Files
TREK/server/src/config.ts
T
Julien G. 1f5deeba6c Bug fixes - April 27th 2026 (#907)
* fix: clean up dangling FK references before deleting a user

Resolves FOREIGN KEY constraint failed (500) on DELETE /api/admin/users/:id
and DELETE /api/auth/me when the target user had rows in trip_members.invited_by,
share_tokens.created_by, budget_items.paid_by_user_id, journeys.user_id,
journey_entries.author_id, journey_contributors.user_id, or
journey_share_tokens.created_by — none of which had ON DELETE clauses.

Introduces deleteUserCompletely() in userCleanupService.ts which wraps all
cleanup and the final DELETE FROM users in a single transaction. Both
adminService.deleteUser and authService.deleteAccount now call it instead of
the bare DELETE. Tests ADMIN-005b and AUTH-040 cover all reference types
including notification sender/recipient and notice dismissals.

* test: extend FK deletion tests to cover journeys, files, and photos

ADMIN-005b and AUTH-040 now also seed and assert:
- owned journey with entries (cascade-deleted via journeys.user_id cleanup)
- trip_files.uploaded_by (SET NULL — file survives, attribution cleared)
- trek_photos.owner_id (SET NULL — photo record survives, owner cleared)
- trip_photos.user_id (CASCADE — photo association removed)

* test: extend user deletion tests to cover all FK relationships

ADMIN-005b and AUTH-040 now seed and assert every user FK relationship:

CASCADE (row deleted): trips, trip_members, tags, mcp_tokens, oauth_tokens,
oauth_consents, vacay_plans, vacay_plan_members, bucket_list,
visited_countries, visited_regions, packing_templates, invite_tokens,
collab_notes, settings, password_reset_tokens, notification_channel_preferences

SET NULL (row survives, column nulled): categories, todo_items.assigned_user_id,
packing_bags, audit_log

Caught and fixed: notification_preferences was dropped in migration 72;
correct table is notification_channel_preferences.

* fix: preserve URL hash and OIDC redirect target through login flow

- Include location.hash in redirect param at all three producer sites
  (ProtectedRoute, axios 401 interceptor, OAuthAuthorizePage) so
  hash fragments survive the login bounce
- Stash redirectTarget in sessionStorage before any OIDC provider
  redirect and restore it after the code exchange, since the IdP
  strips the original ?redirect= param during the roundtrip
- Clear sessionStorage on OIDC error to avoid stale state
- Add tests covering sessionStorage stash on mount, navigate to saved
  redirect after OIDC exchange, fallback to /dashboard, and cleanup
  on error

* fix: use day position instead of ID for accommodation date range clamping

Math.min/Math.max over raw day IDs breaks the start/end picker when a
trip's day IDs are non-monotonic relative to day_number (normal after
repeated generateDays extend/shrink cycles). Replaced with findIndex
lookups so clamping is always based on positional order.

Closes #889

* fix: normalize env var comparisons to be case-insensitive

All NODE_ENV, DEMO_MODE, OIDC_ONLY, FORCE_HTTPS, COOKIE_SECURE, and
ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK checks now use .toLowerCase() so values like
'Production' or 'True' behave identically to their lowercase forms.
Also adds APP_VERSION to the startup banner.

* fix: delete surplus days when shortening a trip

When shrinking a trip's date range, surplus days are now deleted along
with their assignments, notes, and accommodations (cascade). Places
remain in the trip pool; reservations keep their day reference nulled
by the existing ON DELETE SET NULL constraint (issue #909).

Updates TRIP-SVC-011 to reflect the new behaviour; adds TRIP-SVC-016
as a regression test for the empty-day case.

* fix: auto-backup retention deletes itself and manual backups on Docker

Two bugs in cleanupOldBackups:
1. Filter was .endsWith('.zip') — swept manual backup-*.zip files too.
   Now restricted to auto-backup-* prefix.
2. Age was derived from stat.birthtimeMs, which is 0 on overlayfs
   (Docker default), making every backup appear epoch-old and get
   deleted immediately. Age is now parsed from the filename timestamp
   and falls back to mtimeMs (reliable on overlayfs).

Also converts inline require('./services/auditLog') calls to a static
import throughout scheduler.ts, and adds 8 unit tests covering the
fixed retention logic including the overlayfs regression case.

* test: update TRIP-024 to match delete behavior on trip shrink

* feat: add bypass-branch-check label to skip branch enforcement
2026-04-28 05:17:20 +02:00

113 lines
5.3 KiB
TypeScript

import crypto from 'node:crypto';
import fs from 'node:fs';
import path from 'node:path';
const dataDir = path.resolve(__dirname, '../data');
// JWT_SECRET is always managed by the server — auto-generated on first start and
// persisted to data/.jwt_secret. Use the admin panel to rotate it; do not set it
// via environment variable (env var would override a rotation on next restart).
const jwtSecretFile = path.join(dataDir, '.jwt_secret');
let _jwtSecret: string;
try {
_jwtSecret = fs.readFileSync(jwtSecretFile, 'utf8').trim();
} catch {
_jwtSecret = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
try {
if (!fs.existsSync(dataDir)) fs.mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(jwtSecretFile, _jwtSecret, { mode: 0o600 });
console.log('Generated and saved JWT secret to', jwtSecretFile);
} catch (writeErr: unknown) {
console.warn('WARNING: Could not persist JWT secret to disk:', writeErr instanceof Error ? writeErr.message : writeErr);
console.warn('Sessions will reset on server restart.');
}
}
// export let so TypeScript's CJS output keeps exports.JWT_SECRET live
// (generates `exports.JWT_SECRET = JWT_SECRET = newVal` inside updateJwtSecret)
export let JWT_SECRET = _jwtSecret;
// Called by the admin rotate-jwt-secret endpoint to update the in-process
// binding that all middleware and route files reference.
export function updateJwtSecret(newSecret: string): void {
JWT_SECRET = newSecret;
}
// ENCRYPTION_KEY is used to derive at-rest encryption keys for stored secrets
// (API keys, MFA TOTP secrets, SMTP password, OIDC client secret, etc.).
// Keeping it separate from JWT_SECRET means you can rotate session tokens without
// invalidating all stored encrypted data, and vice-versa.
//
// Resolution order:
// 1. ENCRYPTION_KEY env var — explicit, always takes priority.
// 2. data/.encryption_key file — present on any install that has started at
// least once (written automatically by cases 1b and 3 below).
// 3. data/.jwt_secret — one-time fallback for existing installs upgrading
// without a pre-set ENCRYPTION_KEY. The value is immediately persisted to
// data/.encryption_key so JWT rotation can never break decryption later.
// 4. Auto-generated — fresh install with none of the above; persisted to
// data/.encryption_key.
const encKeyFile = path.join(dataDir, '.encryption_key');
let _encryptionKey: string = process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY || '';
if (_encryptionKey) {
// Env var is set explicitly — persist it to file so the value survives
// container restarts even if the env var is later removed.
try {
if (!fs.existsSync(dataDir)) fs.mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(encKeyFile, _encryptionKey, { mode: 0o600 });
} catch {
// Non-fatal: env var is the source of truth when set.
}
} else {
// Try the dedicated key file first (covers all installs after first start).
try {
_encryptionKey = fs.readFileSync(encKeyFile, 'utf8').trim();
} catch {
// File not found — first start on an existing or fresh install.
}
if (!_encryptionKey) {
// One-time migration: existing install upgrading for the first time.
// Use the JWT secret as the encryption key and immediately write it to
// .encryption_key so future JWT rotations cannot break decryption.
try {
_encryptionKey = fs.readFileSync(jwtSecretFile, 'utf8').trim();
console.warn('WARNING: ENCRYPTION_KEY is not set. Falling back to JWT secret for at-rest encryption.');
console.warn('The value has been persisted to data/.encryption_key — JWT rotation is now safe.');
} catch {
// JWT secret not found — must be a fresh install.
}
}
if (!_encryptionKey) {
// Fresh install — auto-generate a dedicated key.
_encryptionKey = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
}
// Persist whatever key was resolved so subsequent starts skip the fallback chain.
try {
if (!fs.existsSync(dataDir)) fs.mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(encKeyFile, _encryptionKey, { mode: 0o600 });
console.log('Encryption key persisted to', encKeyFile);
} catch (writeErr: unknown) {
console.warn('WARNING: Could not persist encryption key to disk:', writeErr instanceof Error ? writeErr.message : writeErr);
console.warn('Set ENCRYPTION_KEY env var to avoid losing access to encrypted secrets on restart.');
}
}
export const ENCRYPTION_KEY = _encryptionKey;
// DEFAULT_LANGUAGE sets the language shown on the login page before the user
// selects one. Only applies when the user has no saved language preference.
// Supported values: de, en, es, fr, hu, nl, br, cs, pl, ru, zh, zh-TW, it, ar
// Must stay in sync with client/src/i18n/supportedLanguages.ts (canonical source).
// Kept duplicated here because server and client are separate npm packages.
const SUPPORTED_LANG_CODES = ['de', 'en', 'es', 'fr', 'hu', 'nl', 'br', 'cs', 'pl', 'ru', 'zh', 'zh-TW', 'it', 'ar'];
const rawDefaultLang = process.env.DEFAULT_LANGUAGE?.toLowerCase() || 'en';
if (!SUPPORTED_LANG_CODES.includes(rawDefaultLang)) {
console.warn(`DEFAULT_LANGUAGE="${rawDefaultLang}" is not supported. Falling back to "en". Supported: ${SUPPORTED_LANG_CODES.join(', ')}`);
}
export const DEFAULT_LANGUAGE = SUPPORTED_LANG_CODES.includes(rawDefaultLang) ? rawDefaultLang : 'en';