`.meta()` advertises every node of the declaration; `nodeToZod` only walks the
ones it can type. Everything below follows from that gap, so the keyword
allowlist moves into `sanitiseNode`, which is the one walker that sees every
node.
A `pattern` was compiled straight into a RegExp and run on the main thread
against caller input, with no timeout and nothing to abort it: `^(a+)+$` against
33 characters stops the whole server, not just MCP. That is an escape from the
supervised child into the host event loop, and it does not take malice, since a
hand-written email pattern is the classic accident. Quantified groups that repeat
or alternate inside are refused, and the source is capped.
`mcp:tools` counted as a side effect, so `readOnlyHint` was structurally
unreachable: holding that grant is what lets a plugin advertise a tool at all.
Every plugin tool was therefore advertised as potentially destructive and every
client's auto-approval was off. It is a host entry point like `hook:*`, and is
classified as one.
Property names, `default` and `examples` were the strings that never met the
sanitiser. A key may carry newlines, so `\n## SYSTEM\n...` in one defeated the
newline collapse everything else goes through. Names are identifiers now; sample
values keep their own keys but have their strings bounded.
Also refused at parse time, which is what the rest of the file already does: an
object `enum` member carrying `$ref` past the deep scan, a non-boolean
`additionalProperties` advertised and checked by nothing, `enum` beside
`properties` skipping the children, a root `enum`/`const`/`nullable` producing a
non-object schema the SDK cannot read, and a draft-4 `exclusiveMinimum: true`
dropped from the check while staying in the advertisement.
`required` used `in`, so a field named `toString` read as present on every call.
Nodes are built with a null prototype, and the three names Zod cannot round-trip
are refused rather than silently lost.
A result block that had to be shortened got no marker and no log line, which
reads to the model like the whole answer. It is counted now, like a dropped one,
and `isError` survives every envelope path.
The security test file carried two raw NUL bytes, so git, GitHub and ripgrep all
treated it as binary: no diff, no blame, no review. Escaped, same runtime value.
Found in review of the branch. Each one is a case where the host told the
model or the admin something it did not enforce.
Advertised schemas are now enforced. buildToolInputSchema built a loose
object that checked only which keys were present, so a tool advertising
an integer, an enum and additionalProperties: false accepted a string, an
unlisted value and an extra property. .meta() still advertises the
declaration verbatim, and the schema underneath it is now built from that
same declaration, so the two cannot disagree. Anything the builder cannot
enforce (oneOf, unknown formats, non-primitive enum members) is refused by
parseManifest rather than advertised, and the failure lands at install
time where an admin sees it.
Writing the test for that turned up a live bug: z.custom() cannot be
represented in JSON Schema, so building enums that way would have thrown
inside tools/list for the whole session. Enums and consts are real literal
types now.
readOnlyHint classification fails closed. The side-effect list spelled out
db:write: and missed db:create:trips entirely, letting a plugin that can
create trips advertise a tool as read-only and idempotent, which is what
clients gate auto-approval on. It is an allowlist of read-only grants now,
and mcp-tool-annotations.test.ts walks the whole catalog so a new
permission fails a test rather than producing a wrong hint.
The result cap covers the whole result. It bounded each text block, so a
hundred blocks cost a hundred times the limit: 6.5M characters in a probe,
now 65K. Large objects are serialised with a budget instead of stringified
whole and then sliced, and the block count is capped.
The admin tool list was dead code. The registry preview carries only
widget and tripPage, so the section added for it never rendered, and the
UI hid the description behind the title when both existed. The preview
carries sanitised tools now (previewManifest is exported and tested, which
is how the gap survived), and both fields render, description always.
plugins:use is out of the DCR default. Adding it to ALL_SCOPES meant a
registration that names no scopes got it and had it pre-selected at
consent. Defaults come from DEFAULT_CLIENT_SCOPES now; asking for it by
name still works.
The public ManifestCapabilities gained mcpTools, so a typed manifest can
express what the runtime already validates.
MCPANN-001..005, MCPENF-001..010, MCPPREV-001..005, MCPTOOLS-020..022,
SDKP-015b/c.
The advertised tool surface is frozen at initialize, so anything that
changes which plugin tools exist has to end the sessions built before it.
tools/list_changed is not an alternative: no event store is configured,
and the surface would not be re-read anyway.
Unconditional, no diffing. The surface is per-session, since it depends
on the caller's scopes and the plugin's grants, so there is no ctx-free
set to compare against.
Five routes, mirroring what admin.controller.ts already does for addons:
activate, deactivate, update, retrust and uninstall. activate(id,
consent), update and retrust are also the grant-change paths, so "on an
mcp:tools grant change" needs nothing extra. A failed call invalidates
nothing, because nothing changed.
The addon cascade needed its own call. Disabling an addon can stop a
plugin that publishes tools, and the addon doing the cascading is not
necessarily one of MCP_RELEVANT_ADDONS, so mcpAffected does not cover it.
Still gated on a plugin actually stopping, which keeps the #1414 rule
that a config-only save kills nothing.
Imported from sessionManager rather than the src/mcp barrel, which
evaluates readEnv().mcp at module scope.
MCPINV-001 to MCPINV-007.
The advertise path, shaped like trip-warnings.mcp.ts: gate on the kill
switch, fan out over providersOf, let a failing provider contribute
nothing rather than fail the surface.
A tool is advertised only if the signed manifest declares it AND the
running build reported implementing it, the same two-sided check
callPlugin makes for exports. The manifest half is what makes the text
auditable: the child composes its loaded payload after onLoad, so without
it a sha256-pinned artifact could change what it publishes on every
restart with no re-consent.
The result envelope is built here, always. The registry returns a
handler's value verbatim and skips output validation without an
outputSchema, so a plugin returning {ok: true, data} would emit a result
with no content key and every conforming client would error. A failed or
timed-out invoke becomes isError rather than a JSON-RPC fault, so the
model can see it and try something else.
Gates in order: kill switch, then demo mode. The plugins domain had no
demo call site before, and the child has none of its own.
The service owns the process-level source rather than PluginRuntimeService
beside the other sinks, because it needs PluginHooks and PluginHooks
injects PluginRuntimeService. It clears the source on destroy, which the
existing setPluginChannelSource forgets to do: a torn-down buildApp()
would otherwise leave a live source closing over a dead runtime and bleed
into the next suite.
mcpToolCapabilities is a parallel reader rather than a capabilityList
generalisation, since that one returns string[]. It re-runs the manifest
parser instead of trusting the stored blob, which was written by whatever
parser was current at install time and whose caps are the security
control.
Two caps not in the brief: MCP_TOOLS_TOTAL_MAX across all plugins, since
8 each times twenty installed plugins would put 160 tools in front of a
model already choosing from ~200. Truncation is logged, because a
truncated surface reads exactly like a plugin that published nothing.
MCPTOOLS-001 to MCPTOOLS-019.
Tools are declared in the signed manifest, not only reported at load.
plugin-host-entry composes its loaded payload AFTER onLoad runs, so a
signed, sha256-pinned artifact could otherwise emit different tool text on
every restart with no version bump and no re-consent. The host will
advertise the intersection of the two.
It also gives the admin something to read. What mcp:tools will put in
front of every user is a manifest field now, so it can be shown on the
consent screen before the grant is given.
Rejects rather than drops, unlike most capability parsing: a malformed
tool should fail the install visibly, not become a tool that silently
never appears once the plugin is running. Caps and sanitising come from
mcp-tool-schema.ts, so the install path and the advertise path cannot
disagree about them.
Declaring tools without mcp:tools is an error on both sides. Otherwise
the consent screen lists tools that can never run.
No migration: install/discovery.ts already persists capabilities as JSON.
The SDK validator mirrors the checks it can make without the server's
normaliser, so `trek-plugin validate` catches a bad declaration before
publish rather than at install.
The security control for plugin MCP tools, landed on its own so it is
reviewable as one diff. Pure and Nest-free: no container, no DB, no
running plugin needed to test it.
The threat is not a plugin crashing. A tool name, title and description
are a persistent, admin-invisible write into every user's assistant
context, and .meta() puts the JSON Schema there verbatim. TREK's own code
proves the channel is obeyed: the static-token deprecation notice is
delivered in a tool result precisely because that is what an assistant
reliably surfaces.
sanitiseAssistantText is a sibling of stripEmoji, not a change to it.
stripEmoji preserves newlines on purpose (PDF paragraphs) and ~15 render
call sites depend on that. The new one collapses every whitespace run to
a single space, so a description cannot forge "## System" as a heading
that reads to the model like host text, and strips more than the brief
asked for: the bidi overrides and isolates and U+2028/9 are neither C0
controls nor \n, so they defeat both halves of the stated rule.
The schema is advertised rather than converted. z.looseObject({}).meta()
passes the plugin's own schema through byte for byte, keeping pattern,
oneOf and format, which a hand-rolled converter flattens to unknown. The
.check() keeps required enforced, so the handler cannot receive a call
missing arguments its own schema declared mandatory.
That only works with a normaliser in front, since .meta() is a
passthrough. It rejects a root type that is not object (which would
advertise a non-object inputSchema while the runtime still passes an
object), rejects $ref/$defs/definitions at any depth, and caps bytes,
properties and nesting. It strips a top-level id, which vanishes from the
advertisement and lands in z.globalRegistry._idmap, a strong Map unlike
the WeakMap holding the rest.
Sanitising recurses into every nested description, title and string enum
member. That is the part a top-level cap misses, and where a property
named trek_session_token with a plausible description would live.
Annotations are clamped asymmetrically. readOnlyHint gates client
auto-approval, so a plugin may lower its danger level and never raise it;
openWorldHint goes the other way, since egress makes a tool open-world
whether it admits it or not. db:own is deliberately not a side effect:
counting the plugin's private SQLite would make nearly every plugin
non-read-only and kill auto-approval for legitimate read tools.
MCPSCHEMA-001 to MCPSCHEMA-030.
Modelled on the hook:* family rather than on geolocation:read. The host
dispatches INTO the child for every tool call, so it needs what
HOOK_PERMISSION buys: providersOf()'s active-and-holds-the-grant check,
the second gate in invokeHook, and the acting-user binding. That last one
is the point. The user is bound host-side from the supervisor's
invocation map, so a tool called by user A reaches A's data whatever the
model puts in args.
The permission keeps no hook: prefix because the surface it opens is MCP,
not a TREK render slot, and nothing keys off that prefix. It is the first
HOOK_PERMISSION value shaped that way; `satisfies` still holds.
One commit, because it cannot be split. requireTotalCoverage makes a
HOOK_PERMISSION key with no @PluginHook consumer a boot failure, not a
test failure, and PluginRpcRegistryService.onModuleInit runs in every
buildApp() — so a half-landed version breaks every integration test in the
repo. The generator is chained to it too: it refuses to run without both
the en admin label and the CLI hint.
15s is the longest budget of any read hook. The others back a render
someone is waiting on and fall back when they time out; this one backs a
chat turn, and the plugin is likely calling a third-party API of its own.
Still under the supervisor's unused 30s default, which is a hung client
rather than a budget.
One callTool fn for every tool, since tool names are runtime data and
hookContracts() is keyed by (hook, fn).
PluginDefinition exists in two copies with no generator between them, so
both get McpToolProvider. grantGaps and the dev mock host need no change:
both read HOOK_PERMISSION, which is generated.
PLUGHOOK-010, plus the CONTRACTS row.
One coarse scope rather than per-plugin granularity. Which plugins are
installed is runtime data, so a per-plugin scope cannot be statically
enumerated: it would break the ${group}:${mode} derivation and the
AssertExact guards in nest-mcp-policy.ts, and its consent copy could not
be written ahead of time for a third-party plugin name. Tokens issued
before a plugin existed could never carry its scope either. Per-plugin
granularity already exists one layer down as the admin's mcp:tools grant.
'use' is a fourth mode, which widens ScopeMode. Nothing else moves:
McpAccessGroup and McpAccessMode derive from Scope, so both AssertExact
guards self-heal, and the policy's fallback branch already covers a third
mode the way it covers files:content.
The presets needed an explicit exclusion. Five of the six are written as
"everything except deletes", so plugins:use would have joined Claude.ai,
Cursor, Windsurf and Zed silently and handed out third-party tool
execution without anyone choosing it. That filter was duplicated across
the desktop and mobile files with nothing pinning it, so both now use one
shared constant, and FE-OAUTH-SCOPES-012 holds the line for the next
scope like this one.
The consent copy says what the scope does not do: the RPC host authorises
from grants frozen at construction, so this scope plus weather:read still
reaches whatever the plugin itself was granted.
Two i18n gates, not one. The dot-only group key is tracked by
i18n-parity.mjs, whose regex has no colon in its character class; the
colon-bearing label/description pair is invisible to it but is compared by
client/tests/unit/i18n/parity.test.ts, which diffs merged bundles. All 23
locales get all three keys, including the three in neither gate.
The consent glyph gets a ':use' branch. Falling through to the eye would
tell the user a tool-running scope only looks at things.
Sibling of plugin-event-sink.ts: the plugins layer registers a source, and
src/mcp/tools.ts reads it as a defaulted argument. mcp-transport/ is not
touched at all, so it never learns that plugins exist and the tool-call
audit row for a plugin tool comes out of code that did not change.
Pull rather than push, unlike the event sink, because the answer depends
on the session's ctx: there is nothing a push could carry ahead of time,
and reading it per attach means activating or uninstalling a plugin takes
effect on the next session with nothing to invalidate. Same argument
channel-registry.ts makes for setPluginChannelSource.
An unset source means "no plugin tools" rather than an error, the right
answer for any app built without the plugins runtime. MCPSINK-003 pins
that case, which none of the sibling sinks covers today.
Not try/caught here: attach() already contains a throwing source and logs
which one failed, and catching again would swallow that.
The harness takes dynamicTools explicitly so suites exercise the path
without installing a process-level source.
MCPSINK-001 to MCPSINK-005.
A host can now contribute tools for one session through
McpAttachOptions.dynamicTools, consulted once per attach() with that
session's ctx.
It belongs here rather than in the host calling server.registerTool()
itself, because attach() is where the onInvoke seam fires. Anything
registered outside it is invisible to the tool-call audit trail, and
handlers that run as the calling user are the last thing that should sit
in an audit blind spot.
The source is synchronous: attach() runs inside the initialize request,
so an awaited source would put a third party's round trip in front of
every session creation.
Two properties carry the weight, both security ones:
- Names are reserved against every registered entry, not against what
this session was granted. Reserving against the session would mean a
token scoped to trips:read has no create_trip attached, so a
contributed tool could take that name for exactly the callers holding
no scope for it.
- Nothing a contributor does can make attach() throw. Hosts call it
outside their request try block, so an escape is a 500 on every
initialize and one bad contributor takes MCP down instance-wide. The
source is contained once, each entry again. Both live throw sites are
covered: the SDK duplicate-name throw, and the policy-less declarative
access throw that registered entries only avoid because validate()
pre-checks them at boot.
ToolOptions.inputSchema widens to ZodRawShape | McpZodSchema. The SDK has
accepted either since it normalises both to one object schema, and a
whole schema is what lets a host advertise one it did not author (via
.meta()) without converting it to Zod first. The arms are disjoint, so
nothing else moves; one test cast in decorators.test.ts records which arm
that decorator declared.
DYNTOOL-001 to DYNTOOL-014.
The body was a hand-inlined duplicate of sessionManager's own closeSession
helper, so it moves next to revokeUserSessions and reuses it. The barrel
re-exports it, leaving admin.service.ts and admin.controller.ts untouched.
The reason to move it is that callers outside src/mcp/ are coming. index.ts
evaluates readEnv().mcp at module scope and installs the sweep interval, so
importing the barrel from a domain module drags both into every test file
that mocks app-config with a partial export set, which is the hazard kill-switch.ts
documents. sessionManager.ts has no module-scope side effects.
The log line loses "due to addon state change"; addons stop being the only
thing that invalidates a session surface.
SESS-017 to SESS-020 cover it.
The importer's parsed item spells the provider id `googleFtid`; the match rule
reads `google_ftid`. `isPlaceDuplicate` was handed a mapped object, but
`findDuplicatePlace` got the raw one, so its id strategy was always empty. The
name then decided the match, and a second place sharing that name could take the
ftid belonging to the renamed one. One candidate now serves all three calls.
Sharing the strategy list shares the ORDER, not the comparison, and two
differences survive it. SQLite `lower()` is ASCII-only where JavaScript's is not,
so a row stored as CAFÉ CENTRAL does not match the candidate Café Central in SQL
while it does in memory. The coordinate fallback used to paper over that for a
named candidate, sometimes with the wrong row. And `buildDedupSet` collects
coordinates only for unnamed rows while the coordinate query considers every row,
which is the answer `findMatchingPlaceId` wants and the opposite of what the
in-memory half says. Both are now written down where someone will read them, and
pinned by tests, rather than implied away.
PLACE-SVC-028e covers the backfill landing on the right row. PLACES-SVC-014 to
-017 cover the id beating a misleading name, both remaining divergences, and the
tolerance as a number rather than as a reference to itself.
Two consumers decide whether a candidate place is one the trip already has,
and they spelled the rule out separately: the bulk importers ask an in-memory
set (isPlaceDuplicate), while findDuplicatePlace asks the database because its
caller needs the matched row's id. The two had drifted — the SQL copy falls
back to a coordinate match for a NAMED candidate, which the in-memory copy
deliberately never does, since that would merge the restaurant and the bar at
the same address.
The order now lives once in @trek/shared as placeMatchStrategies(), and each
consumer is a mechanical interpreter of it: provider id (the only part that
survives a rename, #1550), then name, then coordinates and only when there is
no name.
Adds PlacesService.findMatchingPlaceId as the public door for an importer that
has to link to the existing place rather than merely skip the candidate.
findDuplicatePlace stays private behind it — it also returns google_ftid for
the bulk importer's backfill, which is that caller's business and not part of
"which place is this?".
No behaviour change for either existing caller. The coordinate branch is
currently unreachable from the one call site, which sits inside an
isPlaceDuplicate() guard that has already matched on name and returned; the
drift only bites once something calls it standalone.
COORD_DEDUP_TOLERANCE and externalIdsOf move to shared and are re-exported from
places.helpers, so collections.service and places.service keep their imports.
Guests are trip-scoped accounts. Trip Members excludes them from its picker and
refuses them on the write path, and Collections does the same, but Vacay's two
directories did not: a guest stayed selectable in a plan's Invite User dialog
and in the shared-calendar picker, including after being removed from the trip
it was created for.
The queries are server-side, so the filter belongs there rather than in the
client, which never received the flag to filter on. Both write paths get it too:
the picker only hands out a list, the id comes back from the client, and the
Vacay MCP tools reach the same two service methods.
Fixes#2112
The Atlas hero counted more countries than the continent bars below it drew,
and more than the dashboard widget. The extra ones were invented: a place
without coordinates fell back to parsing its address, and any two-letter
uppercase segment at the end became a country code. "New York, NY" produced NY,
"Toronto, ON" produced ON.
Those phantoms only ever showed up in the one number. The continent strip files
an unknown code under 'Other' and never draws it, the map skips codes it cannot
resolve, and the dashboard builds its set from stored regions instead, which is
why it stayed right.
Filtering against a list of valid codes would not have been enough, and would
have hidden the worse half of this: 26 US state abbreviations are real ISO
country codes. CA is California far more often than Canada, DE is Delaware, IN
is Indiana. The existing comment above resolveCountryCode already describes that
collision and solves it by trusting coordinates first and sanity-checking the
address against the country's own bounding box. The gap it names in its last
line is this bug: with no coordinates there is nothing to check against.
So the bare-code branch is now only offered to callers that have coordinates. A
spelled-out country name still resolves either way. A lone "NY" or "CA" resolves
to nothing, which is the honest answer.
Fixes#2111
Pointing the instance at a different OIDC provider left two things from the old
one on every account. The avatar kept a URL on a host this instance no longer
talks to, so it rendered as a broken image and stayed that way: the sync only
ran when the new provider sent a picture claim, and having no picture for a user
is a perfectly normal answer.
The account also stayed pinned to the old provider. Login still worked, because
the verified-email lookup finds the row, but the relink sat behind a check for a
missing sub, so oidc_sub and oidc_issuer never moved. The SSO note in settings
went on naming a provider that was gone.
An uploaded avatar is a bare filename rather than a URL and is left alone on
both paths, exactly as before.
Fixes#2110
The handler had eight cases, its two doubles had none, which Sonar counted as
new code without coverage. The mock is the more useful of the two to pin
anyway: an importer developing against it should hit the same refusals it will
hit in production, so the SVG, the missing extension, the empty payload and the
size cap are all asserted against the double rather than only against the host.
A journal importer can create the journey, create its entries and write their
stories, and then it stops: there was no way to give an entry a picture. The
seven journal.* methods cover text and nothing else, so an importer reading an
export archive could only upload its photos as trip files, which live on a trip
and never reach the journey's gallery.
journal.addEntryPhoto takes the bytes. Deliberately not a link to an existing
gallery photo and not a provider asset: an importer holding an archive has
neither, it has a file it just unpacked.
The access decision stays where it already was. addPhoto answers null unless the
acting user may edit the journey the entry belongs to, and null becomes
RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN here, so a plugin reaches exactly the entries its acting user
does. Everything the REST upload refuses, this refuses too: images only and no
SVG, the operator's allowed-file-types setting, 10MB decoded, demo mode. The
stored filename is the host's, never the plugin's, because the gallery dedupes
on file_path. The object is written before any row points at it and removed
again when the link is refused.
JournalRpc moves into its own module for this. It now needs StorageService and
the EXIF backfill out of MemoriesModule, and JourneyDomainModule exists
precisely so places, assignments and the plugin host can reach a few journey
functions without dragging both photo providers into their graphs.
Discussion #1365
Homepage's customapi widget and everything shaped like it want a handful
of numbers from one request; /api/v1/trips hands out the rows, but a
widget maps fields, it cannot aggregate a list.
The figures come from AtlasService.getTravelStats, the same call behind
the dashboard's passport card, rather than from a second count. Visited
countries carries years of rules — countries reached only by a flight,
layovers that do not count, countries hidden by hand — and a second
implementation would disagree with the card next to it within a release.
That is also why the controller sits in atlas/ and not in public-api/:
PublicApiModule stays a leaf, so the route comes to the data instead.
TravelStatsController next door already does this for
/api/auth/travel-stats. ApiTokenGuard is provided locally rather than
imported with PublicApiModule — @UseGuards instantiates a guard in the
declaring controller's module, so an export would still leave its
TokenService unresolvable here.
last_trip means the most recently started trip, not the most recently
created one, and is null while every trip is still ahead.
Closes#1367
The three api-tokens endpoints landed without tests, which took
src/nest/auth/** under its coverage floor. Same four paths the
mcp-tokens block above already pins, plus the rate limit: unlike MCP
tokens these are not refused on a managed instance, so the limiter is
the only thing bounding a scripted caller.
Reading the surface back against real data turned up three things it dropped
without saying so.
Places with no day were invisible, because the payload only reached places
through day_assignments. On a live instance that is half of them, and they
are the ones carrying a coordinate and no claim about when — exactly what an
integration can act on. They come back under `unplanned_places`, minus the
hotel, which is already reported as an accommodation.
Bookings with no day were dropped by the day filter. reservations.day_id is
nullable and deleting a day detaches its bookings rather than removing them,
so this is not a hypothetical.
The bucket list had no endpoint at all. It hangs off the user rather than a
trip, so it gets its own, and it answers whether or not the Atlas addon is
switched on: the addon decides what TREK shows, not what a key can read.
Also fixes ?include=notes returning the bare trip: places, notes and
reservations are reported on days, so asking for one now implies days
instead of quietly answering with nothing.
The module stays a leaf. Reaching for AtlasService pulled AuthModule and the
storage registry in behind it and broke the surface's own boot, so the one
SELECT lives here like every other query in the file.
Minting a key for other software meant finding it under MCP, behind a
heading about AI assistants and gated on an addon it does not need. It now
sits on its own in Settings, above the MCP block, and works on an instance
with MCP switched off.
Deliberately separate state rather than another branch of the tab's shared
hook: the section has to stand on its own, and that hook is already carrying
forty fields through three levels of props.
Translated into all 23 languages.
Two gaps from the first pass, both about a client that polls.
Rate limiting is keyed by user rather than by IP. A self-hosted integration and
its owner's browser routinely leave the same address, and an IP bucket would let
one starve the other; 120 requests a minute is generous for a sync surface and
still bounded, so a runaway poll degrades its own integration instead of the
instance.
updated_at now ships with every trip, and its docblock says plainly what it is
not: a content timestamp. It moves when the trip's own fields change — title,
dates, currency, cover — and stays put when a place, a day or a note is edited,
because the child tables carry no updated_at of their own. That also rules out
the ?since= filter this was meant to enable: it would silently hide every trip
whose itinerary changed, which is worse than no filter at all. Making it honest
needs a schema change, not an API field, so the field is documented for what it
is and the filter is left out.
TREK's REST surface is internal: it answers a session cookie, carries no
version, and changes with the client. That is fine for our own frontend and
useless for anyone building against us — the Dawarich integration people have
been asking for since April needs something it can rely on not moving.
So this adds a small one rather than opening the existing 549 endpoints:
GET /api/v1/trips the trips the caller can reach
GET /api/v1/trips/:id one trip, ?include= picks the sections
Auth reuses the trek_ tokens users already manage under Settings, via Bearer
or X-API-Key. No new credential type, no new table — the guard calls the same
hash lookup the MCP transport does. It deliberately refuses a session JWT and,
for now, OAuth bearers: a credential whose scopes this surface does not yet
interpret is worse than one it rejects outright.
Access is decided per trip against canAccessTrip, the same owner-or-member
predicate as everywhere else, and a trip the caller may not read answers 404
identically to one that does not exist — a 403 would confirm the id is real and
turn the endpoint into a way to count someone else's trips.
The payload is not the rows. Ids, foreign keys and order_index stay inside;
accommodation day ids resolve to ISO dates, places arrive in planned order, and
every dated thing carries its date so a consumer can join on days rather than
on ids it has no way to look up.
When neither the keyword table nor the model produced a type, the router wrote
"hotel" and cast whatever string it got to FlatType without checking it. A hotel
is a booking type, so a ferry voucher imported from the Transport tab opened the
booking form, which offers six chips and not one transport among them, and
"other" was the only honest pick left. An unrecognised string got through the
cast too and then vanished silently in nuExtractToKiReservations.
The type is validated against FLAT_TYPES now. When it cannot be read the item is
still extracted with the lodging shape so it survives mapping, but it says so,
and the tie-breaker #2080 added finally has something to fire on: isUnplaceableItem
only ever matched a type outside both form's vocabularies, and the server can
only emit its own eight, so on a real document it never matched at all.
The tab travels with the job instead of sitting in component state. The parse
deliberately outlives navigation and reload and the review is triggered by the
global widget on any page, so by the time it ran the state had remounted back to
its default and the context was gone.
splitIso reached the time by taking characters 11..16, so "2026-06-11T01:11 PM"
became 01:11. The hour survived and the half of the day did not, which is why
AM and 24-hour times in the same document imported correctly. The arrival then
sorted before the departure and the router rolled it onto the next day, so a
three-hour hop was rendered as an overnight.
The client has done this properly since #1725; this is the server half, which
was never pulled across. normalizeLocalDateTime rewrites a value only when it
actually finds a meridiem, so a date-only value, a value carrying an offset and
anything the parser does not know come back byte for byte.
The mapper has only two exits for a date, toIsoString and splitIso, so this
covers all eight types and every emitted field at once. It also stops
sameConnection comparing a NaN timestamp, which silently merged unrelated legs
into one booking.
The ICS feed is public with a token that never expires and prints the
confirmation number into the DESCRIPTION, and the shared-trip payload does a
SELECT * over reservations with share_bookings on by default. Neither filters
anything, so whatever lands on a trip is published the moment it is written.
That is fine while a person types every booking in, and it stops being fine as
soon as something writes on their behalf.
reservations.ingest_state is that gate. It defaults to live, SQLite backfills
every existing row on the ALTER, and no current writer names the column, so
every booking visible today stays visible. Nothing writes staged yet.
The predicate takes its table alias because share.service.ts queried
reservations without one. A stay is withheld only when bookings point at it and
all of them are staged: a hand-added hotel has no booking at all and has to keep
showing up.
A plugin warning is a plugin telling the user something is wrong with their
trip, and get_trip_summary omitted them, so an assistant reviewed a trip
from a strictly smaller picture than the user was looking at.
The whole memories domain had no tools, so the Immich and Synology
libraries were invisible even though the attach body is plain JSON and the
photos never pass through the call. Search, album listing, album contents,
and the attach.
The routes that stream photo bytes stay out: those are img targets.
TREK's own bulk travel-history importer, and the closest thing in the
product to what this whole branch is about. Both halves are server-side
JSON, so neither was ever browser-bound; they simply had no tools. The list
tool's output carries what the import tool needs, so a model can run the
pair without a detour through the UI.
export_trip_ics is a snapshot of one trip, so subscribing was out of reach
and the all-trips feed had no counterpart at all. Both feed tokens can now
be read, minted, rotated and revoked.
The invite link is the one that grants membership, which create_share_link
is not, and the descriptions say so in both directions so a model does not
reach for the wrong one. The two consumer routes stay out: the ics URLs are
what gets subscribed to, and accepting an invite is a human act.
test-db's reset list was missing trip_invite_tokens, so a leftover invite
re-attached itself to the next test's trip once ids restarted.
131 of 201 tools carry an addon gate, and the registry drops an entry when
either the addon gate or the scope gate fails: one filter, one outcome. The
session instructions tell the model to check what is available before
assuming a tool exists while giving it nothing to check with. list_addons is
that something, and it is the difference between a confused apology and
'ask your admin to enable Budget'.
The help routes were already public, so the two reader tools add no scope
surface at all. The asset route stays out: it serves bytes to an img tag.
An assistant rendering a temperature, a distance or a clock time was
guessing: the session instructions named only the trip currency, and nothing
could read what the user had picked.
The write works off an allow-list rather than off the settings row, because
that row also holds the webhook URL, the ntfy token and the Mapbox, Carto
and LLM keys, and getUserSettings hands some of those back in cleartext.
Everything outside the list is refused, including a key nobody has heard of
yet. The guard test asserts against the service's own encrypted and masked
sets rather than a copy of them, so a sixth key added there fails it.
Often the travel history is the uploaded PDFs, and an assistant could not
learn that a trip had any: there was no files.mcp.ts, no files scope, and no
files section in the trip summary.
Six tools: list, read contents, set description and primary link, add a
link, remove one, list them. Reading contents rides files:content rather
than files:read, because listing what a trip carries and reading what is
inside a booking PDF are different privileges.
The content read is not a second copy of the plugin path. readContent moved
out of files.rpc.ts into FilesService and both callers use it, so the 10 MB
cap, the storage-layer read and the off-thread decode stay in one place. The
RPC keeps its own error wording, which its tests still pin.
The admin gate on the three new category tools reached for AuthService, which
drags the storage registry in behind it, and the categories e2e builds a
container around one module against a two-table database. It stopped booting.
budget/ already solved this: isDemoUserId reads RuntimeEnvService and the
users table directly, and its module comments say why AuthModule is absent.
Categories now does the same, which also takes eight hand-built collaborators
out of its unit test.
The e2e gained RealtimeModule, which is global in the app graph but not in a
partial container, the way days.e2e.test.ts already imports it.
Two domains an assistant cannot reach at all today need somewhere to hang,
so this is the credential half on its own, ahead of the tools.
files:content is a third mode rather than a second group. Listing the
documents on a trip and reading the bytes inside a booking PDF are different
privileges, and the plugin host already draws that line between
db:read:files and db:read:files:content. It is not implied by files:write,
the same way journey:share is not implied by journey:write; the policy's
fallback branch covers both.
settings:write is scoped to display preferences. Settings also holds the
webhook URL, the ntfy token and the Mapbox, Carto and LLM keys, so the tools
that ride this scope work off an allow-list rather than off the settings
row.
34 scopes across 16 groups, translated into all 23 languages.
A dateless trip made by a tool silently got seven days, and reminder_days
was stuck on the default of three with no way to turn it off. Cover images
had no search at all.
add_trip_member and remove_trip_member hardcoded an owner check while REST
consults the configurable permission matrix and the plugin RPC does too:
three surfaces, two behaviours. They now use the same permission call
update_trip already made, so an instance that lowered member_manage behaves
consistently. The guest tools stay owner-only, because their REST routes are
owner-only by design and document it.
Asking whether a place is already in one of your lists took a walk over
every collection and lost the coordinate tolerance the server matches on.
Marking a trip's places visited across every list holding them was one call
per place.
The dashboard's next-booking view is a three way union that folds in
synthetic check-in and check-out rows, so rebuilding it from per-trip
summaries silently drops the accommodations.
A day note could not be coloured or positioned, so the service default of
9999 pinned every note an assistant wrote to the bottom of the timeline. A
collab note could not carry the website the card renders.
Categories could be assigned by bulk_update_places but never created: the
whole file was one read tool and a resource. The three new tools are
admin-only, matching the REST routes exactly.
image_url was in no places tool although the service persists it and the
picker in the UI sets a URL, which is not a file transport question.
search_place passed two of the service's four arguments, so an unbiased
query resolved to the wrong continent.
get_place_details gained expand for reviews and the editorial summary. It
defaults to off because that field mask bills as a Google Enterprise SKU,
and it now honours the admin kill switch the REST route checks: an instance
owner who turns Place Details off to stop the billing was still billable
through this one surface.
location_name was settable when creating an entry and never afterwards,
which is the sharpest create-versus-update asymmetry in the surface.
Coordinates, weather, tags and the pros and cons verdict were persisted by
the insert but had no way in, so an entry written by an assistant never
placed on the journey map.
mark_region_visited wanted a code like US-CA that nothing in the tool
surface could produce. The visited-region list also read the raw manual
marks while the UI reads the list derived from trip places, so the two
disagreed about where somebody had been. Travel stats gained the cities and
the distance the dashboard shows.
The toggle took a date and nothing else, then hardcoded a full vacation day
for the calling user, so a half day, a comp day or a day logged for another
plan member had no expression.
School holidays needed the plan flags that switch them on, and the region
list that makes them usable. That list needs care: a group region is stored
as COUNTRY|group:CODE and the reader treats a bare code as a subdivision, so
the tool now returns the string add_holiday_calendar actually wants. Belgium
and the Netherlands are the two countries this affects.
Bag assignment was reachable only while bulk-importing a list, and by bag
name, never for an item that already exists. Quantity, weight and the
private flag were not reachable at all, and the whole three-tier sharing
model was invisible: an item made by a tool was always Common.
Historical costs are rarely split evenly, and every budget tool took only a
list of member ids, which the service stores as a null amount, meaning an
equal share. members[] carries what each person owes instead.
A custom split has to reconcile before it is persisted, so the tool refuses
one whose shares do not add up in whole cents. Two ways round that check
needed closing with it: the write path drops a payer who is not on the trip
and then derives the total from what survived, and an empty payer list means
a total of zero rather than the previous one. Both would have certified a
split the stored row does not satisfy.
Also on update, which had none of them: currency (so the FX freeze is no
longer a no-op), expense_date, and a settlement currency, plus place_id on
create so a museum ticket can point at the museum.
An imported itinerary landed in whatever order the assistant appended it,
with no way to fix it afterwards: create_day only ever appended, and
days.service.insert was reachable from exactly one place in the server, the
REST controller. Because both halves were missing, inserting a day into the
middle of a trip could not be expressed at all.
url is persisted on create and update and rendered as a link by the
planner, and reservation_end_time is what makes a dinner run 19:00-21:30
rather than just starting. Neither was in a tool schema, so a booking
written by an assistant lost both - which for an imported itinerary is
every confirmation link it came with.
url validates through reservationUrlSchema from @trek/shared, the same
refinement the REST route applies, rather than a second hand-written one.
The transport form's picker has nine entries, not ten: a transit booking
carries a provider itinerary in metadata.transit and create_transit_journey
is what writes one, so letting a caller hand-make a bare transit row
produces a shape the transit UI does not expect.
Splits the one list in two - what may be asked for, and what counts as a
transport for the update gate - so a stored transit booking stays editable
through update_transport, which is where it was already reachable.
Also reports the ids set_reservation_travelers dropped instead of
returning a plain success with a shorter list.
Reads have hydrated a booking's travellers since #1517; there was no way
to write them, so an imported booking could not record who was on it -
and creating a guest is only half an answer if the guest cannot then be
attached to the flight they were on.
Mirrors PUT /api/trips/:tripId/reservations/:id/travelers. The roster
filter stays in the service, so an off-trip id is dropped rather than
attached and the tool cannot be used to enumerate users.
add_trip_member resolves an existing account by username or email, so a
travelling companion who never signed up could be put on a trip in the
planner and not through an assistant. A guest is assignable to budget
splits, packing, to-dos and day participants like any member, so leaving
them out of an import loses who was actually there.
Mirrors the owner-only /api/trips/:id/guests routes, including the
trip-scoped guard that keeps one trip's owner away from another trip's
guest and off a real member's user row.
Maurice