Introduces a dedicated ENCRYPTION_KEY for encrypting stored secrets
(API keys, MFA TOTP, SMTP password, OIDC client secret) so that
rotating the JWT signing secret no longer invalidates encrypted data,
and a compromised JWT_SECRET no longer exposes stored credentials.
- server/src/config.ts: add ENCRYPTION_KEY (auto-generated to
data/.encryption_key if not set, same pattern as JWT_SECRET);
switch JWT_SECRET to `export let` so updateJwtSecret() keeps the
CJS module binding live for all importers without restart
- apiKeyCrypto.ts, mfaCrypto.ts: derive encryption keys from
ENCRYPTION_KEY instead of JWT_SECRET
- admin POST /rotate-jwt-secret: generates a new 32-byte hex secret,
persists it to data/.jwt_secret, updates the live in-process binding
via updateJwtSecret(), and writes an audit log entry
- Admin panel (Settings → Danger Zone): "Rotate JWT Secret" button
with a confirmation modal warning that all sessions will be
invalidated; on success the acting admin is logged out immediately
- docker-compose.yml, .env.example, README, Helm chart (values.yaml,
secret.yaml, deployment.yaml, NOTES.txt, README): document
ENCRYPTION_KEY and its upgrade migration path
- Add { algorithms: ['HS256'] } to all jwt.verify() calls to prevent
algorithm confusion attacks (including the 'none' algorithm)
- Add { algorithm: 'HS256' } to all jwt.sign() calls for consistency
- Reduce OIDC token payload to only { id } (was leaking username, email, role)
- Validate OIDC redirect URI against APP_URL env var when configured
- Add startup warning when JWT_SECRET is auto-generated
https://claude.ai/code/session_01SoQKcF5Rz9Y8Nzo4PzkxY8
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