Files
TREK/server/src/services/oidcService.ts
T
Julien G. de6c0fb781 fix: prevent Invalid URL crash when APP_URL lacks a protocol (#972)
* fix: prevent Invalid URL crash when APP_URL lacks a protocol (issue #970)

- Add getMcpSafeUrl() to notifications.ts: wraps getAppUrl() and
  guarantees a result that satisfies the MCP SDK's checkIssuerUrl
  requirement (https:// or http://localhost). Non-HTTPS, non-localhost
  URLs fall back to http://localhost:{PORT} instead of propagating an
  "Issuer URL must be HTTPS" error.
- Switch app.ts, mcp/index.ts, mcp/oauthProvider.ts, and oauthService.ts
  to import getMcpSafeUrl instead of getAppUrl for all MCP resource URL
  construction, so a misconfigured APP_URL never crashes the metadata
  router initialisation.
- Restrict the SDK metadata router middleware to /.well-known/* paths
  only. Previously it was invoked on every request; in production the
  lazy getMetaRouter() init ran on GET / and threw "Invalid URL" when
  APP_URL had no scheme, returning 500 for every page load.
- Log a startup warning when APP_URL is set but not usable, and include
  the resolved App URL in the startup banner so operators can confirm
  the correct value at a glance.
- Update oauth.test.ts mock to target notifications.getMcpSafeUrl.

* fix: show getAppUrl in banner and add two separate APP_URL startup checks

- Banner now displays getAppUrl() (the resolved app URL) rather than
  getMcpSafeUrl() so operators see the actual configured value
- Two independent startup warnings after the banner when APP_URL is set:
  1. whether APP_URL is a valid URL (parseable by new URL())
  2. whether APP_URL is MCP-safe (https:// or http://localhost)
- Fix getMcpSafeUrl() fallback port to use Number(PORT) || 3001,
  consistent with how index.ts parses PORT

* fix: update oidc.ts to import getAppUrl from notifications
2026-05-07 13:49:39 +02:00

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import crypto from 'crypto';
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import { db } from '../db/database';
import { JWT_SECRET } from '../config';
import { User } from '../types';
import { decrypt_api_key } from './apiKeyCrypto';
import { resolveAuthToggles } from './authService';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Types
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export interface OidcDiscoveryDoc {
authorization_endpoint: string;
token_endpoint: string;
userinfo_endpoint: string;
jwks_uri?: string;
issuer?: string;
_issuer?: string;
}
export interface OidcTokenResponse {
access_token?: string;
id_token?: string;
token_type?: string;
}
export interface OidcUserInfo {
sub: string;
email?: string;
name?: string;
preferred_username?: string;
groups?: string[];
roles?: string[];
[key: string]: unknown;
}
export interface OidcConfig {
issuer: string;
clientId: string;
clientSecret: string;
displayName: string;
discoveryUrl: string | null;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Constants / TTLs
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const AUTH_CODE_TTL = 60000; // 1 minute
const AUTH_CODE_CLEANUP = 30000; // 30 seconds
const STATE_TTL = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5 minutes
const STATE_CLEANUP = 60 * 1000; // 1 minute
const DISCOVERY_TTL = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// State management pending OIDC states
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const pendingStates = new Map<string, { createdAt: number; redirectUri: string; inviteToken?: string }>();
setInterval(() => {
const now = Date.now();
for (const [state, data] of pendingStates) {
if (now - data.createdAt > STATE_TTL) pendingStates.delete(state);
}
}, STATE_CLEANUP);
export function createState(redirectUri: string, inviteToken?: string): string {
const state = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
pendingStates.set(state, { createdAt: Date.now(), redirectUri, inviteToken });
return state;
}
export function consumeState(state: string) {
const pending = pendingStates.get(state);
if (!pending) return null;
pendingStates.delete(state);
return pending;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Auth code management short-lived codes exchanged for JWT
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const authCodes = new Map<string, { token: string; created: number }>();
setInterval(() => {
const now = Date.now();
for (const [code, entry] of authCodes) {
if (now - entry.created > AUTH_CODE_TTL) authCodes.delete(code);
}
}, AUTH_CODE_CLEANUP);
export function createAuthCode(token: string): string {
const { v4: uuidv4 } = require('uuid');
const authCode: string = uuidv4();
authCodes.set(authCode, { token, created: Date.now() });
return authCode;
}
export function consumeAuthCode(code: string): { token: string } | { error: string } {
const entry = authCodes.get(code);
if (!entry) return { error: 'Invalid or expired code' };
authCodes.delete(code);
if (Date.now() - entry.created > AUTH_CODE_TTL) return { error: 'Code expired' };
return { token: entry.token };
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// OIDC configuration (env + DB)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export function getOidcConfig(): OidcConfig | null {
const get = (key: string) =>
(db.prepare("SELECT value FROM app_settings WHERE key = ?").get(key) as { value: string } | undefined)?.value || null;
const issuer = process.env.OIDC_ISSUER || get('oidc_issuer');
const clientId = process.env.OIDC_CLIENT_ID || get('oidc_client_id');
const clientSecret = process.env.OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET || decrypt_api_key(get('oidc_client_secret'));
const displayName = process.env.OIDC_DISPLAY_NAME || get('oidc_display_name') || 'SSO';
const discoveryUrl = process.env.OIDC_DISCOVERY_URL || get('oidc_discovery_url') || null;
if (!issuer || !clientId || !clientSecret) return null;
return { issuer: issuer.replace(/\/+$/, ''), clientId, clientSecret, displayName, discoveryUrl };
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Discovery document (cached, 1 h TTL)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
let discoveryCache: OidcDiscoveryDoc | null = null;
let discoveryCacheTime = 0;
export async function discover(issuer: string, discoveryUrl?: string | null): Promise<OidcDiscoveryDoc> {
const url = discoveryUrl || `${issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;
if (discoveryCache && Date.now() - discoveryCacheTime < DISCOVERY_TTL && discoveryCache._issuer === url) {
return discoveryCache;
}
const res = await fetch(url);
if (!res.ok) throw new Error('Failed to fetch OIDC discovery document');
const doc = (await res.json()) as OidcDiscoveryDoc;
// Validate that the discovery doc's issuer matches the operator-configured one.
// When no custom discoveryUrl is set, a mismatch signals a MITM or misconfiguration
// and we reject. When the operator explicitly overrides the discovery URL (e.g.
// Authentik realm paths), the discovery doc's issuer is the canonical value —
// trust it and warn rather than blocking login.
const docIssuer = doc.issuer?.replace(/\/+$/, '') ?? '';
if (docIssuer && docIssuer !== issuer) {
if (discoveryUrl) {
console.warn(
`[OIDC] Discovery doc issuer "${doc.issuer}" differs from configured OIDC_ISSUER "${issuer}". ` +
`Using discovery doc issuer for id_token verification (custom OIDC_DISCOVERY_URL is set).`,
);
} else {
throw new Error(`OIDC discovery issuer mismatch: expected "${issuer}", got "${doc.issuer}"`);
}
}
doc._issuer = url;
discoveryCache = doc;
discoveryCacheTime = Date.now();
return doc;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Role resolution via OIDC claims
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export function resolveOidcRole(userInfo: OidcUserInfo, isFirstUser: boolean): 'admin' | 'user' {
if (isFirstUser) return 'admin';
const adminValue = process.env.OIDC_ADMIN_VALUE;
if (!adminValue) return 'user';
const claimKey = process.env.OIDC_ADMIN_CLAIM || 'groups';
const claimData = userInfo[claimKey];
if (Array.isArray(claimData)) {
return claimData.some((v) => String(v) === adminValue) ? 'admin' : 'user';
}
if (typeof claimData === 'string') {
return claimData === adminValue ? 'admin' : 'user';
}
return 'user';
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export function frontendUrl(path: string): string {
const base = process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production' ? '' : 'http://localhost:5173';
return base + path;
}
export function generateToken(user: { id: number }): string {
return jwt.sign({ id: user.id }, JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '24h', algorithm: 'HS256' });
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Token exchange with OIDC provider
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export async function exchangeCodeForToken(
doc: OidcDiscoveryDoc,
code: string,
redirectUri: string,
clientId: string,
clientSecret: string,
): Promise<OidcTokenResponse & { _ok: boolean; _status: number }> {
const tokenRes = await fetch(doc.token_endpoint, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: 'authorization_code',
code,
redirect_uri: redirectUri,
client_id: clientId,
client_secret: clientSecret,
}),
});
const tokenData = (await tokenRes.json()) as OidcTokenResponse;
return { ...tokenData, _ok: tokenRes.ok, _status: tokenRes.status };
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Fetch userinfo from OIDC provider
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export async function getUserInfo(userinfoEndpoint: string, accessToken: string): Promise<OidcUserInfo> {
const res = await fetch(userinfoEndpoint, {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}` },
});
return (await res.json()) as OidcUserInfo;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// id_token verification (signature + iss + aud + exp)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 5 minute JWKS cache — short enough to pick up key rotation within a
// reasonable window, long enough that normal login flow doesn't fetch
// JWKS on every callback.
const JWKS_TTL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
type JwksEntry = { keys: Array<Record<string, unknown>>; fetchedAt: number };
const jwksCache = new Map<string, JwksEntry>();
async function fetchJwks(jwksUri: string): Promise<Array<Record<string, unknown>>> {
const cached = jwksCache.get(jwksUri);
if (cached && Date.now() - cached.fetchedAt < JWKS_TTL_MS) return cached.keys;
const res = await fetch(jwksUri);
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`JWKS fetch failed: HTTP ${res.status}`);
const json = (await res.json()) as { keys?: Array<Record<string, unknown>> };
const keys = json.keys ?? [];
jwksCache.set(jwksUri, { keys, fetchedAt: Date.now() });
return keys;
}
function base64UrlDecode(input: string): Buffer {
const padded = input.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/') + '='.repeat((4 - (input.length % 4)) % 4);
return Buffer.from(padded, 'base64');
}
/**
* Verify an OIDC id_token end-to-end: signature against the provider's
* JWKS, issuer match, audience match, and exp/nbf. Does NOT verify a
* nonce — the server doesn't currently send one in the auth request;
* when that's added, pass the expected nonce here and check `claims.nonce`.
*
* Returning the claims lets callers cross-check `sub` / `email` against
* the userinfo response. A mismatch would mean the provider's userinfo
* endpoint is speaking for a different subject than the id_token — a
* classic IdP-side compromise signal worth refusing login over.
*/
export async function verifyIdToken(
idToken: string,
doc: OidcDiscoveryDoc,
clientId: string,
expectedIssuer: string,
): Promise<{ ok: true; claims: Record<string, unknown> } | { ok: false; error: string }> {
if (!doc.jwks_uri) return { ok: false, error: 'no_jwks_uri' };
const parts = idToken.split('.');
if (parts.length !== 3) return { ok: false, error: 'malformed_token' };
let header: { kid?: string; alg?: string };
try { header = JSON.parse(base64UrlDecode(parts[0]!).toString('utf8')); }
catch { return { ok: false, error: 'bad_header' }; }
const alg = header.alg;
if (!alg || !/^(RS256|RS384|RS512|ES256|ES384|ES512|PS256|PS384|PS512)$/.test(alg)) {
return { ok: false, error: 'unsupported_alg' };
}
let keys: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
try { keys = await fetchJwks(doc.jwks_uri); }
catch (e) { return { ok: false, error: 'jwks_fetch_failed' }; }
// When the token carries a `kid`, refuse to fall back to any other
// key in the JWKS — a mismatch means the token was signed with a key
// the provider no longer publishes, and we should reject rather than
// mask the failure by trying another key.
const jwk = header.kid
? keys.find((k) => k['kid'] === header.kid)
: keys[0];
if (!jwk) return { ok: false, error: 'no_matching_key' };
let publicKey;
try {
// Node 16+ understands JWK directly; no PEM conversion library needed.
// Node's crypto accepts a JWK object directly as `{ key, format: 'jwk' }`.
// The type signature isn't strict on our TS config so we cast through any.
publicKey = crypto.createPublicKey({ key: jwk as any, format: 'jwk' });
} catch {
return { ok: false, error: 'key_import_failed' };
}
let claims: Record<string, unknown>;
try {
const verified = jwt.verify(idToken, publicKey, {
algorithms: [alg as jwt.Algorithm],
audience: clientId,
});
claims = typeof verified === 'string' ? {} : (verified as Record<string, unknown>);
} catch (err) {
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'verify_failed';
return { ok: false, error: `signature_or_claim_mismatch: ${msg}` };
}
// Normalize trailing slash before issuer comparison — some IdPs (e.g. Authentik)
// include a trailing slash in the id_token iss claim.
const tokenIssuer = typeof claims['iss'] === 'string' ? claims['iss'].replace(/\/+$/, '') : '';
if (tokenIssuer !== expectedIssuer) {
return { ok: false, error: `signature_or_claim_mismatch: jwt issuer invalid. expected: ${expectedIssuer}` };
}
return { ok: true, claims };
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Find or create user by OIDC sub / email
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export function findOrCreateUser(
userInfo: OidcUserInfo,
config: OidcConfig,
inviteToken?: string,
): { user: User } | { error: string } {
const email = userInfo.email!.trim().toLowerCase();
const name = userInfo.name || userInfo.preferred_username || email.split('@')[0];
const sub = userInfo.sub;
// Try to find existing user by sub, then by email
let user = db.prepare('SELECT * FROM users WHERE oidc_sub = ? AND oidc_issuer = ?').get(sub, config.issuer) as User | undefined;
if (!user) {
user = db.prepare('SELECT * FROM users WHERE LOWER(email) = ?').get(email) as User | undefined;
}
if (user) {
// Link OIDC identity if not yet linked
if (!user.oidc_sub) {
db.prepare('UPDATE users SET oidc_sub = ?, oidc_issuer = ? WHERE id = ?').run(sub, config.issuer, user.id);
}
// Update role based on OIDC claims on every login (if claim mapping is configured)
if (process.env.OIDC_ADMIN_VALUE) {
const newRole = resolveOidcRole(userInfo, false);
if (user.role !== newRole) {
db.prepare('UPDATE users SET role = ? WHERE id = ?').run(newRole, user.id);
user = { ...user, role: newRole } as User;
}
}
return { user };
}
// --- New user registration ---
const userCount = (db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM users').get() as { count: number }).count;
const isFirstUser = userCount === 0;
let validInvite: any = null;
if (inviteToken) {
validInvite = db.prepare('SELECT * FROM invite_tokens WHERE token = ?').get(inviteToken);
if (validInvite) {
if (validInvite.max_uses > 0 && validInvite.used_count >= validInvite.max_uses) validInvite = null;
if (validInvite?.expires_at && new Date(validInvite.expires_at) < new Date()) validInvite = null;
}
}
if (!isFirstUser && !validInvite) {
const { oidc_registration } = resolveAuthToggles();
if (!oidc_registration) {
return { error: 'registration_disabled' };
}
}
const role = resolveOidcRole(userInfo, isFirstUser);
const randomPass = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
const bcrypt = require('bcryptjs');
const hash = bcrypt.hashSync(randomPass, 10);
// Username: sanitize and avoid collisions
let username = name.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/g, '').substring(0, 30) || 'user';
const existing = db.prepare('SELECT id FROM users WHERE LOWER(username) = LOWER(?)').get(username);
if (existing) username = `${username}_${Date.now() % 10000}`;
// Atomic registration: if an invite was presented, the increment IS
// the capacity check — UPDATE matches zero rows the moment another
// concurrent callback wins the last slot, and the transaction aborts
// the user INSERT. Without this, two parallel OIDC callbacks could
// both pass the earlier SELECT-based check and each create a user.
const inviteRaceError = new Error('invite_exhausted');
try {
const createUser = db.transaction(() => {
if (validInvite) {
const updated = db.prepare(
'UPDATE invite_tokens SET used_count = used_count + 1 WHERE id = ? AND (max_uses = 0 OR used_count < max_uses)',
).run(validInvite.id);
if (updated.changes === 0) throw inviteRaceError;
}
return db.prepare(
'INSERT INTO users (username, email, password_hash, role, oidc_sub, oidc_issuer, first_seen_version, login_count) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 0)',
).run(username, email, hash, role, sub, config.issuer, process.env.APP_VERSION || '0.0.0');
});
const result = createUser() as { lastInsertRowid: number | bigint };
user = { id: Number(result.lastInsertRowid), username, email, role } as User;
return { user };
} catch (err) {
if (err === inviteRaceError) {
console.warn(`[OIDC] Invite token ${inviteToken?.slice(0, 8)}... exhausted — concurrent callback won the last slot`);
return { error: 'registration_disabled' };
}
throw err;
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Update last_login timestamp
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export function touchLastLogin(userId: number): void {
db.prepare('UPDATE users SET last_login = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, login_count = login_count + 1 WHERE id = ?').run(userId);
}