mirror of
https://github.com/mauriceboe/TREK.git
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64136484ee
Remediates the findings from the adversarial audit (threat model: malicious plugin author + malicious artifact). Highlights: Critical - proxy: force nosniff + Content-Disposition: attachment on every proxied reply and drop location/content-disposition + non-2xx from the passthrough, so a plugin can't serve an HTML document at TREK's origin (sandbox-escape → account takeover) or an open redirect. High - db:own runs synchronously in the host: cap the plugin DB (max_page_count) and row-cap query() via iterate() so a recursive CTE / huge blob can't stall the event loop, OOM, or exhaust the shared volume. - supervisor: measure child RSS host-side (/proc/<pid>/statm) instead of trusting the spoofable heartbeat; add an activation timeout so a stuck onLoad can't hang activate() or peg a core unreaped. - safe-extract: enforce entry-count + cumulative-size limits INSIDE readZip before inflating (decompression-bomb OOM). - re-consent: activate() never widens granted permissions without explicit consent (409 CONSENT_REQUIRED); the row toggle + "Update All" route through the consent dialog, which now queues instead of overwriting. Medium/low - egress: gate dgram hostnames through the IP-vetting resolver; block the low-level socket escape (process.binding) + lock the wrapped prototypes; canonicalize IPv6 in isBlockedIp (hex-mapped/compressed metadata); reject degenerate `*.` / whole-TLD / spaced outbound hosts in the manifest + CSP. - ws:broadcast is membership-gated to the acting user's trips / own connections; users.getById is scoped to users the acting user can see (no enumeration). - safe-fetch streams + aborts at the byte cap (chunked codeload OOM); isPrivateIp reuses the canonicalizing check. - native-scan throws instead of silently passing past its entry cap. - SDK: dev serves binary assets as raw buffers + handles EADDRINUSE; manifest validator gains the reserved-id + outbound-host checks; wikis corrected. Tests updated for the new membership-gated behaviour + regression tests added (IPv6 canonicalization, wildcard hardening, outbound-host validation, ws/user scoping). 234 plugin tests + 24 SDK tests green.
213 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
213 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* The capability router is the plugin permission boundary (#plugins, M1). These
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* tests prove that an ungranted method is never reachable, a granted method
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* works, a granted trip read is still membership-checked against the acting
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* user, and bad params / unknown methods are rejected — without ever spawning a
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* child (the router runs in the host).
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
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import { PluginRpcHost, type HostDeps } from '../../../src/nest/plugins/host/rpc-host';
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import type { RpcRequest, RpcResponse, RpcError } from '../../../src/nest/plugins/protocol/envelope';
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function makeDeps(): HostDeps {
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return {
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data: {
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query: vi.fn(() => [{ n: 1 }]),
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exec: vi.fn(() => ({ changes: 1 })),
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migrate: vi.fn(() => ({ applied: true })),
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close: vi.fn(),
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} as unknown as HostDeps['data'],
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db: {
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prepare: vi.fn((sql: string) => ({
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all: () => [{ id: 7, name: 'Place' }],
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get: () =>
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sql.includes('FROM trips')
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? { id: 1, title: 'Japan', start_date: '2027-01-01' }
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: { id: 3, username: 'ada', display_name: 'Ada', avatar: null },
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})),
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},
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// trip 1 is accessible to user 42; everything else is not
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canAccessTrip: vi.fn((tripId: number, userId: number) => (tripId === 1 && userId === 42 ? { id: 1 } : undefined)),
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// user 42 may see user 3 (they share a trip); nobody else
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canSeeUser: vi.fn((actingUserId: number, targetUserId: number) => actingUserId === 42 && targetUserId === 3),
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broadcastToTrip: vi.fn(),
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broadcastToUser: vi.fn(),
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};
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}
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const req = (method: string, params: Record<string, unknown> = {}): RpcRequest => ({ k: 'req', id: 'x', method, params });
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const ok = (r: RpcResponse | RpcError): r is RpcResponse => r.ok === true;
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describe('PluginRpcHost — capability enforcement', () => {
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let deps: HostDeps;
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beforeEach(() => { deps = makeDeps(); });
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it('registers only granted methods; an ungranted method is PERMISSION_DENIED', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:own']), deps);
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const denied = await host.dispatch(req('trips.getById', { tripId: 1, asUserId: 42 }));
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expect(denied.ok).toBe(false);
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expect((denied as RpcError).error.code).toBe('PERMISSION_DENIED');
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expect(deps.canAccessTrip).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('a granted db:own method runs against the plugin db', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:own']), deps);
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const res = await host.dispatch(req('db.query', { sql: 'SELECT 1', args: [] }));
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expect(ok(res)).toBe(true);
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expect((res as RpcResponse).result).toEqual([{ n: 1 }]);
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expect(deps.data.query).toHaveBeenCalledWith('SELECT 1', []);
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});
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it('an unknown method is UNKNOWN_METHOD, not PERMISSION_DENIED', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:own']), deps);
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const res = await host.dispatch(req('fs.readFile', { path: '/etc/passwd' }));
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expect((res as RpcError).error.code).toBe('UNKNOWN_METHOD');
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});
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it('db:read:trips reads a trip the acting user can access', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:read:trips']), deps);
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// The acting user is bound by the HOST (2nd dispatch arg), never from params.
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const res = await host.dispatch(req('trips.getById', { tripId: 1 }), 42);
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expect(ok(res)).toBe(true);
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// returns the ACTUAL trip row (title/start_date), not the access-check object
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expect((res as RpcResponse).result).toMatchObject({ id: 1, title: 'Japan', start_date: '2027-01-01' });
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expect(deps.db.prepare).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringContaining('FROM trips'));
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});
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it('db:read:trips is still RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN when the user is not a member', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:read:trips']), deps);
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const res = await host.dispatch(req('trips.getById', { tripId: 1 }), 99);
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expect((res as RpcError).error.code).toBe('RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN');
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});
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it('a trip read with NO bound acting user is RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN (jobs / forged calls)', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:read:trips']), deps);
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// A plugin-supplied asUserId is ignored; without a host-bound user, deny.
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const res = await host.dispatch(req('trips.getById', { tripId: 1, asUserId: 42 }), undefined);
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expect((res as RpcError).error.code).toBe('RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN');
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expect(deps.canAccessTrip).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('trips.getPlaces is membership-checked before the core read', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:read:trips']), deps);
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const forbidden = await host.dispatch(req('trips.getPlaces', { tripId: 2 }), 42);
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expect((forbidden as RpcError).error.code).toBe('RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN');
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expect(deps.db.prepare).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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const allowed = await host.dispatch(req('trips.getPlaces', { tripId: 1 }), 42);
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expect(ok(allowed)).toBe(true);
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expect((allowed as RpcResponse).result).toEqual([{ id: 7, name: 'Place' }]);
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});
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it('db:read:users returns only the public projection for a visible user', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:read:users']), deps);
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const res = await host.dispatch(req('users.getById', { id: 3 }), 42);
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expect(ok(res)).toBe(true);
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expect((res as RpcResponse).result).toEqual({ id: 3, username: 'ada', display_name: 'Ada', avatar: null });
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// the SELECT column list is host-controlled — no password/token columns
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expect(deps.db.prepare).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringContaining('id, username, display_name, avatar'));
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});
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it('db:read:users is RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN for a user the acting user cannot see (no enumeration)', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:read:users']), deps);
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const forbidden = await host.dispatch(req('users.getById', { id: 999 }), 42);
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expect((forbidden as RpcError).error.code).toBe('RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN');
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// and with no bound acting user (job / forged call), also denied
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const noUser = await host.dispatch(req('users.getById', { id: 3 }), undefined);
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expect((noUser as RpcError).error.code).toBe('RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN');
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});
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it('ws:broadcast:trip forwards to the (namespaced) broadcaster for a member', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['ws:broadcast:trip']), deps);
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const res = await host.dispatch(req('ws.broadcastToTrip', { tripId: 1, event: 'ping', data: { a: 1 } }), 42);
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expect(ok(res)).toBe(true);
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expect(deps.broadcastToTrip).toHaveBeenCalledWith(1, 'ping', { a: 1 });
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});
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it('ws:broadcast:trip is RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN for a non-member trip (no cross-tenant push)', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['ws:broadcast:trip']), deps);
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const forbidden = await host.dispatch(req('ws.broadcastToTrip', { tripId: 999, event: 'x', data: {} }), 42);
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expect((forbidden as RpcError).error.code).toBe('RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN');
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expect(deps.broadcastToTrip).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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// and a broadcast with no bound acting user is denied too
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const noUser = await host.dispatch(req('ws.broadcastToTrip', { tripId: 1, event: 'x', data: {} }), undefined);
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expect((noUser as RpcError).error.code).toBe('RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN');
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});
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it('bad params are BAD_PARAMS', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:own']), deps);
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const res = await host.dispatch(req('db.query', { args: [] }));
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expect((res as RpcError).error.code).toBe('BAD_PARAMS');
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});
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it('with no permissions, every real method is denied', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set<string>(), deps);
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for (const m of ['db.query', 'trips.getById', 'users.getById', 'ws.broadcastToTrip']) {
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const res = await host.dispatch(req(m, { tripId: 1, asUserId: 42, id: 3, event: 'x', sql: 'SELECT 1' }));
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expect((res as RpcError).error.code).toBe('PERMISSION_DENIED');
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}
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});
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it('ws:broadcast:user forwards only to the acting user (never an arbitrary one)', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['ws:broadcast:user']), deps);
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const res = await host.dispatch(req('ws.broadcastToUser', { userId: 42, event: 'poke', data: { x: 2 } }), 42);
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expect(ok(res)).toBe(true);
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expect(deps.broadcastToUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(42, { event: 'poke', x: 2 });
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// broadcasting to a DIFFERENT user is refused
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const forbidden = await host.dispatch(req('ws.broadcastToUser', { userId: 9, event: 'poke', data: {} }), 42);
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expect((forbidden as RpcError).error.code).toBe('RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN');
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});
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it('non-array db args are BAD_PARAMS; a primitive ws payload is wrapped', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:own', 'ws:broadcast:trip']), deps);
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const bad = await host.dispatch(req('db.query', { sql: 'SELECT 1', args: 'nope' }));
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expect((bad as RpcError).error.code).toBe('BAD_PARAMS');
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await host.dispatch(req('ws.broadcastToTrip', { tripId: 1, event: 'ping', data: 'primitive' }), 42);
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expect(deps.broadcastToTrip).toHaveBeenCalledWith(1, 'ping', { value: 'primitive' });
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});
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it('dispose() closes the plugin data db', () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:own']), deps);
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host.dispose();
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expect(deps.data.close).toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('trips.getReservations is membership-checked and reads reservations', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:read:trips']), deps);
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const res = await host.dispatch(req('trips.getReservations', { tripId: 1 }), 42);
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expect(ok(res)).toBe(true);
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expect(deps.db.prepare).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringContaining('FROM reservations'));
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});
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it('an error thrown by a handler becomes HOST_ERROR', async () => {
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(deps.data.query as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mockImplementation(() => {
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throw new Error('disk gone');
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});
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:own']), deps);
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const res = await host.dispatch(req('db.query', { sql: 'SELECT 1', args: [] }));
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expect((res as RpcError).error.code).toBe('HOST_ERROR');
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expect((res as RpcError).error.message).toBe('disk gone');
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});
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it('a non-Error thrown by a handler still maps to HOST_ERROR', async () => {
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(deps.data.query as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mockImplementation(() => {
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throw 'raw string';
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});
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:own']), deps);
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const res = await host.dispatch(req('db.query', { sql: 'SELECT 1' }));
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expect((res as RpcError).error.code).toBe('HOST_ERROR');
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expect((res as RpcError).error.message).toBe('internal error');
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});
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it('coerces numeric string params and tolerates a missing params object', async () => {
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const host = new PluginRpcHost('p', new Set(['db:read:trips', 'db:own']), deps);
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// tripId as a string -> coerced to a number; acting user is the bound host arg
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const res = await host.dispatch(req('trips.getById', { tripId: '1' }), 42);
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expect(ok(res)).toBe(true);
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// a request with no params object at all -> BAD_PARAMS (sql missing), not a crash
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const noParams = await host.dispatch({ k: 'req', id: 'y', method: 'db.query', params: undefined });
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expect((noParams as RpcError).error.code).toBe('BAD_PARAMS');
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});
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});
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