Files
TREK/server/src/routes/oidc.ts
T
Julien G. de6c0fb781 fix: prevent Invalid URL crash when APP_URL lacks a protocol (#972)
* fix: prevent Invalid URL crash when APP_URL lacks a protocol (issue #970)

- Add getMcpSafeUrl() to notifications.ts: wraps getAppUrl() and
  guarantees a result that satisfies the MCP SDK's checkIssuerUrl
  requirement (https:// or http://localhost). Non-HTTPS, non-localhost
  URLs fall back to http://localhost:{PORT} instead of propagating an
  "Issuer URL must be HTTPS" error.
- Switch app.ts, mcp/index.ts, mcp/oauthProvider.ts, and oauthService.ts
  to import getMcpSafeUrl instead of getAppUrl for all MCP resource URL
  construction, so a misconfigured APP_URL never crashes the metadata
  router initialisation.
- Restrict the SDK metadata router middleware to /.well-known/* paths
  only. Previously it was invoked on every request; in production the
  lazy getMetaRouter() init ran on GET / and threw "Invalid URL" when
  APP_URL had no scheme, returning 500 for every page load.
- Log a startup warning when APP_URL is set but not usable, and include
  the resolved App URL in the startup banner so operators can confirm
  the correct value at a glance.
- Update oauth.test.ts mock to target notifications.getMcpSafeUrl.

* fix: show getAppUrl in banner and add two separate APP_URL startup checks

- Banner now displays getAppUrl() (the resolved app URL) rather than
  getMcpSafeUrl() so operators see the actual configured value
- Two independent startup warnings after the banner when APP_URL is set:
  1. whether APP_URL is a valid URL (parseable by new URL())
  2. whether APP_URL is MCP-safe (https:// or http://localhost)
- Fix getMcpSafeUrl() fallback port to use Number(PORT) || 3001,
  consistent with how index.ts parses PORT

* fix: update oidc.ts to import getAppUrl from notifications
2026-05-07 13:49:39 +02:00

165 lines
6.1 KiB
TypeScript

import express, { Request, Response } from 'express';
import { setAuthCookie } from '../services/cookie';
import {
getOidcConfig,
discover,
createState,
consumeState,
createAuthCode,
consumeAuthCode,
exchangeCodeForToken,
getUserInfo,
verifyIdToken,
findOrCreateUser,
touchLastLogin,
generateToken,
frontendUrl,
} from '../services/oidcService';
import { getAppUrl } from '../services/notifications';
import { resolveAuthToggles } from '../services/authService';
const router = express.Router();
// ---- GET /login ----------------------------------------------------------
router.get('/login', async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
if (!resolveAuthToggles().oidc_login) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'SSO login is disabled.' });
}
const config = getOidcConfig();
if (!config) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'OIDC not configured' });
if (config.issuer && !config.issuer.startsWith('https://') && process.env.NODE_ENV?.toLowerCase() === 'production') {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'OIDC issuer must use HTTPS in production' });
}
try {
const doc = await discover(config.issuer, config.discoveryUrl);
const appUrl = getAppUrl();
if (!appUrl) {
return res.status(500).json({ error: 'APP_URL is not configured. OIDC cannot be used.' });
}
const redirectUri = `${appUrl.replace(/\/+$/, '')}/api/auth/oidc/callback`;
const inviteToken = req.query.invite as string | undefined;
const state = createState(redirectUri, inviteToken);
const params = new URLSearchParams({
response_type: 'code',
client_id: config.clientId,
redirect_uri: redirectUri,
scope: process.env.OIDC_SCOPE || 'openid email profile',
state,
});
res.redirect(`${doc.authorization_endpoint}?${params}`);
} catch (err: unknown) {
console.error('[OIDC] Login error:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'OIDC login failed' });
}
});
// ---- GET /callback -------------------------------------------------------
router.get('/callback', async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
if (!resolveAuthToggles().oidc_login) {
return res.redirect(frontendUrl('/login?oidc_error=sso_disabled'));
}
const { code, state, error: oidcError } = req.query as { code?: string; state?: string; error?: string };
if (oidcError) {
console.error('[OIDC] Provider error:', oidcError);
return res.redirect(frontendUrl('/login?oidc_error=' + encodeURIComponent(oidcError)));
}
if (!code || !state) {
return res.redirect(frontendUrl('/login?oidc_error=missing_params'));
}
const pending = consumeState(state);
if (!pending) {
return res.redirect(frontendUrl('/login?oidc_error=invalid_state'));
}
const config = getOidcConfig();
if (!config) return res.redirect(frontendUrl('/login?oidc_error=not_configured'));
if (config.issuer && !config.issuer.startsWith('https://') && process.env.NODE_ENV?.toLowerCase() === 'production') {
return res.redirect(frontendUrl('/login?oidc_error=issuer_not_https'));
}
try {
const doc = await discover(config.issuer, config.discoveryUrl);
const tokenData = await exchangeCodeForToken(doc, code, pending.redirectUri, config.clientId, config.clientSecret);
if (!tokenData._ok || !tokenData.access_token) {
console.error('[OIDC] Token exchange failed: status', tokenData._status);
return res.redirect(frontendUrl('/login?oidc_error=token_failed'));
}
// Strict id_token verification: signature via JWKS + iss + aud.
// Previously only the access_token was used to hit userinfo, so a
// compromised provider or MITM could supply a crafted userinfo
// response the server would blindly trust. When the id_token is
// missing from the token response (non-compliant provider) we still
// reject — an Authorization Code flow MUST return one per OIDC Core.
if (!tokenData.id_token) {
console.error('[OIDC] Token response missing id_token — refusing login');
return res.redirect(frontendUrl('/login?oidc_error=no_id_token'));
}
const idVerify = await verifyIdToken(
tokenData.id_token,
doc,
config.clientId,
(doc.issuer ?? '').replace(/\/+$/, '') || config.issuer,
);
if (idVerify.ok !== true) {
const reason = 'error' in idVerify ? idVerify.error : 'unknown';
console.error('[OIDC] id_token verification failed:', reason);
return res.redirect(frontendUrl('/login?oidc_error=id_token_invalid'));
}
const userInfo = await getUserInfo(doc.userinfo_endpoint, tokenData.access_token);
if (!userInfo.email) {
return res.redirect(frontendUrl('/login?oidc_error=no_email'));
}
// Cross-check: the userinfo response must be for the same subject
// the id_token signed. Catches a compromised userinfo endpoint that
// speaks for a different principal than the id_token's claim.
const tokenSub = idVerify.claims.sub;
if (typeof tokenSub === 'string' && userInfo.sub && userInfo.sub !== tokenSub) {
console.error('[OIDC] userinfo.sub does not match id_token.sub — refusing login');
return res.redirect(frontendUrl('/login?oidc_error=subject_mismatch'));
}
const result = findOrCreateUser(userInfo, config, pending.inviteToken);
if ('error' in result) {
return res.redirect(frontendUrl('/login?oidc_error=' + result.error));
}
touchLastLogin(result.user.id);
const jwtToken = generateToken(result.user);
const authCode = createAuthCode(jwtToken);
res.redirect(frontendUrl('/login?oidc_code=' + authCode));
} catch (err: unknown) {
console.error('[OIDC] Callback error:', err);
res.redirect(frontendUrl('/login?oidc_error=server_error'));
}
});
// ---- GET /exchange -------------------------------------------------------
router.get('/exchange', (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const { code } = req.query as { code?: string };
if (!code) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Code required' });
const result = consumeAuthCode(code);
if ('error' in result) return res.status(400).json({ error: result.error });
setAuthCookie(res, result.token, req);
res.json({ token: result.token });
});
export default router;