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TREK/wiki/Encryption-Key-Rotation.md
Maurice 40bce5554d docs: the key check, the restore guard, the new probes, failed offline changes and reminders
Updates the wiki for the changes in this branch: TREK refuses an
ENCRYPTION_KEY that disagrees with the key file, the rotation script
covers the AI Parsing key and moves the file along, a restore refuses a
newer backup and keeps the replaced database, the chart's startup and
readiness probes, PORT and extraEnv, retrying or discarding failed
offline changes, trip reminders catching up, and why a Portainer
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2026-10-07 17:11:56 +02:00

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Encryption Key Rotation

What the encryption key protects

TREK encrypts sensitive settings at rest using AES-256-GCM. The following values are stored encrypted in the database:

  • Google Maps API key (instance-wide, in app_settings; the per-user column is still read as a fallback)
  • Unsplash access key (instance-wide, in app_settings; the per-user column is still read as a fallback)
  • Amap API key (instance-wide, in app_settings; the per-user column is still read as a fallback)
  • Mapbox access token (per user)
  • CARTO API key (per user, in settings table)
  • OpenWeather API key (per user)
  • Immich API key (per user)
  • AirTrail API key (per user)
  • Dawarich API key (per user, in dawarich_connections)
  • Synology Photos password, session ID, and device ID (per user)
  • Per-user webhook URL, ntfy notification token, and LLM provider API key (in settings table)
  • Instance-wide API key of the AI Parsing addon (in addons.config)
  • Document sync credentials of a trip's stores, one encrypted blob per store and trip (in document_connections), and the webhook secret of each binding (in trip_document_links); see Document-Sync
  • OIDC client secret (global, in app_settings)
  • SMTP password (global, in app_settings)
  • Admin webhook URL and admin ntfy token (global, in app_settings)
  • Web Push VAPID private key, the one TREK generates and signs push messages with when the VAPID_* variables supply no key pair (global, in app_settings; see Notifications)
  • MFA (TOTP) secrets for all users
  • Photo passphrases for Synology shared-link photos (in trek_photos)
  • Passphrases for shared trip album links (in trip_album_links)
  • S3 storage backend secret access keys (in app_settings['storage.backends']; see Admin-Storage)
  • Plugin OAuth access and refresh tokens, plus every plugin settings field the plugin's manifest marks secret (instance scope in plugins.config, user scope in plugin_user_config.config)

The encryption derives a key from ENCRYPTION_KEY using SHA-256 (with a domain suffix per secret type), so the raw ENCRYPTION_KEY value is never stored in the database.

Key resolution order

On startup, TREK resolves the encryption key in this order:

  1. ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable: explicit, always takes priority. When set, the value is also written to ./data/.encryption_key so it survives container restarts if the env var is later removed. If that file already holds a different key, TREK refuses to start: the stored secrets are encrypted with the file's key, and starting with another one would make them unreadable and overwrite the only copy of the old key. Set the variable back to the value in the file, remove it, or rotate the key with the script below.
  2. ./data/.encryption_key file: present on any install that has started at least once.
  3. ./data/.jwt_secret file: one-time fallback for older installs that pre-date the dedicated encryption key. The value is immediately persisted to ./data/.encryption_key so future JWT rotations cannot break decryption.
  4. Auto-generated: fresh install with none of the above. A random 32-byte hex key is generated and written to ./data/.encryption_key.

What happens if the key is lost

All encrypted settings (API keys, SMTP password, OIDC secret, MFA secrets, notification tokens, etc.) become unreadable — TREK cannot decrypt them. They must be re-entered manually after the key is restored or replaced. Unencrypted data (trips, places, users, etc.) is unaffected.

The Web Push key pair cannot be re-entered, and TREK never replaces it on its own: unless the VAPID_* variables supply a pair, push stays off, with an error in the log, until TREK runs with the original key again, and then every device receives as before. To give it up instead, delete both web_push_vapid_public_key and web_push_vapid_private_key from app_settings. TREK then generates a new pair, and every device has to subscribe again (see Environment-Variables).

Backing up the key

Unless you set ENCRYPTION_KEY in the environment, your backup ZIP does include the encryption key: ./data/.encryption_key is bundled into every archive, manual and automatic, as a root-level .encryption_key entry, so a restore onto a different install can still decrypt the stored secrets. That makes the ZIP exactly as sensitive as the key itself — store and transfer it accordingly.

On installs that supply the key through the environment the file is not the source of truth, so no backup carries it. Keep it somewhere separate — for example, in a password manager or a secrets manager. See Backups.

To find your current key: check the ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable or read ./data/.encryption_key.

Rotating the key

Use scripts/migrate-encryption.ts to re-encrypt the stored secrets listed below without downtime or manual re-entry.

Docker:

docker exec -it -w /app/server trek node --import tsx scripts/migrate-encryption.ts

Host (run from the server/ directory):

node --import tsx scripts/migrate-encryption.ts

The script:

  1. Prompts for the old and new encryption keys interactively (keys are never echoed to the terminal or written to shell history).
  2. Asks for confirmation before making any changes.
  3. Creates a timestamped backup of the database (e.g. travel.db.backup-1713484800000) before modifying anything.
  4. Re-encrypts all stored secrets across all tables:
    • app_settings: oidc_client_secret, smtp_pass, admin_webhook_url, admin_ntfy_token, maps_api_key, unsplash_api_key, amap_api_key, web_push_vapid_private_key
    • app_settings['storage.backends']: the secretAccessKey of every S3 storage backend
    • users (per user): maps_api_key, unsplash_api_key, amap_api_key, openweather_api_key, immich_api_key, synology_password, synology_sid, synology_did, airtrail_api_key, mfa_secret
    • settings (per user): webhook_url, ntfy_token, mapbox_access_token, carto_api_key, llm_api_key
    • dawarich_connections (per user): api_key
    • plugin_oauth_tokens: access_token, refresh_token (per plugin and user)
    • plugins.config and plugin_user_config.config: every settings field a plugin's manifest marks secret, resolved per plugin and scope from plugin_settings_fields
    • trip_album_links: passphrase
    • trek_photos: passphrase
    • document_connections: secrets (the one encrypted blob per store and trip, including tokens the store handed out itself, such as Synology's device token)
    • trip_document_links: webhook_secret
    • addons.config: the instance-wide API key of the AI Parsing addon
  5. Reports counts of migrated, already-migrated, skipped (empty), and errored values.
  6. Writes the new key to .encryption_key next to the database, when that file exists, so the file and the secrets agree again.

After a successful migration:

  1. If you supply the key through ENCRYPTION_KEY, update it to the new value. (TREK refuses to start while the variable and the key file disagree.)
  2. Restart TREK.

If any secrets could not be migrated, the script exits with a non-zero status and the original database backup is retained.

Upgrading from very old versions

Old installs may have used ./data/.jwt_secret as the encryption source (before a dedicated ENCRYPTION_KEY was introduced). The key resolution chain above handles this automatically on startup — the JWT secret is read, immediately written to ./data/.encryption_key, and JWT rotation is then safe without breaking decryption.

See also