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aa8d9b4037a1773276a0cfaf74c8fc7a6dffa4d2
22 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Maurice
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aa8d9b4037 |
refactor(server): inject the transit base URL and the kitinerary paths as config tokens
The ownership rule says a boot-stable value that only Nest providers read belongs to a registerAs token, yet TransitService froze TRANSIT_API_URL in a module-top readEnv() const and KitineraryExtractorService read KITINERARY_EXTRACTOR_PATH and PATH through readEnv() in its probe. Both now come from tokens: transitConfig and kitineraryConfig, derived in boot-derive.ts and dropped from deriveIntegrations, so readEnv() no longer reads those variables at all. TransitModule and KitineraryExtractorModule import AppConfigModule, which keeps them buildable on their own in tests. Behaviour is unchanged: the same defaults, the same trailing-slash strip and PATH split, now frozen per built app instead of at import. The app-config README names each boot-stable variable that stays on readEnv() together with the reader the container cannot inject into. |
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Maurice
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a6f635f3e0 |
docs(server): keep the managed-hosting switches out of the env reference
The env reference parity test forced TREK_MANAGED, MAPBOX_ACCESS_TOKEN, CARTO_API_KEY and PLACES_API_BASE into server/.env.example with how-to text. They are managed hosting only and stay out of the public docs, the same way TREK_DB_FILE and APP_VERSION do, so they move to NOT_OPERATOR_SETTINGS with that reason and their lines leave the self-hoster reference again. The variables themselves and their behaviour are unchanged. |
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Maurice
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fa0e6a3eae |
refactor(server): take the storage roots from DataPathsService
The data-directory change said Nest classes inject DataPathsService, but only AdminService did. StorageRegistryService still read the built-in uploads and backups roots and the scratch dir from module constants frozen at import, and StorageJobsService read the scratch dir the same way. The registry now takes DataPathsService through its constructor (a hand-built one resolves the same layout), and the jobs service asks the registry for its temp dir. The plain helper modules keep calling resolveDataPaths() because they run without a container or are shared with code that does: config.ts, the database path, index.ts, the logger, the backup functions and the plugin trees, which the out-of-process supervisor reads too. The app-config README now lists both sides, and the nest README, server/CLAUDE.md and the provider's own comment say the same. |
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Maurice
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d1b461a37f |
docs(server): name HTTP_KEEP_ALIVE_TIMEOUT_MS as an httpConfig variable
The keep-alive change moved HTTP_KEEP_ALIVE_TIMEOUT_MS onto the httpConfig token, but the app-config README still listed only TRUST_PROXY and HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS for it and left the variable out of the boot-stable list. Also drops the dashes from two lines the recent scheduling and entity changes rewrote. |
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Maurice
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ba1504d6e9 |
refactor(server): give every environment variable one config owner
Eight registerAs tokens existed while every consumer read the same values through readEnv() instead, so the boot-stable layer the repo rules describe was unused and nothing said which path owned a variable. FORCE_HTTPS, for instance, was frozen by the middleware through the http token and read live by the cookie code at the same time. A variable is now owned by exactly one side. TRUST_PROXY and HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS belong to httpConfig, which buildApp() already injects into the pre-init middleware, and TREK_PLACE_PHOTO_DIR to the new storageConfig, which the storage registry now injects instead of reading it through RuntimeEnvService. Their derive functions moved to boot-derive.ts, which deriveAll() never calls. The six tokens nothing injected are gone: their values are needed before the container exists (config.ts, the database, src/mcp, the SSRF guard) and stay on readEnv(). config-ownership.test.ts records the keys each side reads through a Proxy and fails on a variable read through both, on a token nothing injects and on a variable the schema does not validate. env-reference.test.ts holds server/.env.example to the schema, which had drifted by 34 variables (SMTP, WebAuthn, plugins, MCP session tuning, TREK_MANAGED and others); they are documented now. jwt-verify.ts no longer cites a middleware file that is gone. |
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Maurice
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5c054863b9 |
refactor(server): resolve the data directory in one place
The data and uploads directories were derived independently in about ten files, each counting `..` hops from its own `__dirname`, and the file logger used `process.cwd()` instead. Moving a file or starting the server from another directory quietly moved where secrets, backups or logs went, and the backup code named `data/travel.db` directly, so with TREK_DB_FILE set a backup archived and a restore replaced a file the connection never opened. `resolveDataPaths()` in app-config now anchors data/, uploads/, backups, tmp, logs, the JWT secret and encryption key files and the database file (TREK_DB_FILE when set, else data/travel.db) on the server package root. Code that runs before the container calls it directly; Nest classes inject the new `DataPathsService`. Every previous anchor uses it, and the resolved paths are unchanged for the image and for `npm run dev`. |
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Maurice
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ff3615fdf0 |
feat(db): copy the database before a boot migrates it
Migrations only go forward, and since #2610 an older image refuses a database a newer one migrated. Going back after a bad update therefore needs a copy from before it, and the only copies were backups the admin takes by hand or auto-backup, which is off by default. The first boot on 4.4 migrates every 4.3.x install through the legacy baseline and the new migrations without either. Before applying pending migrations to a file database that holds anything, the boot now writes a VACUUM INTO copy next to it, named pre-migrate-<schema>-<time>.db (legacy-<schema_version> for an install the positional runner left, otherwise the last recorded migration), and keeps the newest TREK_DB_PRE_MIGRATE_SNAPSHOT_KEEP (3). The copy is written under a temporary name and renamed, so a crash never leaves a truncated file that looks good. If it cannot be written the boot refuses before anything is migrated; TREK_DB_PRE_MIGRATE_SNAPSHOT=false is the documented way past that. The newer-database refusal names the copy taken right before the newer release migrated past this one. A fresh install, a restart with nothing pending, an in-memory database and a restore's re-bootstrap (the archive is the copy) take none, and NODE_ENV=test leaves it off unless a suite sets the switch. |
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Maurice
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650451bdf7 |
feat(notifications): Web Push delivers notifications to every device, even with TREK closed
A fourth built-in channel next to email, webhook and ntfy. Browsers register per device, the server encrypts per RFC 8291 and signs per RFC 8292 with node:crypto and sends only to known push services through the SSRF guard. The event matrix decides per category what arrives by push; admins switch the channel on under Notifications. VAPID keys come from the environment or are generated once, only while neither stored row exists, and kept encrypted. A pair that does not decrypt or match is never overwritten and never swapped for another one: push stays off with an error in the log and every device stays registered until the key is fixed. The subject is VAPID_SUBJECT, then an https APP_URL, then the project URL. Only chat messages collapse into one notification per trip, and a replacement still alerts. A 403 removes a device only after three failures in a row; 404 and 410 remove it at once. Password change, reset and an admin setting a password drop the user's devices with the other credentials. The request log redacts subscriptions and endpoints, boot errors print *** for every secret variable, and logout forgets the device with a plain fetch so an expired session cannot redirect midway. Addresses discussion #894. |
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Maurice
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7cfec6452d |
fix(ssrf): let a listed link-local address through, such as a rootless Podman host gateway
A rootless Podman container reaches its host through 169.254.1.2, and an identity provider behind that address failed the OIDC login with "Requests to link-local / cloud-metadata addresses are not allowed", with no setting to change it. ALLOW_LINK_LOCAL_IPS names single link-local IPv4 addresses that may be reached after all. The admin-configured lane (OIDC, AI parsing, plugin OAuth, routing engines) reaches a listed address directly; the guard on user-supplied URLs treats it as internal, so it also needs ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK there. 169.254.169.0/24 and 169.254.170.0/24, where clouds serve instance metadata and credentials, cannot be listed, and an entry that is not one link-local IPv4 aborts startup. Unset, nothing changes. Closes #2400 |
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Luffy
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c0195557d4 | feat(geo): support overriding Nominatim endpoint via env | ||
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A1phaN
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57eac32f9f |
feat(map): amap as map api provider and display template
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RemEx
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dba4434ef6 |
fix(llm-parse): one configurable ceiling for a model call, and undici honours it
The timeout for a model call was spelled three times and adjustable nowhere: 120s in the Anthropic client, 300s in the OpenAI-compatible one, 300s in the Ollama one. None of them was the ceiling that actually applied, either — every one of those calls goes through the pinned undici dispatcher, and an undici Agent stops waiting for response headers after five minutes by default, so a client constant set above that never got the chance to fire. - LLM_TIMEOUT_MS (default 900000) replaces the three constants and is passed to the dispatcher as headersTimeout/bodyTimeout, so the abort signal and undici are governed by the same setting. The default is deliberately generous: heavier parsing work should fit without a code change, and an admin who would rather fail fast can lower it. - The ceiling stays on the model lane. safeFetchAdminConfigured is also the OIDC lane (discovery, token, userinfo, JWKS) and the plugin OAuth token exchange, and that one sends no AbortSignal of its own, so it keeps undici's five minutes rather than inheriting a model setting. - The derived value is floored: the schema accepts any positive number and undici rejects a fractional headersTimeout. |
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jubnl
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bc10fba389 |
feat(plugins): TREK_PLUGINS_IGNORE_TREK_RANGE turns the version gate into a warning (#2226)
* feat(plugins): TREK_PLUGINS_IGNORE_TREK_RANGE turns the version gate into a warning A plugin whose author has not updated its `trek` range for the running TREK can now be installed, updated and activated when the operator sets TREK_PLUGINS_IGNORE_TREK_RANGE to a truthy value. Every gate (registry picker, post-extraction re-check, sideload, dev-link, activation) warns instead of refusing; a missing range is tolerated the same way; "install latest" takes the newest published version. The plugin-API version gate is not lifted and the Discover compatibility verdict stays truthful. The admin is warned at every step: each bypass is logged, install/upload/link/ update responses carry a `trekRangeBypassed` marker, and both admin panels show a "Version checks off" pill, an "Install anyway" confirm dialog before a registry install, the same notice after a path that could not ask first, and a persistent chip on the row while the plugin runs outside its range. Nine new i18n keys in every locale; wiki pages updated (Environment-Variables, Admin-Plugins, Plugin-Development, Security-Hardening). * refactor(plugins): one useRangeBypass hook behind both admin shells SonarQube flagged PR 2226 at 10.8% duplicated new code: the range-bypass logic had been added to the desktop and phone plugin panels as identical copies. The marker/warning types, the row chip, the "Install anyway" offer, the dialog copy and the confirm-or-notice state now live in useRangeBypass (next to useInstanceSettings, the existing shared-logic precedent); each panel keeps only its own dialog/sheet markup. * docs(claude): record the SonarQube gate rules and the no-English-placeholder i18n rule The CI SonarCloud gate (Sonar way, on new code: >=80% coverage, <=3% duplication, A ratings, hotspots reviewed) was only discoverable by waiting 20-25 minutes for the workflow. The root CLAUDE.md now states the conditions, the desktop/mobile shell-mirror duplication trap and its shared-hook fix, and how to check a PR with the sonarqube MCP first; client and server CLAUDE.md point at it. shared/CLAUDE.md says every locale needs a real translation — parity cannot tell an English placeholder from a translation. * docs(claude): keep CLAUDE.md to commands, invariants, gates and philosophy Verified every concrete claim in the five CLAUDE.md files against the code and fixed the stale ones: the websocket server is the Nest realtime gateway, MCP tools live in <domain>.mcp.ts files, the client "native shell" section described code that was never written, offline maps also prefetch vector basemaps, plus several renamed files and wrong table names. Then trimmed everything that drifts on its own: dates, migration history, counts, and inventories of stores, slices, domains, sync files and CLI commands. What stays is the commands, the invariants with the file that enforces each one, what CI actually runs, the reference implementations to copy, and the rules for new code. Each file now opens with that rule. |
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Maurice
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1f66ef1d32 |
fix(maps): let users and admins enter a CARTO API key (#2060)
CARTO stamps an "API KEY REQUIRED" watermark onto every basemap tile fetched without a key since 26.08.2026, and both CartoDB presets plus the built-in fallback are CARTO. The key is free and needs no account, so add it as a setting rather than dropping the provider. carto_api_key sits next to mapbox_access_token: per user in Settings/Map, instance-wide under Admin/User Defaults, encrypted at rest, injected from CARTO_API_KEY on managed instances. Unlike Mapbox it never switches the map provider, since a raster key says nothing about the renderer. The key is appended as ?key= at render time instead of being stored in the template, so a saved URL stays portable and survives a rotation. That is also what reaches the four maps that pinned CARTO and ignored the user's tile setting: atlas, collections, the public trip share and the public journey. The two share pages read it from their token-gated payload, the same way baseCurrency already travels. Also lifts the release notice above page chrome. Its overlay sat at z-index 50, under the Vacay mode toolbar at 61, so the dialog was neither on top nor modal. Adds a six-step layer scale to index.css and moves the three notice shells onto it. Closes #2054 Closes #2052 |
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Maurice
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a7aaa29c16 |
fix(db): stop losing secrets and notes to the boot and migration paths
An unreadable or empty encryption-key file was treated the same as a missing one: regenerate and overwrite. That is the one case where regenerating is the worst possible move - every secret already at rest becomes undecryptable, permanently. Both now refuse to start and say which file to fix. The key-rotation script advertised re-encrypting all stored secrets while its hardcoded column lists had drifted: the AirTrail key, the per-user LLM key and the plugin OAuth tokens were never migrated, so they silently stopped decrypting after a rotation. The parity test now pins the full set against what the code actually encrypts, rather than two tables of it. The schema_version bump ran outside the migration's transaction, so a crash in between left the schema advanced and the version stale - the next boot replayed a non-idempotent step and exited, turning one crash into a boot loop. And the TICKETJSON receipt migration matched with LIKE, which SQLite treats case-insensitively, so a note somebody had typed starting 'ticketjson:' was cut up and its text dropped. Also: APP_VERSION was interpolated into migration SQL instead of bound, the capture-metadata backfill passed (photoId, userId) to a (userId, photoId) signature and its mock keyed on the wrong argument, TRUST_PROXY=0 was accepted and silently coerced to 1, demo-reset hardcoded the db path instead of honouring TREK_DB_FILE, and a demo instance with no DEMO_ADMIN_PASS set now says out loud that its admin password is the published default. |
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jubnl
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305b113d5f |
Feat/storage driver (#1949)
* feat(storage): storage key validation, driver contract suite, LocalDriver * feat(storage): MirrorDriver composite backend * feat(server): add TREK_UPLOADS_DIR env var for the uploads root * feat(storage): settings-backed registry, StorageService facade, module wiring * test(storage): pin src/nest/storage coverage thresholds * feat(storage): multer upload options factory * refactor(files): spool trip-file uploads through storage * refactor(collab): spool note attachments through storage; normalize files/ prefix * refactor(journey): spool journey media uploads through storage * refactor(trips): spool trip cover upload through storage * refactor(places): spool place-image and collection uploads through storage * refactor(auth): spool avatar upload through storage * fix(server): consolidate allowed_file_types onto AllowedFileTypesService * fix(storage): default defParamCharset to utf8 in the upload factory * test(db): re-point the trailing-migration guard at the trip_files prefix strip * fix(storage): age-gate the boot spool sweep * test(files): key FILE-P02 residue checks on upload size * test(storage): raise src/nest/storage coverage pin * refactor(platform): serve /uploads routes through storage * refactor(files): serve trip-file downloads through storage * refactor(memories): serve photo bytes through storage * refactor(maps): stream place-photo bytes through storage * refactor(share): stream shared place-photo bytes through storage * refactor(journey): serve public journey assets through storage * fix(share): answer place-photo cache miss with 204 like the maps proxy * test(server): close serving-swap gaps surfaced by the full tier * test(storage): raise src/nest/storage branches pin * refactor(place-photos): route place-photo cache through storage * refactor(places): reclaim place images and collection covers through storage * refactor(trips): trip covers through storage * refactor(auth): avatar reclaim through storage * refactor(collab): note-file deletion through storage * refactor(files): trash deletion through storage * refactor(memories): trek photo cache internals through storage * refactor(memories): thumbnail service category-addressed * refactor(memories): immich upload reads through storage; drop uploads-root * refactor(journey): photo deletion through storage * fix(memories): reclaim orphaned trek photo cache objects in the ttl sweep * feat(journey): journey-thumbs orphan sweep and delete-site derived-artifact reclaim * test(server): close slice-4 gaps surfaced by the full tier * test(coverage): raise slice-4 domain pins * refactor(backup): list, existence and delete through storage * refactor(backup): download through storage sendToResponse * refactor(backup): create backup through per-category storage enumeration * refactor(backup): restore and upload-restore through storage * refactor(backup): auto-backup retention through storage * refactor(server): boot dir-creation to driver init * test(server): close slice-5 gaps surfaced by the coverage tier * test(coverage): raise slice-5 backup pin * test(server): resolve async backupFileExists mocks for the tests typecheck * test(server): pin ranged-read stat and zero-byte roundtrip in the storage driver contract * feat(server): TREK_S3_* env wiring — schema, s3 namespace, all-or-nothing boot rule * feat(server): S3 driver core — aws-lite client seam, stat/delete, driver-owned deadlines * refactor(server): type the aws-lite S3 client via s3-types reference * feat(server): S3 driver getStream and list — ranged full-object stat, iterator pagination * feat(server): S3 driver put — bounded-peek routing, Upload inactivity deadline * fix(server): S3 driver Upload monitoring — Transform interposition, stream cleanup * feat(server): env-declared s3-main storage backend; settings-declared s3 rejected * test(server): env-gated S3 driver contract suite against MinIO * fix(server): S3 driver zero-byte put — work around aws4 duplicate Content-Length signing defect * fix(server): scope the zero-byte put workaround to buffered bodies; bind test MinIO to localhost * ci(server): MinIO-backed S3 driver contract job * ci(server): align s3-contract shim comment and MinIO bind with references * docs: S3 storage backend configuration and off-box backup mirroring * docs: restore README formatting, keep S3 additions only * ci(server): make live-MinIO contract runs manual-only (AIStor licensing) MinIO's community line is discontinued entirely; the maintained successor, AIStor, requires a license key that can't safely live in a shared CI runner. The s3-contract CI job is removed; live-provider contract runs against MinIO/AIStor are now a manual, license-gated procedure documented in docker-compose.minio-test.yml's header. * chore(server): final-review polish — stale CI refs, dockerignore key, boundary pins, zero-byte tempfile contract case * expose admin ui * feat(shared): storage backend type registry, wire schemas, category relocation * feat(server): accept settings-declared s3 backends — shared-schema options, decrypt-at-build, registry preview() * feat(server): remove TREK_S3_*/TREK_UPLOADS_DIR — tombstone boot rule, built-in override as the relocation path * feat(server): deriveSecurity.encryptionKeySet and storage secret plumbing (gate, encrypt, unmask, mask, redact) * chore(server): drop storage-secrets import that only Task 8's probe helper will use * feat(server): seed-once storage-config.json boot import — fail closed on any invalid seed * feat(server): registry snapshot() — effective storage config with provenance * feat(server): api/admin/storage GET/PUT — masked secrets, preview-gated saves, wired reload, audits * feat(server): api/admin/storage/test — per-target ephemeral probes, mirror targets probed individually * test(server): e2e coverage for api/admin/storage — guards, managed refusal, envelope, probes * test(server): give e2e harness DBs the app_settings table the storage registry reads at boot * test(coverage): raise pins after the storage admin-config slice * fix(server): final-review polish — encryption-gate wording, all-field sentinel guard, README/e2e notes * test(server): storage slice-1 review follow-ups — mirror s3-replica probe decrypt, all-encrypted seed without key, test-route 401 * feat(i18n): storage admin domain + tab label in every locale * feat(client): adminApi storage endpoints — getStorage, updateStorage, testStorageBackend * feat(client): storage admin draft-document helpers + relative-time util * feat(client): schema-driven storage BackendForm — fields by kind, mask echo, encryption banner * feat(client): admin storage panel — backends list, category map, health strip, one-PUT save * feat(client): storage tab on the admin page * feat(client): storage admin panel and section on the phone shell * fix(client): block renaming a storage backend onto an existing name * feat(server): allow mirrors on any storage category — lift the backups-only rule * feat(i18n): replicas-on-primary mirror strings in every locale * feat(client): mirror fold/synthesize model helpers for replicas-on-primary * feat(client): BackendForm mirror-targets composer; raw mirror type hidden * feat(client): desktop storage panel folds mirrors into their primaries * feat(client): phone storage panel folds mirrors into their primaries * fix(client): strip removed backends from remaining mirror replicas — no phantom refs * feat(storage): retire photos as a configurable category — served-only via the ServedCategory seam * feat(i18n): descriptive storage category names and descriptions in every locale * feat(client): descriptive category names, descriptions and id badges in the storage panel * docs(storage): fix stale nine-category comments after the eight-category shrink * docs: storage configuration via the admin UI and seed file — README + compose * docs(wiki): Admin Storage page and storage cross-links * docs(server): storage domain blueprint entry; TREK_PLACE_PHOTO_DIR tombstone clarifier * refactor(server): drop the storage env-var tombstones — the variables never shipped * docs: storage config is simply new in v4 — drop the removed-variables story * feat(shared): backfill-status and usage wire schemas on the storage admin state * feat(server): MirrorDriver.backfill — prefix-scoped, size-compared, cancellable replica catch-up * feat(server): one-at-a-time storage backfill jobs + the storage events bridge * feat(server): storage usage scan — nightly cron, on-demand service, persisted with computedAt * feat(server): replica_failure admin notifications — events bridge, hourly debounce, channel registration * feat(i18n): replica-failure notification text in every locale * feat(server): storage backfill and stats-refresh admin endpoints * feat(client): adminApi backfill and stats-refresh endpoints * feat(i18n): storage sync and usage strings in every locale * feat(client): desktop storage panel — sync now, usage display, backfill polling * feat(client): phone storage panel — sync now, usage display, backfill polling * fix(client): per-category usage line on the phone storage panel * docs: sync now, usage stats and replica-failure notifications * test(server): admin scope now includes replica_failure, not just version_available Commit |
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Maurice
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3a0604b3f5 |
feat(config): put the operator-owned surfaces behind TREK_MANAGED (#1946)
* feat(config): put the operator-owned surfaces behind TREK_MANAGED The switch landed last release with nothing behind it. This is what it turns off, plus the four fixes that came out of walking every one of these surfaces. Nothing here changes anything for an install that does not set the flag. That is not a hope, it is what managed-inert.test.ts asserts: the mode stays off for any unparseable value, no other variable can turn it on, every settings key stays writable, and splitManagedKeys hands back the same object rather than a copy so no write path can quietly diverge on self-hosted installs only. WHAT THE MODE WITHHOLDS Fourteen routes carry @ManagedForbidden: key validation, static MCP tokens, JWT rotation, the OIDC admin pair, restore and auto-backup, plugin sideload and reload, the Ollama model list and pull, and the SMTP test send. Each names the reason it is not the instance admin's, and the reason is mandatory. Eighteen settings keys are filtered instead of refused. SMTP, the OIDC toggles and the WebAuthn pair share one handler with keys the admin does own, and the llm_* family is reachable through per-user settings, the instance defaults and the addon config alike, so a route-level refusal would be both too coarse and incomplete. A locked key is skipped and reported as managed_keys; the rest of the save goes through. Refusing the request would take the registration toggles down with the SMTP block. GET /api/auth/me/settings stops returning the three API keys in the clear. It is the only endpoint that decrypts a stored credential back to the caller, which is fine when the admin pasted it in and wrong when the operator supplied it. Two multipart routes check in the handler rather than the guard: a guard throws before the parser drains the body and the client gets an ECONNRESET instead of the 403 (PROFILE-015). They still carry the marker so the boot gate sees them. WHAT KEEPS IT FROM DRIFTING validate-managed-routes.ts refuses to boot on a marking that is not on the reviewed list, a list entry whose route lost its marking, or a marking with no reason. The third case has no equivalent in the guard gate next door and is the one that matters most: a blank reason destroys the only record of why a control was taken away, and nothing recovers that later. It found two wrong entries in my own list while I was writing this. managed-keys.test.ts asserts that every key in ADMIN_SETTINGS_KEYS and DEFAULTABLE_USER_SETTING_KEYS belongs to exactly one of two sets. A key added to either list belongs to neither until somebody decides, and that is the failure this prevents: the lists grow, the mode does not. PLACES_API_BASE AND PLACES_API_KEY The nine Places endpoints spell out googleapis.com, so an install that wants those calls to leave through something of its own has no way to say so. One variable, substituted where every call already funnels through. A second one supplies the key, and when it is set the users table is not consulted at all — a per-user key would route around whatever the endpoint counts, and those columns are readable by any admin of the instance. FOUR FIXES THAT ARE NOT ABOUT THE MODE An admin setting somebody's password now bumps password_version and clears their MCP tokens. An admin sets a password for one reason, and until now verifyJwtAndLoadUser kept accepting every cookie the intruder already had: the one action taken to lock them out was the one action that did not. The four OIDC provider calls go through the SSRF guard. Three are worse than they look — the token, userinfo and JWKS URLs come out of the discovery response, so they are chosen by the other end, not by an admin. safeFetchLlm is renamed safeFetchAdminConfigured and keeps its old name as an alias, because it is the variant that allows loopback and LAN: a self-hoster with Authentik on localhost:9000 must keep working. The token exchange follows no redirect at all, since one would hand client_secret to a second host. DELETE /api/admin/users/:id/mfa clears another account's TOTP. The passkey half has existed since passkeys landed; the TOTP half never did, which left "somebody on the trip lost their phone" with no answer short of an operator in the database. Never for the caller themselves. TREK_PLUGIN_PERMISSIONS=off refuses to boot when the install is centrally administered. A warning is right for a machine its owner chose to trust; where the person who set the flag and the people whose data is in the database are not the same person, fail closed. TEXTS Four strings lose the phrase "self-hosted" because they describe somebody else's software — an Ollama endpoint, an AirTrail instance, a service a plugin talks to — and read better without it in both modes. The one string that describes TREK itself keeps it, and the mode picks a second key instead, so self-hosters lose nothing. A grep gate in shared/ keeps the canonical locale honest, because the parity check compares the file set and the top-level keys and never looks at a value: re-wording a string is invisible to CI today, and so is putting it back. * feat(maps): supply the map credential with the instance when centrally administered MAPBOX_ACCESS_TOKEN joins PLACES_API_KEY as an operator-supplied value. SettingsService injects it when the settings are read, and picks GL as the provider if the reader is still on Leaflet, since a token is always present. The key moves from the customer set to the locked set. It is the one locked key whose value is public by design — a pk.* token has to reach the browser to be useful — so this is not about secrecy: a per-user save landing on top of the instance token would only break the map for that user. Both settings fields for it go away with it. * fix(auth): count the operator key when reporting whether Google features work has_maps_key only looked at the users table, but getMapsKey prefers the PLACES_API_KEY env over anything stored there. On an install that supplies the key that way and has an empty column, every lookup worked while the client was told there was no key and hid the search, the autocomplete and the place photos. Found by walking the running instance rather than the code: the map came up, the search box did not. * feat(admin): hide the settings a centrally administered install cannot act on A control that answers 403 is worse than no control: the AI section rendered the refusal as "Request failed with status code 403", which tells an admin they broke something rather than that the decision is not theirs. So the surfaces go rather than being disabled in place: - AI parsing and AirTrail leave the addon list, and the AI addon route now refuses outright. The endpoint, the model and what a document costs come with the instance, so there is no instance decision left — not even whether it runs. - Immich and Synology Photos leave it too. Both connect to a server the reader runs at home, and there is no route from here to one. - The SMTP block, the admin webhook and ntfy targets, and the passkey RP ID and origins follow the same rule: they configure something the operator owns, and a wrong RP ID on a shared parent domain reaches past this instance entirely. - The About tab goes. It is about the project — what TREK is, where to file a bug, where to support it — and is aimed at the person running the software. The version and the link to the source move to the sidebar footer, on both the desktop page and the mobile twin, because AGPL 13 wants that offer wherever people reach the software over a network. - The update check stops asking GitHub and reports nothing available. Separately, the version footers lose the "self-hosted" suffix everywhere, not just here. It read as a label on the software rather than on the install, and the version alone says what it needs to. * feat(config): refuse to boot centrally administered without an at-rest key Measured on a running instance rather than assumed: with ENCRYPTION_KEY unset, the at-rest key falls back to a file in the data volume, and backupService bundles that file into every archive it builds. The archive is downloadable by any instance admin, so the encryption ships with its own key in the same zip. The skip in backupService already handles this — it only omits the file when the key came from the env — but nothing made sure the env actually carried one. Provisioning sets it; forgetting it was silent. validateEnvAtBoot now carries a second kind of check next to the schema: cross- field rules that only apply with the flag set, for combinations where every value is individually valid and the result is wrong. Empty without the flag, so an install that never asked to be centrally administered cannot meet it. * feat(client): add an attachment point for install-specific screens Two empty exports on the client, an empty module on the server, and the four places that read them. Nothing here adds a route, a nav entry or an endpoint — the arrays are empty and the module contributes nothing, which managed-ext.test pins so it stays that way. Read unconditionally, never behind a flag. On the server a conditional import would tie the module graph to an environment variable, and the graph is built once per app while the flag is read live; on the client an empty array costs nothing to spread, so every build walks the same path instead of one build walking a path nobody tests. Anything attached here follows the same rules as the rest of src/nest and src/components: a real module with a controller and a provider, bodies through the Zod pipe, routes under the global guards, tests. * test(shared): move the wording gate out of src so shared typechecks again CI installs shared with its own dependencies only (npm ci --workspace shared), so there is no @types/node and the `node:fs` import inside src/ failed to compile. The tests passed the whole time — vitest supplies the module — which is why this only showed up in the typecheck step. The walk moves to scripts/, next to i18n-parity.mjs, and the spec imports it the same way that one does. It also runs on its own now (`node scripts/i18n-selfhost-wording.mjs`), which is what you want when CI names a line you have to go find. * test(server): repair the call sites typecheck:tests caught tests/ sits outside the build tsconfig, so none of this showed up in a green test run — which is exactly the gap `npm run typecheck:tests` exists to close. Three kinds, all mine: - Seven `import type` paths for RuntimeEnvService carried one `../` too many. Type-only imports are erased, so vitest never resolved them and nothing failed. - VersionCheckJob and PluginsController grew a constructor parameter and eleven hand-wired `new` calls kept passing the old count. The argument arrived as undefined and no assertion happened to read it. - ConditionContext grew `managed`, and the shared context object in the conditions suite did not. The condition also had no test of its own, so it has one now: both directions, since the registry uses `is: false` to keep a notice away and a notice that only belongs on a centrally administered install would use `is: true`. |
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Maurice
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bfb3bcd63c |
feat(config): mark an install as centrally administered
Some installs are run by somebody other than the person who administers them. The operator owns the credentials, the configuration and the upgrade schedule, and the admin of the instance is a user of the result rather than the one who set it up. Nothing in the app knows that today, so it keeps offering settings whose values are not the admin's to change, and the honest answer to half of them would be a 403 the UI never anticipated. TREK_MANAGED says it once. It is a single boolean and the surfaces that care read it themselves, so adding one never comes back to the config layer. Runtime-toggled, in the same class as DEMO_MODE, rather than a registerAs token: roughly sixty tests mutate env mid-lifetime, and a value frozen per built app breaks all of them. `=== true` on the way in, so an unset, empty or misspelled value means off — a managed install sets it deliberately, and a typo must not quietly take settings away from an admin who never asked for it. The guard keys on a decorator, not on a path. MfaPolicyGuard documents where the two literal path lists it replaced ended up: they stopped being maintained, and every endpoint added afterwards silently fell on the wrong side. A marker on the handler cannot drift away from the handler. It carries a mandatory reason, which is for the next reader of the source rather than for the client, so the marks stay auditable. It registers third, after the auth and MFA guards, so a stranger still gets the 401 those two would have given them instead of a 403 that would confirm the route exists. And it checks the mode before it touches metadata, because it runs on every request of every install and almost all of them are self-hosted. One 403 body, shared by REST and MCP. DEMO_MODE grew two texts for the same condition and neither can be changed now without hunting for the other. The flag reaches the client through app-config so the UI can stop offering what the server would refuse anyway, but it is deliberately not persisted the way demo_mode is: two installs can share a browser profile, and a stale "this one is managed" would take settings away on an install that never set it. No route carries the marker yet. The per-domain marks follow. Unset, which is every self-hosted install, nothing about this changes anything. |
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Maurice
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98ad2450a2 |
feat(db): make the SQLite journal mode configurable (#1675)
WAL was hardcoded, and on network-backed storage — Azure App Service Linux, SMB/NFS volumes on NAS and PaaS — SQLite documents it as unsafe, because the coordination runs through the -shm file and mmap. Operators had no way out. TREK_DB_JOURNAL_MODE and TREK_DB_SYNCHRONOUS now set both pragmas, defaulting to today's behaviour. The mode lives in the file header, so all three processes that open travel.db read the same configuration — the server, reset-admin.js and migrate-encryption.ts, which used to hard-set WAL and would have silently reverted a deliberate DELETE setup on the first key rotation. An invalid value falls back and warns rather than refusing to start, and the mode that actually took effect is read back and logged, so an operator can see whether the setting landed. |
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jubnl
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cafff003a3 | refactor(server): move instance-URL resolution to app-config | ||
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jubnl
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0f3a6f80b7 | chore(server): forbid direct process.env access outside app-config | ||
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jubnl
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48ba9092c3 | feat(server): add app-config core with fail-fast env validation |