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jubnl
2899465dac
Two pre-existing bugs in the plugin egress guard, found by running a plugin against a real service end to end. 1. Every plain-HTTP request a plugin made was refused, whatever host it had declared. Node pre-normalises `net.connect()` args into an [options, cb] array and passes THAT array as the single argument; undici's plain-HTTP connector takes this path, its TLS connector does not. classifyConnect read `host` off the array, got undefined, and fell back to 'localhost' — so a fetch to a declared, public host was rejected with the nonsense message "localhost is not in the plugin's declared hosts". It failed closed, so it was never a security hole, and it went unnoticed because the only shipped egress plugin uses HTTPS. unwrapConnectArgs() unwraps the normalised form before anything reads host/path. 2. TREK_PLUGIN_ALLOW_PRIVATE_EGRESS could never have any effect. The guard that reads it runs INSIDE the child, whose env is scrubbed to a four-entry whitelist that never included it — so a documented setting (wiki/ Environment-Variables.md) was wired to nothing, and no plugin could reach a self-hoster's LAN service no matter what the operator set. Forwarded only when set, so the default stays the secure block-private policy. Regression tests cover the normalised form in both directions: the real host is now resolved, and an undeclared host, a private IP and a unix socket are all still refused when passed that way.