k1nq/TREK

mirror of https://github.com/mauriceboe/TREK.git synced 2026-10-18 21:16:47 +00:00

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Maurice 44c92052a3 docs(wiki): bring the pages in line with 4.3.0

Every page was read against the code on dev. What changed:

- Pages that described 4.2 behaviour: satellite view on the vector maps,
  the mobile journal timeline, Collab with its fifth tab, the Review badge,
  clustered pins on the share page, the Leaflet preset list, the strict
  guard on fe80::/10, the invite link tools and their scopes, the Public
  API scope rules, the permission count in the plugin SDK.
- Features of this release that no page mentioned: videos in a journal
  entry, receipts on an expense, the Google transit backend, routing
  counters, the rating on a place, the navigation menu, car stops, the
  manual school holiday catalogue and its MCP tools, the Dawarich panel in
  the Atlas, the release notes modal, plugin frames going fullscreen, the
  corridor call into the search provider hook.
- Statements that sent an admin the wrong way: DEFAULT_LANGUAGE is not in
  the Helm ConfigMap, env.PORT cannot be changed on the chart alone, the
  rotation script does not cover the document sync credentials, event
  handlers cannot broadcast, there is no per user MFA reset in the admin
  panel, the demo user can edit, an unparsable APP_URL stops the server.
- Updating gets a section for 4.3.0: the TREK Places API as the new
  default, the new variables, the Overpass timeout, SSO sessions on an
  OIDC only instance, the migration that puts booked nights on the drive.

2026-09-20 12:11:41 +02:00

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Encryption Key Rotation

What the encryption key protects

TREK encrypts sensitive settings at rest using AES-256-GCM. The following values are stored encrypted in the database:

Google Maps API key (instance-wide, in app_settings; the per-user column is still read as a fallback)
Unsplash access key (instance-wide, in app_settings; the per-user column is still read as a fallback)
Amap API key (instance-wide, in app_settings; the per-user column is still read as a fallback)
Mapbox access token (per user)
CARTO API key (per user, in settings table)
OpenWeather API key (per user)
Immich API key (per user)
AirTrail API key (per user)
Dawarich API key (per user, in dawarich_connections)
Synology Photos password, session ID, and device ID (per user)
Per-user webhook URL, ntfy notification token, and LLM provider API key (in settings table)
Instance-wide API key of the AI Parsing addon (in addons.config)
Document sync credentials of a trip's stores, one encrypted blob per store and trip (in document_connections), and the webhook secret of each binding (in trip_document_links); see Document-Sync
OIDC client secret (global, in app_settings)
SMTP password (global, in app_settings)
Admin webhook URL and admin ntfy token (global, in app_settings)
MFA (TOTP) secrets for all users
Photo passphrases for Synology shared-link photos (in trek_photos)
Passphrases for shared trip album links (in trip_album_links)
S3 storage backend secret access keys (in app_settings['storage.backends']; see Admin-Storage)
Plugin OAuth access and refresh tokens, plus every plugin settings field the plugin's manifest marks secret (instance scope in plugins.config, user scope in plugin_user_config.config)

The encryption derives a key from ENCRYPTION_KEY using SHA-256 (with a domain suffix per secret type), so the raw ENCRYPTION_KEY value is never stored in the database.

Key resolution order

On startup, TREK resolves the encryption key in this order:

ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable — explicit, always takes priority. When set, the value is also written to ./data/.encryption_key so it survives container restarts if the env var is later removed.
./data/.encryption_key file — present on any install that has started at least once.
./data/.jwt_secret file — one-time fallback for older installs that pre-date the dedicated encryption key. The value is immediately persisted to ./data/.encryption_key so future JWT rotations cannot break decryption.
Auto-generated — fresh install with none of the above. A random 32-byte hex key is generated and written to ./data/.encryption_key.

What happens if the key is lost

All encrypted settings (API keys, SMTP password, OIDC secret, MFA secrets, notification tokens, etc.) become unreadable — TREK cannot decrypt them. They must be re-entered manually after the key is restored or replaced. Unencrypted data (trips, places, users, etc.) is unaffected.

Backing up the key

Unless you set ENCRYPTION_KEY in the environment, your backup ZIP does include the encryption key: ./data/.encryption_key is bundled into every archive, manual and automatic, as a root-level .encryption_key entry, so a restore onto a different install can still decrypt the stored secrets. That makes the ZIP exactly as sensitive as the key itself — store and transfer it accordingly.

On installs that supply the key through the environment the file is not the source of truth, so no backup carries it. Keep it somewhere separate — for example, in a password manager or a secrets manager. See Backups.

To find your current key: check the ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable or read ./data/.encryption_key.

Rotating the key

Use scripts/migrate-encryption.ts to re-encrypt the stored secrets listed below without downtime or manual re-entry.

Docker:

docker exec -it -w /app/server trek node --import tsx scripts/migrate-encryption.ts

Host (run from the server/ directory):

node --import tsx scripts/migrate-encryption.ts

The script:

Prompts for the old and new encryption keys interactively (keys are never echoed to the terminal or written to shell history).
Asks for confirmation before making any changes.
Creates a timestamped backup of the database (e.g. travel.db.backup-1713484800000) before modifying anything.
Re-encrypts all stored secrets across all tables:
- app_settings: oidc_client_secret, smtp_pass, admin_webhook_url, admin_ntfy_token, maps_api_key, unsplash_api_key, amap_api_key
- app_settings['storage.backends']: the secretAccessKey of every S3 storage backend
- users (per user): maps_api_key, unsplash_api_key, amap_api_key, openweather_api_key, immich_api_key, synology_password, synology_sid, synology_did, airtrail_api_key, mfa_secret
- settings (per user): webhook_url, ntfy_token, mapbox_access_token, carto_api_key, llm_api_key
- dawarich_connections (per user): api_key
- plugin_oauth_tokens: access_token, refresh_token (per plugin and user)
- plugins.config and plugin_user_config.config: every settings field a plugin's manifest marks secret, resolved per plugin and scope from plugin_settings_fields
- trip_album_links: passphrase
- trek_photos: passphrase
Reports counts of migrated, already-migrated, skipped (empty), and errored values.

Not covered by the script: the document sync credentials (document_connections.secrets and trip_document_links.webhook_secret) and the instance-wide API key of the AI Parsing addon (addons.config). They stay encrypted under the old key and read back as empty afterwards. The AI Parsing key has to be entered again under Admin → Addons. A document sync binding fails with The credentials were refused. and cannot be repaired from the trip: the connection form only opens for a store the trip has not been connected to yet, and Disconnect removes the binding but keeps the stored connection. Removing the trip's row from document_connections takes its bindings with it and lets the trip owner connect the store again; the documents themselves stay in TREK and at the store. Rotate before trips are bound to a store where you can. See Document-Sync.

After a successful migration:

Update ENCRYPTION_KEY in your environment to the new value.
Restart TREK.

If any secrets could not be migrated, the script exits with a non-zero status and the original database backup is retained.

Upgrading from very old versions

Old installs may have used ./data/.jwt_secret as the encryption source (before a dedicated ENCRYPTION_KEY was introduced). The key resolution chain above handles this automatically on startup — the JWT secret is read, immediately written to ./data/.encryption_key, and JWT rotation is then safe without breaking decryption.

7.1 KiB Raw Blame History