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TREK/wiki/Encryption-Key-Rotation.md
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Adds the complete TREK documentation wiki covering installation,
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Also fixes encrypt-at-rest gaps: mapbox_access_token, Synology
credentials, per-user webhook/ntfy tokens, and photo passphrases
are now rotated by migrate-encryption.ts and stored encrypted via
settingsService.
2026-04-20 10:11:53 +02:00

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Encryption Key Rotation

What the encryption key protects

TREK encrypts sensitive settings at rest using AES-256-GCM. The following values are stored encrypted in the database:

  • Google Maps API key (per user)
  • Mapbox access token (per user)
  • OpenWeather API key (per user)
  • Immich API key (per user)
  • Synology Photos password, session ID, and device ID (per user)
  • Per-user webhook URL and ntfy notification token (in settings table)
  • OIDC client secret (global, in app_settings)
  • SMTP password (global, in app_settings)
  • Admin webhook URL and admin ntfy token (global, in app_settings)
  • MFA (TOTP) secrets for all users
  • Photo passphrases for Synology shared-link photos (in trek_photos)

The encryption derives a key from ENCRYPTION_KEY using SHA-256 (with a domain suffix per secret type), so the raw ENCRYPTION_KEY value is never stored in the database.

Key resolution order

On startup, TREK resolves the encryption key in this order:

  1. ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable — explicit, always takes priority. When set, the value is also written to ./data/.encryption_key so it survives container restarts if the env var is later removed.
  2. ./data/.encryption_key file — present on any install that has started at least once.
  3. ./data/.jwt_secret file — one-time fallback for older installs that pre-date the dedicated encryption key. The value is immediately persisted to ./data/.encryption_key so future JWT rotations cannot break decryption.
  4. Auto-generated — fresh install with none of the above. A random 32-byte hex key is generated and written to ./data/.encryption_key.

What happens if the key is lost

All encrypted settings (API keys, SMTP password, OIDC secret, MFA secrets, notification tokens, etc.) become unreadable — TREK cannot decrypt them. They must be re-entered manually after the key is restored or replaced. Unencrypted data (trips, places, users, etc.) is unaffected.

Backing up the key

Your backup ZIP does not include the encryption key. Store the key separately from your backups — for example, in a password manager or a secrets manager. See Backups.

To find your current key: check the ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable or read ./data/.encryption_key.

Rotating the key

Use scripts/migrate-encryption.ts to re-encrypt all stored secrets without downtime or manual re-entry.

Docker:

docker exec -it trek node --import tsx scripts/migrate-encryption.ts

Host (run from the server/ directory):

node --import tsx scripts/migrate-encryption.ts

The script:

  1. Prompts for the old and new encryption keys interactively (keys are never echoed to the terminal or written to shell history).
  2. Asks for confirmation before making any changes.
  3. Creates a timestamped backup of the database (e.g. travel.db.backup-1713484800000) before modifying anything.
  4. Re-encrypts all stored secrets across all tables:
    • app_settings: oidc_client_secret, smtp_pass, admin_webhook_url, admin_ntfy_token
    • users (per user): maps_api_key, openweather_api_key, immich_api_key, synology_password, synology_sid, synology_did, mfa_secret
    • settings (per user): webhook_url, ntfy_token, mapbox_access_token
    • trip_album_links: passphrase
    • trek_photos: passphrase
  5. Reports counts of migrated, already-migrated, skipped (empty), and errored values.

After a successful migration:

  1. Update ENCRYPTION_KEY in your environment to the new value.
  2. Restart TREK.

If any secrets could not be migrated, the script exits with a non-zero status and the original database backup is retained.

Upgrading from very old versions

Old installs may have used ./data/.jwt_secret as the encryption source (before a dedicated ENCRYPTION_KEY was introduced). The key resolution chain above handles this automatically on startup — the JWT secret is read, immediately written to ./data/.encryption_key, and JWT rotation is then safe without breaking decryption.

See also