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b3a085df3f
The process-state ports were meant to let a store shared between processes replace the in-memory one, but they could not. The readers outside the container (the broadcast functions, the backup restore's permissions-cache flush, the pending-code sweep, hand-built consumers) went straight to the module-level in-memory instances, so an overridden provider was used by the gateway and the services while the broadcasts and the restore flush kept using the old store. And every port was synchronous, while a store in the database or on the network is async, so plugging one in would have changed every signature anyway. RateLimitStore, PendingCodeStore, OidcFlowStore and PermissionsCacheStore now return promises, and RateLimitService, OauthService, OidcService, PermissionsService and their callers await them. The in-memory stores still decide synchronously, so who gets a 429, a code or a cached level is unchanged. RoomRegistry stays synchronous: membership holds live sockets and broadcast() is a synchronous call every domain makes, so several processes need a fan-out in front of broadcast(), not a different place for the sets. The process-wide ports get a ProcessStoreSlot. PermissionsModule, OauthModule and RealtimeGatewayModule install the store the container resolved and release it on shutdown, and the free functions, the sweep and hand-built consumers read the slot, so overriding the provider changes every reader. Tests provide fake stores and check that the broadcasts, the restore flush and the sweep use them. Two callers needed more than an await. The transit MCP tools counted in a RateLimitService of their own that no provider could reach; they now take the one RateLimitModule provides (their mcp_transit_* buckets never overlap the REST ones). The link preview claimed its in-flight slot only after the budget check, which now yields, so simultaneous askers would each have been charged; it now claims the slot first, and an asker that joined someone out of budget asks again on its own budget. The unused putPendingCode/takePendingCode helpers are gone.
207 lines
7.5 KiB
TypeScript
207 lines
7.5 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Security integration tests.
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* Covers SEC-001 to SEC-015.
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*
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* Notes:
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* - SSRF tests (SEC-001 to SEC-004) are unit-level tests on ssrfGuard — see tests/unit/utils/ssrfGuard.test.ts
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* - SEC-015 (MFA backup codes) is covered in auth.test.ts
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* - These tests focus on HTTP-level security: headers, auth, injection protection, etc.
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeAll, beforeEach, afterAll } from 'vitest';
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import request from 'supertest';
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import type { Application } from 'express';
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import type { INestApplication } from '@nestjs/common';
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import path from 'path';
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import fs from 'fs';
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vi.mock('../../src/db/database', async () => {
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const { createSnapshotTestDb, buildDbMock } = await import('../helpers/db-mock');
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return buildDbMock(createSnapshotTestDb());
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});
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vi.mock('../../src/config', () => ({
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JWT_SECRET: 'test-jwt-secret-for-trek-testing-only',
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ENCRYPTION_KEY: 'a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6a7b8c9d0e1f2',
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updateJwtSecret: () => {},
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SESSION_DURATION: '24h',
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SESSION_DURATION_MS: 86400000,
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SESSION_DURATION_SECONDS: 86400,
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DEFAULT_LANGUAGE: 'en',
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}));
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vi.mock('../../src/websocket', () => ({ broadcast: vi.fn(), broadcastToUser: vi.fn() }));
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import { db as testDb } from '../../src/db/database';
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import { buildApp } from '../../src/bootstrap';
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import { resetTestDb, resetRateLimits } from '../helpers/test-db';
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import { createUser, createTrip } from '../helpers/factories';
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import { authCookie, authHeader, generateToken } from '../helpers/auth';
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let nestApp: INestApplication;
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let app: Application;
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const FIXTURE_IMG = path.join(__dirname, '../fixtures/small-image.jpg');
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const uploadsDir = path.join(__dirname, '../../uploads/files');
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beforeAll(async () => {
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nestApp = await buildApp();
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app = nestApp.getHttpAdapter().getInstance();
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if (!fs.existsSync(uploadsDir)) fs.mkdirSync(uploadsDir, { recursive: true });
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testDb.prepare("INSERT OR REPLACE INTO app_settings (key, value) VALUES ('allowed_file_types', '*')").run();
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});
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beforeEach(async () => {
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resetTestDb(testDb);
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await resetRateLimits(nestApp);
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testDb.prepare("INSERT OR REPLACE INTO app_settings (key, value) VALUES ('allowed_file_types', '*')").run();
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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await nestApp.close();
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fs.rmSync(uploadsDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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testDb.close();
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});
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describe('Authentication security', () => {
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it('SEC-007 — invalid JWT in Authorization Bearer header is rejected', async () => {
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const { user } = createUser(testDb);
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const token = generateToken(user.id);
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// The file download endpoint accepts bearer auth
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// Other endpoints use cookie auth — but /api/auth/me works with cookie auth
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// Test that a forged/invalid JWT is rejected
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/api/auth/me')
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.set('Authorization', 'Bearer invalid.token.here');
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// Should return 401 (auth fails)
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it('unauthenticated request to protected endpoint returns 401', async () => {
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const res = await request(app).get('/api/trips');
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it('expired/invalid JWT cookie returns 401', async () => {
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/api/trips')
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.set('Cookie', 'trek_session=invalid.jwt.token');
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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});
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describe('Security headers', () => {
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it('SEC-011 — Helmet sets X-Content-Type-Options header', async () => {
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const res = await request(app).get('/api/health');
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expect(res.headers['x-content-type-options']).toBe('nosniff');
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});
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it('SEC-011 — Helmet sets X-Frame-Options header', async () => {
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const res = await request(app).get('/api/health');
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expect(res.headers['x-frame-options']).toBe('SAMEORIGIN');
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});
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});
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describe('API key encryption', () => {
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it('SEC-008 — encrypted API keys are stored with enc:v1: prefix', async () => {
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const { user } = createUser(testDb);
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await request(app)
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.put('/api/auth/me/api-keys')
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.set('Cookie', authCookie(user.id))
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.send({ openweather_api_key: 'test-api-key-12345' });
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const row = testDb.prepare('SELECT openweather_api_key FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(user.id) as any;
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expect(row.openweather_api_key).toMatch(/^enc:v1:/);
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});
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it('SEC-008 — saving keys audits the names and never the values (#1939)', async () => {
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const { user } = createUser(testDb);
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const save = () =>
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request(app)
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.put('/api/auth/me/api-keys')
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.set('Cookie', authCookie(user.id))
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.send({ openweather_api_key: 'test-api-key-12345' });
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const first = await save();
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expect(first.status).toBe(200);
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// changedKeys is internal: the client body is what it always was.
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expect(first.body).not.toHaveProperty('changedKeys');
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const rows = () =>
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testDb
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.prepare("SELECT details FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'settings.api_keys_update'")
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.all() as { details: string | null }[];
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expect(rows()).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(rows()[0].details).toContain('openweather_api_key');
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expect(rows()[0].details).not.toContain('test-api-key-12345');
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// The same value again writes no second row. This is the real test of the
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// cleartext comparison: encryption uses a random IV, so the stored blob
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// differs on every save even when the key does not.
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await save();
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expect(rows()).toHaveLength(1);
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});
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it('SEC-008 — GET /api/auth/me does not return plaintext API key', async () => {
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const { user } = createUser(testDb);
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await request(app)
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.put('/api/auth/me/api-keys')
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.set('Cookie', authCookie(user.id))
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.send({ openweather_api_key: 'secret-key' });
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const me = await request(app)
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.get('/api/auth/me')
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.set('Cookie', authCookie(user.id));
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expect(me.body.user.openweather_api_key).not.toBe('secret-key');
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});
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});
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describe('MFA secret protection', () => {
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it('SEC-009 — GET /api/auth/me does not expose mfa_secret', async () => {
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const { user } = createUser(testDb);
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/api/auth/me')
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.set('Cookie', authCookie(user.id));
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expect(res.body.user.mfa_secret).toBeUndefined();
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expect(res.body.user.password_hash).toBeUndefined();
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});
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});
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describe('Request body size limit', () => {
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it('SEC-013 — oversized JSON body is rejected', async () => {
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// Send a large body (2MB+) to exceed the default limit
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const bigData = { data: 'x'.repeat(2 * 1024 * 1024) };
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const res = await request(app)
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.post('/api/auth/login')
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.send(bigData);
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// body-parser rejects oversized payloads with 413
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expect(res.status).toBe(413);
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});
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});
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describe('File download path traversal', () => {
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it('SEC-005 — path traversal in file download is blocked', async () => {
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const { user } = createUser(testDb);
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const trip = createTrip(testDb, user.id);
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const upload = await request(app)
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.post(`/api/trips/${trip.id}/files`)
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.set('Cookie', authCookie(user.id))
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.attach('file', FIXTURE_IMG);
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expect(upload.status).toBe(201);
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const fileId = upload.body.file.id;
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testDb.prepare('UPDATE trip_files SET filename = ? WHERE id = ?').run('../../etc/passwd', fileId);
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const res = await request(app)
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.get(`/api/trips/${trip.id}/files/${fileId}/download`)
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.set(authHeader(user.id));
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// path.basename() strips traversal in the download controller; the normalized
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// name does not exist in uploads, so the answer is the same 404 a missing file
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// gets. Pinned exactly: a 500 from a thrown guard would also be "not 200".
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expect(res.status).toBe(404);
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expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: 'File not found' });
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});
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});
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