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2d0414b4a3
Fixes the critical + high + medium findings from our internal security
review. Bundled into one PR because the changes overlap heavily (JWT
verification unifies across three call sites; backup-code hashing and
demo-email handling cross-cut several services); splitting them out
would mean redundant reviews of the same files.
Critical
- CI-C1 — .github/workflows/test.yml: restore actions/{checkout,setup-
node,upload-artifact} to @v4. The @v6 refs don't exist, so the test
workflow was errorring before a single test ran.
- SEC-C1 — mfaPolicy now extracts the token via extractToken() (cookie-
first, Bearer fallback). Previously it only read Authorization, so
every cookie-authenticated SPA session bypassed require_mfa entirely.
- SEC-C2/C4/C6 — all JWT verification paths (MCP bearer, file download,
photo route) now go through the shared verifyJwtAndLoadUser that
checks password_version. resetPassword additionally deletes every
mcp_tokens row and marks outstanding oauth_tokens revoked, so a
password reset invalidates ALL credential classes — not just the
cookie JWT.
High
- SEC-H2 — reset email URL is built from server-side APP_URL /
ALLOWED_ORIGINS (via existing getAppUrl()), not request headers.
Closes the host-header-injection vector into reset links.
- SEC-H3 — OIDC findOrCreateUser wraps the invite-redemption UPDATE +
user INSERT in a transaction. The UPDATE is the capacity check; if
a concurrent callback takes the last slot, the whole transaction
aborts with registration_disabled instead of double-creating users.
- SEC-H4 — new verifyIdToken() performs full JWT signature
verification via the provider's JWKS (Node's crypto.createPublicKey
accepts JWK directly — no extra dependency), plus iss/aud/exp
checks. The callback also rejects the login when userinfo.sub does
not match id_token.sub.
- SEC-H5 — OAuth DCR now validates redirect_uris against an allowlist
of schemes: https, http-loopback, or a private custom scheme. Plain
http://non-loopback is rejected.
- SEC-H6 — oauthService audience defaults to mcpResource when the
`resource` parameter is missing, so tokens are always audience-bound
to /mcp instead of being issued with audience=null.
- SEC-H7 — HSTS is enabled any time NODE_ENV=production (previously
required FORCE_HTTPS=true), includeSubDomains defaults on and can
be disabled with HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS=false.
- SEC-H8 — trek_session cookie Secure flag is also driven by
req.secure (which Express resolves from X-Forwarded-Proto once
trust proxy is set), so instances behind a TLS-terminating proxy
get Secure cookies without needing FORCE_HTTPS.
Medium
- SEC-M1 — permanentDeleteFile / emptyTrash / avatar unlink now use
fs.promises.rm with { force: true } (one async op vs the previous
existsSync + unlinkSync pair per file).
- SEC-M2 — invalidatePermissionsCache() is called inside restoreFromZip
so a restored DB with different permission rows is honoured
immediately.
- SEC-M3 + C1 — idempotency store bounds the key at 128 chars, caches
only responses ≤ 256 KiB, and scopes the lookup by (key, user_id,
method, path) rather than (key, user_id). Same key replayed against
a different endpoint no longer returns a stale unrelated body.
- SEC-M4 — share_tokens gets an expires_at column; new tokens default
to 90-day TTL, expired tokens are denied at lookup. Existing tokens
stay NULL = no expiry so already-published links don't break.
- SEC-M5 — /uploads/photos/:filename now resolves the photo to its
trip_id and requires the share token to cover THAT trip. Previously
any share token for any trip would unlock any photo filename.
- SEC-M6 — BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS is the single source of truth shared
between fileService and collab uploads. The '*' allowed_file_types
wildcard now still rejects executables/scripts.
- SEC-M7 — single DEMO_EMAILS constant (services/demo.ts) used by
demoUploadBlock, mfaPolicy, and every demo-mode guard in
authService. The old demoUploadBlock only matched 'demo@nomad.app'
so the seed 'demo@trek.app' could in fact upload in demo mode.
- SEC-M8 — MFA backup codes are now bcrypt-hashed at rest
(hashBackupCodeBcrypt). matchBackupCode accepts both bcrypt and
legacy SHA-256 hex hashes, so existing installs keep working until
the user regenerates codes via enableMfa.
- SEC-M9 — document the "security via UUID v4 filename" model for
/uploads/avatars|covers|journey. Requires no code change but
captures the decision so future reviewers don't re-flag it.
- SEC-M10 — already covered by the resetPassword revocation logic
above: mcp_tokens DELETE + oauth_tokens UPDATE … SET revoked_at.
Performance
- PERF-H1 — new migration adds the indexes flagged in the audit:
trips(user_id), trips(created_at DESC), photos(day_id),
photos(place_id), reservations(day_id), share_tokens(token), plus
conditional day_accommodations and notifications indexes depending
on which columns are present.
Tests
- tests/integration/oidc.test.ts now mocks verifyIdToken and passes
an id_token in the exchangeCodeForToken stub for the three flows
that exercise a successful callback. The three remaining failures
tests pointed out were all pre-existing (file-upload flakes +
notificationPreferences event_types count drift), none introduced
by this PR.
289 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
289 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
import express, { Request, Response } from 'express';
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import multer from 'multer';
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import path from 'path';
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import fs from 'fs';
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import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid';
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import { authenticate, demoUploadBlock } from '../middleware/auth';
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import { requireTripAccess } from '../middleware/tripAccess';
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import { broadcast } from '../websocket';
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import { AuthRequest } from '../types';
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import { checkPermission } from '../services/permissions';
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import {
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MAX_FILE_SIZE,
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BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS,
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filesDir,
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getAllowedExtensions,
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verifyTripAccess,
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formatFile,
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resolveFilePath,
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authenticateDownload,
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listFiles,
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getFileById,
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getFileByIdFull,
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getDeletedFile,
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createFile,
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updateFile,
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toggleStarred,
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softDeleteFile,
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restoreFile,
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permanentDeleteFile,
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emptyTrash,
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createFileLink,
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deleteFileLink,
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getFileLinks,
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} from '../services/fileService';
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const router = express.Router({ mergeParams: true });
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Multer setup (HTTP middleware — stays in route)
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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const storage = multer.diskStorage({
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destination: (_req, _file, cb) => {
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if (!fs.existsSync(filesDir)) fs.mkdirSync(filesDir, { recursive: true });
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cb(null, filesDir);
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},
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filename: (_req, file, cb) => {
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const ext = path.extname(file.originalname);
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cb(null, `${uuidv4()}${ext}`);
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},
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});
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const upload = multer({
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storage,
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limits: { fileSize: MAX_FILE_SIZE },
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defParamCharset: 'utf8',
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fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => {
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const ext = path.extname(file.originalname).toLowerCase();
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if (BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS.includes(ext) || file.mimetype.includes('svg')) {
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const err: Error & { statusCode?: number } = new Error('File type not allowed');
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err.statusCode = 400;
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return cb(err);
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}
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const allowed = getAllowedExtensions().split(',').map(e => e.trim().toLowerCase());
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const fileExt = ext.replace('.', '');
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if (allowed.includes(fileExt) || (allowed.includes('*') && !BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS.includes(ext))) {
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cb(null, true);
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} else {
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const err: Error & { statusCode?: number } = new Error('File type not allowed');
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err.statusCode = 400;
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cb(err);
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}
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},
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Routes
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Authenticated file download (supports Bearer header or ?token= query param)
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router.get('/:id/download', (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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const { tripId, id } = req.params;
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const authHeader = req.headers['authorization'];
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const bearerToken = authHeader && authHeader.split(' ')[1];
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const queryToken = req.query.token as string | undefined;
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const auth = authenticateDownload(bearerToken, queryToken);
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if ('error' in auth) return res.status(auth.status).json({ error: auth.error });
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const trip = verifyTripAccess(tripId, auth.userId);
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if (!trip) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Trip not found' });
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const file = getFileById(id, tripId);
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if (!file) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'File not found' });
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const { resolved, safe } = resolveFilePath(file.filename);
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if (!safe) return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Forbidden' });
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if (!fs.existsSync(resolved)) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'File not found' });
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// Serve Apple Wallet passes inline with the canonical MIME type so Safari
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// (iOS/macOS) hands them off to Wallet instead of downloading as a blob.
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if (path.extname(resolved).toLowerCase() === '.pkpass') {
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res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/vnd.apple.pkpass');
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res.setHeader('Content-Disposition', `inline; filename="${path.basename(file.original_name || resolved)}"`);
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}
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res.sendFile(resolved);
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});
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// List files (excludes soft-deleted by default)
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router.get('/', authenticate, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
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const { tripId } = req.params;
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const showTrash = req.query.trash === 'true';
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const trip = verifyTripAccess(tripId, authReq.user.id);
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if (!trip) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Trip not found' });
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res.json({ files: listFiles(tripId, showTrash) });
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});
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// Upload file
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router.post('/', authenticate, requireTripAccess, demoUploadBlock, upload.single('file'), (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
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const { tripId } = req.params;
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const { user_id: tripOwnerId } = authReq.trip!;
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if (!checkPermission('file_upload', authReq.user.role, tripOwnerId, authReq.user.id, tripOwnerId !== authReq.user.id))
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'No permission to upload files' });
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if (!req.file) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No file uploaded' });
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const { place_id, description, reservation_id } = req.body;
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const created = createFile(tripId, req.file, authReq.user.id, { place_id, description, reservation_id });
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res.status(201).json({ file: created });
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broadcast(tripId, 'file:created', { file: created }, req.headers['x-socket-id'] as string);
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});
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// Update file metadata
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router.put('/:id', authenticate, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
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const { tripId, id } = req.params;
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const { description, place_id, reservation_id } = req.body;
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const access = verifyTripAccess(tripId, authReq.user.id);
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if (!access) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Trip not found' });
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if (!checkPermission('file_edit', authReq.user.role, access.user_id, authReq.user.id, access.user_id !== authReq.user.id))
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'No permission to edit files' });
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const file = getFileById(id, tripId);
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if (!file) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'File not found' });
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const updated = updateFile(id, file, { description, place_id, reservation_id });
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res.json({ file: updated });
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broadcast(tripId, 'file:updated', { file: updated }, req.headers['x-socket-id'] as string);
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});
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// Toggle starred
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router.patch('/:id/star', authenticate, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
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const { tripId, id } = req.params;
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const trip = verifyTripAccess(tripId, authReq.user.id);
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if (!trip) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Trip not found' });
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if (!checkPermission('file_edit', authReq.user.role, trip.user_id, authReq.user.id, trip.user_id !== authReq.user.id))
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'No permission' });
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const file = getFileById(id, tripId);
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if (!file) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'File not found' });
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const updated = toggleStarred(id, file.starred);
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res.json({ file: updated });
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broadcast(tripId, 'file:updated', { file: updated }, req.headers['x-socket-id'] as string);
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});
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// Soft-delete (move to trash)
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router.delete('/:id', authenticate, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
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const { tripId, id } = req.params;
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const access = verifyTripAccess(tripId, authReq.user.id);
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if (!access) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Trip not found' });
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if (!checkPermission('file_delete', authReq.user.role, access.user_id, authReq.user.id, access.user_id !== authReq.user.id))
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'No permission to delete files' });
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const file = getFileById(id, tripId);
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if (!file) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'File not found' });
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softDeleteFile(id);
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res.json({ success: true });
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broadcast(tripId, 'file:deleted', { fileId: Number(id) }, req.headers['x-socket-id'] as string);
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});
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// Restore from trash
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router.post('/:id/restore', authenticate, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
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const { tripId, id } = req.params;
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const trip = verifyTripAccess(tripId, authReq.user.id);
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if (!trip) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Trip not found' });
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if (!checkPermission('file_delete', authReq.user.role, trip.user_id, authReq.user.id, trip.user_id !== authReq.user.id))
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'No permission' });
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const file = getDeletedFile(id, tripId);
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if (!file) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'File not found in trash' });
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const restored = restoreFile(id);
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res.json({ file: restored });
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broadcast(tripId, 'file:created', { file: restored }, req.headers['x-socket-id'] as string);
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});
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// Permanently delete from trash
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router.delete('/:id/permanent', authenticate, async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
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const { tripId, id } = req.params;
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const trip = verifyTripAccess(tripId, authReq.user.id);
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if (!trip) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Trip not found' });
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if (!checkPermission('file_delete', authReq.user.role, trip.user_id, authReq.user.id, trip.user_id !== authReq.user.id))
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'No permission' });
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const file = getDeletedFile(id, tripId);
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if (!file) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'File not found in trash' });
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await permanentDeleteFile(file);
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res.json({ success: true });
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broadcast(tripId, 'file:deleted', { fileId: Number(id) }, req.headers['x-socket-id'] as string);
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});
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// Empty entire trash
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router.delete('/trash/empty', authenticate, async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
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const { tripId } = req.params;
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const trip = verifyTripAccess(tripId, authReq.user.id);
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if (!trip) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Trip not found' });
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if (!checkPermission('file_delete', authReq.user.role, trip.user_id, authReq.user.id, trip.user_id !== authReq.user.id))
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'No permission' });
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const deleted = await emptyTrash(tripId);
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res.json({ success: true, deleted });
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});
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// Link a file to a reservation (many-to-many)
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router.post('/:id/link', authenticate, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
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const { tripId, id } = req.params;
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const { reservation_id, assignment_id, place_id } = req.body;
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const trip = verifyTripAccess(tripId, authReq.user.id);
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if (!trip) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Trip not found' });
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if (!checkPermission('file_edit', authReq.user.role, trip.user_id, authReq.user.id, trip.user_id !== authReq.user.id))
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'No permission' });
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const file = getFileById(id, tripId);
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if (!file) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'File not found' });
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const links = createFileLink(id, { reservation_id, assignment_id, place_id });
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res.json({ success: true, links });
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});
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// Unlink a file from a reservation
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router.delete('/:id/link/:linkId', authenticate, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
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const { tripId, id, linkId } = req.params;
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const trip = verifyTripAccess(tripId, authReq.user.id);
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if (!trip) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Trip not found' });
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if (!checkPermission('file_edit', authReq.user.role, trip.user_id, authReq.user.id, trip.user_id !== authReq.user.id))
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'No permission' });
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deleteFileLink(linkId, id);
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res.json({ success: true });
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});
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// Get all links for a file
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router.get('/:id/links', authenticate, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
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const { tripId, id } = req.params;
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const trip = verifyTripAccess(tripId, authReq.user.id);
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if (!trip) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Trip not found' });
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const links = getFileLinks(id);
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res.json({ links });
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});
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export default router;
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