Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
mauriceboe 29c2979da4 fix(plugins): trips.getById returns the actual trip row, not the access check
canAccessTrip only returns { id, user_id } (it's a membership check), but the
rpc-host's trips.getById returned it verbatim — so plugins saw a trip with no
title/start_date/etc. Fetch the real row after the access check. Also fix the
reference plugin to read t.title (the trips column is 'title', not 'name').
2026-07-04 19:11:23 +02:00
mauriceboe de49cde363 feat(plugins): activation, HTTP route proxy + instance settings (M2)
Wires the isolated runtime into TREK. Admins can now activate a plugin from the
panel and its HTTP routes work end to end, still behind the kill switch.

- PluginRuntimeService owns the supervisor: activate spawns the child with its
  granted permissions + decrypted instance config, deactivate kills it, status
  and errors are persisted to the plugins / plugin_error_log tables, and active
  plugins are booted on startup (OnModuleInit).
- Bidirectional RPC: the child now handles host→child invokes (routes/jobs) and
  reports its declared routes on load; the supervisor gained invoke()/routesOf().
- /api/plugins/:id/* proxy controller — a single static route that matches the
  plugin's declared routes, enforces per-route auth (auth:false routes are public
  for OAuth callbacks/webhooks), forwards only a whitelisted request view (never
  the session cookie), and strips unsafe response headers.
- Admin endpoints: POST :id/activate, POST :id/deactivate, GET/PUT :id/config —
  instance settings with secret fields encrypted (apiKeyCrypto) and masked.
- Kill switch moved to its own module so it never collides with test config mocks.

Photo/calendar hook consumers are deferred to a later slice.
2026-07-04 19:11:23 +02:00
mauriceboe 5e3f7095a5 feat(plugins): isolated per-plugin runtime + capability RPC (M1)
Every plugin now runs in its own forked child process with a scrubbed env
(no JWT_SECRET, no db path, nothing inherited). It talks to TREK only over a
JSON-RPC channel, and the host's capability router registers ONLY the methods a
plugin's granted permissions unlock — so an ungranted call is unreachable, not
merely refused. The plugin's own data lives in a separate sqlite file it can
never open directly; core reads (trips/users) go through membership-checked,
column-projected host methods; ws broadcasts are force-namespaced.

- protocol/envelope: the wire types + method→permission map (pure, shared by
  host and the isolated child)
- host/rpc-host: the capability router = the enforcement point (dispatch,
  BAD_PARAMS / PERMISSION_DENIED / RESOURCE_FORBIDDEN / UNKNOWN_METHOD)
- host/plugin-data: the per-plugin sqlite file (db:own), guarded against
  ATTACH/PRAGMA escape, idempotent migrations
- host/create-rpc-host: wires the router to the real db/websocket (host-only)
- runtime/plugin-sdk + plugin-host-entry: the child bootstrap + definePlugin
  ctx; turns each ctx call into an RPC, never imports a privileged module
- supervisor: spawn on activate, heartbeat/reap, crash backoff + auto-disable,
  graceful shutdown — a plugin crash/OOM/hang can never reach the Nest loop
- paths: code/data layout, dist-vs-tsx child entry resolution

Nothing is wired into activation yet (that's the next slice); exercised by unit
tests for the router/sdk/data and an integration test that forks a real child.
2026-07-04 19:11:23 +02:00