)',
+  ).run(e.pluginId, e.actingUserId ?? null, e.method, e.resource ?? null, e.code, ts, prev || null, hash);
+}
+
+/** Read the most recent audit rows for a plugin (admin view). */
+export function readAudit(db: AuditDb, pluginId: string, limit = 200): unknown[] {
+  return db
+    .prepare('SELECT ts, acting_user_id, method, resource, code FROM plugin_capability_audit WHERE plugin_id = ? ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT ?')
+    .all(pluginId, limit);
+}

server/src/nest/plugins/host/rpc-host.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import {
   type RpcResponse,
 } from '../protocol/envelope';
 import type { PluginDataDb } from './plugin-data.service';
+import { auditResource, isAuditable } from './plugin-audit';
 
 /**
  * The per-plugin capability router (#plugins, M1) — the ENFORCEMENT POINT.
@@ -39,6 +40,8 @@ export interface HostDeps {
   broadcastToTrip(tripId: number, eventType: string, payload: Record<string, unknown>): void;
   /** Namespaced per-user broadcast. */
   broadcastToUser(userId: number, payload: Record<string, unknown>): void;
+  /** Optional sink for the capability audit log (host-side, hash-chained). */
+  audit?(entry: { pluginId: string; actingUserId?: number; method: string; resource: string | null; code: string }): void;
 }
 
 type Handler = (params: Record<string, unknown>, actingUserId: number | undefined) => unknown;
@@ -123,6 +126,30 @@ export class PluginRpcHost {
   }
 
   async dispatch(req: RpcRequest, actingUserId?: number): Promise<RpcResponse | RpcError> {
+    const params = (req.params ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>;
+    const res = await this.handle(req, params, actingUserId);
+    // Audit the core-data / broadcast surface (incl. denials) at the boundary.
+    if (this.deps.audit && isAuditable(req.method)) {
+      try {
+        this.deps.audit({
+          pluginId: this.pluginId,
+          actingUserId,
+          method: req.method,
+          resource: auditResource(req.method, params),
+          code: res.ok ? 'ok' : (res as RpcError).error.code,
+        });
+      } catch {
+        /* auditing must never break a call */
+      }
+    }
+    return res;
+  }
+
+  private async handle(
+    req: RpcRequest,
+    params: Record<string, unknown>,
+    actingUserId?: number,
+  ): Promise<RpcResponse | RpcError> {
     const handler = this.methods.get(req.method);
     if (!handler) {
       const known = (KNOWN_METHODS as readonly string[]).includes(req.method as KnownMethod);
@@ -134,7 +161,6 @@ export class PluginRpcHost {
           : `unknown method ${req.method}`,
       );
     }
-    const params = (req.params ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>;
     try {
       const result = await handler(params, actingUserId);
       return { k: 'res', id: req.id, ok: true, result };

server/src/nest/plugins/plugin-frame.controller.ts

@@ -83,7 +83,10 @@ export class PluginFrameController {
       "frame-ancestors 'self'",
       "base-uri 'none'",
       "form-action 'self'",
-      'sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms allow-popups',
+      // No allow-popups: window.open() ignores connect-src, so it would be an
+      // egress/phishing bypass (open any URL / a fake full-page login). A future
+      // OAuth-popup addon can re-request it as an explicit capability.
+      'sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms',
     ].join('; ');
   }
 }

server/src/nest/plugins/plugins.controller.ts

@@ -95,6 +95,11 @@ export class PluginsController {
     return { errors: this.plugins.errors(id) };
   }
 
+  @Get(':id/audit')
+  audit(@Param('id') id: string) {
+    return { audit: this.plugins.auditLog(id) };
+  }
+
   @Delete(':id/errors')
   clearErrors(@Param('id') id: string) {
     this.plugins.clearErrors(id);

server/src/nest/plugins/plugins.service.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { db } from '../../db/database';
 import { pluginsEnabled } from './kill-switch';
 import { maybe_encrypt_api_key } from '../../services/apiKeyCrypto';
+import { readAudit } from './host/plugin-audit';
 
 const SECRET_MASK = '••••••••';
 
@@ -80,6 +81,11 @@ export class PluginsService {
     db.prepare('DELETE FROM plugin_error_log WHERE plugin_id = ?').run(id);
   }
 
+  /** A plugin's hash-chained capability audit log, newest first. */
+  auditLog(id: string): unknown[] {
+    return readAudit(db, id);
+  }
+
   /** Read the instance config with secret fields masked. */
   getInstanceConfig(id: string): Record<string, unknown> {
     const row = db.prepare('SELECT config FROM plugins WHERE id = ?').get(id) as { config: string } | undefined;

server/src/nest/plugins/runtime/egress-policy.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/**
+ * Pure egress-policy helpers for the plugin child's network guard (#plugins, L1
+ * hardening). Kept dependency-free so the isolated child can import them without
+ * pulling in any privileged server module, and so they are unit-testable on
+ * their own (the guard that uses them lives in plugin-host-entry, which is
+ * excluded from coverage as a subprocess entry).
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Block outbound connections to loopback / private / link-local / ULA / carrier-
+ * grade-NAT / cloud-metadata / multicast / reserved destinations. This is the
+ * SSRF backstop: even a declared host that (re)resolves to one of these is
+ * refused, so a plugin can't pivot to trek.db's host, the 169.254.169.254
+ * metadata IP, the local docker network, or other internal services.
+ */
+export function isBlockedIp(ip: string): boolean {
+  const v4 = ip.match(/^(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)$/);
+  if (v4) {
+    const a = Number(v4[1]);
+    const b = Number(v4[2]);
+    return (
+      a === 0 ||
+      a === 10 ||
+      a === 127 ||
+      (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) ||
+      (a === 192 && b === 168) ||
+      (a === 169 && b === 254) || // link-local, incl. 169.254.169.254 metadata
+      (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) || // CGNAT 100.64/10
+      a >= 224 // multicast + reserved
+    );
+  }
+  const h = ip.toLowerCase().replace(/^\[/, '').replace(/\]$/, '');
+  if (h === '::' || h === '::1' || h === '0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0' || h === '0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1') return true;
+  if (h.startsWith('fe80') || h.startsWith('fc') || h.startsWith('fd')) return true; // link-local + ULA
+  const mapped = h.match(/^::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/);
+  if (mapped) return isBlockedIp(mapped[1]);
+  return false;
+}
+
+/** Build a declared-egress host matcher (exact host or `*.suffix` wildcard). */
+export function makeHostAllow(egress: string[]): (host: string) => boolean {
+  const patterns = egress.map((h) => h.trim().toLowerCase()).filter(Boolean);
+  return (host: string) => {
+    const h = host.toLowerCase();
+    return patterns.some((p) => (p.startsWith('*.') ? h === p.slice(2) || h.endsWith(p.slice(1)) : h === p));
+  };
+}
+
+export interface ConnectTarget {
+  kind: 'local' | 'literal-ip' | 'hostname';
+  host: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Classify a `net.Socket.connect(...)` argument list into what we must check:
+ * a unix-socket/pipe (local, allowed), a literal IP (checked synchronously), or
+ * a hostname (allowlist + a DNS-resolving guard). Mirrors Node's connect
+ * overloads: connect(options[,cb]) | connect(port[,host][,cb]) | connect(path[,cb]).
+ */
+export function classifyConnect(args: unknown[], isIP: (s: string) => boolean): ConnectTarget {
+  const first = args[0];
+  if (first && typeof first === 'object') {
+    const o = first as { host?: string; path?: string };
+    if (o.path) return { kind: 'local', host: o.path };
+    const host = o.host ?? 'localhost';
+    return { kind: isIP(host) ? 'literal-ip' : 'hostname', host };
+  }
+  if (typeof first === 'string' && !/^\d+$/.test(first)) {
+    // a bare string that isn't a port number is an IPC path
+    return { kind: 'local', host: first };
+  }
+  // connect(port[, host][, cb])
+  const host = typeof args[1] === 'string' ? (args[1] as string) : 'localhost';
+  return { kind: isIP(host) ? 'literal-ip' : 'hostname', host };
+}

server/src/nest/plugins/runtime/plugin-host-entry.ts

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@
 
 import path from 'node:path';
 import net from 'node:net';
+import dns from 'node:dns';
 import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
 import { createPluginContext, type ChildTransport, type PluginContext, type PluginDefinition } from './plugin-sdk';
+import { isBlockedIp, makeHostAllow, classifyConnect } from './egress-policy';
 import type { Envelope, RpcError } from '../protocol/envelope';
 
 const pluginId = process.argv[2] || process.env.TREK_PLUGIN_ID || 'unknown';
@@ -146,20 +148,23 @@ process.on('message', (raw: unknown) => {
  * subdomain.
  *
  * Two layers, so a plugin can't just sidestep `fetch` with a raw socket:
- *  1. `globalThis.fetch` is wrapped (undici path).
+ *  1. `globalThis.fetch` is wrapped (early hostname reject).
  *  2. `net.Socket.prototype.connect` is wrapped — the single TCP choke point that
- *     node:http / node:https / node:net / node:tls all funnel through — so
- *     `require('node:https').request(...)` is subject to the same allowlist.
+ *     node:http / node:https / node:net / node:tls AND undici/fetch all funnel
+ *     through. Here we additionally RESOLVE the destination and refuse any
+ *     private/loopback/link-local/metadata/CGNAT/ULA address (SSRF + DNS-rebinding
+ *     backstop), pinning the resolved IP into the connect so the name can't flip
+ *     to an internal address between check and connect.
+ *
  * Under the OS permission model the child also cannot spawn a fresh process or
- * load a native addon to escape these wrappers. This is strong defense in depth;
- * a kernel/network-namespace guarantee still belongs to the container runtime.
+ * load a native addon to escape these wrappers. A kernel/network-namespace
+ * guarantee still belongs to the container runtime. Set
+ * TREK_PLUGIN_ALLOW_PRIVATE_EGRESS=on to permit private/internal targets (e.g. a
+ * self-hoster's sibling service) — default is the secure, block-private policy.
  */
 function installEgressGuard(egress: string[]): void {
-  const patterns = egress.map((h) => h.trim().toLowerCase()).filter(Boolean);
-  const allowed = (hostname: string): boolean => {
-    const h = hostname.toLowerCase();
-    return patterns.some((p) => (p.startsWith('*.') ? h === p.slice(2) || h.endsWith(p.slice(1)) : h === p));
-  };
+  const allowed = makeHostAllow(egress);
+  const blockPrivate = (process.env.TREK_PLUGIN_ALLOW_PRIVATE_EGRESS ?? '').toLowerCase() !== 'on';
 
   const realFetch = globalThis.fetch;
   if (typeof realFetch === 'function') {
@@ -167,7 +172,7 @@ function installEgressGuard(egress: string[]): void {
       const url = typeof input === 'string' ? input : (input as { url?: string })?.url ?? String(input);
       let host: string;
       try {
-        host = new URL(url).hostname;
+        host = new URL(url).hostname.replace(/^\[/, '').replace(/\]$/, '');
       } catch {
         return Promise.reject(new Error('egress: invalid url'));
       }
@@ -176,25 +181,48 @@ function installEgressGuard(egress: string[]): void {
     }) as typeof fetch;
   }
 
-  // TCP choke point: http/https/net/tls all end up here. A unix-socket (path)
-  // connect is local IPC, not network egress, so it's left alone.
+  // A DNS lookup that refuses to resolve a name to a blocked address; injected
+  // into every hostname connect so the socket only ever reaches a vetted IP.
+  const guardedLookup = (
+    hostname: string,
+    options: unknown,
+    cb: (err: Error | null, address?: unknown, family?: number) => void,
+  ): void => {
+    const opts = typeof options === 'function' ? {} : options;
+    if (typeof options === 'function') cb = options as typeof cb;
+    dns.lookup(hostname, opts as dns.LookupOptions, (err, address, family) => {
+      if (err) return cb(err, address as unknown, family);
+      const list = Array.isArray(address) ? address : [{ address: address as string }];
+      for (const a of list) {
+        if (blockPrivate && isBlockedIp((a as { address: string }).address)) {
+          return cb(new Error(`egress: ${hostname} resolves to a blocked address (${(a as { address: string }).address})`));
+        }
+      }
+      cb(null, address as unknown, family);
+    });
+  };
+
   const proto = net.Socket.prototype as unknown as { connect: (...a: unknown[]) => unknown };
   const realConnect = proto.connect;
   proto.connect = function (this: unknown, ...args: unknown[]): unknown {
+    const target = classifyConnect(args, (s) => net.isIP(s) !== 0);
+    if (target.kind === 'local') return realConnect.apply(this, args); // unix socket / pipe
+    if (!allowed(target.host)) {
+      throw new Error(`egress: ${target.host} is not in the plugin's declared hosts`);
+    }
+    if (target.kind === 'literal-ip') {
+      if (blockPrivate && isBlockedIp(target.host)) {
+        throw new Error(`egress: ${target.host} is a blocked address`);
+      }
+      return realConnect.apply(this, args);
+    }
+    // Hostname: inject the resolving guard. Preserve an existing lookup by
+    // wrapping the args' options object.
     const first = args[0];
-    let host: string | undefined;
-    if (first && typeof first === 'object') {
-      const o = first as { host?: string; path?: string };
-      if (o.path) return realConnect.apply(this, args); // unix socket — local
-      host = o.host ?? 'localhost';
-    } else if (typeof first === 'number' || typeof first === 'string') {
-      // connect(port[, host]) — a numeric-only path connects to localhost.
-      host = typeof args[1] === 'string' ? (args[1] as string) : 'localhost';
-    }
-    if (host && !allowed(host)) {
-      throw new Error(`egress: ${host} is not in the plugin's declared hosts`);
-    }
-    return realConnect.apply(this, args);
+    const options = first && typeof first === 'object' ? { ...(first as object) } : { host: target.host, port: args[0] };
+    (options as { lookup?: unknown }).lookup = guardedLookup;
+    const rest = first && typeof first === 'object' ? args.slice(1) : args.slice(typeof args[1] === 'string' ? 2 : 1);
+    return realConnect.call(this, options, ...rest);
   };
 }
 

server/src/nest/plugins/supervisor/plugin-supervisor.ts

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ interface Supervised {
   status: PluginStatus;
   crashes: number[]; // crash timestamps (ms)
   lastBeat: number;
+  lastRss: number; // last reported resident set size (bytes)
   routes: PluginRouteInfo[];
   jobs: string[];
   pending: Map<string, Pending>; // host→child invokes awaiting a response
@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ export interface SupervisorTuning {
   crashLimit?: number;
   backoffCapMs?: number;
   killGraceMs?: number;
+  maxRssBytes?: number;
 }
 
 const DEFAULTS: Required<SupervisorTuning> = {
@@ -66,6 +68,10 @@ const DEFAULTS: Required<SupervisorTuning> = {
   crashLimit: 5,
   backoffCapMs: 30_000,
   killGraceMs: 3000,
+  // Hard RSS ceiling — the real memory cap. --max-old-space-size only bounds the
+  // V8 heap; Buffers/ArrayBuffers/native allocations sail past it, so a plugin
+  // could OOM the box while staying "under" the heap limit. Overridable via env.
+  maxRssBytes: (Number(process.env.TREK_PLUGIN_MAX_RSS_MB) || 300) * 1024 * 1024,
 };
 
 export class PluginSupervisor {
@@ -94,6 +100,7 @@ export class PluginSupervisor {
       status: 'starting',
       crashes: [],
       lastBeat: Date.now(),
+      lastRss: 0,
       routes: [],
       jobs: [],
       pending: new Map(),
@@ -236,9 +243,12 @@ export class PluginSupervisor {
         case 'hello':
           sup.child?.send({ k: 'evt', topic: 'init', data: { config: sup.config, egress: sup.egress } } satisfies Envelope);
           break;
-        case 'heartbeat':
+        case 'heartbeat': {
           sup.lastBeat = Date.now();
+          const rss = (msg.data as { rss?: number })?.rss;
+          if (typeof rss === 'number') sup.lastRss = rss;
           break;
+        }
         case 'loaded': {
           sup.lastBeat = Date.now();
           const d = msg.data as { routes?: PluginRouteInfo[]; jobs?: string[] };
@@ -310,12 +320,23 @@ export class PluginSupervisor {
     this.sweep.unref?.();
   }
 
-  /** Kill any active plugin that has stopped sending heartbeats (drives the crash path). */
+  /**
+   * Kill any active plugin that has stopped sending heartbeats OR blown its RSS
+   * ceiling (drives the crash/backoff path, so a repeat offender auto-disables).
+   */
   reapStale(now = Date.now()): void {
     for (const sup of this.running.values()) {
-      if (sup.status === 'active' && now - sup.lastBeat > this.tuning.heartbeatTimeoutMs) {
+      if (sup.status !== 'active') continue;
+      if (now - sup.lastBeat > this.tuning.heartbeatTimeoutMs) {
         this.hooks.onLog?.(sup.id, 'warn', 'missed heartbeats; killing');
         sup.child?.kill('SIGKILL');
+      } else if (sup.lastRss > this.tuning.maxRssBytes) {
+        this.hooks.onLog?.(
+          sup.id,
+          'warn',
+          `exceeded memory ceiling (${Math.round(sup.lastRss / 1048576)}MB > ${Math.round(this.tuning.maxRssBytes / 1048576)}MB); killing`,
+        );
+        sup.child?.kill('SIGKILL');
       }
     }
   }

server/tests/unit/plugins/egress-policy.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/**
+ * Egress-policy helpers for the plugin network guard (#plugins, L1 hardening):
+ * SSRF/private-IP blocking, declared-host allowlisting, and connect() arg
+ * classification.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import net from 'node:net';
+import { isBlockedIp, makeHostAllow, classifyConnect } from '../../../src/nest/plugins/runtime/egress-policy';
+
+const isIP = (s: string) => net.isIP(s) !== 0;
+
+describe('isBlockedIp', () => {
+  it.each([
+    '0.0.0.0', '10.1.2.3', '127.0.0.1', '172.16.0.1', '172.31.255.255',
+    '192.168.1.1', '169.254.169.254', '100.64.0.1', '224.0.0.1', '255.255.255.255',
+    '::1', '::', 'fe80::1', 'fc00::1', 'fd12:3456::1', '::ffff:127.0.0.1', '::ffff:10.0.0.1',
+  ])('blocks %s', (ip) => {
+    expect(isBlockedIp(ip)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    '8.8.8.8', '1.1.1.1', '140.82.121.3', '172.15.0.1', '172.32.0.1',
+    '100.63.0.1', '100.128.0.1', '2606:4700::1111', '::ffff:8.8.8.8',
+  ])('allows public %s', (ip) => {
+    expect(isBlockedIp(ip)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('makeHostAllow', () => {
+  it('matches exact hosts and *.suffix wildcards, case-insensitively', () => {
+    const allow = makeHostAllow(['api.example.com', '*.aviationstack.com']);
+    expect(allow('api.example.com')).toBe(true);
+    expect(allow('API.example.com')).toBe(true);
+    expect(allow('v2.aviationstack.com')).toBe(true);
+    expect(allow('aviationstack.com')).toBe(true); // apex matches *.suffix
+    expect(allow('evil.com')).toBe(false);
+    expect(allow('notapi.example.com')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('an empty egress list allows nothing', () => {
+    const allow = makeHostAllow([]);
+    expect(allow('anything.com')).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('classifyConnect', () => {
+  it('treats a unix-socket path (options.path) as local', () => {
+    expect(classifyConnect([{ path: '/tmp/x.sock' }], isIP)).toEqual({ kind: 'local', host: '/tmp/x.sock' });
+  });
+
+  it('treats a bare non-numeric string as a local IPC path', () => {
+    expect(classifyConnect(['/run/app.sock'], isIP).kind).toBe('local');
+  });
+
+  it('classifies an options object with a hostname', () => {
+    expect(classifyConnect([{ host: 'api.example.com', port: 443 }], isIP)).toEqual({ kind: 'hostname', host: 'api.example.com' });
+  });
+
+  it('classifies an options object with a literal IP', () => {
+    expect(classifyConnect([{ host: '10.0.0.5', port: 80 }], isIP)).toEqual({ kind: 'literal-ip', host: '10.0.0.5' });
+  });
+
+  it('classifies the (port, host) form', () => {
+    expect(classifyConnect([443, 'example.com'], isIP)).toEqual({ kind: 'hostname', host: 'example.com' });
+    expect(classifyConnect([80, '127.0.0.1'], isIP)).toEqual({ kind: 'literal-ip', host: '127.0.0.1' });
+  });
+
+  it('defaults a port-only connect to localhost', () => {
+    expect(classifyConnect([8080], isIP)).toEqual({ kind: 'hostname', host: 'localhost' });
+  });
+});

server/tests/unit/plugins/plugin-audit.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/**
+ * Host-side capability audit log (#plugins, L1 hardening): resource projection,
+ * which methods are auditable, and the per-plugin hash chain.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
+import Database from 'better-sqlite3';
+import { appendAudit, readAudit, auditResource, isAuditable } from '../../../src/nest/plugins/host/plugin-audit';
+
+function makeDb() {
+  const db = new Database(':memory:');
+  db.exec(`CREATE TABLE plugin_capability_audit (
+    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, plugin_id TEXT NOT NULL, acting_user_id INTEGER,
+    method TEXT NOT NULL, resource TEXT, code TEXT NOT NULL, ts TEXT NOT NULL,
+    prev_hash TEXT, hash TEXT NOT NULL);`);
+  return db;
+}
+
+describe('auditResource + isAuditable', () => {
+  it('projects a resource key from method + params (never raw params)', () => {
+    expect(auditResource('trips.getById', { tripId: 12 })).toBe('trip:12');
+    expect(auditResource('users.getById', { id: 3 })).toBe('user:3');
+    expect(auditResource('ws.broadcastToTrip', { tripId: 7 })).toBe('trip:7');
+    expect(auditResource('ws.broadcastToUser', { userId: 9 })).toBe('user:9');
+    expect(auditResource('db.query', { sql: 'x' })).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('audits core-data + ws, not a plugin own-db call', () => {
+    expect(isAuditable('trips.getReservations')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isAuditable('users.getById')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isAuditable('ws.broadcastToTrip')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isAuditable('db.query')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isAuditable('db.migrate')).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('appendAudit hash chain', () => {
+  let db: ReturnType<typeof makeDb>;
+  beforeEach(() => { db = makeDb(); });
+
+  it('chains each entry off the previous hash (per plugin)', () => {
+    appendAudit(db, { pluginId: 'p', actingUserId: 42, method: 'trips.getById', resource: 'trip:1', code: 'ok' });
+    appendAudit(db, { pluginId: 'p', actingUserId: 42, method: 'trips.getById', resource: 'trip:2', code: 'ok' });
+    const rows = db.prepare('SELECT prev_hash, hash FROM plugin_capability_audit ORDER BY id').all() as Array<{ prev_hash: string | null; hash: string }>;
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(2);
+    expect(rows[0].prev_hash).toBeNull();
+    expect(rows[1].prev_hash).toBe(rows[0].hash); // chain links
+    expect(rows[1].hash).not.toBe(rows[0].hash);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps separate chains per plugin', () => {
+    appendAudit(db, { pluginId: 'a', method: 'trips.getById', resource: 'trip:1', code: 'ok' });
+    appendAudit(db, { pluginId: 'b', method: 'trips.getById', resource: 'trip:1', code: 'ok' });
+    const a = db.prepare("SELECT prev_hash FROM plugin_capability_audit WHERE plugin_id='b'").get() as { prev_hash: string | null };
+    expect(a.prev_hash).toBeNull(); // b's first entry doesn't chain off a's
+  });
+
+  it('records denials too (code is the error code)', () => {
+    appendAudit(db, { pluginId: 'p', actingUserId: 99, method: 'trips.getById', resource: 'trip:1', code: 'RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN' });
+    const row = readAudit(db, 'p')[0] as { code: string; method: string };
+    expect(row.code).toBe('RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN');
+  });
+
+  it('readAudit returns newest first with the projected fields only', () => {
+    appendAudit(db, { pluginId: 'p', actingUserId: 42, method: 'trips.getById', resource: 'trip:1', code: 'ok' });
+    const rows = readAudit(db, 'p') as Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
+    expect(rows[0]).toHaveProperty('method', 'trips.getById');
+    expect(rows[0]).not.toHaveProperty('prev_hash'); // internal chain fields not exposed
+  });
+});

server/tests/unit/plugins/plugin-frame.test.ts

@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ describe('PluginFrameController', () => {
     expect(res.filePath).toContain(path.join('widget', 'client', 'index.html'));
     const csp = res.headers['Content-Security-Policy'];
     expect(csp).toContain("default-src 'none'");
-    expect(csp).toContain('sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms allow-popups');
+    expect(csp).toContain('sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms');
+    expect(csp).not.toContain('allow-popups');
     expect(csp).not.toContain('allow-same-origin');
     expect(csp).toContain('connect-src \'self\' https://api.weather.com');
     expect(res.headers['X-Content-Type-Options']).toBe('nosniff');