3 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jubnl	dd90c6d424	fix(mcp): add RFC 9728 PRM, RFC 8707 audience binding, and collab sub-feature gating ... Root cause: claude.ai's MCP connector (spec 2025-06-18) requires the resource server to publish Protected Resource Metadata and return WWW-Authenticate on 401s to bind the /mcp endpoint to its AS. Without these, it silently shows no tools after OAuth. - Add /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource (RFC 9728) with addon gating - Emit WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata=... on 401/auth-failure 403s - Open CORS (origin: *) on both .well-known/* endpoints per RFC 8414/9728 - Accept resource parameter at authorize + token endpoints (RFC 8707) - Store audience on oauth_tokens; validate on every MCP request - Refresh tokens inherit audience; add resource_parameter_supported to AS metadata - DB migration: ADD COLUMN audience TEXT to oauth_tokens - Gate collab MCP tools/resources by chat/notes/polls sub-features individually - Invalidate MCP sessions when collab sub-features are toggled in admin - Update test mocks and MCP.md	2026-04-20 07:34:38 +02:00
jubnl	7c0a0d5f39	security(oauth): harden OAuth 2.1/MCP implementation (Critical + High + Medium findings) ... Address 14 security findings from internal review of the OAuth 2.1 + MCP layer: Critical: - C1: Scope-gate all MCP resources (trips, budget, packing, collab, atlas, vacay, etc.) - C2: Wire token/session revocation into active MCP session lifecycle per (user, client_id) - C3: Refresh-token replay detection via parent_token_id chain + cascade revoke on replay High: - H1: Validate PKCE code_challenge (43-char base64url) and code_verifier (43–128 chars) format - H2: Rate-limit /oauth/token (30/min), /authorize/validate (30/min), /oauth/revoke (10/min) - H3: Strip client metadata from unauthenticated /authorize/validate responses (oracle prevention) - H4: Constant-time secret comparison via crypto.timingSafeEqual (prevents timing attacks) - H5: Collapse all invalid_grant cases to a single generic message; log specifics server-side Medium: - M1: Set Cache-Control: no-store + Pragma: no-cache on token endpoint responses - M2: Return 404 (not 200/403) on discovery + revoke endpoints when MCP addon is disabled - M4: Audit-log all OAuth lifecycle events (create, consent, issue, refresh, revoke, replay) - M5: Union consent scopes on re-authorization instead of replacing existing grants - M7: Require httpOnly cookie auth (not Bearer JWT) on all state-mutating OAuth endpoints - M8: Strict Bearer scheme check in MCP token verification Refactoring: - Extract MCP session management (sessions Map, revokeUserSessions, revokeUserSessionsForClient) into mcp/sessionManager.ts to break the circular dependency between oauthService and mcp/index - Extract verifyJwtAndLoadUser helper in auth middleware, shared by authenticate and new requireCookieAuth middleware Tests: - Fix all existing integration tests broken by the security hardening (OAUTH-019 to OAUTH-032) - Add 13 new integration tests covering M1, M2, H1, H3, H5, M5, M7, C3 - Add 14 new unit tests covering C2, C3, H1, H3, M5 behaviors in oauthService	2026-04-10 02:03:27 +02:00
jubnl	f2908fdd65	test(mcp): add tests for OAuth 2.1, addon gating, and budget reorder ... Covers OAuth integration flow, scope enforcement, addon-gated tool access, oauthService unit tests, and budget reorder/permission/reservation-sync scenarios.	2026-04-09 23:12:59 +02:00