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12 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Julien G.
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86ee8044da |
v3.0.22 Bug Fixes & Improvements (#1041)
Bundles the v3.0.22 bug fixes and improvements. See the release notes for the full list. |
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Julien G.
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25f326a659 |
v3.0.16 — bug fixes (#964)
* fix(mcp): MCP RFC compliant for more strict clients * fix(mcp): serve flat /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource for ChatGPT reconnect Clients such as ChatGPT probe the flat well-known URL on every fresh discovery cycle (i.e. after a full disconnect/reconnect where cached OAuth state is cleared). The SDK's mcpAuthMetadataRouter only serves the path-based form /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp, so the flat probe returned 404. Without the resource metadata, ChatGPT fell back to the issuer URL as the resource parameter (https://…/ instead of https://…/mcp). The authorize handler then rejected it with invalid_target and redirected back to ChatGPT's callback with an error — showing the user the TREK home page instead of the consent form. Add an explicit GET handler for the flat URL that returns the same protected resource metadata, so the resource URI is discovered correctly on the first probe. * fix(mcp): fix OAuth popup blank page — SW denylist and COOP header Service worker was intercepting /oauth/authorize navigate requests (not in denylist), serving index.html, and React Router's catch-all redirected to / instead of the SDK authorize handler. Helmet's default COOP: same-origin isolated the /oauth/consent popup from its cross-origin opener, making window.opener null and breaking the popup-based OAuth completion signal for ChatGPT and similar clients. * fix(ntfy): encode non-Latin-1 header values with RFC 2047 to prevent ByteString crash Todo/trip names containing chars like → or € (and non-Latin-1 locale templates for Czech, Chinese, Russian, etc.) caused the Fetch API to throw when setting the ntfy Title header. Apply RFC 2047 base64 encoded-word encoding for any header value containing chars above U+00FF; ntfy decodes this automatically. * docs(mcp): document Cloudflare bot detection blocking ChatGPT MCP requests Add Cloudflare WAF note to MCP-Setup and a full troubleshooting entry covering root cause (IP reputation + UA heuristics), free-plan limitation (disable Bot Fight Mode entirely, with explicit warning), and paid-plan WAF skip rule with the full expression syntax and path table for all MCP/OAuth/.well-known routes. * fix(pwa): detect upstream proxy auth challenges and recover gracefully Behind Cloudflare Zero Trust or Pangolin, cross-origin auth redirects on /api/* calls surface as CORS errors (error.response === undefined) that the existing 401 interceptor never catches, leaving the PWA stuck with network-error toasts instead of re-authenticating. New connectivity module probes /api/health every 30s using fetch with cache:no-store and inspects Content-Type to reliably detect whether the server is reachable vs intercepted by an upstream proxy. axios interceptor changes: - On !error.response + navigator.onLine: run probeNow(); if the health probe also fails (proxy is intercepting all requests), trigger a guarded window.location.reload() so the edge proxy can intercept the top-level navigation and run its auth flow (covers CF Access and Pangolin 302 mode) - On error.response status 401 with text/html body: same reload path, covering Pangolin header-auth extended compatibility mode which returns 401+HTML instead of a 302 redirect. TREK own 401s are always JSON so there is no collision with the existing AUTH_REQUIRED branch. - sessionStorage flag prevents reload loops; cleared on any successful response so the guard resets after re-auth. /api/health excluded from SW NetworkFirst cache (vite.config.js regex) and Cache-Control: no-store added server-side so probes always hit the network and cannot be served stale from the 24h api-data cache. LoginPage caches last-known appConfig in localStorage so the SSO button renders in OIDC+UN/PW dual mode even when the config fetch is intercepted by the proxy. Auto-redirect to IdP skipped when config comes from cache to avoid redirect loops while the proxy is challenging. Fixes discussion #836. * fix(files): add bottom-nav padding to files tab wrapper on mobile * fix(budget): expose toolbar on mobile so users can add budget categories * fix(pwa): unregister SW before proxy-reauth reload so Pangolin can challenge WorkBox's NavigationRoute served the cached SPA shell on window.location.reload(), meaning Pangolin/CF Access never saw the navigation and the app was left stuck showing stale offline data. Unregistering the SW first lets the navigation reach the network so the upstream proxy can run its auth flow. Also rebuilds server/public with corrected sw.js (health excluded from NetworkFirst, /oauth/ and /.well-known/ added to NavigationRoute denylist). * chore: remove committed build artifacts from server/public Dockerfile and Proxmox community script both rebuild client/dist and copy it into server/public at build time — committed artifacts were never used. Replace with .gitkeep and add server/public/* to .gitignore. * chore: add build-from-sources script |
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Maurice
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292e443dbe |
security: address silent-failure review findings on top of batch 1
Second-pass fixes caught by a self-review after the initial commit — each one would have undermined a fix from the previous commit. - mfaPolicy now goes through `verifyJwtAndLoadUser` too. Without this, a JWT stolen before a password reset still satisfied `require_mfa` until its natural 24h expiry, defeating the whole point of the password_version bump. - Drop the `?? keys[0]` fallback in OIDC JWKS key selection. When the token carries a `kid` that is not in the current JWKS, refuse outright instead of picking an arbitrary key and letting the signature check produce a generic failure — the real failure mode deserves a specific error code. - Tighten OAuth DCR custom-scheme rule so `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, `blob:`, `about:`, `chrome:` are all rejected. Previously the catch-all "not http/https" check admitted them; the authorize flow later 302s the browser to whatever is registered, which with a `javascript:` URI would execute attacker script on redirect. Also require the private-use scheme body to be reverse-DNS (contain a dot), matching RFC 8252 §7.1. - permanentDeleteFile / emptyTrash only delete the trip_files row when the on-disk unlink actually succeeded. Previously Promise.all swallowed individual unlink failures and DELETE ran unconditionally, so a permission / ENOSPC failure would orphan bytes on disk. - restoreFromZip also invalidates the permissions cache in the outer catch. If extraction threw before the DB swap even started, the cache wasn't stale, but belt-and-braces is cheap and guarantees no failed-restore path leaves stale cache behind. |
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Maurice
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2d0414b4a3 |
security: internal audit — batch 1
Fixes the critical + high + medium findings from our internal security
review. Bundled into one PR because the changes overlap heavily (JWT
verification unifies across three call sites; backup-code hashing and
demo-email handling cross-cut several services); splitting them out
would mean redundant reviews of the same files.
Critical
- CI-C1 — .github/workflows/test.yml: restore actions/{checkout,setup-
node,upload-artifact} to @v4. The @v6 refs don't exist, so the test
workflow was errorring before a single test ran.
- SEC-C1 — mfaPolicy now extracts the token via extractToken() (cookie-
first, Bearer fallback). Previously it only read Authorization, so
every cookie-authenticated SPA session bypassed require_mfa entirely.
- SEC-C2/C4/C6 — all JWT verification paths (MCP bearer, file download,
photo route) now go through the shared verifyJwtAndLoadUser that
checks password_version. resetPassword additionally deletes every
mcp_tokens row and marks outstanding oauth_tokens revoked, so a
password reset invalidates ALL credential classes — not just the
cookie JWT.
High
- SEC-H2 — reset email URL is built from server-side APP_URL /
ALLOWED_ORIGINS (via existing getAppUrl()), not request headers.
Closes the host-header-injection vector into reset links.
- SEC-H3 — OIDC findOrCreateUser wraps the invite-redemption UPDATE +
user INSERT in a transaction. The UPDATE is the capacity check; if
a concurrent callback takes the last slot, the whole transaction
aborts with registration_disabled instead of double-creating users.
- SEC-H4 — new verifyIdToken() performs full JWT signature
verification via the provider's JWKS (Node's crypto.createPublicKey
accepts JWK directly — no extra dependency), plus iss/aud/exp
checks. The callback also rejects the login when userinfo.sub does
not match id_token.sub.
- SEC-H5 — OAuth DCR now validates redirect_uris against an allowlist
of schemes: https, http-loopback, or a private custom scheme. Plain
http://non-loopback is rejected.
- SEC-H6 — oauthService audience defaults to mcpResource when the
`resource` parameter is missing, so tokens are always audience-bound
to /mcp instead of being issued with audience=null.
- SEC-H7 — HSTS is enabled any time NODE_ENV=production (previously
required FORCE_HTTPS=true), includeSubDomains defaults on and can
be disabled with HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS=false.
- SEC-H8 — trek_session cookie Secure flag is also driven by
req.secure (which Express resolves from X-Forwarded-Proto once
trust proxy is set), so instances behind a TLS-terminating proxy
get Secure cookies without needing FORCE_HTTPS.
Medium
- SEC-M1 — permanentDeleteFile / emptyTrash / avatar unlink now use
fs.promises.rm with { force: true } (one async op vs the previous
existsSync + unlinkSync pair per file).
- SEC-M2 — invalidatePermissionsCache() is called inside restoreFromZip
so a restored DB with different permission rows is honoured
immediately.
- SEC-M3 + C1 — idempotency store bounds the key at 128 chars, caches
only responses ≤ 256 KiB, and scopes the lookup by (key, user_id,
method, path) rather than (key, user_id). Same key replayed against
a different endpoint no longer returns a stale unrelated body.
- SEC-M4 — share_tokens gets an expires_at column; new tokens default
to 90-day TTL, expired tokens are denied at lookup. Existing tokens
stay NULL = no expiry so already-published links don't break.
- SEC-M5 — /uploads/photos/:filename now resolves the photo to its
trip_id and requires the share token to cover THAT trip. Previously
any share token for any trip would unlock any photo filename.
- SEC-M6 — BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS is the single source of truth shared
between fileService and collab uploads. The '*' allowed_file_types
wildcard now still rejects executables/scripts.
- SEC-M7 — single DEMO_EMAILS constant (services/demo.ts) used by
demoUploadBlock, mfaPolicy, and every demo-mode guard in
authService. The old demoUploadBlock only matched 'demo@nomad.app'
so the seed 'demo@trek.app' could in fact upload in demo mode.
- SEC-M8 — MFA backup codes are now bcrypt-hashed at rest
(hashBackupCodeBcrypt). matchBackupCode accepts both bcrypt and
legacy SHA-256 hex hashes, so existing installs keep working until
the user regenerates codes via enableMfa.
- SEC-M9 — document the "security via UUID v4 filename" model for
/uploads/avatars|covers|journey. Requires no code change but
captures the decision so future reviewers don't re-flag it.
- SEC-M10 — already covered by the resetPassword revocation logic
above: mcp_tokens DELETE + oauth_tokens UPDATE … SET revoked_at.
Performance
- PERF-H1 — new migration adds the indexes flagged in the audit:
trips(user_id), trips(created_at DESC), photos(day_id),
photos(place_id), reservations(day_id), share_tokens(token), plus
conditional day_accommodations and notifications indexes depending
on which columns are present.
Tests
- tests/integration/oidc.test.ts now mocks verifyIdToken and passes
an id_token in the exchangeCodeForToken stub for the three flows
that exercise a successful callback. The three remaining failures
tests pointed out were all pre-existing (file-upload flakes +
notificationPreferences event_types count drift), none introduced
by this PR.
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jubnl
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dd90c6d424 |
fix(mcp): add RFC 9728 PRM, RFC 8707 audience binding, and collab sub-feature gating
Root cause: claude.ai's MCP connector (spec 2025-06-18) requires the resource server to publish Protected Resource Metadata and return WWW-Authenticate on 401s to bind the /mcp endpoint to its AS. Without these, it silently shows no tools after OAuth. - Add /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource (RFC 9728) with addon gating - Emit WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata=... on 401/auth-failure 403s - Open CORS (origin: *) on both .well-known/* endpoints per RFC 8414/9728 - Accept resource parameter at authorize + token endpoints (RFC 8707) - Store audience on oauth_tokens; validate on every MCP request - Refresh tokens inherit audience; add resource_parameter_supported to AS metadata - DB migration: ADD COLUMN audience TEXT to oauth_tokens - Gate collab MCP tools/resources by chat/notes/polls sub-features individually - Invalidate MCP sessions when collab sub-features are toggled in admin - Update test mocks and MCP.md |
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jubnl
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535c06bb3f |
feat(mcp): granular OAuth scopes and per-client rate limiting
- Split `media:read` into `geo:read` and `weather:read` scopes - Add dedicated `atlas:read/write` scopes (previously under `places`) - Add dedicated `todos:read/write` scopes (previously under `collab`) - Rate limiting now keyed by userId+clientId instead of userId alone - Bind MCP sessions to the OAuth client that created them - Log MCP tool calls to audit log with clientId - Invalidate all MCP sessions on addon state change - Reduce session sweep interval from 10min to 1min - Update all translations with new scope labels |
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jubnl
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cc2a2ddca3 |
remove(oauth): drop browser-initiated DCR registration flow
OAuthRegisterPage and its server routes (GET /api/oauth/register/validate, POST /api/oauth/register) are superseded by the RFC 7591 machine-to-machine DCR endpoint (POST /oauth/register). Claude.ai and compliant MCP clients register via RFC 7591, then go through the standard /oauth/authorize consent screen for scope selection. |
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jubnl
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cb3aeda8e0 |
fix(oauth): add public RFC 7591 DCR endpoint at POST /oauth/register
Claude.ai's start-auth flow POSTs to the registration_endpoint advertised
in the discovery document, but no public handler existed at /oauth/register
(only /api/oauth/register with browser cookie auth). This caused a
start_error redirect immediately on every connect attempt.
- Add POST /oauth/register to oauthPublicRouter following RFC 7591
- Make oauth_clients.user_id nullable via a raw (no-transaction) migration
so anonymous DCR clients can be created without a user context
- Update migration runner to support { raw: () => void } migrations for
DDL that requires PRAGMA foreign_keys = OFF outside a transaction
- Update createOAuthClient to accept userId: number | null with a global
cap (500) for anonymous DCR clients in place of the per-user limit
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jubnl
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9b1baaf7b8 |
feat(oauth): browser-initiated dynamic client registration (DCR)
Adds an OAuth 2.1 public client registration flow so MCP clients can
self-register via a user-facing consent page instead of requiring manual
setup in Settings.
Server:
- DB migration adds `is_public` and `created_via` columns to oauth_clients
- New GET /api/oauth/register/validate — validates DCR params, returns
requested scopes; unauthenticated callers get loginRequired flag
- New POST /api/oauth/register — creates a public client, saves consent,
and redirects with client_id (cookie auth required)
- `authenticateClient` / `refreshTokens` skip secret check for public
clients (PKCE provides the security guarantee)
- `createOAuthClient` accepts options for isPublic/createdVia; public
clients store an opaque secret hash instead of a usable secret
- `rotateOAuthClientSecret` blocked on public clients
- `isValidRedirectUri` extracted as a shared helper
- Discovery metadata now advertises registration_endpoint and auth method
`none`; token/revoke endpoints no longer require client_secret for
public clients
Client:
- New OAuthRegisterPage (/oauth/register) — loading → optional
login-required gate → scope selection → done states
- New ScopeGroupPicker component — collapsible groups, indeterminate
checkboxes, select-all per group or globally
- oauthApi.register.{validate,submit} added to api/client.ts
- apiClient exported so it can be reused outside api/client.ts
- IntegrationsTab tests fixed for new collapsible section structure
- collab_notes fallback changed from undefined to [] in MCP trip tools
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jubnl
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7c0a0d5f39 |
security(oauth): harden OAuth 2.1/MCP implementation (Critical + High + Medium findings)
Address 14 security findings from internal review of the OAuth 2.1 + MCP layer: Critical: - C1: Scope-gate all MCP resources (trips, budget, packing, collab, atlas, vacay, etc.) - C2: Wire token/session revocation into active MCP session lifecycle per (user, client_id) - C3: Refresh-token replay detection via parent_token_id chain + cascade revoke on replay High: - H1: Validate PKCE code_challenge (43-char base64url) and code_verifier (43–128 chars) format - H2: Rate-limit /oauth/token (30/min), /authorize/validate (30/min), /oauth/revoke (10/min) - H3: Strip client metadata from unauthenticated /authorize/validate responses (oracle prevention) - H4: Constant-time secret comparison via crypto.timingSafeEqual (prevents timing attacks) - H5: Collapse all invalid_grant cases to a single generic message; log specifics server-side Medium: - M1: Set Cache-Control: no-store + Pragma: no-cache on token endpoint responses - M2: Return 404 (not 200/403) on discovery + revoke endpoints when MCP addon is disabled - M4: Audit-log all OAuth lifecycle events (create, consent, issue, refresh, revoke, replay) - M5: Union consent scopes on re-authorization instead of replacing existing grants - M7: Require httpOnly cookie auth (not Bearer JWT) on all state-mutating OAuth endpoints - M8: Strict Bearer scheme check in MCP token verification Refactoring: - Extract MCP session management (sessions Map, revokeUserSessions, revokeUserSessionsForClient) into mcp/sessionManager.ts to break the circular dependency between oauthService and mcp/index - Extract verifyJwtAndLoadUser helper in auth middleware, shared by authenticate and new requireCookieAuth middleware Tests: - Fix all existing integration tests broken by the security hardening (OAUTH-019 to OAUTH-032) - Add 13 new integration tests covering M1, M2, H1, H3, H5, M5, M7, C3 - Add 14 new unit tests covering C2, C3, H1, H3, M5 behaviors in oauthService |
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jubnl
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5b44fe68b1 |
fix(mcp): narrow OAuth scope to allowed intersection instead of rejecting
When a client requests scopes it is not permitted for, silently drop them rather than failing the entire authorization flow. The token is issued with only the intersection of requested and allowed scopes. Also fix /authorize/validate to always return HTTP 200 so the consent page can surface the actual error_description instead of a generic axios failure message. |
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jubnl
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830f6c0706 |
feat(mcp): introduce OAuth 2.1 auth and enforce addon gating
OAuth 2.1 authentication for MCP:
- Add OAuth 2.1 authorization server with PKCE support (routes/oauth.ts)
- Add OAuth service for client CRUD, auth-code flow, and token management (services/oauthService.ts)
- Add typed scope definitions and enforcement helpers (mcp/scopes.ts)
- Add OAuth consent UI page (OAuthAuthorizePage.tsx)
- Add client-side scope labels and descriptions (api/oauthScopes.ts)
- Integrate OAuth token auth into MCP handler alongside existing static tokens
- All OAuth endpoints gated on `mcp` addon
Addon gating across MCP tools, resources, and prompts:
- Add typed ADDON_IDS constant (server/src/addons.ts) replacing all string literals
- Gate budget tools and resources (trip-budget, per-person, settlement) on `budget` addon
- Gate packing tools and resources (trip-packing, trip-packing-bags, trip-todos) on `packing` addon
- Gate todos tools on `packing` addon (mirrors web UI Lists tab behavior)
- Expand atlas gate to cover full tool body (bucket-list + country tools no longer leak)
- Expand collab gate to cover full tool body (collab notes no longer leak)
- Gate packing-list and budget-overview MCP prompts on their respective addons
- Gate get_trip_summary sections per addon; blank packing/budget/collab_notes/todos when disabled
- Remove trip-files resource and files field from get_trip_summary
- Replace all isAddonEnabled('literal') calls with ADDON_IDS constants
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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