connect-src never listed tile.openstreetmap.de or tiles.stadiamaps.com, so every prefetch fetch was refused before the service worker saw it, while the swallowed error still counted as a cached tile. Both hosts are allowed now and only reached tiles count. The prefetch rectangle is also widened to the screen the fitBounds view fills, on the raster and the vector path alike; the places extent alone left grey bands beside a north-south trip.
The redirect grew three paths nothing exercised: a malformed APP_URL falling
back to the request host, a request the proxy already terminated TLS for, and
the health probe, which talks plain HTTP on the loopback and must not be sent
to a hostname it cannot resolve. The per-domain coverage ratchet caught the
gap - src/middleware sat at 93.44% against its 94% pin.
An adversarial review of what had already landed here turned up three that
were wrong, and they are the reason for this commit.
The CSP change removed 'unsafe-eval', which is not leftover: heic-to's
libheif build initialises embind through new Function(), and without it every
iPhone .heic upload fails in the browser. 'wasm-unsafe-eval' alone was tried
once already and was not enough (93b51a0b). Put back, with the reason written
down this time and the test pinning it rather than its absence.
The idempotency in-flight guard never fired. finalize() runs when the
handler's observable completes, but Nest writes the response - and therefore
stores the row - several microtasks later, so the waiting request always woke
up before the row existed and ran the handler a second time. It releases from
the point the row is written now; finalize is the backstop for handlers that
answer another way. The test drove the two in the opposite order from Nest,
which is why it passed either way.
And the trip-scoping check treated an id that resolves to nothing like one
belonging to someone else. accommodation_id has no foreign key, so shortening
a trip's dates leaves a booking pointing at a gap - which update() has always
healed by clearing the link, and which would have become a permanent 400.
The rest: a reply to a soft-deleted chat message is refused and the create
path blanks the quote like the list path does; the ws-token buckets are keyed
by account rather than by IP, where every user behind one NAT shared a
ceiling; the weather and vacay caps read through the stream, since a chunked
response has no content-length to check; the Google host gate takes country
domains again; abandoned response bodies are cancelled instead of left to GC;
the boot failure prints its errno; and a share link that is not yours to read
now says so instead of reporting that the journey has none.
TICKETJSON gets a real repair: the in-place GLOB fix only helps installs that
have not run it yet, so an appended migration puts back the note text the
case-insensitive LIKE cut off, for rows where what it stored is not valid
JSON. A genuine receipt always parses, so it cannot be touched.
Wiki: the audit log records the IP Express resolves after TRUST_PROXY, not
the leftmost X-Forwarded-For entry a caller can write. That is the right way
round, but it means the hop count has to be accurate - said plainly in both
places now.
Permissions cached an empty map before it had loaded, so a DB error during
the load cached permissive defaults and every later check answered from that
cache - fail-open, and it never expired. The rate limiter grew its per-IP map
forever; the GC the legacy version had was dropped in the fold. Idempotency
did a check-then-insert, so two concurrent duplicates both ran the handler.
Audit rows recorded whatever X-Forwarded-For said, which the client writes,
and the request-body debug logger redacted by exact key match - it missed
refresh tokens, api keys and PKCE verifiers. FORCE_HTTPS built its redirect
from the client's Host header. CSP asked for unsafe-eval on top of the
wasm-unsafe-eval it actually needs.
The OAuth deny path redirected to an unvalidated URI, ws-token minting had
no rate limit at all, and PKCE was skipped when code_verifier was absent
rather than refused. An MCP session resumed with a token whose scopes had
since been reduced kept the capability set it was created with, and the
session cap was checked before the async registration that increments it.
Plugin frame containment was lexical, so a symlink out of the directory was
never noticed, and instance config accepted keys the manifest never
declared.
The Express shell set a 100kb limit and stopped applying it the moment the
Nest instance took over parsing: bootstrap passed bodyParser:false and
nothing replaced it. The number happened to stay the same, because it is also
the framework default - but it lived nowhere anybody would look for it, and
one NestFactory default away from silently becoming something else.
It goes through Nest's own parser rather than a second express.json(),
because that parser carries the verify hook that keeps req.rawBody, and the
plugin webhook routes need the exact payload bytes to check a provider's
HMAC. Adding a parser in front of it would have taken rawBody away without
failing anything.
MISC-009 and MISC-010 pin it from both sides.
The bodyParser flag on applyGlobalMiddleware goes with it: one caller, which
passed false.
Not moved: cookieParser stays on the raw Express layer rather than becoming a
configure(consumer) middleware. The platform routes - the OAuth consent flow
among them - are registered on that instance before Nest routing exists, so a
Nest-slot cookie parser would simply not run for them. helmet, CORS,
compression, the forced-HTTPS 301 and the res.on('finish') logging stay for
the same reason: they have to see requests Nest never routes.
The a/b/c shards stopped being necessary in 2022 and d has since lost its
DNS record. The map never asked for d — Leaflet defaults to abc — but the
offline prefetcher rotated over a to d, which is where the failing requests
came from, and it cached most tiles under a host the map never requests.
Presets and the prefetcher use the apex host now. A URL already saved in
user_settings is rewritten where it is read and written back, so existing
instances heal without a migration touching what someone typed themselves.
The CSP only allowed https://*.tile.openstreetmap.org, and a wildcard host
never matches the apex domain, so the prefetch fetch would have been blocked.
The service worker rule had the same gap and would have stopped filling the
tile cache.
Maurice