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Maurice
b16a7d7b77
A second adversarial pass over the first remediation found four findings only partially closed and five issues the fixes themselves introduced. This closes them: Partial → closed - re-consent gate keyed on `granted.length > 0`, so a plugin first activated with ZERO permissions (granted '[]') was treated as never-consented and a later widening was granted silently. Now discovery marks a never-consented plugin with granted_permissions '' and activate() gates on "ever consented" (any non-empty string, including '[]'). - db:own DoS: block WITH RECURSIVE outright (the one construct that spins the synchronous host unboundedly regardless of the size/row caps, via query OR exec). - dgram: also wrap `new dgram.Socket(...)` (bypassed createSocket) to inject the IP-vetting lookup, and lock createSocket/Socket. - frame self-navigation: documented as a bounded best-effort mitigation (inherent to sandboxed iframes; exposure is the plugin's own routes + already-held context, never the httpOnly cookie). Regressions introduced by the first pass → fixed - proxy: only real redirects (301/302/303/307/308) are gated, to a RELATIVE in-app Location (supports OAuth-callback bounce, blocks open redirect); 300/304 pass through; attachment only on non-redirects. - supervisor: measure RSS via /proc/<pid>/status VmRSS (page-size independent); activation-timeout awaits kill() before disposing the db handle. - manifest HOST_RE: allow single-label hosts (self-hoster sibling services) while keeping wildcards multi-label; mirrored in the SDK + frame CSP filter. Regression tests added (re-consent incl. the '[]' case, WITH RECURSIVE + row cap, single-label host). 236 plugin tests + 24 SDK tests green.