Files
TREK/server/tests/integration/mcp.test.ts
T
2026-10-06 21:50:59 +02:00

870 lines
36 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* MCP integration tests.
* Covers MCP-001 to MCP-013.
*
* The MCP endpoint uses JWT auth and server-sent events / streaming HTTP.
* Tests cover authentication, session management, rate limiting, and API token auth.
*/
import { getMcpSafeUrl } from '../../src/app-config';
import { buildApp } from '../../src/bootstrap';
import { db as testDb } from '../../src/db/database';
import { AuditLog } from '../../src/db/entities/AuditLog.entity';
import { OauthClients } from '../../src/db/entities/OauthClients.entity';
import { OauthConsents } from '../../src/db/entities/OauthConsents.entity';
import { OauthTokens } from '../../src/db/entities/OauthTokens.entity';
import { Users } from '../../src/db/entities/Users.entity';
import { closeMcpSessions } from '../../src/mcp/index';
import { sessions } from '../../src/mcp/sessionManager';
import type { McpDynamicTool } from '../../src/nest-mcp';
import { AuditService } from '../../src/nest/audit/audit.service';
import { OauthService } from '../../src/nest/oauth/oauth.service';
import { setPluginMcpToolSource } from '../../src/plugin-mcp-tools';
import { generateToken } from '../helpers/auth';
import { createUser } from '../helpers/factories';
import { createMcpToken } from '../helpers/factories';
import { createTestAddonsService } from '../helpers/test-addons';
import { resetTestDb, resetRateLimits } from '../helpers/test-db';
import { createTestOrm, type TestOrm } from '../helpers/test-orm';
import { MikroORM } from '@mikro-orm/core';
import type { INestApplication } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { Application } from 'express';
import request from 'supertest';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeAll, beforeEach, afterEach, afterAll } from 'vitest';
vi.mock('../../src/db/database', async () => {
const { createSnapshotTestDb, buildDbMock } = await import('../helpers/db-mock');
return buildDbMock(createSnapshotTestDb());
});
vi.mock('../../src/config', () => ({
JWT_SECRET: 'test-jwt-secret-for-trek-testing-only',
ENCRYPTION_KEY: 'a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6a7b8c9d0e1f2',
updateJwtSecret: () => {},
SESSION_DURATION: '24h',
SESSION_DURATION_MS: 86400000,
SESSION_DURATION_SECONDS: 86400,
DEFAULT_LANGUAGE: 'en',
}));
vi.mock('../../src/websocket', () => ({ broadcast: vi.fn(), broadcastToUser: vi.fn() }));
let oauthSvc: OauthService;
/** Mint a trekoa_ access token for the user via a fresh OAuth client. */
async function mintOauthToken(
userId: number,
audience: string | null,
scopes: string[] = ['trips:read'],
): Promise<{ accessToken: string; clientId: string }> {
const created = await oauthSvc.createOAuthClient(
userId,
'MCP Test Client',
['https://client.example.com/cb'],
scopes,
);
const clientId = (created.client as { client_id: string }).client_id;
const tokens = await oauthSvc.issueTokens(clientId, userId, scopes, null, audience);
return { accessToken: tokens.access_token, clientId };
}
/** /mcp answers as SSE, so the JSON-RPC payload rides a `data:` line. */
function rpcResult(text: string): { tools?: Array<{ name: string; description?: string }> } {
const line = text.split('\n').find((l) => l.startsWith('data:'));
if (!line) throw new Error(`no SSE data frame in: ${text.slice(0, 200)}`);
return (JSON.parse(line.slice('data:'.length).trim()) as { result?: Record<string, never> }).result ?? {};
}
const MCP_AUDIENCE = `${getMcpSafeUrl().replace(/\/+$/, '')}/mcp`;
const EXPECTED_CHALLENGE = `Bearer realm="TREK MCP", resource_metadata="${getMcpSafeUrl().replace(/\/+$/, '')}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp", error="invalid_token"`;
let nestApp: INestApplication;
let app: Application;
let t: TestOrm;
beforeAll(async () => {
nestApp = await buildApp();
app = nestApp.getHttpAdapter().getInstance();
t = await createTestOrm(testDb);
oauthSvc = new OauthService(
t.repo(OauthClients),
t.repo(OauthTokens),
t.repo(OauthConsents),
await createTestAddonsService(testDb),
new AuditService(t.repo(AuditLog), t.repo(Users)),
);
});
beforeEach(() => {
resetTestDb(testDb);
resetRateLimits(nestApp);
});
afterAll(async () => {
closeMcpSessions();
await nestApp.close();
await t.close();
testDb.close();
});
describe('MCP authentication', () => {
// MCP handler checks if the 'mcp' addon is enabled first (403 if not),
// then checks auth (401). In test DB the addon may be disabled.
it('MCP-001 — POST /mcp without auth returns 403 (addon disabled before auth check)', async () => {
const res = await request(app).post('/mcp').send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'initialize', id: 1 });
// MCP handler checks addon enabled before verifying auth; addon is disabled in test DB
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it('MCP-001 — GET /mcp without auth returns 403 (addon disabled)', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/mcp');
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it('MCP-001 — DELETE /mcp without auth returns 403 (addon disabled)', async () => {
const res = await request(app).delete('/mcp').set('Mcp-Session-Id', 'fake-session-id');
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
});
describe('MCP session init', () => {
it('MCP-002 — POST /mcp with valid JWT passes auth check (may fail if addon disabled)', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const token = generateToken(user.id);
// Enable MCP addon in test DB
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({
jsonrpc: '2.0',
method: 'initialize',
id: 1,
params: { protocolVersion: '2024-11-05', capabilities: {}, clientInfo: { name: 'test', version: '1' } },
});
// Valid JWT + enabled addon → auth passes; SDK returns 200 with session headers
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it('MCP-003 — DELETE /mcp with unknown session returns 404', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const token = generateToken(user.id);
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const res = await request(app)
.delete('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set('Mcp-Session-Id', 'nonexistent-session-id');
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
it('MCP-004 — POST /mcp with invalid JWT returns 401 (when addon enabled)', async () => {
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', 'Bearer invalid.jwt.token')
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'initialize', id: 1 });
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
});
describe('MCP API token auth', () => {
it('MCP-002 — POST /mcp with valid trek_ API token authenticates successfully', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const { rawToken } = createMcpToken(testDb, user.id);
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${rawToken}`)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({
jsonrpc: '2.0',
method: 'initialize',
id: 1,
params: { protocolVersion: '2024-11-05', capabilities: {}, clientInfo: { name: 'test', version: '1' } },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it('MCP-002 — last_used_at is updated on token use', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const { rawToken, id: tokenId } = createMcpToken(testDb, user.id);
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const before = (
testDb.prepare('SELECT last_used_at FROM mcp_tokens WHERE id = ?').get(tokenId) as { last_used_at: string | null }
).last_used_at;
await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${rawToken}`)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({
jsonrpc: '2.0',
method: 'initialize',
id: 1,
params: { protocolVersion: '2024-11-05', capabilities: {}, clientInfo: { name: 'test', version: '1' } },
});
const after = (
testDb.prepare('SELECT last_used_at FROM mcp_tokens WHERE id = ?').get(tokenId) as { last_used_at: string | null }
).last_used_at;
expect(after).not.toBeNull();
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
});
it('MCP — POST /mcp with unknown trek_ token returns 401', async () => {
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', 'Bearer trek_totally_fake_token_not_in_db')
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'initialize', id: 1 });
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('MCP — POST /mcp with no Authorization header returns 401', async () => {
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const res = await request(app).post('/mcp').send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'initialize', id: 1 });
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
});
describe('MCP session management', () => {
async function createSession(userId: number): Promise<string> {
const token = generateToken(userId);
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({
jsonrpc: '2.0',
method: 'initialize',
id: 1,
params: { protocolVersion: '2024-11-05', capabilities: {}, clientInfo: { name: 'test', version: '1' } },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const sessionId = res.headers['mcp-session-id'];
expect(sessionId).toBeTruthy();
return sessionId as string;
}
it('MCP-003 — at the session cap, the coldest session is evicted rather than the request refused', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const sessionsForUser = () => [...sessions.values()].filter((s) => s.userId === user.id).length;
// Fill the default cap of 20.
const firstSessionId = await createSession(user.id);
for (let i = 1; i < 20; i++) await createSession(user.id);
expect(sessionsForUser()).toBe(20);
// The 21st initialize must still succeed. A hard 429 here is what wedged real users: a
// client that can't persist its Mcp-Session-Id re-initializes on every tool call, and
// would be locked out of the server permanently once it hit the cap.
const newSessionId = await createSession(user.id);
expect(sessionsForUser()).toBe(20); // capped, not growing
expect(sessions.has(newSessionId)).toBe(true);
expect(sessions.has(firstSessionId)).toBe(false); // the least-recently-active one made room
});
it('MCP-006 — initializes that race past the cap check are trimmed when they register', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const sessionsForUser = () => [...sessions.values()].filter((s) => s.userId === user.id).length;
// What the race leaves behind: concurrent initializes all read the same
// pre-registration count, all pass the cap check, and all register — so the
// map ends up over the cap. Driving that through supertest depends on how
// the requests interleave, so the state itself is set up instead: four past
// the cap, none of them the newcomer's doing. Each entry is only ever
// counted and evicted, so a stub with closable halves is enough.
// Inside the TTL, or countSessionsForUser skips them and there is nothing
// over the cap to trim.
const stale = Date.now() - 10_000;
for (let i = 0; i < 24; i++) {
sessions.set(`overshoot-${i}`, {
server: { close() {} },
transport: { close() {} },
userId: user.id,
scopes: null,
clientId: null,
isStaticToken: false,
lastActivity: stale + i,
lastClientIp: null,
} as unknown as NonNullable<ReturnType<typeof sessions.get>>);
}
expect(sessionsForUser()).toBe(24);
// The pre-check gives back one; without the trim at registration the other
// four stay in the map — each holding a full McpServer — until the TTL sweep.
const newSessionId = await createSession(user.id);
expect(sessionsForUser()).toBe(20);
expect(sessions.has(newSessionId)).toBe(true);
});
it('MCP — session resumption with valid mcp-session-id', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const sessionId = await createSession(user.id);
const token = generateToken(user.id);
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/list', id: 2, params: {} });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it('MCP — session belongs to different user returns 403', async () => {
const { user: user1 } = createUser(testDb);
const { user: user2 } = createUser(testDb);
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const sessionId = await createSession(user1.id);
const token2 = generateToken(user2.id);
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token2}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/list', id: 2 });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it('MCP — a session-less non-initialize POST is rejected without registering a session', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const token = generateToken(user.id);
const before = sessions.size;
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/list', id: 1, params: {} });
// The SDK rejects it ("Server not initialized"); the McpServer built to serve it must not
// linger — it is in no session, so nothing would ever sweep or close it.
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(sessions.size).toBe(before);
});
it('MCP — initialize response exposes Mcp-Session-Id to browser-context clients', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const token = generateToken(user.id);
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set('Origin', 'https://claude.ai')
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({
jsonrpc: '2.0',
method: 'initialize',
id: 1,
params: { protocolVersion: '2024-11-05', capabilities: {}, clientInfo: { name: 'test', version: '1' } },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['mcp-session-id']).toBeTruthy();
// Without this header the Fetch spec hides Mcp-Session-Id from the client, so it can never
// echo it back and every tool call mints a fresh session until the cap kills the connection.
expect(String(res.headers['access-control-expose-headers'] ?? '').toLowerCase()).toContain('mcp-session-id');
});
it('MCP — GET without mcp-session-id returns 400', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const token = generateToken(user.id);
const res = await request(app).get('/mcp').set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
});
describe('MCP transport parity pins (Nest-hosted /mcp)', () => {
const initBody = {
jsonrpc: '2.0',
method: 'initialize',
id: 1,
params: { protocolVersion: '2024-11-05', capabilities: {}, clientInfo: { name: 'test', version: '1' } },
};
async function createSession(token: string): Promise<string> {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send(initBody);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
return res.headers['mcp-session-id'] as string;
}
beforeEach(() => {
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
});
// The source is process-level, so a test that installs one must not leak it
// into the next: every later session would carry its tools.
afterEach(() => {
setPluginMcpToolSource(null);
});
it('MCP-P01 — addon off answers 403 with the exact legacy body', async () => {
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 0 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const res = await request(app).post('/mcp').send(initBody);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: 'MCP is not enabled' });
});
it('MCP-P02 — missing/invalid auth carries the exact WWW-Authenticate challenge', async () => {
const res = await request(app).post('/mcp').send(initBody);
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: 'Access token required' });
expect(res.headers['www-authenticate']).toBe(EXPECTED_CHALLENGE);
});
it('MCP-P03 — a non-Bearer scheme and a schemeless token are both rejected', async () => {
for (const header of ['Basic dXNlcjpwdw==', 'just-a-token']) {
const res = await request(app).post('/mcp').set('Authorization', header).send(initBody);
expect(res.status, header).toBe(401);
}
});
it('MCP-P04 — a trekoa_ token with the wrong audience is rejected with a challenge', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const { accessToken } = await mintOauthToken(user.id, 'https://other.example.com/api');
const res = await request(app).post('/mcp').set('Authorization', `Bearer ${accessToken}`).send(initBody);
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(res.headers['www-authenticate']).toBe(EXPECTED_CHALLENGE);
});
it('MCP-P05 — a trekoa_ token with the MCP audience authenticates', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const { accessToken } = await mintOauthToken(user.id, MCP_AUDIENCE);
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${accessToken}`)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send(initBody);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['mcp-session-id']).toBeTruthy();
});
it('MCP-P06 — resuming an unknown session answers the exact 404 body', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${generateToken(user.id)}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', 'no-such-session')
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/list', id: 2 });
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: 'Session not found' });
});
it("MCP-P07 — another user's session answers 403 with the challenge and exact body", async () => {
const { user: owner } = createUser(testDb);
const { user: intruder } = createUser(testDb);
const sessionId = await createSession(generateToken(owner.id));
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${generateToken(intruder.id)}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/list', id: 2 });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: 'Session belongs to a different user' });
expect(res.headers['www-authenticate']).toBe(EXPECTED_CHALLENGE);
});
it('MCP-P08 — a session created via JWT rejects resumption by an OAuth client', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const sessionId = await createSession(generateToken(user.id));
const { accessToken } = await mintOauthToken(user.id, MCP_AUDIENCE);
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${accessToken}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/list', id: 2 });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: 'Session was created with a different OAuth client' });
expect(res.headers['www-authenticate']).toBe(EXPECTED_CHALLENGE);
});
it('MCP-P08b — a narrower token cannot resume a session that was created with wider scopes', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const created = await oauthSvc.createOAuthClient(
user.id,
'Scope Test Client',
['https://client.example.com/cb'],
['trips:read', 'trips:write'],
);
const clientId = (created.client as { client_id: string }).client_id;
const wide = await oauthSvc.issueTokens(clientId, user.id, ['trips:read', 'trips:write'], null, MCP_AUDIENCE);
const narrow = await oauthSvc.issueTokens(clientId, user.id, ['trips:read'], null, MCP_AUDIENCE);
const sessionId = await createSession(wide.access_token);
// The tool surface was registered from the wide set; resuming with the
// narrow one would ride it.
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${narrow.access_token}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/list', id: 2 });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: 'Session was created with different scopes' });
expect(res.headers['www-authenticate']).toContain('error="insufficient_scope"');
});
it('MCP-P08c — the same scopes in a different order still resume', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const created = await oauthSvc.createOAuthClient(
user.id,
'Scope Order Client',
['https://client.example.com/cb'],
['trips:read', 'trips:write'],
);
const clientId = (created.client as { client_id: string }).client_id;
const first = await oauthSvc.issueTokens(clientId, user.id, ['trips:read', 'trips:write'], null, MCP_AUDIENCE);
const reordered = await oauthSvc.issueTokens(clientId, user.id, ['trips:write', 'trips:read'], null, MCP_AUDIENCE);
const sessionId = await createSession(first.access_token);
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${reordered.access_token}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/list', id: 2 });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it('MCP-P09 — a static-token session carries the deprecation notice on the first tool call only', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const { rawToken } = createMcpToken(testDb, user.id);
const sessionId = await createSession(rawToken);
const callBody = { jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/call', id: 3, params: { name: 'list_trips', arguments: {} } };
const first = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${rawToken}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send(callBody);
expect(first.status).toBe(200);
expect(first.text).toContain('Deprecated authentication');
const second = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${rawToken}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({ ...callBody, id: 4 });
expect(second.status).toBe(200);
expect(second.text).not.toContain('Deprecated authentication');
});
it('MCP-P13 — an authorized tools/call writes exactly one mcp.tool_call audit row', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const { accessToken, clientId } = await mintOauthToken(user.id, MCP_AUDIENCE);
const sessionId = await createSession(accessToken);
testDb.prepare("DELETE FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'mcp.tool_call'").run();
const call = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${accessToken}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/call', id: 3, params: { name: 'list_trips', arguments: {} } });
expect(call.status).toBe(200);
const rows = testDb
.prepare("SELECT user_id, action, resource, details FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'mcp.tool_call'")
.all() as Array<{ user_id: number; action: string; resource: string; details: string }>;
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].user_id).toBe(user.id);
expect(rows[0].resource).toBe('list_trips');
expect(JSON.parse(rows[0].details)).toEqual({ clientId });
});
it('MCP-P14 — tools/list and resource reads write no mcp.tool_call rows', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const token = generateToken(user.id);
const sessionId = await createSession(token);
testDb.prepare("DELETE FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'mcp.tool_call'").run();
const list = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/list', id: 2, params: {} });
expect(list.status).toBe(200);
const read = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'resources/list', id: 3, params: {} });
expect(read.status).toBe(200);
const rows = testDb.prepare("SELECT id FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'mcp.tool_call'").all();
expect(rows).toHaveLength(0);
});
// ── plugin-contributed tools ──
//
// These prove the containment in nest-mcp's attach() from the outside, which is
// the only place it matters: registerTools is called OUTSIDE the transport's try
// block, and mcp-transport.service.ts states that nothing there may reach the
// global exception filters. A unit test on the registry cannot show that.
const dynamicTool = (name: string, text: string): McpDynamicTool => ({
options: {
name,
description: `Contributed ${name}.`,
access: { group: 'plugins', mode: 'use' } as never,
},
handler: () => ({ content: [{ type: 'text', text }] }),
});
it('MCP-P15 — a contributed tool colliding with a built-in never displaces it, and the session still serves', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
// list_trips is a real built-in; the contributor tries to take its name.
setPluginMcpToolSource(() => [
dynamicTool('list_trips', 'hijacked'),
dynamicTool('plugin_demo_echo', 'contributed'),
]);
const token = generateToken(user.id);
const sessionId = await createSession(token);
expect(sessionId).toBeTruthy();
const list = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/list', id: 2, params: {} });
expect(list.status).toBe(200);
const names = (rpcResult(list.text).tools ?? []).map((t) => t.name);
expect(names.filter((n: string) => n === 'list_trips')).toHaveLength(1);
expect(names).toContain('plugin_demo_echo');
// The surviving list_trips is the built-in: it takes arguments, the
// contributed stand-in declared none.
const builtin = (rpcResult(list.text).tools ?? []).find((t) => t.name === 'list_trips');
expect(builtin?.description).not.toBe('Contributed list_trips.');
});
it('MCP-P16 — a throwing tool source degrades the surface instead of the session', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
setPluginMcpToolSource(() => {
throw new Error('the plugin runtime is down');
});
const token = generateToken(user.id);
// The whole point: initialize still returns 200 with a session id. Before the
// containment in attach() this was a 500 on every /mcp initialize.
const sessionId = await createSession(token);
expect(sessionId).toBeTruthy();
const list = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/list', id: 2, params: {} });
expect(list.status).toBe(200);
expect((rpcResult(list.text).tools ?? []).length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
});
it('MCP-P17 — a contributed tool call writes an mcp.tool_call audit row like any other', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
setPluginMcpToolSource(() => [dynamicTool('plugin_demo_echo', 'contributed')]);
const { accessToken, clientId } = await mintOauthToken(user.id, MCP_AUDIENCE, ['trips:read', 'plugins:use']);
const sessionId = await createSession(accessToken);
testDb.prepare("DELETE FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'mcp.tool_call'").run();
const call = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${accessToken}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/call', id: 3, params: { name: 'plugin_demo_echo', arguments: {} } });
expect(call.status).toBe(200);
// The audit seam is exactly why the source lives on McpAttachOptions rather
// than the host calling server.registerTool() itself.
const rows = testDb
.prepare("SELECT user_id, resource, details FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'mcp.tool_call'")
.all() as Array<{ user_id: number; resource: string; details: string }>;
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0].user_id).toBe(user.id);
expect(rows[0].resource).toBe('plugin_demo_echo');
expect(JSON.parse(rows[0].details)).toEqual({ clientId });
});
it('MCP-P18 — a token without plugins:use is never shown a plugin tool', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
setPluginMcpToolSource(() => [dynamicTool('plugin_demo_echo', 'contributed')]);
// trips:read only. The declarative access marker on every contributed tool
// resolves through the same policy as a built-in's.
const { accessToken } = await mintOauthToken(user.id, MCP_AUDIENCE, ['trips:read']);
const sessionId = await createSession(accessToken);
const list = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${accessToken}`)
.set('mcp-session-id', sessionId)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'tools/list', id: 2, params: {} });
const names = (rpcResult(list.text).tools ?? []).map((t) => t.name);
expect(names).not.toContain('plugin_demo_echo');
expect(names).toContain('list_trips');
});
it('MCP-P10 — /mcp bodies stay raw: an initialize payload over the global 100kb cap succeeds', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const big = {
...initBody,
params: { ...initBody.params, clientInfo: { name: 'x'.repeat(150 * 1024), version: '1' } },
};
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${generateToken(user.id)}`)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send(big);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers['mcp-session-id']).toBeTruthy();
});
it('MCP-P11 — the global 100kb JSON cap still guards every other route', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/auth/login')
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json')
.send(JSON.stringify({ username: 'x'.repeat(150 * 1024), password: 'y' }));
expect(res.status).toBe(413);
});
it('MCP-P12 — malformed JSON on /mcp gets the SDK JSON-RPC parse error, not body-parser 400', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${generateToken(user.id)}`)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json')
.send('{ this is not json');
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.jsonrpc).toBe('2.0');
expect(res.body.error.code).toBe(-32700);
});
});
describe('MCP rate limiting', () => {
it('MCP-005 — requests below limit succeed', async () => {
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const token = generateToken(user.id);
// Set a very low rate limit via env for this test
const originalLimit = process.env.MCP_RATE_LIMIT;
process.env.MCP_RATE_LIMIT = '3';
try {
for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({
jsonrpc: '2.0',
method: 'initialize',
id: i + 1,
params: { protocolVersion: '2024-11-05', capabilities: {}, clientInfo: { name: 'test', version: '1' } },
});
// Each should pass (no rate limit hit yet since limit is read at module init,
// but we can verify that the responses are not 429)
expect(res.status).not.toBe(429);
}
} finally {
if (originalLimit === undefined) delete process.env.MCP_RATE_LIMIT;
else process.env.MCP_RATE_LIMIT = originalLimit;
}
});
});
/**
* Plan 3b Task 0 (D6): the MCP transport's bearer-token verification step
* (`McpTransportService.verifyToken`, called from `handle()` before any tool
* dispatch) is expected to already run inside the HTTP request context —
* `/mcp` is an ordinary (if `@Public()`) Nest-routed controller, so
* the per-request EntityManager-fork middleware `buildApp()` mounts
* (bootstrap.ts's pathless `mikroOrmRequestContext`) applies to it exactly
* like every other route, BEFORE any guard runs. Verified here rather than
* assumed: `TokenService.verifyMcpToken` (TK13 in the inventory) is now
* repository-backed (`McpTokensRepository.findUserByHashAndKind` +
* `touchLastUsedByHash`, Plan 3b Task 2) — MCP-CTX-002 drives a real `trek_`
* bearer token through the genuine DI-provided `TokenService` singleton the
* `/mcp` route calls (no mock of `verifyMcpToken` itself, per the Task 2
* review's F5: a spy on the very method under test does not exercise the
* repository path it exists to guard) and asserts the repository's write
* (`last_used_at`) actually moved, which is only possible if the read ran
* inside the forked context.
*/
describe('MCP bearer-token verification runs inside the HTTP request context (Plan 3b Task 0, D6)', () => {
it('MCP-CTX-001: outside of any request, the SAME ORM refuses a query (allowGlobalContext: false is genuinely enforced, not just permissively configured)', async () => {
const orm = nestApp.get(MikroORM);
await expect(orm.em.getRepository(Users).findOne({ id: 1 })).rejects.toThrow(/context/i);
});
it('MCP-CTX-002: a repository read inside verifyMcpToken (the trek_ bearer-token branch) succeeds — the /mcp route already forks a request context before the auth step runs', async () => {
testDb.prepare("UPDATE addons SET enabled = 1 WHERE id = 'mcp'").run();
const { user } = createUser(testDb);
const { rawToken, id: tokenId } = createMcpToken(testDb, user.id);
const before = (
testDb.prepare('SELECT last_used_at FROM mcp_tokens WHERE id = ?').get(tokenId) as { last_used_at: string | null }
).last_used_at;
expect(before).toBeNull();
const res = await request(app)
.post('/mcp')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${rawToken}`)
.set('Accept', 'application/json, text/event-stream')
.send({
jsonrpc: '2.0',
method: 'initialize',
id: 1,
params: { protocolVersion: '2024-11-05', capabilities: {}, clientInfo: { name: 'test', version: '1' } },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
// The real `TokenService.verifyMcpToken` ran `McpTokensRepository`'s
// `findUserByHashAndKind` (TK13) then `touchLastUsedByHash` (TK14) —
// `last_used_at` moving is only possible if both reached the DB, which
// MCP-CTX-001 proves the ORM refuses outside a forked request context.
const after = (
testDb.prepare('SELECT last_used_at FROM mcp_tokens WHERE id = ?').get(tokenId) as { last_used_at: string | null }
).last_used_at;
expect(after).not.toBeNull();
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
});
});