Files
TREK/server/src/app.ts
T
Julien G. 1f5deeba6c Bug fixes - April 27th 2026 (#907)
* fix: clean up dangling FK references before deleting a user

Resolves FOREIGN KEY constraint failed (500) on DELETE /api/admin/users/:id
and DELETE /api/auth/me when the target user had rows in trip_members.invited_by,
share_tokens.created_by, budget_items.paid_by_user_id, journeys.user_id,
journey_entries.author_id, journey_contributors.user_id, or
journey_share_tokens.created_by — none of which had ON DELETE clauses.

Introduces deleteUserCompletely() in userCleanupService.ts which wraps all
cleanup and the final DELETE FROM users in a single transaction. Both
adminService.deleteUser and authService.deleteAccount now call it instead of
the bare DELETE. Tests ADMIN-005b and AUTH-040 cover all reference types
including notification sender/recipient and notice dismissals.

* test: extend FK deletion tests to cover journeys, files, and photos

ADMIN-005b and AUTH-040 now also seed and assert:
- owned journey with entries (cascade-deleted via journeys.user_id cleanup)
- trip_files.uploaded_by (SET NULL — file survives, attribution cleared)
- trek_photos.owner_id (SET NULL — photo record survives, owner cleared)
- trip_photos.user_id (CASCADE — photo association removed)

* test: extend user deletion tests to cover all FK relationships

ADMIN-005b and AUTH-040 now seed and assert every user FK relationship:

CASCADE (row deleted): trips, trip_members, tags, mcp_tokens, oauth_tokens,
oauth_consents, vacay_plans, vacay_plan_members, bucket_list,
visited_countries, visited_regions, packing_templates, invite_tokens,
collab_notes, settings, password_reset_tokens, notification_channel_preferences

SET NULL (row survives, column nulled): categories, todo_items.assigned_user_id,
packing_bags, audit_log

Caught and fixed: notification_preferences was dropped in migration 72;
correct table is notification_channel_preferences.

* fix: preserve URL hash and OIDC redirect target through login flow

- Include location.hash in redirect param at all three producer sites
  (ProtectedRoute, axios 401 interceptor, OAuthAuthorizePage) so
  hash fragments survive the login bounce
- Stash redirectTarget in sessionStorage before any OIDC provider
  redirect and restore it after the code exchange, since the IdP
  strips the original ?redirect= param during the roundtrip
- Clear sessionStorage on OIDC error to avoid stale state
- Add tests covering sessionStorage stash on mount, navigate to saved
  redirect after OIDC exchange, fallback to /dashboard, and cleanup
  on error

* fix: use day position instead of ID for accommodation date range clamping

Math.min/Math.max over raw day IDs breaks the start/end picker when a
trip's day IDs are non-monotonic relative to day_number (normal after
repeated generateDays extend/shrink cycles). Replaced with findIndex
lookups so clamping is always based on positional order.

Closes #889

* fix: normalize env var comparisons to be case-insensitive

All NODE_ENV, DEMO_MODE, OIDC_ONLY, FORCE_HTTPS, COOKIE_SECURE, and
ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK checks now use .toLowerCase() so values like
'Production' or 'True' behave identically to their lowercase forms.
Also adds APP_VERSION to the startup banner.

* fix: delete surplus days when shortening a trip

When shrinking a trip's date range, surplus days are now deleted along
with their assignments, notes, and accommodations (cascade). Places
remain in the trip pool; reservations keep their day reference nulled
by the existing ON DELETE SET NULL constraint (issue #909).

Updates TRIP-SVC-011 to reflect the new behaviour; adds TRIP-SVC-016
as a regression test for the empty-day case.

* fix: auto-backup retention deletes itself and manual backups on Docker

Two bugs in cleanupOldBackups:
1. Filter was .endsWith('.zip') — swept manual backup-*.zip files too.
   Now restricted to auto-backup-* prefix.
2. Age was derived from stat.birthtimeMs, which is 0 on overlayfs
   (Docker default), making every backup appear epoch-old and get
   deleted immediately. Age is now parsed from the filename timestamp
   and falls back to mtimeMs (reliable on overlayfs).

Also converts inline require('./services/auditLog') calls to a static
import throughout scheduler.ts, and adds 8 unit tests covering the
fixed retention logic including the overlayfs regression case.

* test: update TRIP-024 to match delete behavior on trip shrink

* feat: add bypass-branch-check label to skip branch enforcement
2026-04-28 05:17:20 +02:00

384 lines
17 KiB
TypeScript

import express, { Request, Response, NextFunction } from 'express';
import cors from 'cors';
import helmet from 'helmet';
import cookieParser from 'cookie-parser';
import path from 'node:path';
import fs from 'node:fs';
import { logDebug, logWarn, logError } from './services/auditLog';
import { enforceGlobalMfaPolicy } from './middleware/mfaPolicy';
import { authenticate, verifyJwtAndLoadUser } from './middleware/auth';
import { db } from './db/database';
import authRoutes from './routes/auth';
import tripsRoutes from './routes/trips';
import daysRoutes, { accommodationsRouter as accommodationsRoutes } from './routes/days';
import placesRoutes from './routes/places';
import assignmentsRoutes from './routes/assignments';
import packingRoutes from './routes/packing';
import todoRoutes from './routes/todo';
import tagsRoutes from './routes/tags';
import categoriesRoutes from './routes/categories';
import adminRoutes from './routes/admin';
import mapsRoutes from './routes/maps';
import airportsRoutes from './routes/airports';
import filesRoutes from './routes/files';
import reservationsRoutes from './routes/reservations';
import dayNotesRoutes from './routes/dayNotes';
import weatherRoutes from './routes/weather';
import settingsRoutes from './routes/settings';
import budgetRoutes from './routes/budget';
import collabRoutes from './routes/collab';
import backupRoutes from './routes/backup';
import oidcRoutes from './routes/oidc';
import { oauthPublicRouter, oauthApiRouter } from './routes/oauth';
import vacayRoutes from './routes/vacay';
import atlasRoutes from './routes/atlas';
import memoriesRoutes from './routes/memories/unified';
import photoRoutes from './routes/photos';
import notificationRoutes from './routes/notifications';
import shareRoutes from './routes/share';
import journeyRoutes from './routes/journey';
import journeyPublicRoutes from './routes/journeyPublic';
import publicConfigRoutes from './routes/publicConfig';
import systemNoticesRoutes from './routes/systemNotices';
import { mcpHandler } from './mcp';
import { Addon } from './types';
import { getPhotoProviderConfig } from './services/memories/helpersService';
import { getCollabFeatures } from './services/adminService';
import { isAddonEnabled } from './services/adminService';
import { ADDON_IDS } from './addons';
export function createApp(): express.Application {
const app = express();
// Trust first proxy (nginx/Docker) for correct req.ip
if (process.env.NODE_ENV?.toLowerCase() === 'production' || process.env.TRUST_PROXY) {
app.set('trust proxy', Number.parseInt(process.env.TRUST_PROXY) || 1);
}
const allowedOrigins = process.env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS
? process.env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS.split(',').map(o => o.trim()).filter(Boolean)
: null;
let corsOrigin: cors.CorsOptions['origin'];
if (allowedOrigins) {
corsOrigin = (origin: string | undefined, callback: (err: Error | null, allow?: boolean) => void) => {
if (!origin || allowedOrigins.includes(origin)) callback(null, true);
else callback(new Error('Not allowed by CORS'));
};
} else if (process.env.NODE_ENV?.toLowerCase() === 'production') {
corsOrigin = false;
} else {
corsOrigin = true;
}
const shouldForceHttps = process.env.FORCE_HTTPS?.toLowerCase() === 'true';
// HSTS is worth enabling any time we're serving production traffic,
// not only when FORCE_HTTPS is set. Self-hosters behind Traefik /
// Caddy / Cloudflare Tunnel typically leave FORCE_HTTPS unset (the
// proxy handles the redirect for them), and the previous "HSTS off by
// default" meant those instances never advertised HSTS at all.
//
// `includeSubDomains` stays OFF by default on purpose: an instance
// running on an apex domain would otherwise force HTTPS on every
// sibling subdomain the same operator may still be running over plain
// HTTP. Operators who want the stricter policy opt in with
// `HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS=true`.
const hstsActive = shouldForceHttps || process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production';
const hstsIncludeSubdomains = process.env.HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS === 'true';
// RFC 8414 / RFC 9728: discovery docs are world-readable — open CORS regardless of deployment config
app.use(
['/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server', '/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource'],
cors({ origin: '*', credentials: false }),
);
app.use(cors({ origin: corsOrigin, credentials: true }));
app.use(helmet({
contentSecurityPolicy: {
directives: {
defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
scriptSrc: ["'self'", "'wasm-unsafe-eval'"],
styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'", "https://fonts.googleapis.com", "https://unpkg.com"],
imgSrc: ["'self'", "data:", "blob:", "https:"],
connectSrc: [
"'self'", "ws:", "wss:",
"https://nominatim.openstreetmap.org", "https://overpass-api.de",
"https://places.googleapis.com", "https://api.openweathermap.org",
"https://en.wikipedia.org", "https://commons.wikimedia.org",
"https://*.basemaps.cartocdn.com", "https://*.tile.openstreetmap.org",
"https://unpkg.com", "https://open-meteo.com", "https://api.open-meteo.com",
"https://geocoding-api.open-meteo.com", "https://api.exchangerate-api.com",
"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvkelso/natural-earth-vector/master/geojson/ne_50m_admin_0_countries.geojson",
"https://router.project-osrm.org/route/v1/",
"https://api.mapbox.com", "https://*.tiles.mapbox.com", "https://events.mapbox.com"
],
workerSrc: ["'self'", "blob:"],
childSrc: ["'self'", "blob:"],
fontSrc: ["'self'", "https://fonts.gstatic.com", "data:"],
objectSrc: ["'none'"],
frameSrc: ["'none'"],
frameAncestors: ["'self'"],
upgradeInsecureRequests: shouldForceHttps ? [] : null
}
},
crossOriginEmbedderPolicy: false,
hsts: hstsActive ? { maxAge: 31536000, includeSubDomains: hstsIncludeSubdomains } : false,
referrerPolicy: { policy: 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin' },
}));
if (shouldForceHttps) {
app.use((req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
if (req.path === '/api/health') return next();
if (req.secure || req.headers['x-forwarded-proto'] === 'https') return next();
res.redirect(301, 'https://' + req.headers.host + req.url);
});
}
app.use(express.json({ limit: '100kb' }));
app.use(express.urlencoded({ extended: true }));
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use(enforceGlobalMfaPolicy);
// Request logging with sensitive field redaction
{
const SENSITIVE_KEYS = new Set(['password', 'new_password', 'current_password', 'token', 'jwt', 'authorization', 'cookie', 'client_secret', 'mfa_token', 'code', 'smtp_pass']);
const redact = (value: unknown): unknown => {
if (!value || typeof value !== 'object') return value;
if (Array.isArray(value)) return (value as unknown[]).map(redact);
const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {
out[k] = SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(k.toLowerCase()) ? '[REDACTED]' : redact(v);
}
return out;
};
app.use((req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
if (req.path === '/api/health') return next();
const startedAt = Date.now();
res.on('finish', () => {
const ms = Date.now() - startedAt;
if (res.statusCode >= 500) {
logError(`${req.method} ${req.path} ${res.statusCode} ${ms}ms ip=${req.ip}`);
} else if (res.statusCode === 401 || res.statusCode === 403) {
logDebug(`${req.method} ${req.path} ${res.statusCode} ${ms}ms ip=${req.ip}`);
} else if (res.statusCode >= 400) {
logWarn(`${req.method} ${req.path} ${res.statusCode} ${ms}ms ip=${req.ip}`);
}
const q = Object.keys(req.query).length ? ` query=${JSON.stringify(redact(req.query))}` : '';
const b = req.body && Object.keys(req.body).length ? ` body=${JSON.stringify(redact(req.body))}` : '';
logDebug(`${req.method} ${req.path} ${res.statusCode} ${ms}ms ip=${req.ip}${q}${b}`);
});
next();
});
}
// Static: avatars, covers, and journey photos.
//
// Security model (audit SEC-M9): these paths are unauthenticated by
// design. All filenames are server-chosen UUID v4 (see `uuid()` in
// the multer storage config for avatars / covers / journey uploads),
// which gives each asset >122 bits of namespace entropy — not
// guessable via enumeration. An attacker would need to have already
// seen the URL (email, shared journey, etc.) to request the file.
//
// Moving these behind auth would also break:
// - Unauthenticated trip-card rendering on public share links
// - Journey public-share pages (/public/journey/:token)
// - Email-embedded avatars
//
// The `/uploads/photos/...` route below is DIFFERENT: photo URLs are
// not embedded in unauthenticated UI contexts, so that endpoint IS
// gated (session JWT with pv, or a share token scoped to the photo's
// trip).
app.use('/uploads/avatars', express.static(path.join(__dirname, '../uploads/avatars')));
app.use('/uploads/covers', express.static(path.join(__dirname, '../uploads/covers')));
app.use('/uploads/journey', express.static(path.join(__dirname, '../uploads/journey')));
// Photos require either a valid logged-in session (via JWT with the
// password_version gate) OR a share token that covers the SPECIFIC
// photo's trip. Previously any share token for any trip could request
// any photo filename by UUID — fine in practice because UUIDs are
// unguessable, but the auth model was wrong.
app.get('/uploads/photos/:filename', (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const safeName = path.basename(req.params.filename);
const filePath = path.join(__dirname, '../uploads/photos', safeName);
const resolved = path.resolve(filePath);
if (!resolved.startsWith(path.resolve(__dirname, '../uploads/photos'))) {
return res.status(403).send('Forbidden');
}
// existsSync here is cheap and avoids a sendFile error frame; kept
// sync because the handler is already short-lived.
if (!fs.existsSync(resolved)) return res.status(404).send('Not found');
const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
const rawToken = (req.query.token as string) || (authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ') ? authHeader.slice(7) : null);
if (!rawToken) return res.status(401).send('Authentication required');
// JWT session path (with pv check).
const user = verifyJwtAndLoadUser(rawToken);
if (user) return res.sendFile(resolved);
// Share-token path: require the token to cover the exact trip the
// photo belongs to. Expired tokens fall through to 401.
const photo = db.prepare('SELECT trip_id FROM photos WHERE filename = ?').get(safeName) as { trip_id: number } | undefined;
if (!photo) return res.status(401).send('Authentication required');
const share = db.prepare(
"SELECT trip_id FROM share_tokens WHERE token = ? AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > datetime('now'))"
).get(rawToken) as { trip_id: number } | undefined;
if (!share || share.trip_id !== photo.trip_id) {
return res.status(401).send('Authentication required');
}
res.sendFile(resolved);
});
// Block direct access to /uploads/files
app.use('/uploads/files', (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
res.status(401).send('Authentication required');
});
// API Routes
app.use('/api/auth', authRoutes);
app.use('/api/auth/oidc', oidcRoutes);
app.use('/api/trips', tripsRoutes);
app.use('/api/trips/:tripId/days', daysRoutes);
app.use('/api/trips/:tripId/accommodations', accommodationsRoutes);
app.use('/api/trips/:tripId/places', placesRoutes);
app.use('/api/trips/:tripId/packing', packingRoutes);
app.use('/api/trips/:tripId/todo', todoRoutes);
app.use('/api/trips/:tripId/files', filesRoutes);
app.use('/api/trips/:tripId/budget', budgetRoutes);
app.use('/api/trips/:tripId/collab', collabRoutes);
app.use('/api/trips/:tripId/reservations', reservationsRoutes);
app.use('/api/trips/:tripId/days/:dayId/notes', dayNotesRoutes);
app.get('/api/health', (_req: Request, res: Response) => res.json({ status: 'ok' }));
app.use('/api/config', publicConfigRoutes);
app.use('/api', assignmentsRoutes);
app.use('/api/tags', tagsRoutes);
app.use('/api/categories', categoriesRoutes);
app.use('/api/admin', adminRoutes);
// Addons list endpoint
app.get('/api/addons', authenticate, (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
const addons = db.prepare('SELECT id, name, type, icon, enabled FROM addons WHERE enabled = 1 ORDER BY sort_order').all() as Pick<Addon, 'id' | 'name' | 'type' | 'icon' | 'enabled'>[];
const providers = db.prepare(`
SELECT id, name, icon, enabled, sort_order
FROM photo_providers
WHERE enabled = 1
ORDER BY sort_order, id
`).all() as Array<{ id: string; name: string; icon: string; enabled: number; sort_order: number }>;
const fields = db.prepare(`
SELECT provider_id, field_key, label, input_type, placeholder, hint, required, secret, settings_key, payload_key, sort_order
FROM photo_provider_fields
ORDER BY sort_order, id
`).all() as Array<{
provider_id: string;
field_key: string;
label: string;
input_type: string;
placeholder?: string | null;
hint?: string | null;
required: number;
secret: number;
settings_key?: string | null;
payload_key?: string | null;
sort_order: number;
}>;
const fieldsByProvider = new Map<string, typeof fields>();
for (const field of fields) {
const arr = fieldsByProvider.get(field.provider_id) || [];
arr.push(field);
fieldsByProvider.set(field.provider_id, arr);
}
res.json({
collabFeatures: getCollabFeatures(),
addons: [
...addons.map(a => ({ ...a, enabled: !!a.enabled })),
...providers.map(p => ({
id: p.id,
name: p.name,
type: 'photo_provider',
icon: p.icon,
enabled: !!p.enabled,
config: getPhotoProviderConfig(p.id),
fields: (fieldsByProvider.get(p.id) || []).map(f => ({
key: f.field_key,
label: f.label,
input_type: f.input_type,
placeholder: f.placeholder || '',
hint: f.hint || null,
required: !!f.required,
secret: !!f.secret,
settings_key: f.settings_key || null,
payload_key: f.payload_key || null,
sort_order: f.sort_order,
})),
})),
],
});
});
// Addon routes
app.use('/api/addons/vacay', vacayRoutes);
app.use('/api/addons/atlas', atlasRoutes);
app.use('/api/journeys', (req, res, next) => {
if (!isAddonEnabled(ADDON_IDS.JOURNEY)) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Journey addon is not enabled' });
next();
}, journeyRoutes);
app.use('/api/public/journey', journeyPublicRoutes);
app.use('/api/integrations/memories', memoriesRoutes);
app.use('/api/photos', photoRoutes);
app.use('/api/maps', mapsRoutes);
app.use('/api/airports', airportsRoutes);
app.use('/api/weather', weatherRoutes);
app.use('/api/settings', settingsRoutes);
app.use('/api/system-notices', systemNoticesRoutes);
app.use('/api/backup', backupRoutes);
app.use('/api/notifications', notificationRoutes);
app.use('/api', shareRoutes);
// OAuth 2.1 — public endpoints (/.well-known, /oauth/token, /oauth/revoke)
app.use('/', oauthPublicRouter);
// OAuth 2.1 — SPA-facing authenticated endpoints (/api/oauth/*)
app.use('/api/oauth', oauthApiRouter);
// MCP endpoint
app.post('/mcp', mcpHandler);
app.get('/mcp', mcpHandler);
app.delete('/mcp', mcpHandler);
// Production static file serving
if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
const publicPath = path.join(__dirname, '../public');
app.use(express.static(publicPath, {
setHeaders: (res, filePath) => {
if (filePath.endsWith('index.html')) {
res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate');
}
},
}));
app.get('*', (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate');
res.sendFile(path.join(publicPath, 'index.html'));
});
}
// Global error handler
app.use((err: Error & { status?: number; statusCode?: number }, _req: Request, res: Response, _next: NextFunction) => {
if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
console.error('Unhandled error:', err.message);
} else {
console.error('Unhandled error:', err);
}
const status = err.statusCode || err.status || 500;
// Expose the message for client errors (4xx); keep 'Internal server error' for 5xx.
const message = status < 500 ? err.message : 'Internal server error';
res.status(status).json({ error: message });
});
return app;
}