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fd7f6f3cf9bcfefb28a59cd9731518e841eeebcd
5 Commits
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3fbe0418eb |
fix(server): bound every SSRF-guarded fetch in time and size
The ESLint rule from #2610 that requires a signal on outbound fetches only matched the platform fetch. The guarded wrappers hand it a spread init, which the rule trusts, so safeFetch(url, undefined, options) passed lint with no timeout, and the dispatcher left undici's five-minute default in place. Nothing capped the body either. Two callers did exactly that on hosts TREK does not control: the Synology thumbnail read (a user-configured NAS) and the place enrichment photo download (a URL out of third-party place data), both buffering the whole answer. The wrappers now carry defaults. A call without a signal waits 30 s for the response headers; the body stays under undici's idle timeout, so a proxied video that pauses with its player is not cut off. timeoutMs adds a deadline over the whole exchange and joins the caller's signal, once for the whole redirect chain. Every body is capped at 64 MB, refused up front when the declared length is larger and failed mid-read otherwise; callers pass a tighter maxBytes, or null where the body is streamed on (pipeAsset, the doc-sync transfers that count their own bytes, the Ollama pull). The two call sites get a signal and an 8 MB cap. The lint selectors now cover safeFetch, safeFetchFollow and safeFetchAdminConfigured as well, including an explicit undefined init, and are named once so the repository block restates the same list. A new test asks ESLint for the options it applies to a path and runs them over snippets, so a selector that stops matching fails a test instead of passing silently. |
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25d4e34959 |
fix(docsync): keep the Synology device token across a restart, tied to its row
The DSM trusted-device token lived in process memory only. After a restart every token was gone and the stored one-time code long spent, so every two-factor NAS binding stopped syncing until its owner typed a fresh code, and nothing on screen said why. The token is now kept in the connection's encrypted secrets, together with a digest of the instance and account it was issued for. A saved connection's ref carries a saveSecret callback that writes through DocSyncConfigService.saveEarnedSecret, which rereads the row inside a transaction so a sync run holding an old ref cannot undo a password the owner changed meanwhile. The key belongs to no form field, so maskSecrets never reports it and mergeSecrets never touches it: the GET and PUT payloads do not carry it, an edit keeps it, and a client cannot plant one. It survives a password edit and a spent or cleared code. A connection repointed at another NAS or account drops it on its next call, and a token DSM refuses with 403 or 404 is dropped in memory and in storage. A probe of form values and an unsaved form may use what is stored but never write. A refused token no longer shadows a fresh code: the code in the form gets its turn in the same login call. In memory the slot is keyed by the connection id together with the row's created_at. A backup restored in place or the demo reset rolls the id sequence back without a restart, and a new connection that reused an id must not log in on the token of the row it replaced. The Synology adapter receives its client through DI like Paperless and WebDAV, instead of building a second instance beside the one the module registers. Two readings of a failed request are settled as well: - INVALID_PURPOSE, INVALID_CA and PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED count as an untrusted certificate again, so the settings screen offers the self-signed switch. Papra used to find them through the message text, and the shared classifier reads codes only. - A host that never completes the TCP handshake reads as unreachable on every client. WebDAV said timeout before the shared transport; the change is now documented and tested. |
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01a7224f29 |
fix(docsync): key the Synology device token per connection and share one transport
The DSM trusted-device token was cached per NAS and account. A second trip whose owner knew the account password but never had the authenticator could bind the same account and log in on the first trip's token, a two-factor bypass across trip owners. Nothing ever cleared the entry either, so a token DSM stopped trusting went out ahead of any fresh code on every attempt until the process restarted. The token is now filed per connection, with instance and account still in the key. An edit keeps the connection id, so the token survives a password change and a stale code in the form. An unsaved form (connection 0) keeps what its probe earns on the session only, and the saved connection adopts it from there. A token DSM refuses with 403 or 404 is dropped for that connection alone. The four clients each carried their own copy of the transport, and the copies had drifted. provider-http.ts now holds the SSRF-guarded fetch with its timeout and certificate switch, the reading of a request that got no answer, the base status table and the guard on a streamed download. Timeouts, caps, auth headers and each client's error class and wording are unchanged. Where the copies differed by accident they now agree: - Paperless recognises UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY (a private CA) as tls_untrusted instead of unreachable. - ERR_SSL_* handshake failures read as unreachable on WebDAV too, since the self-signed switch cannot fix them. - Synology maps HTTP 409, 415 and 507 like the others, Paperless maps 415. - Every download is refused on an announced length over its ceiling and counted as it streams. WebDAV and Paperless had no ceiling, Synology only read the header, and Papra's limiter left the source pinned when it tripped. - Papra reported a download without Content-Length as zero bytes, so the size from the listing was never used. PapraProvider and SynologyDriveProvider are renamed PapraDocumentProvider and SynologyDriveDocumentProvider, matching the other adapters. |
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7237a1881d |
fix(docsync): switches that did not switch off, a webhook nobody could authenticate, and a counter that only grew
More from the audit, each checked against the code before it was touched. The webhook obeyed neither the Documents addon nor the app_settings kill switch, so "switch document sync off" stopped the poll while every provider holding a webhook carried on driving full runs. Both are now read on arrival and again when the debounce timer fires, so a switch thrown mid-window still takes effect. Nextcloud's subscription registered its secret under `X-TREK-Docsync-Signature` while the endpoint reads `x-trek-docsync-secret`: the subscription existed, the calls arrived, and every one of them was dropped for carrying no secret the controller could find. The two names now agree, and the test pins the one the endpoint actually reads. A WebDAV create was an unconditional PUT, so a name already taken upstream was silently overwritten — two trips bound to one folder, or a `receipt.pdf` a person put there by hand, is enough. Creates now send `If-None-Match: *`. The per-item retry bookkeeping was stuck at both ends: the backoff was computed at step 1 every time, so three of the curve's four steps were unreachable, and the attempt counter only ever grew, which shelved a row that failed once a month after six months of otherwise healthy syncing. A successful pass now clears it, which is what makes the limit mean six failures in a row. Also: a manual run on an orphaned binding is refused with 409 (its credential belongs to somebody no longer on the trip, and the scheduler already refuses it, so the button was a way around that); a document deleted while a run is in flight is no longer uploaded anyway; a path-shaped WebDAV id containing `..` is rejected instead of addressing a file outside the bound folder; and Papra's multipart part header no longer takes an unescaped media type, which a CR could end early. Client: three writes in useDocSync swallowed their failure into `void` call sites, a load failure blanked the panel to "no providers available" whatever the cause, and overlapping loads let the slowest response win. Writes now report, only 403/404 blanks the panel, and a generation stamp keeps the newest answer. The dead lastRun state went with them. |
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2d7cb124b3 |
feat(documents): two-way sync with Paperless, Papra, Nextcloud, OpenCloud and Synology
A trip can be bound to a folder, tag or space in a self-hosted document store, and documents then move in both directions: what someone uploads in TREK appears there, and what someone files there appears in TREK. Three decisions shape the rest. The connection belongs to the TRIP, not to a person. Every other integration here is per user, and photos are shared only through an opt-in flag; neither can deliver "everyone on the trip sees the same documents", because visibility would depend on whose credentials fetched a file, and a member without their own Paperless account would see nothing. So the trip owner binds the trip once, the server talks to the provider under that one identity, and TREK's own membership decides who sees what. The provider never learns that TREK has members. When the credential holder leaves the trip the binding goes to `orphaned` rather than quietly carrying on with an ex-member's token. TREK keeps the bytes. A synced document is an ordinary trip_files row, so download, trash, offline cache, PDF export and backup keep working untouched, and a provider outage does not blank out a trip that starts tomorrow. Deletion never crosses the boundary on its own. A document that disappears upstream is recorded as missing and waits for a human, and a run that sees more than 40 percent of its known documents vanish at once refuses the whole listing rather than acting on it: an unmounted share answers exactly like a mass delete. The core reconciles by enumerating both sides, because the weakest provider sets the model. A changed-since query cannot see a deletion, Papra does not move updatedAt when a tag changes, a Paperless bulk edit leaves `modified` alone, and Synology FileStation has no change feed at all. A webhook is therefore only ever "look now", never a source of truth. Echo is caught by comparing content, not timestamps: pushed_sha256 records what TREK itself wrote, so a provider reporting TREK's own upload is not mistaken for a stranger's edit. Provider differences are answered by capability data rather than by branching on an id: stable ids where they exist (Paperless document id, oc:fileid, driveId) and a normalised path where they do not, replace-in-place where the API offers it, and a content hash from the listing only where the provider really supplies one. Admins switch providers on under Admin, Addons, Documents, mirroring how photo providers hang off Journey, including the cascade and the 409 when the parent addon is off. The per-trip setup lives in the file manager, where the person has the context that makes the folder choice obvious. |