Permissions cached an empty map before it had loaded, so a DB error during
the load cached permissive defaults and every later check answered from that
cache - fail-open, and it never expired. The rate limiter grew its per-IP map
forever; the GC the legacy version had was dropped in the fold. Idempotency
did a check-then-insert, so two concurrent duplicates both ran the handler.
Audit rows recorded whatever X-Forwarded-For said, which the client writes,
and the request-body debug logger redacted by exact key match - it missed
refresh tokens, api keys and PKCE verifiers. FORCE_HTTPS built its redirect
from the client's Host header. CSP asked for unsafe-eval on top of the
wasm-unsafe-eval it actually needs.
The OAuth deny path redirected to an unvalidated URI, ws-token minting had
no rate limit at all, and PKCE was skipped when code_verifier was absent
rather than refused. An MCP session resumed with a token whose scopes had
since been reduced kept the capability set it was created with, and the
session cap was checked before the async registration that increments it.
Plugin frame containment was lexical, so a symlink out of the directory was
never noticed, and instance config accepted keys the manifest never
declared.
Searching worked for the admin and 403'd for every other member. getMapsKey read
the calling user's own row first and then fell through to "any admin" via LIMIT 1
with no ORDER BY, so the admin who pasted the key hit their own row while everyone
else got a non-deterministic stranger's. That fallback is what CLAUDE.md forbids.
The Places and Unsplash keys bill the install, not the account that pasted them
in, so they become instance configuration: an encrypted app_settings row, resolved
as env -> instance -> the caller's own row, the same shape #1772 chose for the LLM
endpoint. The per-user column stays as the last step because /me/api-keys has
always accepted a personal key.
The trailing migration carries an existing install's key into the instance row so
nothing degrades to OpenStreetMap on upgrade, but only where that key already was
the whole install's: as soon as a second row holds one, it is left alone, because
the instance row outranks everybody's own column and an upgrade must not move a
member onto someone else's key and bill.
Two things from the same report:
The key test button probed with field mask places.displayName while the search
asks for places.rating and more, which is a separate SKU and can be restricted on
its own, so the button could pass while every search failed. It now probes the
resolved key with the search's own mask.
Saving API keys wrote no audit line. It now writes one settings.api_keys_update
row naming which fields changed, never their values, comparing cleartext because
the random IV makes every ciphertext look different.
Closes#1939
Permissions: stored levels are validated at load (corrupt/out-of-range rows
fall back to the default consistently across all readers), the load-error
swallow is narrowed to missing-table (anything else logs), and an
all-skipped save no longer opens a transaction or flushes the cache.
The module-scoped cache stays by design (shared DI+bridge invalidation),
and the checkPermission 'admin' case stays — it is reachable (correct deny
for non-admins on admin-level actions), not dead code.
Audit: data/logs creation is lazy (no import-time disk side effect; the
LOG_LEVEL freeze remains — tests/setup.ts timing contract), the log helpers
gate on a real severity threshold (error < warn < info < debug; prod
default 'info' unchanged), file-IO failures leave a console.error trace
instead of vanishing in bare catches, and resolveUserEmail treats only
null/undefined as anonymous so a real id 0 resolves via the DB.
Maurice