After an update the service worker keeps serving the previous bundle until
the new one is installed. That shell announces the release layout too, so
the layout alone let it draw the notice with its own older texts and use it
up for the version now running with one click on X.
The bundle now sends the version it was built as (client/package.json, baked
in by define), and the server compares it with its own before it hands a
notice with a release block over. A shell of another version is told nothing
and gets the notice after the reload, from the bundle that can draw it. This
holds for every update, not only the one that introduced the parameter.
An unreadable or empty encryption-key file was treated the same as a missing
one: regenerate and overwrite. That is the one case where regenerating is
the worst possible move - every secret already at rest becomes undecryptable,
permanently. Both now refuse to start and say which file to fix.
The key-rotation script advertised re-encrypting all stored secrets while its
hardcoded column lists had drifted: the AirTrail key, the per-user LLM key
and the plugin OAuth tokens were never migrated, so they silently stopped
decrypting after a rotation. The parity test now pins the full set against
what the code actually encrypts, rather than two tables of it.
The schema_version bump ran outside the migration's transaction, so a crash
in between left the schema advanced and the version stale - the next boot
replayed a non-idempotent step and exited, turning one crash into a boot
loop. And the TICKETJSON receipt migration matched with LIKE, which SQLite
treats case-insensitively, so a note somebody had typed starting 'ticketjson:'
was cut up and its text dropped.
Also: APP_VERSION was interpolated into migration SQL instead of bound, the
capture-metadata backfill passed (photoId, userId) to a (userId, photoId)
signature and its mock keyed on the wrong argument, TRUST_PROXY=0 was
accepted and silently coerced to 1, demo-reset hardcoded the db path instead
of honouring TREK_DB_FILE, and a demo instance with no DEMO_ADMIN_PASS set
now says out loud that its admin password is the published default.
* feat(config): put the operator-owned surfaces behind TREK_MANAGED
The switch landed last release with nothing behind it. This is what it turns
off, plus the four fixes that came out of walking every one of these surfaces.
Nothing here changes anything for an install that does not set the flag. That
is not a hope, it is what managed-inert.test.ts asserts: the mode stays off for
any unparseable value, no other variable can turn it on, every settings key
stays writable, and splitManagedKeys hands back the same object rather than a
copy so no write path can quietly diverge on self-hosted installs only.
WHAT THE MODE WITHHOLDS
Fourteen routes carry @ManagedForbidden: key validation, static MCP tokens, JWT
rotation, the OIDC admin pair, restore and auto-backup, plugin sideload and
reload, the Ollama model list and pull, and the SMTP test send. Each names the
reason it is not the instance admin's, and the reason is mandatory.
Eighteen settings keys are filtered instead of refused. SMTP, the OIDC toggles
and the WebAuthn pair share one handler with keys the admin does own, and the
llm_* family is reachable through per-user settings, the instance defaults and
the addon config alike, so a route-level refusal would be both too coarse and
incomplete. A locked key is skipped and reported as managed_keys; the rest of
the save goes through. Refusing the request would take the registration toggles
down with the SMTP block.
GET /api/auth/me/settings stops returning the three API keys in the clear. It
is the only endpoint that decrypts a stored credential back to the caller, which
is fine when the admin pasted it in and wrong when the operator supplied it.
Two multipart routes check in the handler rather than the guard: a guard throws
before the parser drains the body and the client gets an ECONNRESET instead of
the 403 (PROFILE-015). They still carry the marker so the boot gate sees them.
WHAT KEEPS IT FROM DRIFTING
validate-managed-routes.ts refuses to boot on a marking that is not on the
reviewed list, a list entry whose route lost its marking, or a marking with no
reason. The third case has no equivalent in the guard gate next door and is the
one that matters most: a blank reason destroys the only record of why a control
was taken away, and nothing recovers that later. It found two wrong entries in
my own list while I was writing this.
managed-keys.test.ts asserts that every key in ADMIN_SETTINGS_KEYS and
DEFAULTABLE_USER_SETTING_KEYS belongs to exactly one of two sets. A key added to
either list belongs to neither until somebody decides, and that is the failure
this prevents: the lists grow, the mode does not.
PLACES_API_BASE AND PLACES_API_KEY
The nine Places endpoints spell out googleapis.com, so an install that wants
those calls to leave through something of its own has no way to say so. One
variable, substituted where every call already funnels through. A second one
supplies the key, and when it is set the users table is not consulted at all —
a per-user key would route around whatever the endpoint counts, and those
columns are readable by any admin of the instance.
FOUR FIXES THAT ARE NOT ABOUT THE MODE
An admin setting somebody's password now bumps password_version and clears
their MCP tokens. An admin sets a password for one reason, and until now
verifyJwtAndLoadUser kept accepting every cookie the intruder already had: the
one action taken to lock them out was the one action that did not.
The four OIDC provider calls go through the SSRF guard. Three are worse than
they look — the token, userinfo and JWKS URLs come out of the discovery
response, so they are chosen by the other end, not by an admin. safeFetchLlm is
renamed safeFetchAdminConfigured and keeps its old name as an alias, because it
is the variant that allows loopback and LAN: a self-hoster with Authentik on
localhost:9000 must keep working. The token exchange follows no redirect at all,
since one would hand client_secret to a second host.
DELETE /api/admin/users/:id/mfa clears another account's TOTP. The passkey half
has existed since passkeys landed; the TOTP half never did, which left
"somebody on the trip lost their phone" with no answer short of an operator in
the database. Never for the caller themselves.
TREK_PLUGIN_PERMISSIONS=off refuses to boot when the install is centrally
administered. A warning is right for a machine its owner chose to trust; where
the person who set the flag and the people whose data is in the database are
not the same person, fail closed.
TEXTS
Four strings lose the phrase "self-hosted" because they describe somebody
else's software — an Ollama endpoint, an AirTrail instance, a service a plugin
talks to — and read better without it in both modes. The one string that
describes TREK itself keeps it, and the mode picks a second key instead, so
self-hosters lose nothing.
A grep gate in shared/ keeps the canonical locale honest, because the parity
check compares the file set and the top-level keys and never looks at a value:
re-wording a string is invisible to CI today, and so is putting it back.
* feat(maps): supply the map credential with the instance when centrally administered
MAPBOX_ACCESS_TOKEN joins PLACES_API_KEY as an operator-supplied value.
SettingsService injects it when the settings are read, and picks GL as the
provider if the reader is still on Leaflet, since a token is always present.
The key moves from the customer set to the locked set. It is the one locked key
whose value is public by design — a pk.* token has to reach the browser to be
useful — so this is not about secrecy: a per-user save landing on top of the
instance token would only break the map for that user. Both settings fields for
it go away with it.
* fix(auth): count the operator key when reporting whether Google features work
has_maps_key only looked at the users table, but getMapsKey prefers the
PLACES_API_KEY env over anything stored there. On an install that supplies the
key that way and has an empty column, every lookup worked while the client was
told there was no key and hid the search, the autocomplete and the place photos.
Found by walking the running instance rather than the code: the map came up,
the search box did not.
* feat(admin): hide the settings a centrally administered install cannot act on
A control that answers 403 is worse than no control: the AI section rendered the
refusal as "Request failed with status code 403", which tells an admin they broke
something rather than that the decision is not theirs.
So the surfaces go rather than being disabled in place:
- AI parsing and AirTrail leave the addon list, and the AI addon route now
refuses outright. The endpoint, the model and what a document costs come with
the instance, so there is no instance decision left — not even whether it runs.
- Immich and Synology Photos leave it too. Both connect to a server the reader
runs at home, and there is no route from here to one.
- The SMTP block, the admin webhook and ntfy targets, and the passkey RP ID and
origins follow the same rule: they configure something the operator owns, and
a wrong RP ID on a shared parent domain reaches past this instance entirely.
- The About tab goes. It is about the project — what TREK is, where to file a
bug, where to support it — and is aimed at the person running the software.
The version and the link to the source move to the sidebar footer, on both the
desktop page and the mobile twin, because AGPL 13 wants that offer wherever
people reach the software over a network.
- The update check stops asking GitHub and reports nothing available.
Separately, the version footers lose the "self-hosted" suffix everywhere, not
just here. It read as a label on the software rather than on the install, and
the version alone says what it needs to.
* feat(config): refuse to boot centrally administered without an at-rest key
Measured on a running instance rather than assumed: with ENCRYPTION_KEY unset,
the at-rest key falls back to a file in the data volume, and backupService
bundles that file into every archive it builds. The archive is downloadable by
any instance admin, so the encryption ships with its own key in the same zip.
The skip in backupService already handles this — it only omits the file when the
key came from the env — but nothing made sure the env actually carried one.
Provisioning sets it; forgetting it was silent.
validateEnvAtBoot now carries a second kind of check next to the schema: cross-
field rules that only apply with the flag set, for combinations where every value
is individually valid and the result is wrong. Empty without the flag, so an
install that never asked to be centrally administered cannot meet it.
* feat(client): add an attachment point for install-specific screens
Two empty exports on the client, an empty module on the server, and the four
places that read them. Nothing here adds a route, a nav entry or an endpoint —
the arrays are empty and the module contributes nothing, which managed-ext.test
pins so it stays that way.
Read unconditionally, never behind a flag. On the server a conditional import
would tie the module graph to an environment variable, and the graph is built
once per app while the flag is read live; on the client an empty array costs
nothing to spread, so every build walks the same path instead of one build
walking a path nobody tests.
Anything attached here follows the same rules as the rest of src/nest and
src/components: a real module with a controller and a provider, bodies through
the Zod pipe, routes under the global guards, tests.
* test(shared): move the wording gate out of src so shared typechecks again
CI installs shared with its own dependencies only (npm ci --workspace shared),
so there is no @types/node and the `node:fs` import inside src/ failed to
compile. The tests passed the whole time — vitest supplies the module — which is
why this only showed up in the typecheck step.
The walk moves to scripts/, next to i18n-parity.mjs, and the spec imports it the
same way that one does. It also runs on its own now
(`node scripts/i18n-selfhost-wording.mjs`), which is what you want when CI names
a line you have to go find.
* test(server): repair the call sites typecheck:tests caught
tests/ sits outside the build tsconfig, so none of this showed up in a green
test run — which is exactly the gap `npm run typecheck:tests` exists to close.
Three kinds, all mine:
- Seven `import type` paths for RuntimeEnvService carried one `../` too many.
Type-only imports are erased, so vitest never resolved them and nothing failed.
- VersionCheckJob and PluginsController grew a constructor parameter and eleven
hand-wired `new` calls kept passing the old count. The argument arrived as
undefined and no assertion happened to read it.
- ConditionContext grew `managed`, and the shared context object in the
conditions suite did not.
The condition also had no test of its own, so it has one now: both directions,
since the registry uses `is: false` to keep a notice away and a notice that only
belongs on a centrally administered install would use `is: true`.
The 3.0 "what's new" notices have served their purpose, so swap them for a single thank-you notice that comes back once on every fresh install and version bump. It carries Buy Me a Coffee and Ko-fi buttons and only shows on desktop. Adds a per-version recurring mode (new dismissed_app_version column) plus external-link CTAs to support it; the 3.0.14 whitespace-collision admin notice stays active.
Prevents users who upgrade across multiple versions from seeing all
interim notices at once. Version bounds are evaluated server-side using
semver.coerce so prerelease builds compare as their base release.
Range is lower-inclusive, upper-exclusive: maxVersion: '4.0.0' hides
the notice once 4.0.0 ships.
Server-side notice registry with per-user condition evaluation (firstLogin,
existingUserBeforeVersion, addonEnabled, dateWindow, role, custom).
Notices are sorted by priority then severity, filtered against dismissals
stored in a new user_notice_dismissals table, and served via
GET /api/system-notices/active + POST /api/system-notices/:id/dismiss.
Client renders notices through a host component that partitions by
display type (modal / banner / toast). The modal renderer supports
multi-page pagination with directional slide transitions, keyboard
navigation, and correct dismiss-all semantics on CTA / X / ESC.
Dismissals are optimistic with a single background retry.
Includes 3.0.0 upgrade notices (v3-photos, v3-journey, v3-features),
onboarding welcome modal, and full i18n coverage across 15 languages.
The /journey route is addon-gated on both client and server.
Also includes: unit + integration test suites, registry integrity test
that validates action CTA IDs against client source, and technical
documentation in docs/system-notices.md.
Maurice