The deactivation-on-deploy bug: `status` conflated the admin's ON/OFF intent with
runtime health, so a boot crash flipped status to 'error' and the plugin never
rebooted after the next deploy. Migration 156 adds an `enabled` flag (admin
intent) separate from `status` (runtime health); boot now retries every enabled
plugin regardless of last status, and a crash no longer erases the intent.
Admin → Plugins redesign:
- ON/OFF is a ToggleSwitch bound to `enabled`; runtime health shows separately as
a coloured status dot, with the last error inline when it crashed.
- "Update → vX" badge when the registry has a newer version (one click updates
and reactivates).
- Reviewed/unreviewed trust badges, cleaner cards, nicer empty state, registry
browser marks already-installed plugins. i18n across all locales.
- Plugin frame CSP: the frame runs at an opaque origin (sandbox without
allow-same-origin), so script-src 'self' matches nothing and the widget's own
script never runs (stuck on 'Loading…'). Allow 'unsafe-inline' — the sandbox,
not this directive, is the isolation boundary, and the plugin author controls
the frame code either way.
- Fix a no-constant-binary-expression eslint error in registry.test.ts that was
failing the server lint:check (eslint .) in CI.
- Uninstall with data disposition: POST /api/admin/plugins/:id/uninstall kills the
plugin, removes its code + DB metadata, and (deleteData) drops its data dir,
error log and per-user settings.
- Error log: GET/DELETE /api/admin/plugins/:id/errors — the plugin's own crash /
request-failure log, surfaced in the admin panel.
- Egress guard: the isolated child wraps global fetch and refuses any outbound
host not in the plugin's declared egress[]; with none declared, all outbound is
blocked. Process-level defense in depth (the container runtime enforces it at
the network layer in v2).
- Admin → Plugins is now actionable: activate / deactivate / uninstall, a
registry browser (install), and per-plugin error log. i18n across all locales.
- Dashboard widget slot: active widget plugins render as sandboxed cards.
The trek:request core-data bridge + photo/calendar hook consumers remain follow-ups.
Connects TREK to the static GitHub registry (mauriceboe/TREK-Plugins). The
registry repo + CI gates were already live; this is the server side.
- registry.service: fetches the single aggregated dist/index.json (never
per-plugin GitHub API calls — the HACS rate-limit lesson), caches it 30 min,
soft-fails to a stale/empty registry, and installs a pinned version through
the M4 pipeline: safe download -> sha256 verify -> slip-safe extract ->
manifest re-validate -> native re-scan -> atomic move -> discover (inactive),
recording repo/commit/sha provenance. Handles the codeload {repo}-{sha}/
wrapper directory.
- Admin endpoints: GET /api/admin/plugins/registry (browse metadata) and
POST /api/admin/plugins/install { id, version }. Install never executes code;
activation stays a separate, deliberate step.
Plugins placed on the /plugins volume are now discovered, validated and registered
as inactive, ready to activate.
- manifest.ts: strict trek-plugin.json validation (id/version/type, known
permissions only, egress required with http:outbound, native modules rejected).
- discovery.ts: scans the volume on startup + on demand (POST /api/admin/plugins/
rescan), upserts rows INACTIVE, refreshes settings-field descriptors, and never
downgrades or wipes an already-installed plugin's status / grants / config.
Invalid or native-carrying plugins are skipped and logged.
- Activation now grants the DECLARED permissions (the consent gate) and persists
them before spawning.
- install/ utilities for the registry installer (M5), each independently tested:
- safe-fetch: host allowlist (GitHub only) + private-IP refusal + manual
redirect following + size cap + sha256 (constant-time compare).
- safe-extract: zip/tar-slip-safe extraction with its own minimal tar.gz + zip
readers; rejects traversal, absolute paths, symlinks, oversized/too-many
entries, and unsupported formats.
- native-scan: refuses .node / binding.gyp / prebuilds, never follows symlinks.
Plugins can now render UI. Page plugins appear as a nav entry and open a
full-page sandboxed iframe; the frame talks to TREK only over the postMessage
bridge.
- Server serves plugin client assets at /plugin-frame/:id/* with a strict path
guard and a locked-down, per-plugin CSP (default-src none; connect-src limited
to declared outbound hosts; sandbox WITHOUT allow-same-origin -> opaque origin,
so the frame can't read the session cookie or the parent DOM). Global CSP
frameSrc relaxed from 'none' to 'self' for exactly these frames.
- GET /api/plugins feed lists active plugins for the client.
- Client: pluginStore + PluginFrame (the trekBridge host) authenticates every
inbound message by SENDER WINDOW IDENTITY (event.source), not by a claimed id
or origin; pushes context (theme/locale/tripId/userId), validates navigation,
renders notifications as text, resizes widgets, and proxies trek:invoke to the
plugin's own routes host-side (session cookie stays with the host).
- Page route /plugins/:id + Navbar nav injection for page plugins.
Dashboard widget slot and the trek:request core-data bridge are deferred to a
later slice.
Wires the isolated runtime into TREK. Admins can now activate a plugin from the
panel and its HTTP routes work end to end, still behind the kill switch.
- PluginRuntimeService owns the supervisor: activate spawns the child with its
granted permissions + decrypted instance config, deactivate kills it, status
and errors are persisted to the plugins / plugin_error_log tables, and active
plugins are booted on startup (OnModuleInit).
- Bidirectional RPC: the child now handles host→child invokes (routes/jobs) and
reports its declared routes on load; the supervisor gained invoke()/routesOf().
- /api/plugins/:id/* proxy controller — a single static route that matches the
plugin's declared routes, enforces per-route auth (auth:false routes are public
for OAuth callbacks/webhooks), forwards only a whitelisted request view (never
the session cookie), and strips unsafe response headers.
- Admin endpoints: POST :id/activate, POST :id/deactivate, GET/PUT :id/config —
instance settings with secret fields encrypted (apiKeyCrypto) and masked.
- Kill switch moved to its own module so it never collides with test config mocks.
Photo/calendar hook consumers are deferred to a later slice.
Every plugin now runs in its own forked child process with a scrubbed env
(no JWT_SECRET, no db path, nothing inherited). It talks to TREK only over a
JSON-RPC channel, and the host's capability router registers ONLY the methods a
plugin's granted permissions unlock — so an ungranted call is unreachable, not
merely refused. The plugin's own data lives in a separate sqlite file it can
never open directly; core reads (trips/users) go through membership-checked,
column-projected host methods; ws broadcasts are force-namespaced.
- protocol/envelope: the wire types + method→permission map (pure, shared by
host and the isolated child)
- host/rpc-host: the capability router = the enforcement point (dispatch,
BAD_PARAMS / PERMISSION_DENIED / RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN / UNKNOWN_METHOD)
- host/plugin-data: the per-plugin sqlite file (db:own), guarded against
ATTACH/PRAGMA escape, idempotent migrations
- host/create-rpc-host: wires the router to the real db/websocket (host-only)
- runtime/plugin-sdk + plugin-host-entry: the child bootstrap + definePlugin
ctx; turns each ctx call into an RPC, never imports a privileged module
- supervisor: spawn on activate, heartbeat/reap, crash backoff + auto-disable,
graceful shutdown — a plugin crash/OOM/hang can never reach the Nest loop
- paths: code/data layout, dist-vs-tsx child entry resolution
Nothing is wired into activation yet (that's the next slice); exercised by unit
tests for the router/sdk/data and an integration test that forks a real child.
mauriceboe