Commit Graph

10 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Maurice 2d0414b4a3 security: internal audit — batch 1
Fixes the critical + high + medium findings from our internal security
review. Bundled into one PR because the changes overlap heavily (JWT
verification unifies across three call sites; backup-code hashing and
demo-email handling cross-cut several services); splitting them out
would mean redundant reviews of the same files.

Critical
- CI-C1 — .github/workflows/test.yml: restore actions/{checkout,setup-
  node,upload-artifact} to @v4. The @v6 refs don't exist, so the test
  workflow was errorring before a single test ran.
- SEC-C1 — mfaPolicy now extracts the token via extractToken() (cookie-
  first, Bearer fallback). Previously it only read Authorization, so
  every cookie-authenticated SPA session bypassed require_mfa entirely.
- SEC-C2/C4/C6 — all JWT verification paths (MCP bearer, file download,
  photo route) now go through the shared verifyJwtAndLoadUser that
  checks password_version. resetPassword additionally deletes every
  mcp_tokens row and marks outstanding oauth_tokens revoked, so a
  password reset invalidates ALL credential classes — not just the
  cookie JWT.

High
- SEC-H2 — reset email URL is built from server-side APP_URL /
  ALLOWED_ORIGINS (via existing getAppUrl()), not request headers.
  Closes the host-header-injection vector into reset links.
- SEC-H3 — OIDC findOrCreateUser wraps the invite-redemption UPDATE +
  user INSERT in a transaction. The UPDATE is the capacity check; if
  a concurrent callback takes the last slot, the whole transaction
  aborts with registration_disabled instead of double-creating users.
- SEC-H4 — new verifyIdToken() performs full JWT signature
  verification via the provider's JWKS (Node's crypto.createPublicKey
  accepts JWK directly — no extra dependency), plus iss/aud/exp
  checks. The callback also rejects the login when userinfo.sub does
  not match id_token.sub.
- SEC-H5 — OAuth DCR now validates redirect_uris against an allowlist
  of schemes: https, http-loopback, or a private custom scheme. Plain
  http://non-loopback is rejected.
- SEC-H6 — oauthService audience defaults to mcpResource when the
  `resource` parameter is missing, so tokens are always audience-bound
  to /mcp instead of being issued with audience=null.
- SEC-H7 — HSTS is enabled any time NODE_ENV=production (previously
  required FORCE_HTTPS=true), includeSubDomains defaults on and can
  be disabled with HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS=false.
- SEC-H8 — trek_session cookie Secure flag is also driven by
  req.secure (which Express resolves from X-Forwarded-Proto once
  trust proxy is set), so instances behind a TLS-terminating proxy
  get Secure cookies without needing FORCE_HTTPS.

Medium
- SEC-M1 — permanentDeleteFile / emptyTrash / avatar unlink now use
  fs.promises.rm with { force: true } (one async op vs the previous
  existsSync + unlinkSync pair per file).
- SEC-M2 — invalidatePermissionsCache() is called inside restoreFromZip
  so a restored DB with different permission rows is honoured
  immediately.
- SEC-M3 + C1 — idempotency store bounds the key at 128 chars, caches
  only responses ≤ 256 KiB, and scopes the lookup by (key, user_id,
  method, path) rather than (key, user_id). Same key replayed against
  a different endpoint no longer returns a stale unrelated body.
- SEC-M4 — share_tokens gets an expires_at column; new tokens default
  to 90-day TTL, expired tokens are denied at lookup. Existing tokens
  stay NULL = no expiry so already-published links don't break.
- SEC-M5 — /uploads/photos/:filename now resolves the photo to its
  trip_id and requires the share token to cover THAT trip. Previously
  any share token for any trip would unlock any photo filename.
- SEC-M6 — BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS is the single source of truth shared
  between fileService and collab uploads. The '*' allowed_file_types
  wildcard now still rejects executables/scripts.
- SEC-M7 — single DEMO_EMAILS constant (services/demo.ts) used by
  demoUploadBlock, mfaPolicy, and every demo-mode guard in
  authService. The old demoUploadBlock only matched 'demo@nomad.app'
  so the seed 'demo@trek.app' could in fact upload in demo mode.
- SEC-M8 — MFA backup codes are now bcrypt-hashed at rest
  (hashBackupCodeBcrypt). matchBackupCode accepts both bcrypt and
  legacy SHA-256 hex hashes, so existing installs keep working until
  the user regenerates codes via enableMfa.
- SEC-M9 — document the "security via UUID v4 filename" model for
  /uploads/avatars|covers|journey. Requires no code change but
  captures the decision so future reviewers don't re-flag it.
- SEC-M10 — already covered by the resetPassword revocation logic
  above: mcp_tokens DELETE + oauth_tokens UPDATE … SET revoked_at.

Performance
- PERF-H1 — new migration adds the indexes flagged in the audit:
  trips(user_id), trips(created_at DESC), photos(day_id),
  photos(place_id), reservations(day_id), share_tokens(token), plus
  conditional day_accommodations and notifications indexes depending
  on which columns are present.

Tests
- tests/integration/oidc.test.ts now mocks verifyIdToken and passes
  an id_token in the exchangeCodeForToken stub for the three flows
  that exercise a successful callback. The three remaining failures
  tests pointed out were all pre-existing (file-upload flakes +
  notificationPreferences event_types count drift), none introduced
  by this PR.
2026-04-20 20:36:52 +02:00
jubnl dd90c6d424 fix(mcp): add RFC 9728 PRM, RFC 8707 audience binding, and collab sub-feature gating
Root cause: claude.ai's MCP connector (spec 2025-06-18) requires the resource server
to publish Protected Resource Metadata and return WWW-Authenticate on 401s to bind
the /mcp endpoint to its AS. Without these, it silently shows no tools after OAuth.

- Add /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource (RFC 9728) with addon gating
- Emit WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata=... on 401/auth-failure 403s
- Open CORS (origin: *) on both .well-known/* endpoints per RFC 8414/9728
- Accept resource parameter at authorize + token endpoints (RFC 8707)
- Store audience on oauth_tokens; validate on every MCP request
- Refresh tokens inherit audience; add resource_parameter_supported to AS metadata
- DB migration: ADD COLUMN audience TEXT to oauth_tokens
- Gate collab MCP tools/resources by chat/notes/polls sub-features individually
- Invalidate MCP sessions when collab sub-features are toggled in admin
- Update test mocks and MCP.md
2026-04-20 07:34:38 +02:00
jubnl 535c06bb3f feat(mcp): granular OAuth scopes and per-client rate limiting
- Split `media:read` into `geo:read` and `weather:read` scopes
- Add dedicated `atlas:read/write` scopes (previously under `places`)
- Add dedicated `todos:read/write` scopes (previously under `collab`)
- Rate limiting now keyed by userId+clientId instead of userId alone
- Bind MCP sessions to the OAuth client that created them
- Log MCP tool calls to audit log with clientId
- Invalidate all MCP sessions on addon state change
- Reduce session sweep interval from 10min to 1min
- Update all translations with new scope labels
2026-04-11 02:06:32 +02:00
jubnl 4ad1ccf5dd fix(oauth): gate scope selection UI to DCR clients only
Settings-created clients have fixed scopes chosen at creation time and
should show a read-only scope list on the consent screen. Only DCR-registered
clients expose the interactive checkbox UI for user-controlled scope selection.
2026-04-10 06:03:52 +02:00
jubnl cb3aeda8e0 fix(oauth): add public RFC 7591 DCR endpoint at POST /oauth/register
Claude.ai's start-auth flow POSTs to the registration_endpoint advertised
in the discovery document, but no public handler existed at /oauth/register
(only /api/oauth/register with browser cookie auth). This caused a
start_error redirect immediately on every connect attempt.

- Add POST /oauth/register to oauthPublicRouter following RFC 7591
- Make oauth_clients.user_id nullable via a raw (no-transaction) migration
  so anonymous DCR clients can be created without a user context
- Update migration runner to support { raw: () => void } migrations for
  DDL that requires PRAGMA foreign_keys = OFF outside a transaction
- Update createOAuthClient to accept userId: number | null with a global
  cap (500) for anonymous DCR clients in place of the per-user limit
2026-04-10 05:42:18 +02:00
jubnl 9b1baaf7b8 feat(oauth): browser-initiated dynamic client registration (DCR)
Adds an OAuth 2.1 public client registration flow so MCP clients can
self-register via a user-facing consent page instead of requiring manual
setup in Settings.

Server:
- DB migration adds `is_public` and `created_via` columns to oauth_clients
- New GET /api/oauth/register/validate — validates DCR params, returns
  requested scopes; unauthenticated callers get loginRequired flag
- New POST /api/oauth/register — creates a public client, saves consent,
  and redirects with client_id (cookie auth required)
- `authenticateClient` / `refreshTokens` skip secret check for public
  clients (PKCE provides the security guarantee)
- `createOAuthClient` accepts options for isPublic/createdVia; public
  clients store an opaque secret hash instead of a usable secret
- `rotateOAuthClientSecret` blocked on public clients
- `isValidRedirectUri` extracted as a shared helper
- Discovery metadata now advertises registration_endpoint and auth method
  `none`; token/revoke endpoints no longer require client_secret for
  public clients

Client:
- New OAuthRegisterPage (/oauth/register) — loading → optional
  login-required gate → scope selection → done states
- New ScopeGroupPicker component — collapsible groups, indeterminate
  checkboxes, select-all per group or globally
- oauthApi.register.{validate,submit} added to api/client.ts
- apiClient exported so it can be reused outside api/client.ts
- IntegrationsTab tests fixed for new collapsible section structure
- collab_notes fallback changed from undefined to [] in MCP trip tools
2026-04-10 05:20:54 +02:00
jubnl 7c0a0d5f39 security(oauth): harden OAuth 2.1/MCP implementation (Critical + High + Medium findings)
Address 14 security findings from internal review of the OAuth 2.1 + MCP layer:

Critical:
- C1: Scope-gate all MCP resources (trips, budget, packing, collab, atlas, vacay, etc.)
- C2: Wire token/session revocation into active MCP session lifecycle per (user, client_id)
- C3: Refresh-token replay detection via parent_token_id chain + cascade revoke on replay

High:
- H1: Validate PKCE code_challenge (43-char base64url) and code_verifier (43–128 chars) format
- H2: Rate-limit /oauth/token (30/min), /authorize/validate (30/min), /oauth/revoke (10/min)
- H3: Strip client metadata from unauthenticated /authorize/validate responses (oracle prevention)
- H4: Constant-time secret comparison via crypto.timingSafeEqual (prevents timing attacks)
- H5: Collapse all invalid_grant cases to a single generic message; log specifics server-side

Medium:
- M1: Set Cache-Control: no-store + Pragma: no-cache on token endpoint responses
- M2: Return 404 (not 200/403) on discovery + revoke endpoints when MCP addon is disabled
- M4: Audit-log all OAuth lifecycle events (create, consent, issue, refresh, revoke, replay)
- M5: Union consent scopes on re-authorization instead of replacing existing grants
- M7: Require httpOnly cookie auth (not Bearer JWT) on all state-mutating OAuth endpoints
- M8: Strict Bearer scheme check in MCP token verification

Refactoring:
- Extract MCP session management (sessions Map, revokeUserSessions, revokeUserSessionsForClient)
  into mcp/sessionManager.ts to break the circular dependency between oauthService and mcp/index
- Extract verifyJwtAndLoadUser helper in auth middleware, shared by authenticate and new
  requireCookieAuth middleware

Tests:
- Fix all existing integration tests broken by the security hardening (OAUTH-019 to OAUTH-032)
- Add 13 new integration tests covering M1, M2, H1, H3, H5, M5, M7, C3
- Add 14 new unit tests covering C2, C3, H1, H3, M5 behaviors in oauthService
2026-04-10 02:03:27 +02:00
jubnl 41f1dd9ce5 fix(oauth): select ot.user_id instead of u.id in getUserByAccessToken
u.id was returned by SQLite as `id` but the code read `row.user_id`,
which was undefined. This caused all MCP calls to resolve userId as
undefined, making list_trips return empty and canAccessTrip deny all
access when authenticated via OAuth 2.1.
2026-04-09 23:59:11 +02:00
jubnl 5b44fe68b1 fix(mcp): narrow OAuth scope to allowed intersection instead of rejecting
When a client requests scopes it is not permitted for, silently drop
them rather than failing the entire authorization flow. The token is
issued with only the intersection of requested and allowed scopes.

Also fix /authorize/validate to always return HTTP 200 so the consent
page can surface the actual error_description instead of a generic
axios failure message.
2026-04-09 23:48:05 +02:00
jubnl 830f6c0706 feat(mcp): introduce OAuth 2.1 auth and enforce addon gating
OAuth 2.1 authentication for MCP:
- Add OAuth 2.1 authorization server with PKCE support (routes/oauth.ts)
- Add OAuth service for client CRUD, auth-code flow, and token management (services/oauthService.ts)
- Add typed scope definitions and enforcement helpers (mcp/scopes.ts)
- Add OAuth consent UI page (OAuthAuthorizePage.tsx)
- Add client-side scope labels and descriptions (api/oauthScopes.ts)
- Integrate OAuth token auth into MCP handler alongside existing static tokens
- All OAuth endpoints gated on `mcp` addon

Addon gating across MCP tools, resources, and prompts:
- Add typed ADDON_IDS constant (server/src/addons.ts) replacing all string literals
- Gate budget tools and resources (trip-budget, per-person, settlement) on `budget` addon
- Gate packing tools and resources (trip-packing, trip-packing-bags, trip-todos) on `packing` addon
- Gate todos tools on `packing` addon (mirrors web UI Lists tab behavior)
- Expand atlas gate to cover full tool body (bucket-list + country tools no longer leak)
- Expand collab gate to cover full tool body (collab notes no longer leak)
- Gate packing-list and budget-overview MCP prompts on their respective addons
- Gate get_trip_summary sections per addon; blank packing/budget/collab_notes/todos when disabled
- Remove trip-files resource and files field from get_trip_summary
- Replace all isAddonEnabled('literal') calls with ADDON_IDS constants

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-09 22:25:58 +02:00