- Home.md: addon list (9 real addons), MCP numbers (150+ tools, 30 resources, 27 scopes), admin-seeding text
- README.md: expand addon list from 5 to 9 (Lists/Budget/Documents/Naver/MCP in, Dashboard widgets out)
- Photo-Providers.md: 'Memories addon' -> photo provider toggles under Journey
- Admin-Addons.md: Journey works without photo providers; they are optional sub-toggles
- Tags-and-Categories.md: add Personal Tags section (user-scoped, MCP-only for now)
- <br /> between the TREK logo and the subtitle picture so the
subtitle sits below the logo instead of rendering next to it.
- New badge row with Ko-fi and Buy Me a Coffee in the same
for-the-badge style as Live Demo / Docker / Discord / Roadmap.
Moves the 91 MB product-tour GIF out of the repo entirely. Standard
clones and CI checkouts no longer pull it — even LFS-aware clients
previously downloaded the blob on checkout, which made `git pull`
noticeably slower for everyone.
The file now lives as a release asset on a separate repo and is
referenced from README via its GitHub Fastly-backed download URL.
Removes the LFS tracking entry from .gitattributes.
- Animated TREK logo (light + dark variants) via <picture> + prefers-color-scheme
- 60-second product tour GIF (91MB, 1100x619, 10fps) stored via Git LFS so
standard clones don't pull it by default
- 9 feature tiles as composite SVG grids: 3x3 on desktop, 2x4 on mobile
- 8 fresh screenshots captured from dev.pakulat.org
- Feature details folded into a collapsible 2-column table
- Environment variables moved behind a collapsible
- Roadmap badge added next to Live Demo / Docker / Discord
- Removed redundant Community section and footer
Add DEFAULT_LANGUAGE to docker-compose.yml, README (compose example +
env var table), Helm chart values.yaml, and unraid-template.xml.
server/.env.example was already updated in the original PR.
Replaces the coarse oidc_only + allow_registration settings with four
independent toggles: password_login, password_registration, oidc_login,
oidc_registration. Each can be enabled/disabled individually in
Admin > Settings without affecting the others.
- Add resolveAuthToggles() in authService.ts as the central resolver;
falls back to legacy oidc_only/allow_registration keys when new keys
are absent (backward compat)
- OIDC_ONLY env var still works and overrides DB toggles for password_*,
with a visual lock in the admin UI when active
- Server enforces lockout prevention: cannot disable all login methods
- oidc_login gate added to OIDC /login and /callback routes
- Remove oidc_only toggle from OIDC settings panel; replaced by the
granular toggles in the Settings tab
- Add 6 new resolveAuthToggles() unit tests; fix AUTH-DB-033 error
message assertion
- Update OIDC_ONLY descriptions in README, docker-compose, Helm values,
Unraid template, and .env.example to clarify override semantics
Closes#492
FORCE_HTTPS now documents all four effects (redirect, HSTS, CSP
upgrade-insecure-requests, secure cookie flag) and is clearly marked
optional. COOKIE_SECURE default updated to "auto" with explanation of
auto-derivation logic. TRUST_PROXY clarifies it's off in dev unless
set and is required for FORCE_HTTPS. charts/README.md gains FORCE_HTTPS
and TRUST_PROXY entries. README prose expanded to explain all three
vars and their interaction.
- Add explicit warning about FORCE_HTTPS when accessing directly on http://host:3000
- Explain that FORCE_HTTPS=false is required for direct access without reverse proxy
- Clarify TRUST_PROXY usage only when behind actual reverse proxy
- Prevent common configuration issues causing infinite redirects
This resolves potential confusion where users might experience 301 redirects
to non-existent HTTPS endpoints when accessing the Docker container directly.
Fixes#306 — OIDC scopes were hardcoded to 'openid email profile',
causing OIDC_ADMIN_CLAIM-based role mapping to fail when the required
scope (e.g. 'groups') wasn't requested. The new OIDC_SCOPE variable
defaults to 'openid email profile groups' so group-based admin mapping
works out of the box. Variable is now documented in README, docker-compose,
.env.example, and the Helm chart values.
Adds COOKIE_SECURE (fixes login loop on plain-HTTP setups) and the previously
undocumented OIDC_DISCOVERY_URL to .env.example, docker-compose.yml, README.md,
chart/values.yaml, chart/templates/configmap.yaml, and chart/README.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
process.exit(1) when ENCRYPTION_KEY is unset was a breaking change for
existing installs — a plain git pull would prevent the server from
starting.
Replace with a three-step fallback:
1. ENCRYPTION_KEY env var (explicit, takes priority)
2. data/.jwt_secret (existing installs: encrypted data stays readable
after upgrade with zero manual intervention)
3. data/.encryption_key auto-generated on first start (fresh installs)
A warning is logged when falling back to the JWT secret so operators
are nudged toward setting ENCRYPTION_KEY explicitly.
Update README env table and Docker Compose comment to reflect that
ENCRYPTION_KEY is recommended but no longer required.
Add server/scripts/migrate-encryption.ts — a standalone script that
re-encrypts all at-rest secrets (OIDC client secret, SMTP password,
Maps/OpenWeather/Immich API keys, MFA secrets) when rotating
ENCRYPTION_KEY, without requiring the app to be running.
- Prompts for old and new keys interactively; input is never echoed,
handles copy-pasted keys correctly via a shared readline interface
with a line queue to prevent race conditions on piped/pasted input
- Creates a timestamped DB backup before any changes
- Idempotent: detects already-migrated values by trying the new key
- Exits non-zero and retains the backup if any field fails
README updates:
- Add .env setup step (openssl rand -hex 32) before the Docker Compose
snippet so ENCRYPTION_KEY is set before first start
- Add ENCRYPTION_KEY to the docker run one-liner
- Add "Rotating the Encryption Key" section documenting the script,
the docker exec command, and the upgrade path via ./data/.jwt_secret
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The startup error now tells operators exactly where to find the old key
value (./data/.jwt_secret) rather than just saying "your old JWT_SECRET".
docker-compose.yml and README updated to mark ENCRYPTION_KEY as required
and remove the stale "auto-generated" comments.
- Create server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts with checkSsrf() and createPinnedAgent()
- Resolves DNS before allowing outbound requests to catch hostnames that
map to private IPs (closes the TOCTOU gap in the old inline checks)
- Always blocks loopback (127.x, ::1) and link-local/metadata (169.254.x)
- RFC-1918, CGNAT (100.64/10), and IPv6 ULA ranges blocked by default;
opt-in via ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK=true for self-hosters running Immich
on a local network
- createPinnedAgent() pins node-fetch to the validated IP, preventing
DNS rebinding between the check and the actual connection
- Replace isValidImmichUrl() (hostname-string check, no DNS resolution)
with checkSsrf(); make PUT /integrations/immich/settings async
- Audit log entry (immich.private_ip_configured) written when a user
saves an Immich URL that resolves to a private IP
- Response includes a warning field surfaced as a toast in the UI
- Replace ~20 lines of duplicated inline SSRF logic in the link-preview
handler with a single checkSsrf() call + pinned agent
- Document ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK in README, docker-compose.yml,
server/.env.example, chart/values.yaml, chart/templates/configmap.yaml,
and chart/README.md
Setting JWT_SECRET via environment variable was broken by design:
the admin panel rotation updates the in-memory binding and persists
the new value to data/.jwt_secret, but an env var would silently
override it on the next restart, reverting the rotation.
The server now always loads JWT_SECRET from data/.jwt_secret
(auto-generating it on first start), making the file the single
source of truth. Rotation is handled exclusively through the admin
panel.
- config.ts: drop process.env.JWT_SECRET fallback and
JWT_SECRET_IS_GENERATED export; always read from / write to
data/.jwt_secret
- index.ts: remove the now-obsolete JWT_SECRET startup warning
- .env.example, docker-compose.yml, README: remove JWT_SECRET entries
- Helm chart: remove JWT_SECRET from secretEnv, secret.yaml, and
deployment.yaml; rename generateJwtSecret → generateEncryptionKey
and update NOTES.txt and README accordingly
Introduces a dedicated ENCRYPTION_KEY for encrypting stored secrets
(API keys, MFA TOTP, SMTP password, OIDC client secret) so that
rotating the JWT signing secret no longer invalidates encrypted data,
and a compromised JWT_SECRET no longer exposes stored credentials.
- server/src/config.ts: add ENCRYPTION_KEY (auto-generated to
data/.encryption_key if not set, same pattern as JWT_SECRET);
switch JWT_SECRET to `export let` so updateJwtSecret() keeps the
CJS module binding live for all importers without restart
- apiKeyCrypto.ts, mfaCrypto.ts: derive encryption keys from
ENCRYPTION_KEY instead of JWT_SECRET
- admin POST /rotate-jwt-secret: generates a new 32-byte hex secret,
persists it to data/.jwt_secret, updates the live in-process binding
via updateJwtSecret(), and writes an audit log entry
- Admin panel (Settings → Danger Zone): "Rotate JWT Secret" button
with a confirmation modal warning that all sessions will be
invalidated; on success the acting admin is logged out immediately
- docker-compose.yml, .env.example, README, Helm chart (values.yaml,
secret.yaml, deployment.yaml, NOTES.txt, README): document
ENCRYPTION_KEY and its upgrade migration path
Maurice