/** * The canonical JWT session check, moved here with the verify itself. * * These assertions come from tests/unit/middleware/auth.test.ts, which exercised * them through the Express `authenticate` middleware — a wrapper that no longer * exists. They now hit verifyJwtAndLoadUser directly, so a 401 is expressed as * "returns null" rather than "sets status 401"; the guards own the status codes * and assert them in auth-guard.test.ts. * * The password_version gate gets direct cases here for the first time. It is the * reason this function exists at all: a reset bumps users.password_version and * every JWT carrying the prior value has to stop working. * * Plan 3b Task 1: `verifyJwtAndLoadUser` now takes an explicit `UsersRepository` * parameter instead of reading the legacy `db` proxy — this file stubs * `findByIdWithPasswordVersion` directly (a fake repository object, exactly * the shape `Users.repository.test.ts` proves against real rows) rather than * mocking `src/db/database`'s module-level `db` export, which this file no * longer imports at all. */ import { describe, it, expect, vi, afterEach } from 'vitest'; import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken'; vi.mock('../../../../src/config', () => ({ JWT_SECRET: 'test-secret' })); import { extractToken, verifyJwtAndLoadUser } from '../../../../src/nest/auth/jwt-verify'; import type { UsersRepository, UserWithPasswordVersion } from '../../../../src/db/repositories/Users.repository'; import type { Request } from 'express'; function makeReq(overrides: { cookies?: Record; headers?: Record; } = {}): Request { return { cookies: overrides.cookies || {}, headers: overrides.headers || {}, } as unknown as Request; } /** * A fake `UsersRepository` whose `findByIdWithPasswordVersion` returns the * given row. * * `password_version` is widened to `number | null` here, unlike the real * `UserWithPasswordVersion.password_version: number` — the column is * `INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`, so a real row can never carry `null`, but * AUTH-JWT-009 (task-1-review.md F5) still needs to pin * `verifyJwtAndLoadUser`'s `typeof row.password_version === 'number' ? … : * 0` fallback branch, which is otherwise unreachable through the real type. * Widening the fake, not `UserWithPasswordVersion` itself (which would * loosen a production type for a test-only case), keeps that column's real * NOT-NULL guarantee intact everywhere else. */ function usersRepo(row: (Omit & { password_version: number | null }) | null): UsersRepository { return { findByIdWithPasswordVersion: vi.fn(async () => row) } as unknown as UsersRepository; } afterEach(() => vi.clearAllMocks()); describe('extractToken', () => { it('returns cookie value when trek_session cookie is set', () => { expect(extractToken(makeReq({ cookies: { trek_session: 'cookie-token' } }))).toBe('cookie-token'); }); it('returns Bearer token from Authorization header when no cookie', () => { expect(extractToken(makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer header-token' } }))).toBe('header-token'); }); it('prefers cookie over Authorization header when both are present', () => { const req = makeReq({ cookies: { trek_session: 'cookie-token' }, headers: { authorization: 'Bearer header-token' }, }); expect(extractToken(req)).toBe('cookie-token'); }); it('returns null when neither cookie nor header are present', () => { expect(extractToken(makeReq())).toBeNull(); }); it('returns null for Authorization header without a token (empty Bearer)', () => { expect(extractToken(makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer ' } }))).toBeNull(); }); it('returns the second word for a non-Bearer scheme — it splits on space, it does not parse', () => { expect(extractToken(makeReq({ headers: { authorization: 'Basic sometoken' } }))).toBe('sometoken'); }); }); describe('verifyJwtAndLoadUser', () => { it('AUTH-JWT-001: returns the user for a valid token, without password_version', async () => { const users = usersRepo({ id: 1, username: 'alice', email: 'alice@example.com', role: 'user', password_version: 0 }); const token = jwt.sign({ id: 1 }, 'test-secret', { algorithm: 'HS256' }); expect(await verifyJwtAndLoadUser(token, users)).toEqual({ id: 1, username: 'alice', email: 'alice@example.com', role: 'user' }); expect(users.findByIdWithPasswordVersion).toHaveBeenCalledWith(1); }); it('AUTH-JWT-002: returns null for a malformed token', async () => { expect(await verifyJwtAndLoadUser('invalid.jwt.token', usersRepo(null))).toBeNull(); }); it('AUTH-JWT-003: returns null when the user no longer exists', async () => { const users = usersRepo(null); expect(await verifyJwtAndLoadUser(jwt.sign({ id: 99999 }, 'test-secret', { algorithm: 'HS256' }), users)).toBeNull(); }); it('AUTH-JWT-004: returns null for an expired token', async () => { const expired = jwt.sign({ id: 1, exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 3600 }, 'test-secret', { algorithm: 'HS256' }); expect(await verifyJwtAndLoadUser(expired, usersRepo(null))).toBeNull(); }); it('AUTH-JWT-005: returns null for a token signed with the wrong secret', async () => { expect(await verifyJwtAndLoadUser(jwt.sign({ id: 1 }, 'wrong-secret', { algorithm: 'HS256' }), usersRepo(null))).toBeNull(); }); it('AUTH-JWT-006: rejects a purpose-scoped mfa_login token even when the user is valid', async () => { // Issued after the password check but before TOTP, signed with the same // secret. It must never authenticate an ordinary request. const users = usersRepo({ id: 1, username: 'alice', email: 'alice@example.com', role: 'user', password_version: 0 }); const mfaToken = jwt.sign({ id: 1, purpose: 'mfa_login' }, 'test-secret', { algorithm: 'HS256' }); expect(await verifyJwtAndLoadUser(mfaToken, users)).toBeNull(); expect(users.findByIdWithPasswordVersion).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); }); it('AUTH-JWT-007: rejects a token whose password_version predates the user row', async () => { const users = usersRepo({ id: 1, username: 'alice', email: 'alice@example.com', role: 'user', password_version: 2 }); const stale = jwt.sign({ id: 1, pv: 1 }, 'test-secret', { algorithm: 'HS256' }); expect(await verifyJwtAndLoadUser(stale, users)).toBeNull(); }); it('AUTH-JWT-008: accepts a token whose password_version matches', async () => { const users = usersRepo({ id: 1, username: 'alice', email: 'alice@example.com', role: 'user', password_version: 2 }); const current = jwt.sign({ id: 1, pv: 2 }, 'test-secret', { algorithm: 'HS256' }); expect(await verifyJwtAndLoadUser(current, users)).not.toBeNull(); }); it('AUTH-JWT-009: a pre-pv token still works against a row whose password_version reads as unset (both fall back to 0)', async () => { // password_version: null pins the `typeof row.password_version === 'number' ? … : 0` // fallback branch directly (task-1-review.md F5) — unreachable through // the real UsersRepository, whose column is NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, but // worth keeping covered rather than deleting the branch it guards. const users = usersRepo({ id: 1, username: 'alice', email: 'alice@example.com', role: 'user', password_version: null }); const legacy = jwt.sign({ id: 1 }, 'test-secret', { algorithm: 'HS256' }); expect(await verifyJwtAndLoadUser(legacy, users)).not.toBeNull(); }); it('AUTH-JWT-010: but a pre-pv token stops working once the user has reset', async () => { const users = usersRepo({ id: 1, username: 'alice', email: 'alice@example.com', role: 'user', password_version: 1 }); const legacy = jwt.sign({ id: 1 }, 'test-secret', { algorithm: 'HS256' }); expect(await verifyJwtAndLoadUser(legacy, users)).toBeNull(); }); });