Files
TREK/server/tests/integration/security.test.ts
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2026-10-06 21:50:59 +02:00

195 lines
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TypeScript

/**
* Security integration tests.
* Covers SEC-001 to SEC-015.
*
* Notes:
* - SSRF tests (SEC-001 to SEC-004) are unit-level tests on ssrfGuard — see tests/unit/utils/ssrfGuard.test.ts
* - SEC-015 (MFA backup codes) is covered in auth.test.ts
* - These tests focus on HTTP-level security: headers, auth, injection protection, etc.
*/
import { buildApp } from '../../src/bootstrap';
import { db as testDb } from '../../src/db/database';
import { authCookie, authHeader, generateToken } from '../helpers/auth';
import { createUser, createTrip } from '../helpers/factories';
import { resetTestDb, resetRateLimits } from '../helpers/test-db';
import type { INestApplication } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { Application } from 'express';
import fs from 'fs';
import path from 'path';
import request from 'supertest';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeAll, beforeEach, afterAll } from 'vitest';
vi.mock('../../src/db/database', async () => {
const { createSnapshotTestDb, buildDbMock } = await import('../helpers/db-mock');
return buildDbMock(createSnapshotTestDb());
});
vi.mock('../../src/config', () => ({
JWT_SECRET: 'test-jwt-secret-for-trek-testing-only',
ENCRYPTION_KEY: 'a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6a7b8c9d0e1f2',
updateJwtSecret: () => {},
SESSION_DURATION: '24h',
SESSION_DURATION_MS: 86400000,
SESSION_DURATION_SECONDS: 86400,
DEFAULT_LANGUAGE: 'en',
}));
vi.mock('../../src/websocket', () => ({ broadcast: vi.fn(), broadcastToUser: vi.fn() }));
let nestApp: INestApplication;
let app: Application;
const FIXTURE_IMG = path.join(__dirname, '../fixtures/small-image.jpg');
const uploadsDir = path.join(__dirname, '../../uploads/files');
beforeAll(async () => {
nestApp = await buildApp();
app = nestApp.getHttpAdapter().getInstance();
if (!fs.existsSync(uploadsDir)) fs.mkdirSync(uploadsDir, { recursive: true });
testDb.prepare("INSERT OR REPLACE INTO app_settings (key, value) VALUES ('allowed_file_types', '*')").run();
});
beforeEach(() => {
resetTestDb(testDb);
resetRateLimits(nestApp);
testDb.prepare("INSERT OR REPLACE INTO app_settings (key, value) VALUES ('allowed_file_types', '*')").run();
});
afterAll(async () => {
await nestApp.close();
fs.rmSync(uploadsDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
testDb.close();
});
describe('Authentication security', () => {
it('SEC-007 — invalid JWT in Authorization Bearer header is rejected', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const token = generateToken(user.id);
// The file download endpoint accepts bearer auth
// Other endpoints use cookie auth — but /api/auth/me works with cookie auth
// Test that a forged/invalid JWT is rejected
const res = await request(app).get('/api/auth/me').set('Authorization', 'Bearer invalid.token.here');
// Should return 401 (auth fails)
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('unauthenticated request to protected endpoint returns 401', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/trips');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('expired/invalid JWT cookie returns 401', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/trips').set('Cookie', 'trek_session=invalid.jwt.token');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
});
describe('Security headers', () => {
it('SEC-011 — Helmet sets X-Content-Type-Options header', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/health');
expect(res.headers['x-content-type-options']).toBe('nosniff');
});
it('SEC-011 — Helmet sets X-Frame-Options header', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/health');
expect(res.headers['x-frame-options']).toBe('SAMEORIGIN');
});
});
describe('API key encryption', () => {
it('SEC-008 — encrypted API keys are stored with enc:v1: prefix', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
await request(app)
.put('/api/auth/me/api-keys')
.set('Cookie', authCookie(user.id))
.send({ openweather_api_key: 'test-api-key-12345' });
const row = testDb.prepare('SELECT openweather_api_key FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(user.id) as any;
expect(row.openweather_api_key).toMatch(/^enc:v1:/);
});
it('SEC-008 — saving keys audits the names and never the values (#1939)', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const save = () =>
request(app)
.put('/api/auth/me/api-keys')
.set('Cookie', authCookie(user.id))
.send({ openweather_api_key: 'test-api-key-12345' });
const first = await save();
expect(first.status).toBe(200);
// changedKeys is internal: the client body is what it always was.
expect(first.body).not.toHaveProperty('changedKeys');
const rows = () =>
testDb.prepare("SELECT details FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'settings.api_keys_update'").all() as {
details: string | null;
}[];
expect(rows()).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows()[0].details).toContain('openweather_api_key');
expect(rows()[0].details).not.toContain('test-api-key-12345');
// The same value again writes no second row. This is the real test of the
// cleartext comparison: encryption uses a random IV, so the stored blob
// differs on every save even when the key does not.
await save();
expect(rows()).toHaveLength(1);
});
it('SEC-008 — GET /api/auth/me does not return plaintext API key', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
await request(app)
.put('/api/auth/me/api-keys')
.set('Cookie', authCookie(user.id))
.send({ openweather_api_key: 'secret-key' });
const me = await request(app).get('/api/auth/me').set('Cookie', authCookie(user.id));
expect(me.body.user.openweather_api_key).not.toBe('secret-key');
});
});
describe('MFA secret protection', () => {
it('SEC-009 — GET /api/auth/me does not expose mfa_secret', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const res = await request(app).get('/api/auth/me').set('Cookie', authCookie(user.id));
expect(res.body.user.mfa_secret).toBeUndefined();
expect(res.body.user.password_hash).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('Request body size limit', () => {
it('SEC-013 — oversized JSON body is rejected', async () => {
// Send a large body (2MB+) to exceed the default limit
const bigData = { data: 'x'.repeat(2 * 1024 * 1024) };
const res = await request(app).post('/api/auth/login').send(bigData);
// body-parser rejects oversized payloads with 413
expect(res.status).toBe(413);
});
});
describe('File download path traversal', () => {
it('SEC-005 — path traversal in file download is blocked', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const trip = createTrip(testDb, user.id);
const upload = await request(app)
.post(`/api/trips/${trip.id}/files`)
.set('Cookie', authCookie(user.id))
.attach('file', FIXTURE_IMG);
expect(upload.status).toBe(201);
const fileId = upload.body.file.id;
testDb.prepare('UPDATE trip_files SET filename = ? WHERE id = ?').run('../../etc/passwd', fileId);
const res = await request(app).get(`/api/trips/${trip.id}/files/${fileId}/download`).set(authHeader(user.id));
// path.basename() strips traversal in the download controller; the normalized
// name does not exist in uploads, so the answer is the same 404 a missing file
// gets. Pinned exactly: a 500 from a thrown guard would also be "not 200".
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: 'File not found' });
});
});