mirror of
https://github.com/mauriceboe/TREK.git
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38f3cb3101
An adversarial review of what had already landed here turned up three that
were wrong, and they are the reason for this commit.
The CSP change removed 'unsafe-eval', which is not leftover: heic-to's
libheif build initialises embind through new Function(), and without it every
iPhone .heic upload fails in the browser. 'wasm-unsafe-eval' alone was tried
once already and was not enough (93b51a0b). Put back, with the reason written
down this time and the test pinning it rather than its absence.
The idempotency in-flight guard never fired. finalize() runs when the
handler's observable completes, but Nest writes the response - and therefore
stores the row - several microtasks later, so the waiting request always woke
up before the row existed and ran the handler a second time. It releases from
the point the row is written now; finalize is the backstop for handlers that
answer another way. The test drove the two in the opposite order from Nest,
which is why it passed either way.
And the trip-scoping check treated an id that resolves to nothing like one
belonging to someone else. accommodation_id has no foreign key, so shortening
a trip's dates leaves a booking pointing at a gap - which update() has always
healed by clearing the link, and which would have become a permanent 400.
The rest: a reply to a soft-deleted chat message is refused and the create
path blanks the quote like the list path does; the ws-token buckets are keyed
by account rather than by IP, where every user behind one NAT shared a
ceiling; the weather and vacay caps read through the stream, since a chunked
response has no content-length to check; the Google host gate takes country
domains again; abandoned response bodies are cancelled instead of left to GC;
the boot failure prints its errno; and a share link that is not yours to read
now says so instead of reporting that the journey has none.
TICKETJSON gets a real repair: the in-place GLOB fix only helps installs that
have not run it yet, so an appended migration puts back the note text the
case-insensitive LIKE cut off, for rows where what it stored is not valid
JSON. A genuine receipt always parses, so it cannot be touched.
Wiki: the audit log records the IP Express resolves after TRUST_PROXY, not
the leftmost X-Forwarded-For entry a caller can write. That is the right way
round, but it means the hop count has to be accurate - said plainly in both
places now.
156 lines
7.4 KiB
TypeScript
156 lines
7.4 KiB
TypeScript
import crypto from 'node:crypto';
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import fs from 'node:fs';
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import path from 'node:path';
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import { readEnv } from './app-config';
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const dataDir = path.resolve(__dirname, '../data');
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const jwtSecretFile = path.join(dataDir, '.jwt_secret');
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// ENCRYPTION_KEY is used to derive at-rest encryption keys for stored secrets
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// (API keys, MFA TOTP secrets, SMTP password, OIDC client secret, etc.).
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// Keeping it separate from JWT_SECRET means you can rotate session tokens without
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// invalidating all stored encrypted data, and vice-versa.
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//
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// Resolution order:
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// 1. ENCRYPTION_KEY env var — explicit, always takes priority.
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// 2. data/.encryption_key file — present on any install that has started at
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// least once (written automatically by cases 1b and 3 below).
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// 3. data/.jwt_secret — one-time fallback for existing installs upgrading
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// without a pre-set ENCRYPTION_KEY. The value is immediately persisted to
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// data/.encryption_key so JWT rotation can never break decryption later.
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// 4. Auto-generated — fresh install with none of the above; persisted to
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// data/.encryption_key.
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const encKeyFile = path.join(dataDir, '.encryption_key');
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let _encryptionKey: string = process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY || '';
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if (_encryptionKey) {
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// Env var is set explicitly — persist it to file so the value survives
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// container restarts even if the env var is later removed.
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try {
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if (!fs.existsSync(dataDir)) fs.mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
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fs.writeFileSync(encKeyFile, _encryptionKey, { mode: 0o600 });
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} catch {
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// Non-fatal: env var is the source of truth when set.
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}
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} else {
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// Try the dedicated key file first (covers all installs after first start).
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try {
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_encryptionKey = fs.readFileSync(encKeyFile, 'utf8').trim();
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} catch (readErr: unknown) {
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const code = (readErr as NodeJS.ErrnoException)?.code;
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if (code !== 'ENOENT') {
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// The file is there, we just cannot read it (permissions, I/O error).
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// Continuing would resolve a different key and overwrite this one below,
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// which permanently orphans every stored secret. Refuse to start instead.
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// The errno goes in the line because this exit crash-loops the container,
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// and the code is the only part that says which of these it is.
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console.error(
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`FATAL: could not read ${encKeyFile} (${code ?? 'no errno'}) -`,
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readErr instanceof Error ? readErr.message : readErr,
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);
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if (code === 'EISDIR') {
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// Compose creating a missing bind-mount source as a directory is by far
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// the most common way this file stops being a file.
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console.error('EISDIR: the path is a directory. A bind mount pointed at data/.encryption_key created it as one — remove it and mount the data directory instead.');
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}
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console.error('Fix the file permissions or set ENCRYPTION_KEY explicitly.');
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process.exit(1);
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}
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// File not found — first start on an existing or fresh install.
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}
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if (!_encryptionKey && fs.existsSync(encKeyFile)) {
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// Present but empty: a truncated write, a full disk, a broken restore.
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// Same reasoning as above. Regenerating here would silently replace the real key.
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console.error('FATAL:', encKeyFile, 'is empty. Restore it from backup or set ENCRYPTION_KEY.');
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process.exit(1);
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}
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if (!_encryptionKey) {
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// One-time migration: existing install upgrading for the first time.
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// Use the JWT secret as the encryption key and immediately write it to
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// .encryption_key so future JWT rotations cannot break decryption.
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try {
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_encryptionKey = fs.readFileSync(jwtSecretFile, 'utf8').trim();
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console.warn('WARNING: ENCRYPTION_KEY is not set. Falling back to JWT secret for at-rest encryption.');
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console.warn('The value has been persisted to data/.encryption_key — JWT rotation is now safe.');
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} catch {
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// JWT secret not found — must be a fresh install.
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}
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}
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if (!_encryptionKey) {
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// Fresh install — auto-generate a dedicated key.
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_encryptionKey = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
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}
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// Persist whatever key was resolved so subsequent starts skip the fallback chain.
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try {
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if (!fs.existsSync(dataDir)) fs.mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
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fs.writeFileSync(encKeyFile, _encryptionKey, { mode: 0o600 });
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console.log('Encryption key persisted to', encKeyFile);
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} catch (writeErr: unknown) {
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console.warn(
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'WARNING: Could not persist encryption key to disk:',
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writeErr instanceof Error ? writeErr.message : writeErr,
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);
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console.warn('Set ENCRYPTION_KEY env var to avoid losing access to encrypted secrets on restart.');
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}
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}
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export const ENCRYPTION_KEY = _encryptionKey;
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// JWT_SECRET is always managed by the server — auto-generated on first start and
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// persisted to data/.jwt_secret. Use the admin panel to rotate it; do not set it
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// via environment variable (env var would override a rotation on next restart).
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let _jwtSecret: string;
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try {
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_jwtSecret = fs.readFileSync(jwtSecretFile, 'utf8').trim();
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} catch {
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_jwtSecret = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
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try {
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if (!fs.existsSync(dataDir)) fs.mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
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fs.writeFileSync(jwtSecretFile, _jwtSecret, { mode: 0o600 });
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console.log('Generated and saved JWT secret to', jwtSecretFile);
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} catch (writeErr: unknown) {
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console.warn(
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'WARNING: Could not persist JWT secret to disk:',
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writeErr instanceof Error ? writeErr.message : writeErr,
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);
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console.warn('Sessions will reset on server restart.');
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}
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}
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// export let so TypeScript's CJS output keeps exports.JWT_SECRET live
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// (generates `exports.JWT_SECRET = JWT_SECRET = newVal` inside updateJwtSecret)
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export let JWT_SECRET = _jwtSecret;
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// Called by the admin rotate-jwt-secret endpoint to update the in-process
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// binding that all middleware and route files reference.
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export function updateJwtSecret(newSecret: string): void {
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JWT_SECRET = newSecret;
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}
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// DEFAULT_LANGUAGE / SESSION_DURATION* parsing moved into src/app-config
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// (env.schema.ts validates fail-fast at boot; derive.ts resolves/falls back).
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// Re-exported here — frozen at import, exactly like before — so the many
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// importers of this module (mcp, middleware, services, e2e harness) are
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// untouched. This module now owns only key material (above).
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const sessionEnv = readEnv().session;
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/** Default login-page language, validated against the supported set ('en' fallback). */
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export const DEFAULT_LANGUAGE = readEnv().app.defaultLanguage;
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/** Human-readable session length actually in effect (for logs/diagnostics). */
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export const SESSION_DURATION = sessionEnv.duration;
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/** Session length in milliseconds — used for the cookie `maxAge`. */
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export const SESSION_DURATION_MS = sessionEnv.durationMs;
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/** Session length in seconds — passed to `jwt.sign({ expiresIn })` (number = seconds). */
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export const SESSION_DURATION_SECONDS = sessionEnv.durationSeconds;
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/** Human-readable "remember me" session length actually in effect (for logs/diagnostics). */
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export const SESSION_DURATION_REMEMBER = sessionEnv.durationRemember;
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/** "Remember me" session length in milliseconds — used for the persistent cookie `maxAge`. */
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export const SESSION_DURATION_REMEMBER_MS = sessionEnv.durationRememberMs;
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/** "Remember me" session length in seconds — passed to `jwt.sign({ expiresIn })`. */
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export const SESSION_DURATION_REMEMBER_SECONDS = sessionEnv.durationRememberSeconds;
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