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706c6c39598e170d5a79ffdec7e9df667a2b483b
116 Commits
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83d591dc6c |
fix(db): keep SQLite temp files in memory so trips can be deleted (#2518)
Deleting a trip failed with SQLITE_IOERR_GETTEMPPATH when the container runs with a read-only root filesystem and no tmpfs on /tmp. The cascade behind DELETE FROM trips keeps a statement journal, SQLite moves it to a temp file once it passes 64 KiB, and it looks for a directory for that file in SQLITE_TMPDIR, TMPDIR, /var/tmp, /usr/tmp, /tmp and the working directory. None of them is writable there. Installs on the shipped compose file have a tmpfs on /tmp and never hit it. Every connection the server opens now comes from openDatabase() in src/db/connection.ts, which sets temp_store = MEMORY: the main database (also when it is reopened after a restore), each plugin's own database and the uploaded backup checked before a restore. reset-admin.js and the key rotation script cannot import src/ in the image, so they set the pragma themselves. A test pins that nothing else in src/ constructs a handle, and one deletes a full trip on the real schema and watches for temp files. |
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2a8071f642 |
feat(plugins): search plugins can answer the place search as you type
A searchProvider plugin can now implement an optional suggest() beside search(). Its places then show up in the place search's typed-ahead list, after the core suggestions and marked with the plugin's name, on desktop and phone. An index that cannot take a request per keystroke leaves it out and keeps answering the full search only. The child reports which functions each hook object carries at load, so GET /api/plugin-search/suggest only asks the plugins that implement suggest: from the second character, three rows at most across all of them, 800 ms to answer. The feed marks plugins holding hook:search-provider and the client only asks the route while one is installed. A plugin row carries its whole place, so picking it skips the details lookup, which knows no plugin id. The phone's search results now name their source as the desktop ones do, and the desktop dropdown scrolls instead of running past the dialog. Addresses discussion #2221. |
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1727732841 |
feat(plugins): plugins can add POI categories to the map and answer them
A new manifest capability poiCategories (up to 4, icon from an allow-list, strict #rrggbb color) and the hook poiCategoryProvider.getPois behind the hook:poi-category-provider permission. GET /api/plugin-pois in the plugin contributions module answers them in the /api/maps/pois shape, with search_plugin_pois as the MCP twin. plugin: ids no longer count as Google place ids. SDK 1.8.0 carries the types, validation and docs. On the map, one hook merges the built-in categories with the ones active plugins declare, and the pill shows the plugin chips after a divider on desktop and phone, scrolling sideways instead of shrinking a chip below its touch target. A plugin chip searches through a repo that refuses offline and parses the answer strictly. Its pins, on Leaflet and GL, use the category's own icon and color, both checked again before they reach any markup, and the hover card lists the plugin's details as escaped text. A plugin POI can be added as a place like any other. The admin panels on desktop and phone show a chip for the new permission and the categories a plugin would add, from one shared module. Addresses discussion #1781. |
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2350c3ae14 |
fix(places): a website without a scheme no longer blocks saving a place
A place from the TREK index can carry its website the way Overture has it, such as fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chapelle_Sainte-Barbe_du_Faouët, and saving it to a collection or a trip failed with "website must be an http or https URL" over a field the dialog does not show (#2483). OpenStreetMap, Amap and booking mails hand over websites the same way. Every place a website comes in from outside now goes through one shared helper, normalizePlaceWebsite: the index client and its nearby search, the Overpass and OSM detail mappers, Google search and details, Amap, plugin search and the booking import. It completes a bare or protocol-relative host to https, keeps http and https as they are, and drops every other scheme and anything that is no address. Only the scheme is added, so an accented path is stored as written. placeWebsiteSchema completes a bare host the same way before its check, so an older client, a cached offline result, an MCP agent or a plugin is no longer refused, while javascript:, data: and mailto: still are. The REST controller, the plugin RPC and the enrichment now store the parsed value instead of the raw one, and create_place_accommodation takes the website through the same schema as create_place. safeHttpUrl still links only a value already stored in its final form, so nothing changes on screen. Tests: SHARED-WEBSITE-001 to 012, SHARED-PLACE-030 to 034, SHARED-COLLFILE-2483-01, COLLECTIONS-E2E-089 and 090, PLACES-E2E-2483-01 and 02, PLACES-CTRL-2483-01 (the louvre.fr case adjusted), MCP-PLACES-2483-01 to 03, MCP-ACCOM-2483-01, MCP-COLL-2483-01, PLACES-RPC-2483-01, MAPS-2483-01 to 05, MAPS-POIS-015, MAPS-GERS-010, AMAP-012b, TREK-PLACES-2483-01, PLUGIN-SEARCH-2483-01, BOOKING-IMPORT-2483-01, ENRICH-052e, ENRICH-102 extended, ENRICH-120 adjusted, FE-UTIL-SAFEURL-007. |
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e510ff25ab |
fix(mcp): refuse an argument a tool never declared instead of dropping it
The SDK wraps a raw shape in a plain z.object, which strips an undeclared key and runs the handler as if nothing was wrong: an assistant that wrote stopType for stop_type was told the place was updated while nothing had changed. The registry registers every shape as z.strictObject, so the call answers "Unrecognized key" and tools/list advertises additionalProperties false. The nested objects a tool takes, authored inline or spread from a shared schema (legs, stops, links, transit places), are strict at this boundary for the same reason; the shared schemas themselves stay open for REST. A whole Zod schema, the way a plugin's manifest-built tool arrives, passes through as its author wrote it. |
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7ccc8dc03d |
fix(booking-import): say why a recognised booking could not be imported
A document the model read correctly could still come back as "No reservations could be extracted". Every type mapper can answer null when the node carries no reservationFor, or one with no name, and both call sites pushed the item only if there was one — with no else. The unknown-@type branch next to them does warn, so a node TREK did not recognise was reported while a node it recognised but could not map vanished: no item, no warning, nothing in the log. Because the file did produce a node, the "no reservations found" fallback was skipped too, and the preview arrived empty and silent. Every recognised type could disappear this way, on both the kitinerary and the AI path. Each of them now warns, naming the file, the index, the type and the reason. Three smaller silences went with it. The debug line labelled "Raw LLM Response" printed the already-parsed array, so its inspect formatting — single quotes, bare keys — read as a provider emitting broken JSON and sent this report at the JSON parser, which has handled that shape since 4.0.0. A single reservation answered on its own, with no array and no wrapper, was dropped by the list unwrapper although the schema downstream would have taken it. And a response nobody could read returned an empty list, which is the same answer as a voucher with no booking in it; it now raises, on the Anthropic client too, where a reply cut off at the token limit produced exactly this report's symptom. The plugin AI surface keeps its old empty answer, since a value is what a plugin contracts for. The retry ladder gained a rung that sends no response_format at all, for providers that support neither json_schema nor json_object. Closes #2375 |
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ff5fa55fad | add Google Maps route import and plugin corridor search | ||
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fccc55732b | feat(roadtrip): plan and edit trips through MCP without a browser | ||
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a9907e2f10 |
feat(plugins): let a plugin answer place searches from its own index
TREK searches its own place index and OpenStreetMap. Neither carries a rating, so "the best rated hotel around here" has never been answerable, and an operator with a better index for their region had no way to reach the search box at all. The searchProvider hook is that way in: a plugin is handed the query, a limit, the language and the coordinate the search is biased toward, and answers with places in the same shape the core search returns, plus a rating. It sits beside the core search rather than inside it. The plugin runtime already imports PlacesModule, which imports MapsModule, so asking the providers from the maps service would close a module cycle — the same reason the other fourteen contribution controllers stand next to what they contribute to. The client asks both at once and merges, at the single point every caller already goes through, so all nine search surfaces get plugin hits without knowing the hook exists. A plugin index may never hold up the list: the client stops waiting at two and a half seconds and the host gives a provider two, which is also why the budget is the shortest of any hook here. With no such plugin installed the route answers without reaching the runtime at all. Every hit is normalized host-side and shared by the REST route and the MCP tool, so a cap that holds for the browser holds for the assistant: coordinates are range-checked, strings capped, the rating clamped to 0..5, a website must be http or https, and ids are namespaced so they can never collide with an OSM one. search_places_via_plugins is the MCP half, because what the user can see the assistant has to be able to see; search_place now points at it. |
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2d315df8bf |
fix(security): keep the operator's ntfy token in and re-check every redirect hop
Two reported advisories, and a third path neither of them covers. GHSA-7pqc-fj3c-9346 — the ntfy token fell back to the operator's whenever a request did not carry one, so an authenticated user who named their own server was handed the operator's decrypted token as `Authorization: Bearer`. The report covers `test-ntfy`, but the live send path in channels/builtins.ts does the same thing off a per-user `ntfy_server` setting: no test route needed, just wait for the next notification. Gating the route on `role === 'admin'` would have closed one of the two and broken the documented shared-server setup, where the operator supplies server plus token and users only set a topic. The invariant is the target, not the role: the operator's token travels to the operator's server and nowhere else, and that rule fits both paths unchanged. Scheme is part of the comparison — an http twin of an https server would put it on the wire in clear. GHSA-8mw6-xphx-886m — both transports checked only the first URL and then let the platform follow redirects on a dispatcher pinned to that first IP. Pinning does not help: Node skips the pinned lookup for an IP-literal host, so a 307 to 127.0.0.1 or 169.254.169.254 connected straight through. They go through safeFetchFollow now, which re-checks and re-pins per hop. safeFetch itself had the same shape and carried it to sixteen more callers, several with a URL out of a per-user setting, and one (pipeAsset) streams the response back — which would have made a redirect into an internal service readable rather than blind. It now routes through the same follower. The third: following by hand opts out of the platform's own rules, and both manual followers replayed the caller's init verbatim. undici drops `Authorization` across origins itself, so converting ntfy to safeFetchFollow would have re-opened the first advisory through a redirect. Credential headers are now dropped on an origin change (same-host http to https stays, self-hosted setups depend on it), and a 303 — or a 301/302 on a non-idempotent method — drops the body, so a plugin's client_secret is not re-POSTed at a host the first one merely pointed at. plugin-oauth pins maxRedirects to 0 like its OIDC twin, and the Google Places calls get the timeout none of their nine call sites passed. |
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dba4434ef6 |
fix(llm-parse): one configurable ceiling for a model call, and undici honours it
The timeout for a model call was spelled three times and adjustable nowhere: 120s in the Anthropic client, 300s in the OpenAI-compatible one, 300s in the Ollama one. None of them was the ceiling that actually applied, either — every one of those calls goes through the pinned undici dispatcher, and an undici Agent stops waiting for response headers after five minutes by default, so a client constant set above that never got the chance to fire. - LLM_TIMEOUT_MS (default 900000) replaces the three constants and is passed to the dispatcher as headersTimeout/bodyTimeout, so the abort signal and undici are governed by the same setting. The default is deliberately generous: heavier parsing work should fit without a code change, and an admin who would rather fail fast can lower it. - The ceiling stays on the model lane. safeFetchAdminConfigured is also the OIDC lane (discovery, token, userinfo, JWKS) and the plugin OAuth token exchange, and that one sends no AbortSignal of its own, so it keeps undici's five minutes rather than inheriting a model setting. - The derived value is floored: the schema accepts any positive number and undici rejects a fractional headersTimeout. |
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bc10fba389 |
feat(plugins): TREK_PLUGINS_IGNORE_TREK_RANGE turns the version gate into a warning (#2226)
* feat(plugins): TREK_PLUGINS_IGNORE_TREK_RANGE turns the version gate into a warning A plugin whose author has not updated its `trek` range for the running TREK can now be installed, updated and activated when the operator sets TREK_PLUGINS_IGNORE_TREK_RANGE to a truthy value. Every gate (registry picker, post-extraction re-check, sideload, dev-link, activation) warns instead of refusing; a missing range is tolerated the same way; "install latest" takes the newest published version. The plugin-API version gate is not lifted and the Discover compatibility verdict stays truthful. The admin is warned at every step: each bypass is logged, install/upload/link/ update responses carry a `trekRangeBypassed` marker, and both admin panels show a "Version checks off" pill, an "Install anyway" confirm dialog before a registry install, the same notice after a path that could not ask first, and a persistent chip on the row while the plugin runs outside its range. Nine new i18n keys in every locale; wiki pages updated (Environment-Variables, Admin-Plugins, Plugin-Development, Security-Hardening). * refactor(plugins): one useRangeBypass hook behind both admin shells SonarQube flagged PR 2226 at 10.8% duplicated new code: the range-bypass logic had been added to the desktop and phone plugin panels as identical copies. The marker/warning types, the row chip, the "Install anyway" offer, the dialog copy and the confirm-or-notice state now live in useRangeBypass (next to useInstanceSettings, the existing shared-logic precedent); each panel keeps only its own dialog/sheet markup. * docs(claude): record the SonarQube gate rules and the no-English-placeholder i18n rule The CI SonarCloud gate (Sonar way, on new code: >=80% coverage, <=3% duplication, A ratings, hotspots reviewed) was only discoverable by waiting 20-25 minutes for the workflow. The root CLAUDE.md now states the conditions, the desktop/mobile shell-mirror duplication trap and its shared-hook fix, and how to check a PR with the sonarqube MCP first; client and server CLAUDE.md point at it. shared/CLAUDE.md says every locale needs a real translation — parity cannot tell an English placeholder from a translation. * docs(claude): keep CLAUDE.md to commands, invariants, gates and philosophy Verified every concrete claim in the five CLAUDE.md files against the code and fixed the stale ones: the websocket server is the Nest realtime gateway, MCP tools live in <domain>.mcp.ts files, the client "native shell" section described code that was never written, offline maps also prefetch vector basemaps, plus several renamed files and wrong table names. Then trimmed everything that drifts on its own: dates, migration history, counts, and inventories of stores, slices, domains, sync files and CLI commands. What stays is the commands, the invariants with the file that enforces each one, what CI actually runs, the reference implementations to copy, and the rules for new code. Each file now opens with that rule. |
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b82962f95b |
Feat/plugin instance actions (#2209)
* feat(shared): scope plugin action descriptors * feat(plugin-sdk): instance-scoped settings actions * feat(plugins): run instance-scoped actions from the admin settings dialog * feat(admin): instance-scoped plugin actions in the settings dialog * fix(plugins): surface instance actions without instance fields and harden the action gate * docs(plugin-sdk): note that hosts before 4.2.0 ignore action scope * fix(admin): open the dialog for instance actions, explain inactive 404s, guard the save window * docs(wiki): plugin pages for instance actions and the admin panel changes |
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3f49ef8d21 |
fix(plugins): readable save button, honest respawn, scrolling hosts dialog (#2170, #2159)
The instance-settings save button paired bg-accent with a hard text-white and vanished in dark mode; it uses the accent pair token now. A failed activate() after saving no longer reports success over a dead plugin: the config stays, the response says what happened. The allowed-hosts dialog scrolls like the ones
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c907e0d5e5 |
fix(packing): bag totals survive reconnects and MCP bag deletes (#2191)
Deleting a bag over MCP moves every figure, the items fall into the unassigned pile, yet it sent no totals ping; it pings the room now like REST and the plugin RPC do. The client refetches totals after a room re-join and when coming back online, through the same coalescing window. The plugin SDK types learn the create fields the routes accept since #2154, on both hand-kept declarations. |
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1e6ab069cd |
Fix/sdk default (#2199)
* feat(plugin-sdk): settings-field default + unknown-attribute warning
* feat(shared): default on the plugin settings-field contract
* feat(server): persist and serve plugin settings-field defaults
* feat(client): pre-fill plugin settings defaults in the admin and user forms
* feat(server): enforce required plugin settings on both save paths
* feat(client): block plugin-settings save on an empty required field
* feat(server): resolve plugin settings defaults at runtime
A settings-field `default` was stored and served to the form but never
reached the plugin: the child's init envelope, `ctx.settings.get()`, the
channel dispatch's readAll and the OAuth provider config all read the
stored blob only. Fold `stored ?? default` in on every path that hands
config to a plugin (settings-defaults.ts), and let a default satisfy
`required` on both save gates — refusing a save the runtime would have
accepted was a contradiction.
Also: one `isFilled` rule shared by the save gate and `hasRequired`
(checkbox exempt, whitespace empty); the install parser drops a
non-boolean checkbox default or a select default outside its options,
matching what the SDK already refuses; export SETTING_FIELD_KEYS so the
SDK's mirror can be parity-tested.
* feat(client): share the plugin settings form rules across all three forms
The mobile user settings screen was a third consumer of the fields/config
contract that never got `default` pre-fill or the required check, and
the seed/patch loops lived in five hand copies. Extract
seedSettingsValues / findMissingRequired / settingsPatch into one module
and use it from the admin instance form, the desktop user tab and the
mobile screen. The user forms now surface a 4xx `{ error }` from the
server (the required-field refusal) instead of the generic toast.
* feat(plugin-sdk): seed dev fixtures from manifest defaults
`trek-plugin dev` handed the plugin only the fixture values, so a plugin
relying on its manifest defaults read undefined in dev and only in dev.
Seed ctx.config / ctx.settings from the declared defaults (a fixture
value still wins) via a new exported settingDefaults(manifest, scope).
SETTING_FIELD_KEYS is now parity-tested against the host's list.
* docs(plugins): document settings defaults as runtime fallbacks
A `default` is the field's effective value wherever nobody set one, not
just a form pre-fill; `required` is enforced on both ends; unknown
attributes are dropped at install and warned on by validate. Add a
Settings section with the attribute table to the SDK README and update
the ctx type comments, the shared schema, and the wiki guide.
* add missing exports
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394201cd32 |
feat(plugins): instance-wide settings editor in the admin UI (#2170)
* chore: bump version to 4.1.0 [skip ci] * fix(collections): stop findDuplicateCollectionPlace merging places by coordinates alone Three places answered "is this a place the trip already has?", not two: PlacesService.findDuplicatePlace and isPlaceDuplicate got the shared strategy list in #2130; CollectionsService.findDuplicateCollectionPlace was missed and kept its own hand-rolled copy of the pre-#2130 order. Unlike findDuplicatePlace, this one had no isPlaceDuplicate() guard in front of it — savePlace calls it directly — so the coordinate fallback for a NAMED candidate was live, not latent: two distinct places sharing an address (a restaurant and the bar upstairs) would report each other as duplicates the moment their coordinates round to the same ~11 m box, regardless of name. It also never read google_place_id/google_ftid/osm_id at all, even though every collection_places row stores them, so a place renamed since it was saved could be saved again instead of being recognised by its provider id. Now walks placeMatchStrategies() from @trek/shared, same as findMatchingPlaceId: provider id, then name, then coordinates only when there is no name. savePlace passes the provider id fields through since they are already on the request body; the two bulk call sites (importablePlaces, saveFromTripPlaces) are unchanged, since their source rows don't carry provider ids to pass. Closes #2137 * fix(collections): ask the same question at all three call sites savePlace was not the only caller of findDuplicateCollectionPlace. The bulk copy already carries google_place_id/google_ftid/osm_id into the row it writes but asked without them, and the import picker never selected them at all, so a renamed place was recognised on one path and not on the other two. The picker answering differently from the import is the drift the method exists to prevent: a row shown as new would come back refused. COLLECTIONS-SVC-102 and -103 cover the bulk copy and the picker. * fix(map): give the Leaflet map its own zoom ceiling, so a vector basemap cannot take the planner down Opening a trip on 4.1.0 could land on the error boundary with "Map has no maxZoom specified", and so could the map settings tab, which left no screen from which to pick a different basemap. Leaflet answers getMaxZoom() from the map options first and otherwise from a layer that brought one, and only a GridLayer ever contributes via its beforeAdd hook. A vector basemap is a GL canvas on a plain L.Layer, so it contributes nothing, and MapContainer set no ceiling of its own. MarkerClusterGroup.onAdd refuses an infinite one by throwing, before any clustering, so an empty trip hit it too. That path opened when the default basemap became a MapLibre style. It reaches further than an operator choosing OpenFreeMap: resolveTileUrl sends a keyless CARTO template to the app default, which is now a vector style, so every instance still carrying the old CARTO basemap fell into it on upgrade. The ceiling belongs on the map rather than on the base layer, because it has to hold whichever of the three branches renders. 19 matches what the raster and satellite layers already carried, so nothing changes for the maps that worked. SharedTripPage gets the same treatment: it has no cluster to throw, but it draws the same vector basemap and its fitBounds asks for a ceiling. mapZoomCeiling.test.ts pins Leaflet's own semantics against the real library rather than a mock, since a mocked react-leaflet would have kept passing through all of this. * fix(map): put the CARTO key back on the template the settings preview draws The map settings fields hold what the user is editing rather than what useTileUrl already resolved, so the preview received a bare template with no key on it. resolveTileUrl then read it as a keyless CARTO url and did what it is meant to do with one: fall back to the app default. The preview drew OpenFreeMap while the fields said CARTO, whether or not a key was saved. Same reason the tab crashed for anyone on a CARTO basemap even after entering a key, which is the loop that made this hard to escape: the key is entered on the page the fallback had taken down. FE-COMP-MAP-033b pins the template the preview is handed, with and without a key. * fix(admin): put the CARTO key back on the default-settings map preview too Same shape as the user-facing map tab, and reported alongside it: the field holds what the admin is editing, so the preview resolved a keyless CARTO template and drew the app default instead of the basemap being set. * fix(mobile): put the CARTO key back on the phone map settings preview too The third preview with the same shape, and the one that matters most while the crash is live: the phone layout is where someone would go to change the basemap when the desktop tab will not open. * fix(calendar): a fully timed stay is its two hand-overs, not a week-long bar Closes #2136 A stay was always exported as an all-day block across its whole range, and the check-in and check-out markers came on top of it. When the stay records both ends of its clock the markers already say everything the block does, and the block is the half nobody can act on: it takes a week of calendar to repeat what two one-hour events state precisely. Same shape as the parking and rental windows in #2068. Only where the markers actually stand in for the booking, though. They are emitted once per stay and titled from its lowest-id reservation, so a second room on the same stay would otherwise be left with nothing at all. A stay that knows only one end keeps its block too, since nothing else carries the other end's date. CAL-025b covers the drop, -025c the one-sided stay, -025d the second room. * fix(mobile): the phone admin map preview needs the CARTO key too The fourth preview with the same shape, missed when the other three were fixed. Sonar pointed at it: the desktop and phone admin pages are near-identical, so the duplication report named the file the change had not reached. * chore: bump version to 4.1.1 [skip ci] * feat(plugins): admin editor for instance-wide plugin settings The scope:'instance' settings a plugin declares had API endpoints but no UI. - shared: plugins.schema.ts — the settings-field descriptor and the admin instance-config GET/PUT wire contracts, imported by both sides - server: GET /api/admin/plugins/:id/config now returns the declared fields alongside the (masked) values; PUT re-spawns an ACTIVE plugin (its child reads config once, at init) and reports it via 'restarted'; the admin list carries instanceSettingsCount so the UI gates its menu item without a fetch - client: 'Instance settings' row action opening a form modal (desktop) / MSheet (phone) in both admin shells — checkbox/select/secret rendering as in the user settings form; an untouched secret mask is never sent back - i18n: three new admin.plugins.* keys in every locale * refactor(plugins): move the admin body contracts to @trek/shared The remaining plugin DTO schemas (install, link, activate, uninstall, retrust, update, egress-hosts, user-settings update, route) now live in shared/src/plugins/plugins.schema.ts with their inferred types, alongside the instance-config contracts. The journey-contract doctrine notes (#1842) moved with them — each body stays deliberately loose so the handlers keep the rejections and fallbacks they already own, and new spec tests pin that looseness so a well-meant tightening breaks a test that explains itself. plugins.dto.ts is now thin createZodDto wrappers over the shared schemas (same class names, no controller changes), and the client's pluginInstall types its options and body against PluginInstallRequest. * fix(admin): offer Allowed hosts only to plugins that declared operatorEgress The row's egress chip was already gated on the declaration, but the kebab menu (desktop) and row action sheet (phone) offered Allowed hosts on every installed plugin — inviting the admin to widen egress for plugins that never asked for it. Both entries now render only when the plugin declares operatorEgress; the dialog's unsupported-notice fallback stays as the truth-teller for stale list data. * test(admin): close the Sonar gaps on the instance-settings form The PR gate flagged new-code coverage (76.4%) and duplication (10.9%). - The two identical 39-line handler blocks were logic, not markup — they move into one shared useInstanceSettings hook; each shell keeps its own markup (the deliberate desktop/phone divergence stays) - New tests per shell cover the untested branches: every field type renders and round-trips into the save payload (select, checkbox/MToggle, number, hint, no-label key fallback), a failed fetch is a toast, a rejected save shows the server reason and keeps the edits, and the dialog/sheet closes without saving - INS-009 covers the controller's no-body '|| {}' fallback --------- Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: michael-bohr <263459669+michael-bohr@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Maurice <mauriceboe@icloud.com> |
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a8a05ace40 |
fix(plugins): close the gaps between what a tool schema advertises and what it enforces
`.meta()` advertises every node of the declaration; `nodeToZod` only walks the ones it can type. Everything below follows from that gap, so the keyword allowlist moves into `sanitiseNode`, which is the one walker that sees every node. A `pattern` was compiled straight into a RegExp and run on the main thread against caller input, with no timeout and nothing to abort it: `^(a+)+$` against 33 characters stops the whole server, not just MCP. That is an escape from the supervised child into the host event loop, and it does not take malice, since a hand-written email pattern is the classic accident. Quantified groups that repeat or alternate inside are refused, and the source is capped. `mcp:tools` counted as a side effect, so `readOnlyHint` was structurally unreachable: holding that grant is what lets a plugin advertise a tool at all. Every plugin tool was therefore advertised as potentially destructive and every client's auto-approval was off. It is a host entry point like `hook:*`, and is classified as one. Property names, `default` and `examples` were the strings that never met the sanitiser. A key may carry newlines, so `\n## SYSTEM\n...` in one defeated the newline collapse everything else goes through. Names are identifiers now; sample values keep their own keys but have their strings bounded. Also refused at parse time, which is what the rest of the file already does: an object `enum` member carrying `$ref` past the deep scan, a non-boolean `additionalProperties` advertised and checked by nothing, `enum` beside `properties` skipping the children, a root `enum`/`const`/`nullable` producing a non-object schema the SDK cannot read, and a draft-4 `exclusiveMinimum: true` dropped from the check while staying in the advertisement. `required` used `in`, so a field named `toString` read as present on every call. Nodes are built with a null prototype, and the three names Zod cannot round-trip are refused rather than silently lost. A result block that had to be shortened got no marker and no log line, which reads to the model like the whole answer. It is counted now, like a dropped one, and `isError` survives every envelope path. The security test file carried two raw NUL bytes, so git, GitHub and ripgrep all treated it as binary: no diff, no blame, no review. Escaped, same runtime value. |
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937e32924d |
fix(plugins): close six gaps in the MCP tool boundary
Found in review of the branch. Each one is a case where the host told the model or the admin something it did not enforce. Advertised schemas are now enforced. buildToolInputSchema built a loose object that checked only which keys were present, so a tool advertising an integer, an enum and additionalProperties: false accepted a string, an unlisted value and an extra property. .meta() still advertises the declaration verbatim, and the schema underneath it is now built from that same declaration, so the two cannot disagree. Anything the builder cannot enforce (oneOf, unknown formats, non-primitive enum members) is refused by parseManifest rather than advertised, and the failure lands at install time where an admin sees it. Writing the test for that turned up a live bug: z.custom() cannot be represented in JSON Schema, so building enums that way would have thrown inside tools/list for the whole session. Enums and consts are real literal types now. readOnlyHint classification fails closed. The side-effect list spelled out db:write: and missed db:create:trips entirely, letting a plugin that can create trips advertise a tool as read-only and idempotent, which is what clients gate auto-approval on. It is an allowlist of read-only grants now, and mcp-tool-annotations.test.ts walks the whole catalog so a new permission fails a test rather than producing a wrong hint. The result cap covers the whole result. It bounded each text block, so a hundred blocks cost a hundred times the limit: 6.5M characters in a probe, now 65K. Large objects are serialised with a budget instead of stringified whole and then sliced, and the block count is capped. The admin tool list was dead code. The registry preview carries only widget and tripPage, so the section added for it never rendered, and the UI hid the description behind the title when both existed. The preview carries sanitised tools now (previewManifest is exported and tested, which is how the gap survived), and both fields render, description always. plugins:use is out of the DCR default. Adding it to ALL_SCOPES meant a registration that names no scopes got it and had it pre-selected at consent. Defaults come from DEFAULT_CLIENT_SCOPES now; asking for it by name still works. The public ManifestCapabilities gained mcpTools, so a typed manifest can express what the runtime already validates. MCPANN-001..005, MCPENF-001..010, MCPPREV-001..005, MCPTOOLS-020..022, SDKP-015b/c. |
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65a6a46d70 |
fix(plugins): invalidate MCP sessions on lifecycle and grant changes
The advertised tool surface is frozen at initialize, so anything that changes which plugin tools exist has to end the sessions built before it. tools/list_changed is not an alternative: no event store is configured, and the surface would not be re-read anyway. Unconditional, no diffing. The surface is per-session, since it depends on the caller's scopes and the plugin's grants, so there is no ctx-free set to compare against. Five routes, mirroring what admin.controller.ts already does for addons: activate, deactivate, update, retrust and uninstall. activate(id, consent), update and retrust are also the grant-change paths, so "on an mcp:tools grant change" needs nothing extra. A failed call invalidates nothing, because nothing changed. The addon cascade needed its own call. Disabling an addon can stop a plugin that publishes tools, and the addon doing the cascading is not necessarily one of MCP_RELEVANT_ADDONS, so mcpAffected does not cover it. Still gated on a plugin actually stopping, which keeps the #1414 rule that a config-only save kills nothing. Imported from sessionManager rather than the src/mcp barrel, which evaluates readEnv().mcp at module scope. MCPINV-001 to MCPINV-007. |
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21fd04647f |
feat(plugins): advertise plugin tools on the MCP server
The advertise path, shaped like trip-warnings.mcp.ts: gate on the kill
switch, fan out over providersOf, let a failing provider contribute
nothing rather than fail the surface.
A tool is advertised only if the signed manifest declares it AND the
running build reported implementing it, the same two-sided check
callPlugin makes for exports. The manifest half is what makes the text
auditable: the child composes its loaded payload after onLoad, so without
it a sha256-pinned artifact could change what it publishes on every
restart with no re-consent.
The result envelope is built here, always. The registry returns a
handler's value verbatim and skips output validation without an
outputSchema, so a plugin returning {ok: true, data} would emit a result
with no content key and every conforming client would error. A failed or
timed-out invoke becomes isError rather than a JSON-RPC fault, so the
model can see it and try something else.
Gates in order: kill switch, then demo mode. The plugins domain had no
demo call site before, and the child has none of its own.
The service owns the process-level source rather than PluginRuntimeService
beside the other sinks, because it needs PluginHooks and PluginHooks
injects PluginRuntimeService. It clears the source on destroy, which the
existing setPluginChannelSource forgets to do: a torn-down buildApp()
would otherwise leave a live source closing over a dead runtime and bleed
into the next suite.
mcpToolCapabilities is a parallel reader rather than a capabilityList
generalisation, since that one returns string[]. It re-runs the manifest
parser instead of trusting the stored blob, which was written by whatever
parser was current at install time and whose caps are the security
control.
Two caps not in the brief: MCP_TOOLS_TOTAL_MAX across all plugins, since
8 each times twenty installed plugins would put 160 tools in front of a
model already choosing from ~200. Truncation is logged, because a
truncated surface reads exactly like a plugin that published nothing.
MCPTOOLS-001 to MCPTOOLS-019.
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c6027f9e68 |
feat(plugins): report implemented MCP tools at load
The child adds the tool names its mcpToolProvider hook implements to the loaded payload, beside routes/jobs/exports, and the supervisor caches them on Supervised like the rest. The hook itself already rides the existing Object.keys(def.hooks) line, so the "did the child report the hook too" half was free. Declarative and synchronous: the host never asks the child what tools it has. It intersects this list with the signed manifest, so a build that reports a tool the manifest never declared is ignored rather than trusted. grantsOf comes along because the advertise path has to clamp what a tool's annotations may claim against what the plugin was actually granted, and sup.granted is already in memory. A per-tool DB read would be the alternative. plugin-host-entry.ts is excluded from coverage (it runs in a forked subprocess), so the two supervisor integration cases are the only thing proving any of this: the loaded payload, the acting-user-bound invoke, and that both stop the moment the plugin is no longer active. |
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29de8dd9c1 |
feat(plugins): capabilities.mcpTools in the manifest
Tools are declared in the signed manifest, not only reported at load. plugin-host-entry composes its loaded payload AFTER onLoad runs, so a signed, sha256-pinned artifact could otherwise emit different tool text on every restart with no version bump and no re-consent. The host will advertise the intersection of the two. It also gives the admin something to read. What mcp:tools will put in front of every user is a manifest field now, so it can be shown on the consent screen before the grant is given. Rejects rather than drops, unlike most capability parsing: a malformed tool should fail the install visibly, not become a tool that silently never appears once the plugin is running. Caps and sanitising come from mcp-tool-schema.ts, so the install path and the advertise path cannot disagree about them. Declaring tools without mcp:tools is an error on both sides. Otherwise the consent screen lists tools that can never run. No migration: install/discovery.ts already persists capabilities as JSON. The SDK validator mirrors the checks it can make without the server's normaliser, so `trek-plugin validate` catches a bad declaration before publish rather than at install. |
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41de91668b |
feat(plugins): normalise and sanitise plugin-authored assistant text
The security control for plugin MCP tools, landed on its own so it is
reviewable as one diff. Pure and Nest-free: no container, no DB, no
running plugin needed to test it.
The threat is not a plugin crashing. A tool name, title and description
are a persistent, admin-invisible write into every user's assistant
context, and .meta() puts the JSON Schema there verbatim. TREK's own code
proves the channel is obeyed: the static-token deprecation notice is
delivered in a tool result precisely because that is what an assistant
reliably surfaces.
sanitiseAssistantText is a sibling of stripEmoji, not a change to it.
stripEmoji preserves newlines on purpose (PDF paragraphs) and ~15 render
call sites depend on that. The new one collapses every whitespace run to
a single space, so a description cannot forge "## System" as a heading
that reads to the model like host text, and strips more than the brief
asked for: the bidi overrides and isolates and U+2028/9 are neither C0
controls nor \n, so they defeat both halves of the stated rule.
The schema is advertised rather than converted. z.looseObject({}).meta()
passes the plugin's own schema through byte for byte, keeping pattern,
oneOf and format, which a hand-rolled converter flattens to unknown. The
.check() keeps required enforced, so the handler cannot receive a call
missing arguments its own schema declared mandatory.
That only works with a normaliser in front, since .meta() is a
passthrough. It rejects a root type that is not object (which would
advertise a non-object inputSchema while the runtime still passes an
object), rejects $ref/$defs/definitions at any depth, and caps bytes,
properties and nesting. It strips a top-level id, which vanishes from the
advertisement and lands in z.globalRegistry._idmap, a strong Map unlike
the WeakMap holding the rest.
Sanitising recurses into every nested description, title and string enum
member. That is the part a top-level cap misses, and where a property
named trek_session_token with a plausible description would live.
Annotations are clamped asymmetrically. readOnlyHint gates client
auto-approval, so a plugin may lower its danger level and never raise it;
openWorldHint goes the other way, since egress makes a tool open-world
whether it admits it or not. db:own is deliberately not a side effect:
counting the plugin's private SQLite would make nearly every plugin
non-read-only and kill auto-approval for legitimate read tools.
MCPSCHEMA-001 to MCPSCHEMA-030.
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21f4a1241b |
feat(plugins): mcp:tools permission and the mcpToolProvider hook
Modelled on the hook:* family rather than on geolocation:read. The host dispatches INTO the child for every tool call, so it needs what HOOK_PERMISSION buys: providersOf()'s active-and-holds-the-grant check, the second gate in invokeHook, and the acting-user binding. That last one is the point. The user is bound host-side from the supervisor's invocation map, so a tool called by user A reaches A's data whatever the model puts in args. The permission keeps no hook: prefix because the surface it opens is MCP, not a TREK render slot, and nothing keys off that prefix. It is the first HOOK_PERMISSION value shaped that way; `satisfies` still holds. One commit, because it cannot be split. requireTotalCoverage makes a HOOK_PERMISSION key with no @PluginHook consumer a boot failure, not a test failure, and PluginRpcRegistryService.onModuleInit runs in every buildApp() — so a half-landed version breaks every integration test in the repo. The generator is chained to it too: it refuses to run without both the en admin label and the CLI hint. 15s is the longest budget of any read hook. The others back a render someone is waiting on and fall back when they time out; this one backs a chat turn, and the plugin is likely calling a third-party API of its own. Still under the supervisor's unused 30s default, which is a hung client rather than a budget. One callTool fn for every tool, since tool names are runtime data and hookContracts() is keyed by (hook, fn). PluginDefinition exists in two copies with no generator between them, so both get McpToolProvider. grantGaps and the dev mock host need no change: both read HOOK_PERMISSION, which is generated. PLUGHOOK-010, plus the CONTRACTS row. |
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661777f81f |
feat(plugins): let a plugin attach a photo to a journal entry
A journal importer can create the journey, create its entries and write their stories, and then it stops: there was no way to give an entry a picture. The seven journal.* methods cover text and nothing else, so an importer reading an export archive could only upload its photos as trip files, which live on a trip and never reach the journey's gallery. journal.addEntryPhoto takes the bytes. Deliberately not a link to an existing gallery photo and not a provider asset: an importer holding an archive has neither, it has a file it just unpacked. The access decision stays where it already was. addPhoto answers null unless the acting user may edit the journey the entry belongs to, and null becomes RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN here, so a plugin reaches exactly the entries its acting user does. Everything the REST upload refuses, this refuses too: images only and no SVG, the operator's allowed-file-types setting, 10MB decoded, demo mode. The stored filename is the host's, never the plugin's, because the gallery dedupes on file_path. The object is written before any row points at it and removed again when the link is refused. JournalRpc moves into its own module for this. It now needs StorageService and the EXIF backfill out of MemoriesModule, and JourneyDomainModule exists precisely so places, assignments and the plugin host can reach a few journey functions without dragging both photo providers into their graphs. Discussion #1365 |
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8a846e4b91 |
feat(mcp): read the warnings plugins raise about a trip
A plugin warning is a plugin telling the user something is wrong with their trip, and get_trip_summary omitted them, so an assistant reviewed a trip from a strictly smaller picture than the user was looking at. |
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1ad2e92142 |
fix: make the app keyboard-reachable, and close four DoS-able patterns
The bulk of what SonarQube still had open on the reliability side, read site by
site rather than swept. Two clusters are worth calling out because they are
defects, not lint.
**Four regexes could be made to hang the process.** The worst is
`/.+@.+\..+/` in the forgot-password path: three unbounded `.+` that all
overlap, unanchored, on an endpoint that needs no login and whose schema is a
bare z.string() under a 100kb body cap. A thousand '@' characters had not
finished after 100 seconds — one request pins the event loop, and Node has one.
EMAIL_REGEX in auth.helpers is the same shape on register and profile update
(310ms for 8kb). The two tag strippers over an uploaded KML description and over
Commons metadata took 0.52s on a 16k run of '<'. Each rewrite was proven
equivalent by brute force against the original — millions of strings for the
coordinate patterns, 671,876 for the tag stripper — because a subtly different
regex on a parsing path is worse than the finding.
`<[^>]+>` could not be fixed in the pattern: `[^>]` matches `<` too, so the only
unambiguous form changes what happens to malformed markup. It is now a scan in
common/stripHtmlTags.ts, quirks included — `<>` is left alone, `<a<b>` is one
tag — with the equivalence pinned by a test that compares against the old regex
over every string up to length six.
**And roughly 500 places could only be reached with a mouse.** Clickable divs
became real buttons where the markup allowed (52 of them), took
role + tabIndex + Enter/Space where they had to stay divs, and modal backdrops
took role="presentation" — the honest role, since a backdrop is a mouse shortcut
for a Cancel control that is already in the tab order, and making it a button
plants a nameless full-screen tab stop around its own contents.
Alongside those: `.sort()` calls that now say the order they always had, `{n &&
<X/>}` guards that rendered a literal "0" for a zero-byte file and for a place at
latitude 0, an optimistic budget write that stored a boolean where the contract
and both transports use 0/1, and the Number statics.
sonar-project.properties documents the six that were deliberately left: two wiki
patterns with no overlapping quantifier pair whose "fix" would stop parsing
`[see [1]](url)`, four tar header fields bounded at 12-155 bytes by the format,
two djb2 hashes where the 32-bit wrap is the algorithm, two `| 0` that are also
coercing undefined to 0 on a path where the API sends no user_id, and the MCP
session maps Sonar reads as empty because they are filled from another module.
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4ba407aead |
feat(plugins): install an older version of a plugin (#2035)
Adds a version picker to the plugin admin panel, on desktop and mobile: every published version with its own server-computed compatibility verdict, so the client never re-derives semver range logic. A deliberate non-latest pick sets an update hold on the row, which keeps the update banner and "Update all" from immediately nagging the rollback away. The hold releases when an install lands back on the newest compatible version by any path, or when the admin resumes updates explicitly. An unresolvable registry never sets one: refusing to pin on missing information beats silently muting future updates. |
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2c2d008dc2 |
fix: clear every open Sonar security issue, and half the reliability ones (#2037)
* fix(security): mint idempotency keys properly, and resolve the extractor by path Three findings out of a sweep of every open Sonar security issue. The other 49 turned out to be false positives and are documented in sonar-project.properties rather than changed — each entry scoped to a file, never a whole rule, so a future Math.random() on an auth path still fails. The idempotency key is the one that can lose data. Both producers fell back to Math.random when crypto.randomUUID was missing, and randomUUID needs a secure context — TREK's own quickstart is http://localhost:3000 and LAN installs run on http://192.168.x.x, so on the deployments the README documents the fallback is what actually runs. The axios one was `Math.random().toString(36).slice(2)`, which is not length-stable: 0.5 yields a single character and 0 yields the empty string, which the interceptor reads as "no key" and skips deduplication for entirely. Two writes sharing a key collapse into one — the second gets the first one's cached response and the edit is gone with no error anywhere. Both now come from utils/randomId, which has the getRandomValues rung that works in insecure contexts too. The extractor probe stored the bare binary name, so every extraction re-resolved it through whatever PATH held at that moment. The official image sets KITINERARY_EXTRACTOR_PATH and never reaches that branch, but a bare-metal install without it ran an unqualified name from a PATH it does not control. It now walks the search path itself and keeps the absolute path of the file it verified; execFileSync also drops the /bin/sh hop the old probe needed. PATH comes through app-config because process.env is walled off in src/. * fix: four tests and sorts that were not doing what they claimed Sonar reported 43 high-impact reliability issues. Reading all of them, four are real; the rest are cosmetic or would be made worse by the suggested change. budget.test.ts hand-built `paid: true`, but both emitters send `paid: body.paid ? 1 : 0` and the handler stores the value verbatim — the test asserted a payload the server never sends. The line below it already used a number. admin.controller.test.ts had a `.resolves` assertion with no await. The promise was dropped, so that line could not fail the test. The two to-do category lists sorted with a bare .sort(), which is byte order: every accented name files behind the whole ASCII range, so in a German trip "Übernachtung" lands after "Zelt". TREK ships 23 locales, so this is real data. One side effect worth knowing: katColor picks a category's dot colour by its index, so re-sorting can move which category shows which colour — it already moves whenever a category is added, and the colour carries no meaning. Deliberately not changed: the two `| 0` truncations (Math.trunc is not equivalent — `| 0` wraps at 32 bits and these carry millisecond timestamps), the two .map() callbacks whose second parameter is declared and used, and the sha1 in thumbnail.service (its own comment says a swap would orphan every existing thumbnail). * refactor: give every button a type, and prefer the Number statics Two mechanical sweeps, no behaviour change intended in either. A <button> with no type attribute is type="submit" per the HTML spec. Outside a form that does nothing today, but it turns into a surprise the moment the markup is wrapped in one, which is what Sonar's S9011 is warning about. 870 buttons get an explicit type="button". Two things were left alone on purpose: buttons that take a {...spread}, because the spread may carry a type and the merge order decides which wins, and anything inside a <form> — there the answer is a judgement call, and checking all eleven form files found every real submit button already carrying type="submit". The Number sweep covers only the three globals that are exactly equivalent to their Number twin: parseInt, parseFloat and NaN. isNaN is NOT in it — the global coerces its argument, so isNaN('abc') is true where Number.isNaN('abc') is false, and renaming it would change what the code does. It reaches server and plugin-sdk as well as the client; both copies of egress-policy.ts got the identical edit, so the mirror the SDK's parity test guards stays intact. |
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dc74d59b11 |
fix(plugins): stop three ways a hostile archive or child could stall the host
All three sit in code whose whole job is to survive a plugin that misbehaves. readTarGz trusted the tar size field, which parseInt reads with a leading minus. At -512 the cursor advance cancels out and below it goes backwards, so the same header is read forever while every pass appends a member — a 70-byte upload pins the main thread and exhausts the heap, synchronously, taking HTTP, the socket and the database with it. The entry budgets never get a say: they run on the list readTarGz has to finish building first. Sideload is the reachable path. The supervisor handed onMessage's promise to an EventEmitter listener, which discards it. A rejection there is an unhandledRejection, the host has no net for it, and Node ends the process — the supervisor killed by the plugin it contains. dispatch() read `'_inv' in req.params` before handle()'s try/catch, so params that are not an object threw a TypeError into exactly that discarded promise. |
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bc59289f73 |
fix(plugins): keep a plugin id from pointing outside its own directory
`POST /api/admin/plugins/:id/uninstall` walks its route parameter into pluginCodeDir() and hands the result to a recursive remove. Express decodes `%2F` after routing, so `..%2F..%2Fuploads` matches the route and reaches the helper as `../../uploads` — path.join then lands in the uploads tree, and `deleteData` gets the data root the same way. Verified against the express version in the lockfile. pluginCodeDir and pluginDataDir now reject an id that could leave its parent. Narrower than the manifest's ID_RE on purpose: that rule wants 3-40 lowercase characters and belongs at install time, while this one only has to make the id unable to steer a path, so it stays permissive about length and case. Every other filesystem sink in the backend already has its guard — storage keys, extraction, the wiki, backup filenames. This one did not. |
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decc0e1a12 |
fix(plugins): boot enabled plugins after the rpc-registry scan, not before
PluginRuntimeService booted enabled plugins from onModuleInit, but Nest fires
same-module onModuleInit hooks in providers-array order, where the runtime
precedes PluginRpcRegistryService — so every boot-activated plugin's rpc host
was bound from a still-empty registry and its first RPC (typically db.migrate
in onLoad) came back PERMISSION_DENIED on every cold boot, until an admin
deactivated and reactivated it by hand. Move the boot reconcile to
onApplicationBootstrap, which is guaranteed to run after every module's
onModuleInit, registry scan included.
Also fix the denial message, which interpolated the plugin id where the
permission belonged ('db.migrate requires a permission "featured-guides" was
not granted'); it now names both the missing permission and the plugin.
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d110b3bb6d |
Fix/plugin audit findings (#2031)
* fix(plugins): enforce manifest apiVersion at install and activation * test(plugins): exercise the absent-apiVersion default * feat(plugins): generate the core-event catalog into host-facts * docs(plugins): explain the packing.listBags write-permission binding * test(plugins): cover apiVersion upload refusal; tidy docblocks and generator header * fix(plugin-sdk): validate settings options and oauth like the host * fix(plugin-sdk): model the full manifest shape and stop dropping fields * fix(plugin-sdk): drop non-string routeProfiles icons like the host * docs(plugin-sdk): document host limits, oauth contract, and ignored asUserId * feat(plugin-sdk): enforce daily budgets and meta quotas in the mock host * feat(plugin-sdk): expose the generated core-event catalog * feat(plugin-sdk): scaffold trek range >=3.4.0 <5.0.0 ahead of TREK 4.0 * feat(plugin-sdk): scaffold the oauth broker settings for oauth:client plugins * chore(plugin-sdk): fix stale mirror docs and the colliding permissions export * docs(plugin-sdk): add the rate-limit string; restore trek docblock; match host meta sizing * feat(plugin-sdk): raise the scaffold trek floor to 4.0.0 * docs(wiki): bring the plugin pages in line with the current runtime * docs: bring the workspace CLAUDE.md guides up to date and make them committable * feat(plugin-sdk): roll back failed publishes, add unrelease, sync the fork, retro-sign updates * docs(wiki): document the publish rollback, unrelease, fork sync, and retro-signing * chore(plugin-sdk): 1.6.0 |
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8e5fdaa877 |
fix(server): tighten the guard, audit and token paths
Permissions cached an empty map before it had loaded, so a DB error during the load cached permissive defaults and every later check answered from that cache - fail-open, and it never expired. The rate limiter grew its per-IP map forever; the GC the legacy version had was dropped in the fold. Idempotency did a check-then-insert, so two concurrent duplicates both ran the handler. Audit rows recorded whatever X-Forwarded-For said, which the client writes, and the request-body debug logger redacted by exact key match - it missed refresh tokens, api keys and PKCE verifiers. FORCE_HTTPS built its redirect from the client's Host header. CSP asked for unsafe-eval on top of the wasm-unsafe-eval it actually needs. The OAuth deny path redirected to an unvalidated URI, ws-token minting had no rate limit at all, and PKCE was skipped when code_verifier was absent rather than refused. An MCP session resumed with a token whose scopes had since been reduced kept the capability set it was created with, and the session cap was checked before the async registration that increments it. Plugin frame containment was lexical, so a symlink out of the directory was never noticed, and instance config accepted keys the manifest never declared. |
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76c8c349b1 |
Fold nest mcp (#2017)
* refactor(server): fold @trek/nest-mcp into server/src/nest-mcp * docs(server): point nest-mcp references at server/src/nest-mcp * remove tracked md file |
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3a0604b3f5 |
feat(config): put the operator-owned surfaces behind TREK_MANAGED (#1946)
* feat(config): put the operator-owned surfaces behind TREK_MANAGED The switch landed last release with nothing behind it. This is what it turns off, plus the four fixes that came out of walking every one of these surfaces. Nothing here changes anything for an install that does not set the flag. That is not a hope, it is what managed-inert.test.ts asserts: the mode stays off for any unparseable value, no other variable can turn it on, every settings key stays writable, and splitManagedKeys hands back the same object rather than a copy so no write path can quietly diverge on self-hosted installs only. WHAT THE MODE WITHHOLDS Fourteen routes carry @ManagedForbidden: key validation, static MCP tokens, JWT rotation, the OIDC admin pair, restore and auto-backup, plugin sideload and reload, the Ollama model list and pull, and the SMTP test send. Each names the reason it is not the instance admin's, and the reason is mandatory. Eighteen settings keys are filtered instead of refused. SMTP, the OIDC toggles and the WebAuthn pair share one handler with keys the admin does own, and the llm_* family is reachable through per-user settings, the instance defaults and the addon config alike, so a route-level refusal would be both too coarse and incomplete. A locked key is skipped and reported as managed_keys; the rest of the save goes through. Refusing the request would take the registration toggles down with the SMTP block. GET /api/auth/me/settings stops returning the three API keys in the clear. It is the only endpoint that decrypts a stored credential back to the caller, which is fine when the admin pasted it in and wrong when the operator supplied it. Two multipart routes check in the handler rather than the guard: a guard throws before the parser drains the body and the client gets an ECONNRESET instead of the 403 (PROFILE-015). They still carry the marker so the boot gate sees them. WHAT KEEPS IT FROM DRIFTING validate-managed-routes.ts refuses to boot on a marking that is not on the reviewed list, a list entry whose route lost its marking, or a marking with no reason. The third case has no equivalent in the guard gate next door and is the one that matters most: a blank reason destroys the only record of why a control was taken away, and nothing recovers that later. It found two wrong entries in my own list while I was writing this. managed-keys.test.ts asserts that every key in ADMIN_SETTINGS_KEYS and DEFAULTABLE_USER_SETTING_KEYS belongs to exactly one of two sets. A key added to either list belongs to neither until somebody decides, and that is the failure this prevents: the lists grow, the mode does not. PLACES_API_BASE AND PLACES_API_KEY The nine Places endpoints spell out googleapis.com, so an install that wants those calls to leave through something of its own has no way to say so. One variable, substituted where every call already funnels through. A second one supplies the key, and when it is set the users table is not consulted at all — a per-user key would route around whatever the endpoint counts, and those columns are readable by any admin of the instance. FOUR FIXES THAT ARE NOT ABOUT THE MODE An admin setting somebody's password now bumps password_version and clears their MCP tokens. An admin sets a password for one reason, and until now verifyJwtAndLoadUser kept accepting every cookie the intruder already had: the one action taken to lock them out was the one action that did not. The four OIDC provider calls go through the SSRF guard. Three are worse than they look — the token, userinfo and JWKS URLs come out of the discovery response, so they are chosen by the other end, not by an admin. safeFetchLlm is renamed safeFetchAdminConfigured and keeps its old name as an alias, because it is the variant that allows loopback and LAN: a self-hoster with Authentik on localhost:9000 must keep working. The token exchange follows no redirect at all, since one would hand client_secret to a second host. DELETE /api/admin/users/:id/mfa clears another account's TOTP. The passkey half has existed since passkeys landed; the TOTP half never did, which left "somebody on the trip lost their phone" with no answer short of an operator in the database. Never for the caller themselves. TREK_PLUGIN_PERMISSIONS=off refuses to boot when the install is centrally administered. A warning is right for a machine its owner chose to trust; where the person who set the flag and the people whose data is in the database are not the same person, fail closed. TEXTS Four strings lose the phrase "self-hosted" because they describe somebody else's software — an Ollama endpoint, an AirTrail instance, a service a plugin talks to — and read better without it in both modes. The one string that describes TREK itself keeps it, and the mode picks a second key instead, so self-hosters lose nothing. A grep gate in shared/ keeps the canonical locale honest, because the parity check compares the file set and the top-level keys and never looks at a value: re-wording a string is invisible to CI today, and so is putting it back. * feat(maps): supply the map credential with the instance when centrally administered MAPBOX_ACCESS_TOKEN joins PLACES_API_KEY as an operator-supplied value. SettingsService injects it when the settings are read, and picks GL as the provider if the reader is still on Leaflet, since a token is always present. The key moves from the customer set to the locked set. It is the one locked key whose value is public by design — a pk.* token has to reach the browser to be useful — so this is not about secrecy: a per-user save landing on top of the instance token would only break the map for that user. Both settings fields for it go away with it. * fix(auth): count the operator key when reporting whether Google features work has_maps_key only looked at the users table, but getMapsKey prefers the PLACES_API_KEY env over anything stored there. On an install that supplies the key that way and has an empty column, every lookup worked while the client was told there was no key and hid the search, the autocomplete and the place photos. Found by walking the running instance rather than the code: the map came up, the search box did not. * feat(admin): hide the settings a centrally administered install cannot act on A control that answers 403 is worse than no control: the AI section rendered the refusal as "Request failed with status code 403", which tells an admin they broke something rather than that the decision is not theirs. So the surfaces go rather than being disabled in place: - AI parsing and AirTrail leave the addon list, and the AI addon route now refuses outright. The endpoint, the model and what a document costs come with the instance, so there is no instance decision left — not even whether it runs. - Immich and Synology Photos leave it too. Both connect to a server the reader runs at home, and there is no route from here to one. - The SMTP block, the admin webhook and ntfy targets, and the passkey RP ID and origins follow the same rule: they configure something the operator owns, and a wrong RP ID on a shared parent domain reaches past this instance entirely. - The About tab goes. It is about the project — what TREK is, where to file a bug, where to support it — and is aimed at the person running the software. The version and the link to the source move to the sidebar footer, on both the desktop page and the mobile twin, because AGPL 13 wants that offer wherever people reach the software over a network. - The update check stops asking GitHub and reports nothing available. Separately, the version footers lose the "self-hosted" suffix everywhere, not just here. It read as a label on the software rather than on the install, and the version alone says what it needs to. * feat(config): refuse to boot centrally administered without an at-rest key Measured on a running instance rather than assumed: with ENCRYPTION_KEY unset, the at-rest key falls back to a file in the data volume, and backupService bundles that file into every archive it builds. The archive is downloadable by any instance admin, so the encryption ships with its own key in the same zip. The skip in backupService already handles this — it only omits the file when the key came from the env — but nothing made sure the env actually carried one. Provisioning sets it; forgetting it was silent. validateEnvAtBoot now carries a second kind of check next to the schema: cross- field rules that only apply with the flag set, for combinations where every value is individually valid and the result is wrong. Empty without the flag, so an install that never asked to be centrally administered cannot meet it. * feat(client): add an attachment point for install-specific screens Two empty exports on the client, an empty module on the server, and the four places that read them. Nothing here adds a route, a nav entry or an endpoint — the arrays are empty and the module contributes nothing, which managed-ext.test pins so it stays that way. Read unconditionally, never behind a flag. On the server a conditional import would tie the module graph to an environment variable, and the graph is built once per app while the flag is read live; on the client an empty array costs nothing to spread, so every build walks the same path instead of one build walking a path nobody tests. Anything attached here follows the same rules as the rest of src/nest and src/components: a real module with a controller and a provider, bodies through the Zod pipe, routes under the global guards, tests. * test(shared): move the wording gate out of src so shared typechecks again CI installs shared with its own dependencies only (npm ci --workspace shared), so there is no @types/node and the `node:fs` import inside src/ failed to compile. The tests passed the whole time — vitest supplies the module — which is why this only showed up in the typecheck step. The walk moves to scripts/, next to i18n-parity.mjs, and the spec imports it the same way that one does. It also runs on its own now (`node scripts/i18n-selfhost-wording.mjs`), which is what you want when CI names a line you have to go find. * test(server): repair the call sites typecheck:tests caught tests/ sits outside the build tsconfig, so none of this showed up in a green test run — which is exactly the gap `npm run typecheck:tests` exists to close. Three kinds, all mine: - Seven `import type` paths for RuntimeEnvService carried one `../` too many. Type-only imports are erased, so vitest never resolved them and nothing failed. - VersionCheckJob and PluginsController grew a constructor parameter and eleven hand-wired `new` calls kept passing the old count. The argument arrived as undefined and no assertion happened to read it. - ConditionContext grew `managed`, and the shared context object in the conditions suite did not. The condition also had no test of its own, so it has one now: both directions, since the registry uses `is: false` to keep a notice away and a notice that only belongs on a centrally administered install would use `is: true`. |
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3a7c8e1d26 |
Make a bind failure fatal again, and undo four contract tightenings
An adversarial audit over the three merged migration PRs. Sixteen findings
survived triple refutation; these are the ones with a defect behind them.
The serious one is mine, from the gateway move. ws registers
`error: this.emit.bind(this, 'error')` on the http server it attaches to, and
the adapter now runs inside buildApp, before listen(). So from that moment the
http server HAS an error listener and Node stops throwing on one. The adapter's
handler was `() => {}`, which meant EADDRINUSE was forwarded there and dropped:
the process survived, the listen callback never ran, so the banner never
printed and the scheduler never started. A container that looks healthy and
serves nothing. Reproduced, then fixed at both ends: index.ts owns the fatal
decision on the http server, and the adapter logs instead of swallowing.
Four DTOs were tightening contracts rather than describing them, which is the
thing the pipe-before-handler ordering makes easy to do by accident:
- OauthClientCreateDto replaced 'Name is required' with a Zod field report, and
pre-empted the handler's 403 on an instance with the MCP addon off.
- BookingImportConfirmDto demanded per-item fields the service never reads, so
a caller assembling items itself got a 400 about `source`.
- TagCreateDto/TagUpdateDto typed name and color as strings; the legacy route
bound whatever arrived, so a numeric name used to create a tag.
- PluginUserSettingsUpdateDto typed config as a record, where the handler
answers 200 for anything it cannot use.
Two of my own tests were false-green, which the audit demonstrated by mutation
rather than by reading. WSGW-008 asserted on frames that never carry the user
object at all, so it passed with the password_version strip deleted; it reads
the retained identity now. GEO-009 made the same assertion before and after the
write; it distinguishes a cached negative from a miss now, through a hasCached
seam that says what getCached cannot. Both were re-run against the mutation
they exist to catch, and both fail on it.
booking-import geocodes every venue and endpoint in one request loop, up to
thirty sequential calls. Folding maps onto the shared Nominatim cursor put that
loop on the interactive lane, so an import starved every concurrent keystroke
for half a minute. It takes the background lane now, which is what the two-lane
split was built for.
Also: the README's in-container bridge list had outlived one entry and was
missing another, and the journey e2e still mocked a module this branch deleted.
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08dac57577 |
refactor(server): migrate plugin jobs off node-cron
The plugin host's job scheduler now uses the cron package (the one @nestjs/schedule wraps), so node-cron and @types/node-cron leave the dependency tree entirely. Verified against both real libraries that the accepted cron grammar is identical — no plugin's declared schedule tightens — and pinned that with an unmocked compat test. |
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ba7d55f999 |
Finish the contract ratchet, the upload bridge and the client leftovers
BODY_CONTRACT_ALLOW_LIST is empty. The last seventeen handlers type their
body with a createZodDto class, so the fail-closed boot gate has nothing left
to forgive; it still refuses a boot for a new handler that reads @Body()
without one.
Several of those contracts describe rather than constrain, and that is the
whole care in this change. The pipe runs before the handler, so a schema
stricter than the handler moves a user-visible answer:
- TagsController.create answers { error: 'Tag name is required' }, pinned
byte-for-byte in two tests, and the pipe formats as `field: message`. The
DTO leaves name optional and the handler keeps the check that owns the
message. Same shape for the booking-import confirm body, which additionally
gains per-item validation the handler never did.
- PluginsController.activate and install answer 503 when plugins are disabled,
and check that BEFORE looking at the body. A schema that rejected first
would turn that into a 400 for an operator whose server has plugins off.
- setEgressHosts reads a non-array `hosts` as "clear the list", which is the
documented reset. Typing it as string[] would have removed a working admin
action rather than tightened anything.
- PluginRoutesController.route answers { route: null } at 200 for everything
it dislikes, so the client falls back to straight lines. A 400 there would
turn a graceful degradation into a visible error.
files.bridge is gone. The multer options are built by
MulterModule.registerAsync from an AllowedFileTypesService leaf, so the
fileFilter reads the operator's extension list from the container instead of
from a second FilesService built outside it. Nest injects
MULTER_MODULE_OPTIONS with @Optional(), so a token that fails to resolve is
not a boot error: it silently falls back to defaults, with no filter and no
size cap. FILE-020 already proved that for trip files by uploading an .svg
over HTTP and expecting 400; journey uploads had no such case, and now do.
VIDEO_UPLOAD is untouched, including the filename callback that forces .jpg
regardless of what the client sends, which guards the public share proxy.
PluginFrame gets an onError. A frame whose document fails to load left a
blank element at full height, which reads as a hung app rather than as a
plugin that is gone.
typecheck:tests runs in CI now, with the test tree at zero errors. tz-lookup
is left as it is: the build puts it in a lazy helpers chunk, not the entry
chunk, and the remaining split would trade a synchronous render for an async
one to move 172 kB that is already off the critical path.
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ffb73fac20 |
Turn protection from opt-in into default-deny
Nothing in src/nest/** was an APP_GUARD. Every protected route said so itself, 62 times, which means a forgotten @UseGuards was a silent bypass rather than an error. GlobalAuthGuard inverts that: a route is authenticated unless it carries @Public() or @OptionalAuth(), or declares its own guard chain. Reading the declared chain is what makes this behaviour-neutral. Nest runs global guards before route guards, so without that check the global guard would 401 an anonymous request to an addon-gated controller before its AddonGuard could answer 404 - inverting an order four e2e suites pin, and leaking which addons are installed. A controller that declared a chain keeps deciding for itself. It is a new class rather than JwtAuthGuard gaining a Reflector: that guard is constructed positionally in its own test with a context stub that has no getHandler, and the two want opposite behaviour anyway. @Public() takes a required reason, and the reasons are the diff worth reading: the invite token IS the credential, help assets are loaded by <img> which cannot send one, logout has to work with an expired session or nobody can sign out. The real deliverable is the inventory. validateRouteGuards runs in buildApp next to the body-contract gate and refuses to start when a route answers anonymously without being on a reviewed list of 25 - or when a listed one no longer does. An allow list nobody prunes stops being a list. Default-deny found two controllers on its own: SharedController and OidcController both sit in a file next to a guarded controller, so a file-level search for unguarded ones missed them. 37 tests went red and named them. That is the mechanism working before the change shipped, not after. |
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3d522be0e5 |
Give accommodations one home instead of two halves
The routes lived in reservations/ while the SQL lived on DaysService, so the controller delegated every call across a domain boundary to reach its own data, and neither module owned the thing outright. The seven statements move into AccommodationsService unchanged and the domain gets its own directory, module, DTO, RPC and MCP surface. What stays in days/ is the reorder side: assertNoInvertedAccommodation and resyncAccommodationDays are about re-dating day rows, and the stay is the thing being carried, not the thing doing the carrying. Two edges fall out of this. AccommodationsService drops its DaysService dependency, and DaysMcp drops DatabaseService and PlacesService, because create_place_accommodation was their only user - which lets DaysModule stop importing PlacesModule and closes one leg of the latent Days -> Places -> Assignments -> Days cycle. DAY-SVC-016..026, 029 and 035 move to accommodations.service.test.ts with their case ids intact. The reservations e2e container assembles both modules now: it builds a single domain module on purpose, which is exactly what catches a move like this, and it caught it. |
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ad312cdd43 |
Give day notes a domain of their own
days/ carried two fachlichkeiten with a full file set each: days.controller, days.service, days.mcp, days.rpc, days.dto next to the five day-notes ones. The note files move out unchanged; because the new directory sits at the same depth, not one import path inside them changed. The two modules deliberately do not reference each other in either direction: dayExists is raw SQL on the days table in the note service, and DaysService reads day_notes the same way, so a module edge would buy nothing and cost a cycle. DayNotesModule has to be registered in PluginsRuntimeModule as well as AppModule - DayNotesRpc owns four of the 113 wire methods and the registry boots with requireTotalCoverage, so leaving it out would stop every test app that assembles the plugin runtime. The days e2e container assembles both modules now: the note routes still nest under the days prefix, and a container that builds only DaysModule would 404 on them while production served them fine. |
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6680bc7c74 |
Split PluginsModule into four, and gate coverage per domain
PluginsModule was 21 controllers, 24 domain imports and 10 providers in one class, which made it the hub most of the Nest graph ran through: AdminModule imported it for a single cascade-disable call and inherited all of it. It is now PluginsRuntimeModule (supervisor, capability router, hook contracts), PluginContributionsModule (the 14 read-only hook controllers, moved to contributions/), PluginOAuthModule (the credential leaf, moved to oauth/) and a composition root that keeps the install and delivery controllers. AdminModule imports the runtime alone. The three plugin files that reached for the db singleton alongside the injected DatabaseService no longer do. plugin-host-state and signature-status take the connection from the caller, and the three per-user settings functions that were bare exports 'so the RPC host wiring can call them directly' are now PluginUserSettingsService - the host wiring is providers, so it injects them. Coverage moves from one repo-wide 80% to a per-domain ratchet. The single number let a well-covered domain subsidise a thin one: booking-import sits at 50% and integrations at 20%, and the aggregate still cleared the bar, so either could have lost another ten points unnoticed. Each domain now carries its own measured floor, regenerated by scripts/coverage-thresholds.mjs. Two test-side findings on the way: expect(undefined).toContain(SomeClass) PASSES in this vitest version - it only throws for a string needle. Every '<X> is listed in its module providers' guard was written that way, so all twelve of them silently stopped guarding the moment their class moved. They go through expectRegisteredProvider now, which asserts the array shape first. The atlas region test paid for the one-off decompression of the multi-MB admin1 bundle inside its own 5s budget, which is why it failed under load and passed alone. The bundle is warmed in beforeAll instead. |
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dc81a5365e |
Make PluginsModule bring the whole plugin surface with it
With requireTotalCoverage on, a test app that assembles a subset of AppModule now fails to boot: the admin e2e suite pulls PluginsModule in through AdminModule, but WeatherModule was only ever reachable from AppModule, so weather.get had no handler and validate() refused the start. The invariant the gate needs is that importing PluginsModule pulls in every domain that owns part of the wire surface. WeatherModule was the one domain missing from that list. |
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f72aba0c91 |
Finish the plugin RPC decorator rollout
The last 20 wire methods move onto the decorators: db.* and the three unconditional methods (DbRpc), meta.* (MetaRpc) and the host-mediated surface of users/broadcasts/notify/ai/oauth/scheduler (HostSurfaceRpc). That closes the ledger at 113/113, so the legacy has() blocks in rpc-host.ts are gone and the router is down to what was never domain-specific: build the granted subset of the dispatch map, dispatch, audit, map errors. PluginHostDepsFactory was the 26-argument wiring sheet behind those blocks. With the handlers in the domains it has two dependencies left, so it is now PluginRpcHostFactory: the plugin's own sqlite handle, the inter-plugin router bound with this plugin as the caller, and the audit sink. The 18 host-to-plugin hook calls get the same treatment. They used to spell out the fn name and the timeout at each controller, which meant nothing checked that a hook:* grant on the consent screen had a consumer behind it, that the fn matched what the SDK documents, or that two call sites agreed on the budget. PluginHooks declares all 18 with @PluginHook and performs them, and the controllers call it by name. With both halves complete, requireTotalCoverage goes on: a KNOWN_METHOD without a handler, or a hook without a consumer, now fails app boot instead of surfacing as a PERMISSION_DENIED nobody can explain. |
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611f94e820 |
Consolidate the schema-error fallback and cover the defensive branches
Aiming the new files at 95% rather than at the 80% gate turned up something worth fixing rather than testing around: `error.issues[0]?.message ?? 'bad input'` had been copied into twenty handlers. That is twenty two-branch fallbacks that no test can reach, because a real Zod failure always carries at least one issue. They are now one schemaMessage() in rpc-params.ts, with one test that does reach both sides. The rest of this is the branches the handlers inherited from the router: the `!= null` link ternaries, the "service said no" paths, the ValidationError and NotFoundError translations, and a reject case per schema-validated method. Two limits found while measuring, both real rather than laziness. istanbul counts each @PluginController line as a branch and only ever takes one side, so eight branches across the rpc files can never be covered and a two-method file caps out around 50%. And the three update schemas stay deliberately permissive, because the migration's rule is parity over tightening, so their reject branch is defence in depth no payload reaches. Everything else went from 50 uncovered branches to 29. |
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294cfcd8d7 |
Move the addon-gated domains onto the decorators
collab, journal, atlas, vacay and collections: 32 more methods, so the registry owns 93 of 113. rpc-host.ts is at 565 lines, down from 1332, and the deps factory at 384, down from 944. These five are the risky group, because their addon gates lived inside the deps factory's closure rather than in the router. A handler that calls its service directly still works, just without the check, and neither the compiler nor the router tests would notice. So addon-gates.rpc.test.ts walks all 37 gated methods as one table and asserts two things for each: with the addon off it is refused with that addon's message, and the service is never reached. The table length is pinned, so a later method added without a row is a failure rather than a silent gap. One ordering detail worth knowing: on the atlas writes the router evaluated its params before the addon gate inside the closure, so a malformed country code still reports BAD_PARAMS rather than the addon. The handlers keep that order. The collections service reports refusals as status-tagged errors rather than typed ones, so mapCollectionError came across with the handlers: 403 and 404 become RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN, 400 and 409 become BAD_PARAMS, and anything untagged stays a HOST_ERROR instead of being dressed up as a permission problem. |
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010242b107 |
Move costs, reservations and accommodations onto the decorators
Eleven more methods, so the registry owns 61 of 113. rpc-host.ts is at 771 lines,
down from 1332.
costs is the first addon-gated domain, and the addon check sits in a different
place in each of the two reads: inside the membership callback for getByTrip, so a
caller without trip access never learns whether the addon is on, and before
everything for listMine, which has no trip to check. Both orderings are asserted.
The writes keep their own refusal wording ("no permission to edit costs on trip N")
instead of going through requireTripEdit, which words it differently.
The booking paths are cascade-heavy and stay that way: creating a reservation can
create an accommodation and a budget item, deleting one removes both again, and
deleting a lodging block takes its partner reservation and budget item with it.
Each cascade is a broadcast the web app relies on, so they are asserted by event
name and order.
CostsRpc reaches the trip list through trips.bridge rather than by injection.
BudgetModule cannot import TripsModule, because TripsModule already imports
BudgetModule; budget.mcp.ts uses the same escape for the same reason.
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2ec6d006b0 |
Move the trip surface onto the decorators
Twelve more methods, so the registry owns 50 of 113. rpc-host.ts is down from 1332 lines to 830 and the deps factory from 944 to 500. trips.update keeps its two field-level gates: archiving and changing the cover each need their own admin-configurable permission on top of trip_edit, so a plugin cannot do either on a trip it may otherwise edit. Member management keeps its own grant for the same kind of reason, since adding a member grants trip access, and the owner still cannot be removed through it because that would orphan the trip. canEditTrip stays in HostDeps for now: the db:meta gate still resolves an entity's edit permission through it and has not moved yet. |