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TREK/server/src/nest/plugins/plugin-frame.controller.ts
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2026-10-10 21:23:37 +02:00

151 lines
7.4 KiB
TypeScript

import { Public } from '../auth-core/public.decorator';
import { pluginsEnabled } from './kill-switch';
import { pluginCodeDir } from './paths';
import { PluginRuntimeService } from './plugin-runtime.service';
import { Controller, Get, Param, Req, Res } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
import fs from 'node:fs';
import path from 'node:path';
/**
* Serves a page/widget plugin's static client from /plugin-frame/:id/* (#plugins,
* M3). The document is embedded in a sandbox WITHOUT allow-same-origin, so it
* runs at an OPAQUE origin: it cannot read the trek_session cookie, cannot reach
* the parent DOM, and its only channel to TREK is the postMessage bridge.
*
* Each response gets a locked-down, per-plugin CSP (default-src none; own scripts
* only; connect-src limited to declared outbound hosts) and a strict path guard
* so a plugin can only serve files under its own client/ directory.
*/
const MIME: Record<string, string> = {
'.html': 'text/html; charset=utf-8',
'.js': 'text/javascript; charset=utf-8',
'.mjs': 'text/javascript; charset=utf-8',
'.css': 'text/css; charset=utf-8',
'.json': 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
'.svg': 'image/svg+xml',
'.png': 'image/png',
'.jpg': 'image/jpeg',
'.jpeg': 'image/jpeg',
'.gif': 'image/gif',
'.webp': 'image/webp',
'.woff2': 'font/woff2',
'.ico': 'image/x-icon',
};
@Public('serves the sandboxed iframe document itself; the RPC inside it is authenticated')
@Controller('plugin-frame/:pluginId')
export class PluginFrameController {
constructor(private readonly runtime: PluginRuntimeService) {}
@Get('*path')
async serve(@Param('pluginId') pluginId: string, @Req() req: Request, @Res() res: Response): Promise<void> {
if (!pluginsEnabled() || !this.runtime.isActive(pluginId)) {
res.status(404).send('Plugin not available');
return;
}
const rest = (req.params as Record<string, unknown>).path ?? (req.params as Record<string, unknown>)[0] ?? '';
const rel = (Array.isArray(rest) ? rest.join('/') : String(rest)).replace(/^\/+/, '') || 'index.html';
const clientDir = path.join(pluginCodeDir(pluginId), 'client');
const resolved = path.resolve(clientDir, rel);
// Containment: never escape the plugin's own client/ dir.
if (!resolved.startsWith(path.resolve(clientDir) + path.sep) && resolved !== path.resolve(clientDir)) {
res.status(403).send('Forbidden');
return;
}
if (!fs.existsSync(resolved) || !fs.statSync(resolved).isFile()) {
res.status(404).send('Not found');
return;
}
// The check above is lexical, and statSync follows links, so a symlink inside
// client/ still reads whatever it points at. Re-check both sides resolved:
// a dev-linked plugin is a symlinked tree, so comparing against the raw root
// would reject it.
let realRoot: string;
let realFile: string;
try {
realRoot = fs.realpathSync(path.resolve(clientDir));
realFile = fs.realpathSync(resolved);
} catch {
res.status(404).send('Not found');
return;
}
if (realFile !== realRoot && !realFile.startsWith(realRoot + path.sep)) {
res.status(403).send('Forbidden');
return;
}
const ext = path.extname(resolved).toLowerCase();
res.setHeader('Content-Type', MIME[ext] ?? 'application/octet-stream');
res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
// The frame document runs at an OPAQUE origin (sandbox without
// allow-same-origin), so its own <script src>/<link> subresource loads are
// cross-origin — helmet's default CORP: same-origin makes the browser drop
// them (ERR_BLOCKED_BY_RESPONSE) and a multi-file client dies on boot.
// The sandbox + per-plugin CSP are the isolation boundary here, not CORP:
// these files are the plugin's own public client code.
res.setHeader('Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy', 'cross-origin');
res.setHeader('Content-Security-Policy', await this.frameCsp(pluginId, req.get('host')));
// Explicit { root } + basename, not the absolute path: under the Nest
// ExpressAdapter, res.sendFile(absolutePath) resolves against the rewritten
// req.url and 404s spuriously (same trap as files-download.controller.ts).
res.sendFile(path.basename(resolved), { root: path.dirname(resolved) });
}
/** Per-plugin, locked-down CSP for the sandboxed frame document. */
private async frameCsp(pluginId: string, host: string | undefined): Promise<string> {
// The frame must be able to reach exactly what the CHILD may reach. The child's egress
// guard is the union of the manifest's http:outbound:<host> grants AND the hosts an admin
// added post-install for an operatorEgress plugin (plugin-runtime.service: activate()).
// Building connect-src from the grants alone left an operatorEgress plugin WITH A UI able
// to call the operator's host from its server but CSP-blocked in its own iframe. The admin
// consented to these hosts at install and the child already reaches them, so matching the
// frame to the child widens no trust boundary that isn't already crossed.
//
// Defense in depth: both sources are validated upstream (the manifest validator; the
// admin writer's EGRESS_HOST_RE), but never interpolate anything that isn't a clean
// host/wildcard into connect-src — a stray space or `*` would inject an extra CSP source.
const outbound = [
...new Set([
...(await this.runtime.outboundHostsOf(pluginId)),
...(await this.runtime.operatorEgressHosts(pluginId)),
]),
].filter((h) => /^(\*\.[a-z0-9-]+(\.[a-z0-9-]+)+|[a-z0-9-]+(\.[a-z0-9-]+)*)$/i.test(h));
// The frame runs at an OPAQUE origin (sandbox without allow-same-origin), so
// 'self' matches nothing and the plugin's own <script src>/<link> files would
// be blocked — a multi-file client build (Vite/React output) only worked
// inlined. A scheme-less host-source pinned to THIS plugin's frame path
// re-allows exactly its own assets and still no other host. Both interpolated
// parts are charset-checked so a stray token can't widen the policy (the
// Host header is client-controlled; a forged one only lames the forger's own
// response), and a missing/odd Host just falls back to inline-only.
const ownAssets =
host && /^[a-z0-9.-]+(:\d+)?$/i.test(host) && /^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{2,39}$/.test(pluginId)
? ` ${host}/plugin-frame/${pluginId}/`
: '';
const connect = ["'self'", ...outbound.map((h) => `https://${h}`)].join(' ');
return [
"default-src 'none'",
// 'unsafe-inline' is safe here: the sandbox (not this script-src) is the
// isolation boundary, and the plugin author controls the frame's code
// either way. What script-src must keep doing is denying REMOTE hosts —
// a script URL is an egress channel connect-src never sees.
`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'${ownAssets}`,
`style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'${ownAssets}`,
`img-src 'self' data: blob:${ownAssets}`,
`font-src 'self' data:${ownAssets}`,
`connect-src ${connect}${ownAssets}`,
"frame-ancestors 'self'",
"base-uri 'none'",
"form-action 'self'",
// No allow-popups: window.open() ignores connect-src, so it would be an
// egress/phishing bypass (open any URL / a fake full-page login). A future
// OAuth-popup addon can re-request it as an explicit capability.
'sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms',
].join('; ');
}
}