Commit Graph

7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
jubnl 20bf9c2312 security: close SEC-H4/H6 gaps from second-pass review
- SEC-H6: remove conditional audience check in mcp/index.ts — audience is
  now always enforced against the mcpResource URL. Add migration to revoke
  pre-existing oauth_tokens with audience=NULL so dead rows don't linger.
- SEC-H4: validate doc.issuer against config.issuer inside discover() to
  prevent a MITM'd discovery doc from supplying a crafted expected issuer.
  verifyIdToken caller now passes config.issuer as ground truth, not
  doc.issuer.
- tests: cover three new OIDC callback failure paths (no_id_token,
  id_token_invalid, subject_mismatch) and two idempotency caps (key length
  >128 chars returns 400, body >256 KiB skips caching).
2026-04-20 21:35:30 +02:00
Maurice 292e443dbe security: address silent-failure review findings on top of batch 1
Second-pass fixes caught by a self-review after the initial commit — each
one would have undermined a fix from the previous commit.

- mfaPolicy now goes through `verifyJwtAndLoadUser` too. Without this,
  a JWT stolen before a password reset still satisfied `require_mfa`
  until its natural 24h expiry, defeating the whole point of the
  password_version bump.
- Drop the `?? keys[0]` fallback in OIDC JWKS key selection. When the
  token carries a `kid` that is not in the current JWKS, refuse
  outright instead of picking an arbitrary key and letting the
  signature check produce a generic failure — the real failure mode
  deserves a specific error code.
- Tighten OAuth DCR custom-scheme rule so `javascript:`, `data:`,
  `vbscript:`, `file:`, `blob:`, `about:`, `chrome:` are all rejected.
  Previously the catch-all "not http/https" check admitted them; the
  authorize flow later 302s the browser to whatever is registered,
  which with a `javascript:` URI would execute attacker script on
  redirect. Also require the private-use scheme body to be reverse-DNS
  (contain a dot), matching RFC 8252 §7.1.
- permanentDeleteFile / emptyTrash only delete the trip_files row when
  the on-disk unlink actually succeeded. Previously Promise.all
  swallowed individual unlink failures and DELETE ran unconditionally,
  so a permission / ENOSPC failure would orphan bytes on disk.
- restoreFromZip also invalidates the permissions cache in the outer
  catch. If extraction threw before the DB swap even started, the
  cache wasn't stale, but belt-and-braces is cheap and guarantees no
  failed-restore path leaves stale cache behind.
2026-04-20 20:44:57 +02:00
Maurice 2d0414b4a3 security: internal audit — batch 1
Fixes the critical + high + medium findings from our internal security
review. Bundled into one PR because the changes overlap heavily (JWT
verification unifies across three call sites; backup-code hashing and
demo-email handling cross-cut several services); splitting them out
would mean redundant reviews of the same files.

Critical
- CI-C1 — .github/workflows/test.yml: restore actions/{checkout,setup-
  node,upload-artifact} to @v4. The @v6 refs don't exist, so the test
  workflow was errorring before a single test ran.
- SEC-C1 — mfaPolicy now extracts the token via extractToken() (cookie-
  first, Bearer fallback). Previously it only read Authorization, so
  every cookie-authenticated SPA session bypassed require_mfa entirely.
- SEC-C2/C4/C6 — all JWT verification paths (MCP bearer, file download,
  photo route) now go through the shared verifyJwtAndLoadUser that
  checks password_version. resetPassword additionally deletes every
  mcp_tokens row and marks outstanding oauth_tokens revoked, so a
  password reset invalidates ALL credential classes — not just the
  cookie JWT.

High
- SEC-H2 — reset email URL is built from server-side APP_URL /
  ALLOWED_ORIGINS (via existing getAppUrl()), not request headers.
  Closes the host-header-injection vector into reset links.
- SEC-H3 — OIDC findOrCreateUser wraps the invite-redemption UPDATE +
  user INSERT in a transaction. The UPDATE is the capacity check; if
  a concurrent callback takes the last slot, the whole transaction
  aborts with registration_disabled instead of double-creating users.
- SEC-H4 — new verifyIdToken() performs full JWT signature
  verification via the provider's JWKS (Node's crypto.createPublicKey
  accepts JWK directly — no extra dependency), plus iss/aud/exp
  checks. The callback also rejects the login when userinfo.sub does
  not match id_token.sub.
- SEC-H5 — OAuth DCR now validates redirect_uris against an allowlist
  of schemes: https, http-loopback, or a private custom scheme. Plain
  http://non-loopback is rejected.
- SEC-H6 — oauthService audience defaults to mcpResource when the
  `resource` parameter is missing, so tokens are always audience-bound
  to /mcp instead of being issued with audience=null.
- SEC-H7 — HSTS is enabled any time NODE_ENV=production (previously
  required FORCE_HTTPS=true), includeSubDomains defaults on and can
  be disabled with HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS=false.
- SEC-H8 — trek_session cookie Secure flag is also driven by
  req.secure (which Express resolves from X-Forwarded-Proto once
  trust proxy is set), so instances behind a TLS-terminating proxy
  get Secure cookies without needing FORCE_HTTPS.

Medium
- SEC-M1 — permanentDeleteFile / emptyTrash / avatar unlink now use
  fs.promises.rm with { force: true } (one async op vs the previous
  existsSync + unlinkSync pair per file).
- SEC-M2 — invalidatePermissionsCache() is called inside restoreFromZip
  so a restored DB with different permission rows is honoured
  immediately.
- SEC-M3 + C1 — idempotency store bounds the key at 128 chars, caches
  only responses ≤ 256 KiB, and scopes the lookup by (key, user_id,
  method, path) rather than (key, user_id). Same key replayed against
  a different endpoint no longer returns a stale unrelated body.
- SEC-M4 — share_tokens gets an expires_at column; new tokens default
  to 90-day TTL, expired tokens are denied at lookup. Existing tokens
  stay NULL = no expiry so already-published links don't break.
- SEC-M5 — /uploads/photos/:filename now resolves the photo to its
  trip_id and requires the share token to cover THAT trip. Previously
  any share token for any trip would unlock any photo filename.
- SEC-M6 — BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS is the single source of truth shared
  between fileService and collab uploads. The '*' allowed_file_types
  wildcard now still rejects executables/scripts.
- SEC-M7 — single DEMO_EMAILS constant (services/demo.ts) used by
  demoUploadBlock, mfaPolicy, and every demo-mode guard in
  authService. The old demoUploadBlock only matched 'demo@nomad.app'
  so the seed 'demo@trek.app' could in fact upload in demo mode.
- SEC-M8 — MFA backup codes are now bcrypt-hashed at rest
  (hashBackupCodeBcrypt). matchBackupCode accepts both bcrypt and
  legacy SHA-256 hex hashes, so existing installs keep working until
  the user regenerates codes via enableMfa.
- SEC-M9 — document the "security via UUID v4 filename" model for
  /uploads/avatars|covers|journey. Requires no code change but
  captures the decision so future reviewers don't re-flag it.
- SEC-M10 — already covered by the resetPassword revocation logic
  above: mcp_tokens DELETE + oauth_tokens UPDATE … SET revoked_at.

Performance
- PERF-H1 — new migration adds the indexes flagged in the audit:
  trips(user_id), trips(created_at DESC), photos(day_id),
  photos(place_id), reservations(day_id), share_tokens(token), plus
  conditional day_accommodations and notifications indexes depending
  on which columns are present.

Tests
- tests/integration/oidc.test.ts now mocks verifyIdToken and passes
  an id_token in the exchangeCodeForToken stub for the three flows
  that exercise a successful callback. The three remaining failures
  tests pointed out were all pre-existing (file-upload flakes +
  notificationPreferences event_types count drift), none introduced
  by this PR.
2026-04-20 20:36:52 +02:00
jubnl 293506217e feat(notices): add system notice infrastructure
Server-side notice registry with per-user condition evaluation (firstLogin,
existingUserBeforeVersion, addonEnabled, dateWindow, role, custom).
Notices are sorted by priority then severity, filtered against dismissals
stored in a new user_notice_dismissals table, and served via
GET /api/system-notices/active + POST /api/system-notices/:id/dismiss.

Client renders notices through a host component that partitions by
display type (modal / banner / toast). The modal renderer supports
multi-page pagination with directional slide transitions, keyboard
navigation, and correct dismiss-all semantics on CTA / X / ESC.
Dismissals are optimistic with a single background retry.

Includes 3.0.0 upgrade notices (v3-photos, v3-journey, v3-features),
onboarding welcome modal, and full i18n coverage across 15 languages.
The /journey route is addon-gated on both client and server.

Also includes: unit + integration test suites, registry integrity test
that validates action CTA IDs against client source, and technical
documentation in docs/system-notices.md.
2026-04-16 14:36:33 +02:00
jubnl bfd2553d1e feat(auth): split OIDC_ONLY into granular auth toggles
Replaces the coarse oidc_only + allow_registration settings with four
independent toggles: password_login, password_registration, oidc_login,
oidc_registration. Each can be enabled/disabled individually in
Admin > Settings without affecting the others.

- Add resolveAuthToggles() in authService.ts as the central resolver;
  falls back to legacy oidc_only/allow_registration keys when new keys
  are absent (backward compat)
- OIDC_ONLY env var still works and overrides DB toggles for password_*,
  with a visual lock in the admin UI when active
- Server enforces lockout prevention: cannot disable all login methods
- oidc_login gate added to OIDC /login and /callback routes
- Remove oidc_only toggle from OIDC settings panel; replaced by the
  granular toggles in the Settings tab
- Add 6 new resolveAuthToggles() unit tests; fix AUTH-DB-033 error
  message assertion
- Update OIDC_ONLY descriptions in README, docker-compose, Helm values,
  Unraid template, and .env.example to clarify override semantics

Closes #492
2026-04-11 20:21:36 +02:00
jubnl 5cc81ae4b0 refactor(server): replace node-fetch with native fetch + undici, fix photo integrations
Replace node-fetch v2 with Node 22's built-in fetch API across the entire server.
Add undici as an explicit dependency to provide the dispatcher API needed for
DNS pinning (SSRF rebinding prevention) in ssrfGuard.ts. All seven service files
that used a plain `import fetch from 'node-fetch'` are updated to use the global.
The ssrfGuard safeFetch/createPinnedAgent is rewritten as createPinnedDispatcher
using an undici Agent, with correct handling of the `all: true` lookup callback
required by Node 18+. The collabService dynamic require() and notifications agent
option are updated to use the dispatcher pattern. Test mocks are migrated from
vi.mock('node-fetch') to vi.stubGlobal('fetch'), and streaming test fixtures are
updated to use Web ReadableStream instead of Node Readable.

Fix several bugs in the Synology and Immich photo integrations:
- pipeAsset: guard against setting headers after stream has already started
- _getSynologySession: clear stale SID and re-login when decrypt_api_key returns null
  instead of propagating success(null) downstream
- _requestSynologyApi: return retrySession error (not stale session) on retry failure;
  also retry on error codes 106 (timeout) and 107 (duplicate login), not only 119
- searchSynologyPhotos: fix incorrect total field type (Synology list_item returns no
  total); hasMore correctly uses allItems.length === limit
- _splitPackedSynologyId: validate cache_key format before use; callers return 400
- getImmichCredentials / _getSynologyCredentials: treat null from decrypt_api_key as
  a missing-credentials condition rather than casting null to string
- Synology size param: enforce allowlist ['sm', 'm', 'xl'] per API documentation
2026-04-05 21:12:51 +02:00
Maurice 979322025d refactor: extract business logic from routes into reusable service modules 2026-04-02 17:14:53 +02:00