Files
TREK/server/scripts/migrate-encryption.ts
T
Maurice 26ab4a58b1 fix(db): keep SQLite temp files in memory so trips can be deleted (#2518)
Deleting a trip failed with SQLITE_IOERR_GETTEMPPATH when the container
runs with a read-only root filesystem and no tmpfs on /tmp. The cascade
behind DELETE FROM trips keeps a statement journal, SQLite moves it to a
temp file once it passes 64 KiB, and it looks for a directory for that
file in SQLITE_TMPDIR, TMPDIR, /var/tmp, /usr/tmp, /tmp and the working
directory. None of them is writable there. Installs on the shipped
compose file have a tmpfs on /tmp and never hit it.

Every connection the server opens now comes from openDatabase() in
src/db/connection.ts, which sets temp_store = MEMORY: the main database
(also when it is reopened after a restore), each plugin's own database
and the uploaded backup checked before a restore. reset-admin.js and the
key rotation script cannot import src/ in the image, so they set the
pragma themselves. A test pins that nothing else in src/ constructs a
handle, and one deletes a full trip on the real schema and watches for
temp files.
2026-09-26 02:26:39 +00:00

624 lines
26 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Encryption key migration script.
*
* Re-encrypts all at-rest secrets in the TREK database from one ENCRYPTION_KEY
* to another without requiring the application to be running.
*
* Usage (host):
* cd server
* node --import tsx scripts/migrate-encryption.ts
*
* Usage (Docker):
* docker exec -it trek node --import tsx scripts/migrate-encryption.ts
*
* The script will prompt for the old and new keys interactively so they never
* appear in shell history, process arguments, or log output.
*/
import crypto from 'crypto';
import fs from 'fs';
import path from 'path';
import readline from 'readline';
import Database from 'better-sqlite3';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Crypto helpers — mirrors apiKeyCrypto.ts and mfaCrypto.ts but with
// explicit key arguments so the script is independent of config.ts / env vars.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const ENCRYPTED_PREFIX = 'enc:v1:';
function apiKey(encryptionKey: string): Buffer {
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(`${encryptionKey}:api_keys:v1`).digest();
}
function mfaKey(encryptionKey: string): Buffer {
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(`${encryptionKey}:mfa:v1`).digest();
}
function encryptApiKey(plain: string, encryptionKey: string): string {
const iv = crypto.randomBytes(12);
const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', apiKey(encryptionKey), iv);
const enc = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plain, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
return `${ENCRYPTED_PREFIX}${Buffer.concat([iv, tag, enc]).toString('base64')}`;
}
function decryptApiKey(value: string, encryptionKey: string): string | null {
if (!value.startsWith(ENCRYPTED_PREFIX)) return null;
try {
const buf = Buffer.from(value.slice(ENCRYPTED_PREFIX.length), 'base64');
const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', apiKey(encryptionKey), buf.subarray(0, 12));
decipher.setAuthTag(buf.subarray(12, 28));
return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(buf.subarray(28)), decipher.final()]).toString('utf8');
} catch {
return null;
}
}
function encryptMfa(plain: string, encryptionKey: string): string {
const iv = crypto.randomBytes(12);
const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', mfaKey(encryptionKey), iv);
const enc = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plain, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
return Buffer.concat([iv, tag, enc]).toString('base64');
}
function decryptMfa(value: string, encryptionKey: string): string | null {
try {
const buf = Buffer.from(value, 'base64');
if (buf.length < 28) return null;
const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', mfaKey(encryptionKey), buf.subarray(0, 12));
decipher.setAuthTag(buf.subarray(12, 28));
return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(buf.subarray(28)), decipher.final()]).toString('utf8');
} catch {
return null;
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Prompt helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// A single readline interface is shared for the entire script lifetime so
// stdin is never paused between prompts.
//
// Lines are collected into a queue as soon as readline emits them — this
// prevents the race where a line event fires before the next listener is
// registered (common with piped / pasted input that arrives all at once).
const rl = readline.createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout });
const lineQueue: string[] = [];
const lineWaiters: ((line: string) => void)[] = [];
rl.on('line', (line) => {
if (lineWaiters.length > 0) {
lineWaiters.shift()!(line);
} else {
lineQueue.push(line);
}
});
function nextLine(): Promise<string> {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
if (lineQueue.length > 0) {
resolve(lineQueue.shift()!);
} else {
lineWaiters.push(resolve);
}
});
}
// Muted prompt — typed/pasted characters are not echoed.
// _writeToOutput is suppressed only while waiting for this line.
async function promptSecret(question: string): Promise<string> {
process.stdout.write(question);
(rl as any)._writeToOutput = () => {};
const line = await nextLine();
(rl as any)._writeToOutput = (s: string) => process.stdout.write(s);
process.stdout.write('\n');
return line.trim();
}
async function prompt(question: string): Promise<string> {
process.stdout.write(question);
const line = await nextLine();
return line.trim();
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Migration
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
interface MigrationResult {
migrated: number;
alreadyMigrated: number;
skipped: number;
errors: string[];
}
async function main() {
console.log('=== TREK Encryption Key Migration ===\n');
console.log('This script re-encrypts all stored secrets under a new ENCRYPTION_KEY.');
console.log('A backup of the database will be created before any changes are made.\n');
// Resolve DB path
const dbPath = path.resolve(
process.env.DB_PATH ?? path.join(__dirname, '../data/travel.db')
);
if (!fs.existsSync(dbPath)) {
console.error(`Database not found at: ${dbPath}`);
console.error('Set DB_PATH env var if your database is in a non-standard location.');
process.exit(1);
}
console.log(`Database: ${dbPath}\n`);
// Collect keys interactively
const oldKey = await promptSecret('Old ENCRYPTION_KEY: ');
const newKey = await promptSecret('New ENCRYPTION_KEY: ');
if (!oldKey || !newKey) {
rl.close();
console.error('Both keys are required.');
process.exit(1);
}
if (oldKey === newKey) {
rl.close();
console.error('Old and new keys are identical — nothing to do.');
process.exit(0);
}
// Confirm
const confirm = await prompt('\nProceed with migration? This will modify the database. Type "yes" to confirm: ');
if (confirm.trim().toLowerCase() !== 'yes') {
rl.close();
console.log('Aborted.');
process.exit(0);
}
// Backup
const backupPath = `${dbPath}.backup-${Date.now()}`;
const db = new Database(dbPath);
db.pragma('busy_timeout = 5000');
// Temp files in memory, like every connection src/db/connection.ts opens: a
// container with a read-only root and no tmpfs on /tmp has nowhere to put
// them, and the rotation below runs as one long transaction (#2518).
db.pragma('temp_store = MEMORY');
// The rollback copy has to be a consistent snapshot, not a plain file copy:
// this script is documented as running against a live server, so in WAL mode
// the committed tail sits in the -wal sidecar a copy would leave behind.
// VACUUM INTO snapshots even while the server writes; the checkpoint plus
// copy is only the fallback for when it cannot (disk, lock).
try {
db.exec(`VACUUM INTO '${backupPath.replace(/'/g, "''")}'`);
} catch {
db.exec('PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE)');
fs.copyFileSync(dbPath, backupPath);
}
console.log(`\nBackup created: ${backupPath}`);
// journal_mode lives in the file header, so hardcoding WAL here would quietly
// undo a deliberate DELETE/TRUNCATE setup (network storage) on the first key
// rotation. This script ships without src/ in the image and cannot import
// src/app-config, so it reads the same variables directly — keep the defaults
// in step with parsers.resolveDurability().
const journalModes = ['DELETE', 'TRUNCATE', 'PERSIST', 'MEMORY', 'WAL', 'OFF'];
const syncLevels = ['OFF', 'NORMAL', 'FULL', 'EXTRA'];
const wantedJournal = (process.env.TREK_DB_JOURNAL_MODE ?? '').trim().toUpperCase();
const journalMode = journalModes.includes(wantedJournal) ? wantedJournal : 'WAL';
if (wantedJournal && journalMode !== wantedJournal) {
console.warn(`TREK_DB_JOURNAL_MODE="${process.env.TREK_DB_JOURNAL_MODE}" is not a SQLite journal mode — using ${journalMode}.`);
}
const wantedSync = (process.env.TREK_DB_SYNCHRONOUS ?? '').trim().toUpperCase();
const defaultSync = journalMode === 'WAL' ? 'NORMAL' : 'FULL';
const synchronous = syncLevels.includes(wantedSync) ? wantedSync : defaultSync;
if (wantedSync && synchronous !== wantedSync) {
console.warn(`TREK_DB_SYNCHRONOUS="${process.env.TREK_DB_SYNCHRONOUS}" is not a SQLite synchronous level — using ${synchronous}.`);
}
db.pragma(`journal_mode = ${journalMode}`);
db.pragma(`synchronous = ${synchronous}`);
console.log(`Journal mode: ${db.pragma('journal_mode', { simple: true })}\n`);
const result: MigrationResult = { migrated: 0, alreadyMigrated: 0, skipped: 0, errors: [] };
// Helper: migrate a single api-key-style value (enc:v1: prefix)
function migrateApiKeyValue(raw: string, label: string): string | null {
if (!raw || !raw.startsWith(ENCRYPTED_PREFIX)) {
result.skipped++;
console.warn(` SKIP ${label}: not an encrypted value (missing enc:v1: prefix)`);
return null;
}
const plain = decryptApiKey(raw, oldKey);
if (plain !== null) {
result.migrated++;
return encryptApiKey(plain, newKey);
}
// Try new key — already migrated?
const check = decryptApiKey(raw, newKey);
if (check !== null) {
result.alreadyMigrated++;
return null; // no change needed
}
result.errors.push(`${label}: decryption failed with both keys`);
console.error(` ERROR ${label}: could not decrypt with either key — skipping`);
return null;
}
// Helper: migrate a single MFA value (no prefix, raw base64)
function migrateMfaValue(raw: string, label: string): string | null {
if (!raw) { result.skipped++; return null; }
const plain = decryptMfa(raw, oldKey);
if (plain !== null) {
result.migrated++;
return encryptMfa(plain, newKey);
}
const check = decryptMfa(raw, newKey);
if (check !== null) {
result.alreadyMigrated++;
return null;
}
result.errors.push(`${label}: decryption failed with both keys`);
console.error(` ERROR ${label}: could not decrypt with either key — skipping`);
return null;
}
db.transaction(() => {
// --- app_settings: oidc_client_secret, smtp_pass, admin_webhook_url, admin_ntfy_token,
// plus the instance-wide provider keys (#1939) ---
//
// The last two mirror INSTANCE_API_KEY_NAMES in
// src/nest/settings/instance-api-keys.ts. Spelled out rather than imported,
// because that module pulls in DatabaseService and this script deliberately
// stays independent of src/ (see the crypto note above). Miss one and a
// rotation leaves it encrypted under the old key, which reads back as "no
// key" and silently drops the install to OpenStreetMap, so the copy is
// pinned by tests/unit/db/migrate-encryption-parity.test.ts.
for (const key of [
'oidc_client_secret',
'smtp_pass',
'admin_webhook_url',
'admin_ntfy_token',
'maps_api_key',
'unsplash_api_key',
'amap_api_key',
]) {
const row = db.prepare('SELECT value FROM app_settings WHERE key = ?').get(key) as { value: string } | undefined;
if (!row?.value) continue;
const newVal = migrateApiKeyValue(row.value, `app_settings.${key}`);
if (newVal !== null) {
db.prepare('UPDATE app_settings SET value = ? WHERE key = ?').run(newVal, key);
}
}
// --- users: api key columns + synology credentials ---
// unsplash_api_key was missing here for as long as the column has existed. It
// matters now that the resolver reads it as the per-user fallback (#1939): left
// out of a rotation it stays encrypted under the old key and reads back as unset.
// airtrail_api_key arrived with a later migration, so an older database may
// not have the column at all — filter the list against the real table rather
// than letting one missing column throw the whole rotation.
const userColumns = new Set(
(db.prepare("SELECT name FROM pragma_table_info('users')").all() as { name: string }[]).map((r) => r.name),
);
const apiKeyColumns = [
'maps_api_key',
'unsplash_api_key',
// Added with the Amap provider; filtered against the real table below, so a
// database that has not run that migration yet is not a rotation failure.
'amap_api_key',
'openweather_api_key',
'immich_api_key',
'synology_password',
'synology_sid',
'synology_did',
'airtrail_api_key',
].filter((c) => userColumns.has(c));
const users = db.prepare('SELECT id FROM users').all() as { id: number }[];
for (const user of users) {
const row = db.prepare(`SELECT ${apiKeyColumns.join(', ')} FROM users WHERE id = ?`).get(user.id) as Record<string, string>;
for (const col of apiKeyColumns) {
if (!row[col]) continue;
const newVal = migrateApiKeyValue(row[col], `users[${user.id}].${col}`);
if (newVal !== null) {
db.prepare(`UPDATE users SET ${col} = ? WHERE id = ?`).run(newVal, user.id);
}
}
// mfa_secret (mfa crypto)
const mfaRow = db.prepare('SELECT mfa_secret FROM users WHERE id = ? AND mfa_secret IS NOT NULL').get(user.id) as { mfa_secret: string } | undefined;
if (mfaRow?.mfa_secret) {
const newVal = migrateMfaValue(mfaRow.mfa_secret, `users[${user.id}].mfa_secret`);
if (newVal !== null) {
db.prepare('UPDATE users SET mfa_secret = ? WHERE id = ?').run(newVal, user.id);
}
}
}
// --- app_settings: storage.backends ---
// Storage backend secrets live encrypted INSIDE the storage.backends JSON
// array (BACKENDS_KEY in src/nest/storage/storage-registry.service.ts is
// its own app_settings row — 'storage.categories' is a sibling row with no
// secrets), on the fields the shared type registry marks `secret` (only
// options.secretAccessKey for s3 today; src/nest/storage/storage-secrets.ts
// encrypts it with the same enc:v1: scheme as the api-key columns above).
// This script can't import storageSecretFields from @trek/shared (kept
// independent of the app, see the header note), so the field list per
// backend type is pinned here. Miss one and that backend's secret stays
// encrypted under the old key after rotation, then fails to decrypt on the
// next read (StorageBackendError) — pinned by
// tests/unit/db/migrate-encryption-parity.test.ts.
const STORAGE_BACKEND_SECRET_FIELDS: Record<string, readonly string[]> = {
s3: ['secretAccessKey'],
};
{
const row = db.prepare("SELECT value FROM app_settings WHERE key = 'storage.backends'").get() as
| { value: string }
| undefined;
if (row?.value) {
let backends: unknown;
try {
backends = JSON.parse(row.value);
} catch {
result.errors.push('app_settings.storage.backends: invalid JSON — skipping');
backends = undefined;
}
if (backends !== undefined) {
if (Array.isArray(backends)) {
let changed = false;
for (const backend of backends as Record<string, unknown>[]) {
if (!backend || typeof backend !== 'object') continue;
const type = typeof backend.type === 'string' ? backend.type : undefined;
const fields = type ? STORAGE_BACKEND_SECRET_FIELDS[type] : undefined;
if (!fields || fields.length === 0) continue;
const options = backend.options;
if (!options || typeof options !== 'object') continue;
const name = typeof backend.name === 'string' ? backend.name : '?';
for (const field of fields) {
const raw = (options as Record<string, unknown>)[field];
if (typeof raw !== 'string' || !raw) continue;
const newVal = migrateApiKeyValue(raw, `app_settings.storage.backends[${name}].${field}`);
if (newVal !== null) {
(options as Record<string, unknown>)[field] = newVal;
changed = true;
}
}
}
if (changed) {
db.prepare("UPDATE app_settings SET value = ? WHERE key = 'storage.backends'").run(
JSON.stringify(backends),
);
}
} else {
result.errors.push('app_settings.storage.backends: not an array — skipping');
}
}
}
}
// --- settings: per-user encrypted keys ---
const encryptedSettingKeys = ['webhook_url', 'ntfy_token', 'mapbox_access_token', 'carto_api_key', 'llm_api_key'];
const settingRows = db.prepare(
`SELECT user_id, key, value FROM settings WHERE key IN (${encryptedSettingKeys.map(() => '?').join(', ')})`
).all(...encryptedSettingKeys) as { user_id: number; key: string; value: string }[];
for (const row of settingRows) {
if (!row.value) continue;
const newVal = migrateApiKeyValue(row.value, `settings[user=${row.user_id}].${row.key}`);
if (newVal !== null) {
db.prepare('UPDATE settings SET value = ? WHERE user_id = ? AND key = ?').run(newVal, row.user_id, row.key);
}
}
// --- plugins: OAuth tokens and secret settings fields ---
// The plugin host encrypts with the same enc:v1: scheme as everything above:
// plugin-oauth.service stores both tokens encrypted, and plugins.service
// encrypts every settings field the manifest marked secret (instance scope in
// plugins.config, user scope in plugin_user_config.config). Left out of a
// rotation, a connected plugin reads back as "not connected" and a secret
// setting as unset, with nothing in the log to say why. Every table here
// arrived with a later migration, so each block checks that it exists.
const tableExists = (name: string): boolean =>
!!db.prepare("SELECT 1 FROM sqlite_master WHERE type = 'table' AND name = ?").get(name);
if (tableExists('plugin_oauth_tokens')) {
const tokenRows = db
.prepare('SELECT plugin_id, user_id, access_token, refresh_token FROM plugin_oauth_tokens')
.all() as { plugin_id: string; user_id: number; access_token: string | null; refresh_token: string | null }[];
for (const row of tokenRows) {
for (const col of ['access_token', 'refresh_token'] as const) {
const raw = row[col];
if (!raw) continue;
const newVal = migrateApiKeyValue(raw, `plugin_oauth_tokens[${row.plugin_id},${row.user_id}].${col}`);
if (newVal !== null) {
db.prepare(`UPDATE plugin_oauth_tokens SET ${col} = ? WHERE plugin_id = ? AND user_id = ?`).run(
newVal,
row.plugin_id,
row.user_id,
);
}
}
}
}
if (tableExists('plugin_settings_fields')) {
// Which keys are secret is per plugin and per scope, and it lives in the DB
// rather than in this script, so nothing has to be pinned by hand here.
const secretFields = db
.prepare("SELECT plugin_id, field_key, scope FROM plugin_settings_fields WHERE secret = 1")
.all() as { plugin_id: string; field_key: string; scope: string | null }[];
const secretKeysFor = (pluginId: string, scope: string): string[] =>
secretFields
.filter((f) => f.plugin_id === pluginId && (f.scope ?? 'instance') === scope)
.map((f) => f.field_key);
const migrateConfigJson = (raw: string | null, keys: string[], label: string): string | null => {
if (!raw || keys.length === 0) return null;
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
} catch {
result.errors.push(`${label}: invalid JSON — skipping`);
return null;
}
if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object' || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
result.errors.push(`${label}: not an object — skipping`);
return null;
}
const config = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;
let changed = false;
for (const key of keys) {
const value = config[key];
if (typeof value !== 'string' || !value) continue;
const newVal = migrateApiKeyValue(value, `${label}.${key}`);
if (newVal !== null) {
config[key] = newVal;
changed = true;
}
}
return changed ? JSON.stringify(config) : null;
};
if (tableExists('plugins')) {
const pluginRows = db.prepare('SELECT id, config FROM plugins').all() as { id: string; config: string | null }[];
for (const row of pluginRows) {
const next = migrateConfigJson(row.config, secretKeysFor(row.id, 'instance'), `plugins[${row.id}].config`);
if (next !== null) {
db.prepare('UPDATE plugins SET config = ? WHERE id = ?').run(next, row.id);
}
}
}
if (tableExists('plugin_user_config')) {
const userConfigRows = db
.prepare('SELECT plugin_id, user_id, config FROM plugin_user_config')
.all() as { plugin_id: string; user_id: number; config: string | null }[];
for (const row of userConfigRows) {
const next = migrateConfigJson(
row.config,
secretKeysFor(row.plugin_id, 'user'),
`plugin_user_config[${row.plugin_id},${row.user_id}].config`,
);
if (next !== null) {
db.prepare('UPDATE plugin_user_config SET config = ? WHERE plugin_id = ? AND user_id = ?').run(
next,
row.plugin_id,
row.user_id,
);
}
}
}
}
// --- trip_album_links: passphrase ---
const albumLinks = db.prepare('SELECT id, passphrase FROM trip_album_links WHERE passphrase IS NOT NULL').all() as { id: number; passphrase: string }[];
for (const row of albumLinks) {
const newVal = migrateApiKeyValue(row.passphrase, `trip_album_links[${row.id}].passphrase`);
if (newVal !== null) {
db.prepare('UPDATE trip_album_links SET passphrase = ? WHERE id = ?').run(newVal, row.id);
}
}
// --- dawarich_connections: api_key ---
// Its own table rather than a users column, so it needs its own block. The
// table arrived with a later migration, hence the existence check: an older
// database simply has nothing to rotate here.
if (tableExists('dawarich_connections')) {
const connections = db
.prepare('SELECT user_id, api_key FROM dawarich_connections WHERE api_key IS NOT NULL')
.all() as { user_id: number; api_key: string }[];
for (const row of connections) {
const newVal = migrateApiKeyValue(row.api_key, `dawarich_connections[${row.user_id}].api_key`);
if (newVal !== null) {
db.prepare('UPDATE dawarich_connections SET api_key = ? WHERE user_id = ?').run(newVal, row.user_id);
}
}
}
// --- trek_photos: passphrase ---
const photos = db.prepare('SELECT id, passphrase FROM trek_photos WHERE passphrase IS NOT NULL').all() as { id: number; passphrase: string }[];
for (const row of photos) {
const newVal = migrateApiKeyValue(row.passphrase, `trek_photos[${row.id}].passphrase`);
if (newVal !== null) {
db.prepare('UPDATE trek_photos SET passphrase = ? WHERE id = ?').run(newVal, row.id);
}
}
// --- document_connections: secrets ---
// Every credential of a document connection sits in ONE encrypted JSON blob
// (src/nest/doc-sync/doc-sync-secrets.ts) rather than in a column per
// provider, so a new provider changes nothing here: the blob is rotated as
// an opaque value. It also holds secrets the provider handed out itself,
// such as the DSM device token, which no form can re-enter. Left out of a
// rotation, every trip binding on the instance reads back as unauthorized
// and Synology needs a fresh OTP pairing. The table arrived with a later
// migration, hence the existence check.
if (tableExists('document_connections')) {
const documentConnections = db
.prepare('SELECT id, secrets FROM document_connections WHERE secrets IS NOT NULL')
.all() as { id: number; secrets: string }[];
for (const row of documentConnections) {
const newVal = migrateApiKeyValue(row.secrets, `document_connections[${row.id}].secrets`);
if (newVal !== null) {
db.prepare('UPDATE document_connections SET secrets = ? WHERE id = ?').run(newVal, row.id);
}
}
}
// --- trip_document_links: webhook_secret ---
// The secret a provider signs its webhook calls with, stored through the
// same blob helper. It is written once when the link is created and never
// regenerated, so a rotation that misses it leaves the link with nothing to
// check a signature against.
if (tableExists('trip_document_links')) {
const documentLinks = db
.prepare('SELECT id, webhook_secret FROM trip_document_links WHERE webhook_secret IS NOT NULL')
.all() as { id: number; webhook_secret: string }[];
for (const row of documentLinks) {
const newVal = migrateApiKeyValue(row.webhook_secret, `trip_document_links[${row.id}].webhook_secret`);
if (newVal !== null) {
db.prepare('UPDATE trip_document_links SET webhook_secret = ? WHERE id = ?').run(newVal, row.id);
}
}
}
})();
db.close();
rl.close();
console.log('\n=== Migration complete ===');
console.log(` Migrated: ${result.migrated}`);
console.log(` Already on new key: ${result.alreadyMigrated}`);
console.log(` Skipped (empty): ${result.skipped}`);
if (result.errors.length > 0) {
console.warn(` Errors: ${result.errors.length}`);
result.errors.forEach(e => console.warn(` - ${e}`));
console.warn('\nSome secrets could not be migrated. Check the errors above.');
console.warn(`Your original database is backed up at: ${backupPath}`);
process.exit(1);
} else {
console.log('\nAll secrets successfully re-encrypted.');
console.log(`Backup retained at: ${backupPath}`);
}
}
main().catch((err) => {
console.error('Unexpected error:', err);
process.exit(1);
});