Second-pass fixes caught by a self-review after the initial commit — each
one would have undermined a fix from the previous commit.
- mfaPolicy now goes through `verifyJwtAndLoadUser` too. Without this,
a JWT stolen before a password reset still satisfied `require_mfa`
until its natural 24h expiry, defeating the whole point of the
password_version bump.
- Drop the `?? keys[0]` fallback in OIDC JWKS key selection. When the
token carries a `kid` that is not in the current JWKS, refuse
outright instead of picking an arbitrary key and letting the
signature check produce a generic failure — the real failure mode
deserves a specific error code.
- Tighten OAuth DCR custom-scheme rule so `javascript:`, `data:`,
`vbscript:`, `file:`, `blob:`, `about:`, `chrome:` are all rejected.
Previously the catch-all "not http/https" check admitted them; the
authorize flow later 302s the browser to whatever is registered,
which with a `javascript:` URI would execute attacker script on
redirect. Also require the private-use scheme body to be reverse-DNS
(contain a dot), matching RFC 8252 §7.1.
- permanentDeleteFile / emptyTrash only delete the trip_files row when
the on-disk unlink actually succeeded. Previously Promise.all
swallowed individual unlink failures and DELETE ran unconditionally,
so a permission / ENOSPC failure would orphan bytes on disk.
- restoreFromZip also invalidates the permissions cache in the outer
catch. If extraction threw before the DB swap even started, the
cache wasn't stale, but belt-and-braces is cheap and guarantees no
failed-restore path leaves stale cache behind.
Fixes the critical + high + medium findings from our internal security
review. Bundled into one PR because the changes overlap heavily (JWT
verification unifies across three call sites; backup-code hashing and
demo-email handling cross-cut several services); splitting them out
would mean redundant reviews of the same files.
Critical
- CI-C1 — .github/workflows/test.yml: restore actions/{checkout,setup-
node,upload-artifact} to @v4. The @v6 refs don't exist, so the test
workflow was errorring before a single test ran.
- SEC-C1 — mfaPolicy now extracts the token via extractToken() (cookie-
first, Bearer fallback). Previously it only read Authorization, so
every cookie-authenticated SPA session bypassed require_mfa entirely.
- SEC-C2/C4/C6 — all JWT verification paths (MCP bearer, file download,
photo route) now go through the shared verifyJwtAndLoadUser that
checks password_version. resetPassword additionally deletes every
mcp_tokens row and marks outstanding oauth_tokens revoked, so a
password reset invalidates ALL credential classes — not just the
cookie JWT.
High
- SEC-H2 — reset email URL is built from server-side APP_URL /
ALLOWED_ORIGINS (via existing getAppUrl()), not request headers.
Closes the host-header-injection vector into reset links.
- SEC-H3 — OIDC findOrCreateUser wraps the invite-redemption UPDATE +
user INSERT in a transaction. The UPDATE is the capacity check; if
a concurrent callback takes the last slot, the whole transaction
aborts with registration_disabled instead of double-creating users.
- SEC-H4 — new verifyIdToken() performs full JWT signature
verification via the provider's JWKS (Node's crypto.createPublicKey
accepts JWK directly — no extra dependency), plus iss/aud/exp
checks. The callback also rejects the login when userinfo.sub does
not match id_token.sub.
- SEC-H5 — OAuth DCR now validates redirect_uris against an allowlist
of schemes: https, http-loopback, or a private custom scheme. Plain
http://non-loopback is rejected.
- SEC-H6 — oauthService audience defaults to mcpResource when the
`resource` parameter is missing, so tokens are always audience-bound
to /mcp instead of being issued with audience=null.
- SEC-H7 — HSTS is enabled any time NODE_ENV=production (previously
required FORCE_HTTPS=true), includeSubDomains defaults on and can
be disabled with HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS=false.
- SEC-H8 — trek_session cookie Secure flag is also driven by
req.secure (which Express resolves from X-Forwarded-Proto once
trust proxy is set), so instances behind a TLS-terminating proxy
get Secure cookies without needing FORCE_HTTPS.
Medium
- SEC-M1 — permanentDeleteFile / emptyTrash / avatar unlink now use
fs.promises.rm with { force: true } (one async op vs the previous
existsSync + unlinkSync pair per file).
- SEC-M2 — invalidatePermissionsCache() is called inside restoreFromZip
so a restored DB with different permission rows is honoured
immediately.
- SEC-M3 + C1 — idempotency store bounds the key at 128 chars, caches
only responses ≤ 256 KiB, and scopes the lookup by (key, user_id,
method, path) rather than (key, user_id). Same key replayed against
a different endpoint no longer returns a stale unrelated body.
- SEC-M4 — share_tokens gets an expires_at column; new tokens default
to 90-day TTL, expired tokens are denied at lookup. Existing tokens
stay NULL = no expiry so already-published links don't break.
- SEC-M5 — /uploads/photos/:filename now resolves the photo to its
trip_id and requires the share token to cover THAT trip. Previously
any share token for any trip would unlock any photo filename.
- SEC-M6 — BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS is the single source of truth shared
between fileService and collab uploads. The '*' allowed_file_types
wildcard now still rejects executables/scripts.
- SEC-M7 — single DEMO_EMAILS constant (services/demo.ts) used by
demoUploadBlock, mfaPolicy, and every demo-mode guard in
authService. The old demoUploadBlock only matched 'demo@nomad.app'
so the seed 'demo@trek.app' could in fact upload in demo mode.
- SEC-M8 — MFA backup codes are now bcrypt-hashed at rest
(hashBackupCodeBcrypt). matchBackupCode accepts both bcrypt and
legacy SHA-256 hex hashes, so existing installs keep working until
the user regenerates codes via enableMfa.
- SEC-M9 — document the "security via UUID v4 filename" model for
/uploads/avatars|covers|journey. Requires no code change but
captures the decision so future reviewers don't re-flag it.
- SEC-M10 — already covered by the resetPassword revocation logic
above: mcp_tokens DELETE + oauth_tokens UPDATE … SET revoked_at.
Performance
- PERF-H1 — new migration adds the indexes flagged in the audit:
trips(user_id), trips(created_at DESC), photos(day_id),
photos(place_id), reservations(day_id), share_tokens(token), plus
conditional day_accommodations and notifications indexes depending
on which columns are present.
Tests
- tests/integration/oidc.test.ts now mocks verifyIdToken and passes
an id_token in the exchangeCodeForToken stub for the three flows
that exercise a successful callback. The three remaining failures
tests pointed out were all pre-existing (file-upload flakes +
notificationPreferences event_types count drift), none introduced
by this PR.
Adds /auth/forgot-password and /auth/reset-password endpoints plus two new
client pages. When SMTP is configured the user receives a branded, i18n-aware
reset email; when it isn't the reset link is logged to the server console in
a clearly-fenced block so self-hosters can relay it manually.
Security properties:
- 256-bit cryptographically-random tokens, only SHA-256 hashes stored in DB
- 60 min expiry, single-use, prior unconsumed tokens auto-invalidated
- Enumeration-safe: /forgot-password always responds {ok:true} with a minimum
latency pad so timing doesn't leak account existence
- Per-IP rate limit (3/15min on forgot, 5/15min on reset) + per-email throttle
- If the user has MFA enabled, a valid TOTP or backup code is required at
reset-complete time — a compromised mailbox alone cannot take over a
2FA-protected account
- New users.password_version column + JWT "pv" claim: bumping it on reset
invalidates every live session immediately
- Full audit-log coverage (user.password_reset_request/_success/_fail)
- Forgot-page shows a visible hint when SMTP is unconfigured
Migration 115 adds users.password_version and password_reset_tokens
(user_id, token_hash UNIQUE, expires_at, consumed_at, created_ip).
* add test suite, mostly covers integration testing, tests are only backend side
* workflow runs the correct script
* workflow runs the correct script
* workflow runs the correct script
* unit tests incoming
* Fix multer silent rejections and error handler info leak
- Revert cb(null, false) to cb(new Error(...)) in auth.ts, collab.ts,
and files.ts so invalid uploads return an error instead of silently
dropping the file
- Error handler in app.ts now always returns 500 / "Internal server
error" instead of forwarding err.message to the client
* Use statusCode consistently for multer errors and error handler
- Error handler in app.ts reads err.statusCode to forward the correct
HTTP status while keeping the response body generic
- Auth middleware now tags its 401s with code: AUTH_REQUIRED so the
client interceptor only redirects to /login on genuine session failures,
not on upstream API errors
- Fix /albums and album sync routes using raw encrypted API key instead
of getImmichCredentials() (which decrypts it), causing Immich to reject
requests with 401
- Add toast error notifications for all Immich operations in MemoriesPanel
that previously swallowed errors silently
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Eliminates XSS token theft risk by storing session JWTs in an httpOnly
cookie (trek_session) instead of localStorage, making them inaccessible
to JavaScript entirely.
- Add cookie-parser middleware and setAuthCookie/clearAuthCookie helpers
- Set trek_session cookie on login, register, demo-login, MFA verify, OIDC exchange
- Auth middleware reads cookie first, falls back to Authorization: Bearer (MCP unchanged)
- Add POST /api/auth/logout to clear the cookie server-side
- Remove all localStorage auth_token reads/writes from client
- Axios uses withCredentials; raw fetch calls use credentials: include
- WebSocket ws-token exchange uses credentials: include (no JWT param)
- authStore initialises isLoading: true so ProtectedRoute waits for /api/auth/me
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add { algorithms: ['HS256'] } to all jwt.verify() calls to prevent
algorithm confusion attacks (including the 'none' algorithm)
- Add { algorithm: 'HS256' } to all jwt.sign() calls for consistency
- Reduce OIDC token payload to only { id } (was leaking username, email, role)
- Validate OIDC redirect URI against APP_URL env var when configured
- Add startup warning when JWT_SECRET is auto-generated
https://claude.ai/code/session_01SoQKcF5Rz9Y8Nzo4PzkxY8
Add an admin-controlled `require_mfa` policy in App Settings and expose it via `/auth/app-config` so the client can enforce it globally. Users without MFA are redirected to Settings after login and blocked from protected API/WebSocket access until setup is completed, while preserving MFA setup endpoints and admin recovery paths. Also prevent enabling the policy unless the acting admin already has MFA enabled, and block MFA disable while the policy is active. Includes UI toggle in Admin > Settings, required-policy notice in Settings, client-side 403 `MFA_REQUIRED` handling, and i18n updates for all supported locales.
- Demo user gets 403 on all upload endpoints (files, photos, cover, avatar)
- Admin uploads still work normally
- PDF export back in modal popup using srcdoc iframe
- Zero behavior change when DEMO_MODE is not set
Maurice