Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Maurice 8e5fdaa877 fix(server): tighten the guard, audit and token paths
Permissions cached an empty map before it had loaded, so a DB error during
the load cached permissive defaults and every later check answered from that
cache - fail-open, and it never expired. The rate limiter grew its per-IP map
forever; the GC the legacy version had was dropped in the fold. Idempotency
did a check-then-insert, so two concurrent duplicates both ran the handler.

Audit rows recorded whatever X-Forwarded-For said, which the client writes,
and the request-body debug logger redacted by exact key match - it missed
refresh tokens, api keys and PKCE verifiers. FORCE_HTTPS built its redirect
from the client's Host header. CSP asked for unsafe-eval on top of the
wasm-unsafe-eval it actually needs.

The OAuth deny path redirected to an unvalidated URI, ws-token minting had
no rate limit at all, and PKCE was skipped when code_verifier was absent
rather than refused. An MCP session resumed with a token whose scopes had
since been reduced kept the capability set it was created with, and the
session cap was checked before the async registration that increments it.

Plugin frame containment was lexical, so a symlink out of the directory was
never noticed, and instance config accepted keys the manifest never
declared.
2026-08-23 11:59:12 +02:00
jubnl 1239be4259 refactor(server): fold the _shared MCP helpers into an injectable guards provider; delete the last bridge 2026-08-11 23:11:34 +02:00
jubnl 2b2c6462ec refactor(server): fold the in-container bridge edges 2026-08-11 16:32:02 +02:00
jubnl 0718bd1b0c refactor(server): shrink the seam bridges to their live exports 2026-08-11 16:23:46 +02:00
jubnl 132eb2035f fix(server): fix the quirks preserved by the permissions and auditLog DI migrations
Permissions: stored levels are validated at load (corrupt/out-of-range rows
fall back to the default consistently across all readers), the load-error
swallow is narrowed to missing-table (anything else logs), and an
all-skipped save no longer opens a transaction or flushes the cache.
The module-scoped cache stays by design (shared DI+bridge invalidation),
and the checkPermission 'admin' case stays — it is reachable (correct deny
for non-admins on admin-level actions), not dead code.

Audit: data/logs creation is lazy (no import-time disk side effect; the
LOG_LEVEL freeze remains — tests/setup.ts timing contract), the log helpers
gate on a real severity threshold (error < warn < info < debug; prod
default 'info' unchanged), file-IO failures leave a console.error trace
instead of vanishing in bare catches, and resolveUserEmail treats only
null/undefined as anonymous so a real id 0 resolves via the DB.
2026-07-27 22:34:41 +02:00
jubnl 1d56de3897 chore: move permissions backend to proper DI 2026-07-27 22:08:37 +02:00