Maurice
7da0080557
* docs(wiki): correct the install and operations pages for 4.0.0 Quick Start passed docker an empty ENCRYPTION_KEY: an assignment prefix is not expanded on the same command line, so the server silently generated its own key instead of taking the one the page told you to set. The tag examples pinned to the 3.x line, the documented tmpfs size did not match the shipped compose file, and several .env values were described as reaching the container when compose never interpolates them. * docs(wiki): match the MCP reference to the registered surface The scope table was missing the whole Collections group and the totals said 27 scopes across 13 groups where the code registers 29 across 14. The Cloudflare link on the setup page pointed at an anchor on its own page instead of the heading on Troubleshooting. * docs(wiki): correct the plugin and admin pages Three links to Plugin-Development carried a .md suffix, which does not resolve on the wiki. The admin pages described tabs, permissions and storage behaviour that had moved on. * docs(wiki): bring the feature pages back in line with the app Costs still documented the old panel, where categories could be added, renamed, reordered and deleted; they are fixed now and the panel is a day-grouped ledger with settlements. Trip sharing, journeys, maps, packing, reservations and the account pages had all drifted in the same way. * docs(wiki): cover the pages the first pass did not reach The MCP catalog listed 168 of the 201 registered tools; the settlement tools and rate_place were missing here and the Collections family from the addon page. Several resource rows claimed a trips:* scope where the handler asks for trips:read. * docs(wiki): tighten the corrections a review picked apart The audit-log resource is the row id, not the credential id; an admin password reset does not bump password_version the way the page implied; and a few of the new paragraphs described behaviour more confidently than the code supports. * docs(wiki): fix what a last read-through caught Costs shows every figure in your display currency, not the trip's, and an expense with no payer still counts against the members it is split between. Studio's cutoff is a 1024px viewport rather than phones alone, and the Integrations tab is gated on the providers an admin has configured. * docs(wiki): the last few the review caught A passkey satisfies the MFA policy everywhere except the WebSocket handshake, which still asks for TOTP, so a passkey-only account under that policy gets no live updates. Mobile optimizes a day from two places, not three. The ctx.db row carried an unescaped pipe that split the table, and the Backups table linked with a wiki link whose pipe did the same.
9.6 KiB
Audit Log
The audit log records significant actions taken on your TREK instance. Use it to monitor logins, admin changes, and integration configuration.
Where to find it
Admin Panel → Audit tab.
What the log captures
Actions are grouped by area below. The Action key is the raw value stored in the log.
Authentication
| Action key | Description |
|---|---|
user.register |
User registered |
user.login |
User logged in |
user.login_failed |
Login attempt failed |
user.password_change |
User changed their password |
user.account_delete |
User deleted their account |
user.password_reset_request |
Password reset requested |
user.password_reset_success |
Password reset completed |
user.password_reset_fail |
Password reset attempt rejected (reason in details) |
A request for an account that can actually be reset writes two rows: one with delivered: "pending" when the mail is handed off, one with the delivery result. Every other outcome writes a single row carrying a reason instead — no_user, oidc_only, throttled_per_email or password_login_disabled. Passkey logins are not a separate key: they land as user.login with method: passkey in the details.
MFA
| Action key | Description |
|---|---|
user.mfa_enable |
MFA enabled on an account |
user.mfa_disable |
MFA disabled on an account |
Passkeys
| Action key | Description |
|---|---|
user.passkey_register |
Passkey enrolled |
user.passkey_delete |
Passkey removed (resource = the passkey's numeric ID) |
user.passkey_clone_suspected |
A passkey presented a signature counter that did not advance — a possible cloned authenticator. That assertion is rejected, the credential stays enabled |
Trips
| Action key | Description |
|---|---|
trip.create |
Trip created (includes title) |
trip.update |
Trip updated (includes changed fields) |
trip.copy |
Trip duplicated (includes source and new trip IDs) |
trip.delete |
Trip deleted (includes trip ID and title) |
trip.transfer_ownership |
Trip ownership transferred (includes the trip title and both owner emails) |
trip.invite_link_create |
Trip invite link created or rotated (a trip has one link, so creating it again replaces the previous token) |
trip.invite_link_delete |
Trip invite link revoked |
trip.invite_link_join |
An invite link was accepted (joined in details). The row is written even when nobody was added — the trip owner or an existing member opening the link logs joined: false |
Admin actions
| Action key | Description |
|---|---|
admin.user_create |
User created by admin |
admin.user_update |
User edited by admin (role, email, username, etc.) |
admin.user_delete |
User deleted by admin |
admin.user_mfa_reset |
A user's MFA reset by admin |
admin.user_passkeys_reset |
All of a user's passkeys removed by admin |
admin.invite_create |
Invite link created |
admin.invite_delete |
Invite link deleted |
admin.permissions_update |
Instance permissions updated |
admin.oidc_update |
OIDC/SSO settings updated |
admin.addon_update |
Addon enabled, disabled, or configured |
admin.oauth_session_revoke |
OAuth session revoked by admin |
admin.mcp_token_delete |
MCP token revoked by admin |
admin.rotate_jwt_secret |
JWT secret rotated |
admin.bag_tracking |
Bag tracking feature toggled |
admin.places_photos |
Places photos feature toggled |
admin.places_autocomplete |
Places autocomplete feature toggled |
admin.places_details |
Places details feature toggled |
admin.places_enrich |
Place enrichment feature toggled |
admin.collab_features |
Collaboration features updated |
admin.packing_template_create |
Packing template created |
admin.packing_template_delete |
Packing template deleted |
admin.plugin_retrust |
Plugin signing key re-trusted (records the old and the new key fingerprint) |
admin.storage_update |
Storage configuration saved (secrets redacted in the details) |
admin.storage_test |
Storage backend probed (the probe writes and deletes one test object) |
admin.storage_backfill |
Replica catch-up started |
admin.storage_backfill_cancel |
Replica catch-up cancelled |
admin.storage_migration |
Category migration started |
admin.storage_migration_cancel |
Category migration cancelled |
admin.storage_stats_refresh |
Storage usage stats recomputed |
admin.default_user_settings_update |
Default user settings updated |
admin.demo_baseline_save |
Demo baseline snapshot saved |
Settings
| Action key | Description |
|---|---|
settings.app_update |
App settings updated (SMTP, webhooks, MFA policy, etc.) |
settings.api_keys_update |
Maps / OpenWeather / Unsplash API keys changed. Written for any user saving their own keys; an admin's save also updates the instance-wide ones. Records the changed key names only, never the values |
Backups
| Action key | Description |
|---|---|
backup.create |
Manual backup created |
backup.restore |
Restore from stored backup |
backup.upload_restore |
Restore from uploaded ZIP |
backup.delete |
Backup deleted |
backup.auto_settings |
Auto-backup schedule saved |
MCP
| Action key | Description |
|---|---|
mcp.tool_call |
MCP tool invoked (resource = tool name) |
OAuth
| Action key | Description |
|---|---|
oauth.client.create |
OAuth client application created |
oauth.client.rotate_secret |
OAuth client secret rotated |
oauth.client.delete |
OAuth client application deleted |
oauth.consent.grant |
User granted OAuth consent |
oauth.token.issue |
OAuth access token issued |
oauth.token.refresh |
OAuth access token refreshed |
oauth.token.revoke |
OAuth token revoked |
oauth.token.grant_failed |
OAuth token grant attempt failed |
oauth.token.client_auth_failed |
OAuth client authentication failed |
oauth.token.replay_detected |
An already-revoked refresh token was replayed. The whole token chain and the user's OAuth sessions for that client are revoked. Two clients racing on the same token do not land here: that is logged as oauth.token.refresh with concurrent: true |
Integrations
| Action key | Description |
|---|---|
immich.private_ip_configured |
Immich URL saved that resolves to a private IP |
airtrail.private_ip_configured |
AirTrail URL saved that resolves to a private IP |
Log columns
| Column | Description |
|---|---|
| Time | Timestamp of the action |
| User | Username of the acting user, falling back to their email, then #<user id>. Unauthenticated events show — (the plain-text log file writes anonymous for those instead) |
| Action | Action key (see tables above) |
| Resource | Affected resource (filename, trip ID, tool name, etc.) where applicable |
| IP | Client IP address |
| Details | Additional context in JSON format |
Pagination
The panel loads 100 entries at a time by default. Click Load more at the bottom to fetch the next page. The total count is shown above the table.
IP addresses
The client IP is the one Express resolves after applying TRUST_PROXY, not whatever the X-Forwarded-For header happens to say. That distinction matters: the header is written by the caller, and an audit row an attacker can address to someone else's IP is worse than no row at all.
TRUST_PROXY is the number of proxy hops in front of TREK, and it has to be accurate. With TRUST_PROXY=1 (the default) TREK trusts exactly one hop, so a request that passed through two proxies is recorded as coming from the inner one. If your setup is Cloudflare in front of nginx in front of TREK, set TRUST_PROXY=2. Set it to 0 to trust nothing and always record the socket address.
Log file
In addition to the database, audit events are written to a plain-text log file:
- Path:
./data/logs/trek.log - Rotation: rotated when the file reaches 10 MB
- Retention: the 4 most recent rotated files are kept (
trek.log.1throughtrek.log.4)
Database retention
Audit entries in the database are never automatically deleted. They accumulate and are paginated in the UI.
Plugin capability audit
Separate from the instance audit log above, TREK keeps a dedicated hash-chained capability audit for installed plugins. Every host-mediated action a plugin takes — core-data reads, WebSocket broadcasts, notifications, AI calls, cross-plugin calls — is recorded at the point the plugin cannot reach, together with the acting user (bound by the host, never supplied by the plugin), the resource touched, and the outcome.
Each plugin's entries form a per-plugin hash chain (hash = sha256(previous_hash + row)), so the log is tamper-evident: any altered or removed entry breaks the chain. Older rows are pruned per plugin once the row cap is reached (default 20,000 rows/plugin, tunable via TREK_PLUGIN_AUDIT_MAX_ROWS; 0 disables pruning). Pruning keeps the retained window verifiable.
Two views read this log:
| View | Who | Where | Shows |
|---|---|---|---|
| Per-plugin audit | Admins | Admin plugin management (GET /api/admin/plugins/:id/audit) |
Every action one plugin took, across all users |
| My plugin activity | Any user | Settings → Plugins (GET /api/plugin-activity) |
Every action any plugin took in that user's name |
The user-facing view is what makes broad read grants accountable to the person whose data a plugin reads, without needing admin access.