10 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Maurice	2572132117	fix(notices): let the 4.0.0 release modal cover the whole 4.x line ... The version window already said 4.0.0 to 5.0.0, and the test above it is even called "covers the whole 4.x line", but that was only half the story: without `recurring: 'per-version'` a notice falls back to a one-time dismissal, so everyone who closed the modal on 4.0.0 never saw it again. It did not come back on 4.1, 4.2 or 4.2.1, which is the opposite of what the window says. The mechanism was already there and in use one entry below, on thank-you-support. The dismissal path records the app version it was closed at, so the notice re-surfaces on the next upgrade and stays down within the same version. Rows dismissed before that column existed read as 0.0.0 and simply come back once.	2026-09-06 16:50:47 +02:00
Maurice	061a3d91a0	fix(notices): keep the release modal up across the whole 4.x line ... The 4.0.0 notice was scoped to a 4.0.x window on the assumption that each release would bring its own entry. 4.1.0 shipped without one, so the modal switched itself off and nothing took its place: the thank-you notice it replaced is retired below 4.0.0, leaving a 4.1 install with no notice at all. Hold it open to the 5.0.0 boundary instead. What it introduces is the 4.x line, which is still what somebody arriving on 4.1 or 4.2 is meeting for the first time, and a later major gets its own entry the way this one did.	2026-08-29 13:14:30 +02:00
Maurice	e9090fa33c	fix(notices): confine the 4.0.0 release modal to the 4.0.x line ... Without an upper bound it would greet somebody who jumped 3.x straight to 4.2 with a summary of a release they skipped, and it would run alongside the next release's own notice. maxVersion is exclusive, so 4.1.0 covers every 4.0.x patch. Pinned in the registry test, together with the handover from the thank-you notice: at no version may both be active.	2026-08-22 15:48:13 +02:00
Maurice	3a0604b3f5	feat(config): put the operator-owned surfaces behind TREK_MANAGED (#1946) ... * feat(config): put the operator-owned surfaces behind TREK_MANAGED The switch landed last release with nothing behind it. This is what it turns off, plus the four fixes that came out of walking every one of these surfaces. Nothing here changes anything for an install that does not set the flag. That is not a hope, it is what managed-inert.test.ts asserts: the mode stays off for any unparseable value, no other variable can turn it on, every settings key stays writable, and splitManagedKeys hands back the same object rather than a copy so no write path can quietly diverge on self-hosted installs only. WHAT THE MODE WITHHOLDS Fourteen routes carry @ManagedForbidden: key validation, static MCP tokens, JWT rotation, the OIDC admin pair, restore and auto-backup, plugin sideload and reload, the Ollama model list and pull, and the SMTP test send. Each names the reason it is not the instance admin's, and the reason is mandatory. Eighteen settings keys are filtered instead of refused. SMTP, the OIDC toggles and the WebAuthn pair share one handler with keys the admin does own, and the llm_* family is reachable through per-user settings, the instance defaults and the addon config alike, so a route-level refusal would be both too coarse and incomplete. A locked key is skipped and reported as managed_keys; the rest of the save goes through. Refusing the request would take the registration toggles down with the SMTP block. GET /api/auth/me/settings stops returning the three API keys in the clear. It is the only endpoint that decrypts a stored credential back to the caller, which is fine when the admin pasted it in and wrong when the operator supplied it. Two multipart routes check in the handler rather than the guard: a guard throws before the parser drains the body and the client gets an ECONNRESET instead of the 403 (PROFILE-015). They still carry the marker so the boot gate sees them. WHAT KEEPS IT FROM DRIFTING validate-managed-routes.ts refuses to boot on a marking that is not on the reviewed list, a list entry whose route lost its marking, or a marking with no reason. The third case has no equivalent in the guard gate next door and is the one that matters most: a blank reason destroys the only record of why a control was taken away, and nothing recovers that later. It found two wrong entries in my own list while I was writing this. managed-keys.test.ts asserts that every key in ADMIN_SETTINGS_KEYS and DEFAULTABLE_USER_SETTING_KEYS belongs to exactly one of two sets. A key added to either list belongs to neither until somebody decides, and that is the failure this prevents: the lists grow, the mode does not. PLACES_API_BASE AND PLACES_API_KEY The nine Places endpoints spell out googleapis.com, so an install that wants those calls to leave through something of its own has no way to say so. One variable, substituted where every call already funnels through. A second one supplies the key, and when it is set the users table is not consulted at all — a per-user key would route around whatever the endpoint counts, and those columns are readable by any admin of the instance. FOUR FIXES THAT ARE NOT ABOUT THE MODE An admin setting somebody's password now bumps password_version and clears their MCP tokens. An admin sets a password for one reason, and until now verifyJwtAndLoadUser kept accepting every cookie the intruder already had: the one action taken to lock them out was the one action that did not. The four OIDC provider calls go through the SSRF guard. Three are worse than they look — the token, userinfo and JWKS URLs come out of the discovery response, so they are chosen by the other end, not by an admin. safeFetchLlm is renamed safeFetchAdminConfigured and keeps its old name as an alias, because it is the variant that allows loopback and LAN: a self-hoster with Authentik on localhost:9000 must keep working. The token exchange follows no redirect at all, since one would hand client_secret to a second host. DELETE /api/admin/users/:id/mfa clears another account's TOTP. The passkey half has existed since passkeys landed; the TOTP half never did, which left "somebody on the trip lost their phone" with no answer short of an operator in the database. Never for the caller themselves. TREK_PLUGIN_PERMISSIONS=off refuses to boot when the install is centrally administered. A warning is right for a machine its owner chose to trust; where the person who set the flag and the people whose data is in the database are not the same person, fail closed. TEXTS Four strings lose the phrase "self-hosted" because they describe somebody else's software — an Ollama endpoint, an AirTrail instance, a service a plugin talks to — and read better without it in both modes. The one string that describes TREK itself keeps it, and the mode picks a second key instead, so self-hosters lose nothing. A grep gate in shared/ keeps the canonical locale honest, because the parity check compares the file set and the top-level keys and never looks at a value: re-wording a string is invisible to CI today, and so is putting it back. * feat(maps): supply the map credential with the instance when centrally administered MAPBOX_ACCESS_TOKEN joins PLACES_API_KEY as an operator-supplied value. SettingsService injects it when the settings are read, and picks GL as the provider if the reader is still on Leaflet, since a token is always present. The key moves from the customer set to the locked set. It is the one locked key whose value is public by design — a pk.* token has to reach the browser to be useful — so this is not about secrecy: a per-user save landing on top of the instance token would only break the map for that user. Both settings fields for it go away with it. * fix(auth): count the operator key when reporting whether Google features work has_maps_key only looked at the users table, but getMapsKey prefers the PLACES_API_KEY env over anything stored there. On an install that supplies the key that way and has an empty column, every lookup worked while the client was told there was no key and hid the search, the autocomplete and the place photos. Found by walking the running instance rather than the code: the map came up, the search box did not. * feat(admin): hide the settings a centrally administered install cannot act on A control that answers 403 is worse than no control: the AI section rendered the refusal as "Request failed with status code 403", which tells an admin they broke something rather than that the decision is not theirs. So the surfaces go rather than being disabled in place: - AI parsing and AirTrail leave the addon list, and the AI addon route now refuses outright. The endpoint, the model and what a document costs come with the instance, so there is no instance decision left — not even whether it runs. - Immich and Synology Photos leave it too. Both connect to a server the reader runs at home, and there is no route from here to one. - The SMTP block, the admin webhook and ntfy targets, and the passkey RP ID and origins follow the same rule: they configure something the operator owns, and a wrong RP ID on a shared parent domain reaches past this instance entirely. - The About tab goes. It is about the project — what TREK is, where to file a bug, where to support it — and is aimed at the person running the software. The version and the link to the source move to the sidebar footer, on both the desktop page and the mobile twin, because AGPL 13 wants that offer wherever people reach the software over a network. - The update check stops asking GitHub and reports nothing available. Separately, the version footers lose the "self-hosted" suffix everywhere, not just here. It read as a label on the software rather than on the install, and the version alone says what it needs to. * feat(config): refuse to boot centrally administered without an at-rest key Measured on a running instance rather than assumed: with ENCRYPTION_KEY unset, the at-rest key falls back to a file in the data volume, and backupService bundles that file into every archive it builds. The archive is downloadable by any instance admin, so the encryption ships with its own key in the same zip. The skip in backupService already handles this — it only omits the file when the key came from the env — but nothing made sure the env actually carried one. Provisioning sets it; forgetting it was silent. validateEnvAtBoot now carries a second kind of check next to the schema: cross- field rules that only apply with the flag set, for combinations where every value is individually valid and the result is wrong. Empty without the flag, so an install that never asked to be centrally administered cannot meet it. * feat(client): add an attachment point for install-specific screens Two empty exports on the client, an empty module on the server, and the four places that read them. Nothing here adds a route, a nav entry or an endpoint — the arrays are empty and the module contributes nothing, which managed-ext.test pins so it stays that way. Read unconditionally, never behind a flag. On the server a conditional import would tie the module graph to an environment variable, and the graph is built once per app while the flag is read live; on the client an empty array costs nothing to spread, so every build walks the same path instead of one build walking a path nobody tests. Anything attached here follows the same rules as the rest of src/nest and src/components: a real module with a controller and a provider, bodies through the Zod pipe, routes under the global guards, tests. * test(shared): move the wording gate out of src so shared typechecks again CI installs shared with its own dependencies only (npm ci --workspace shared), so there is no @types/node and the `node:fs` import inside src/ failed to compile. The tests passed the whole time — vitest supplies the module — which is why this only showed up in the typecheck step. The walk moves to scripts/, next to i18n-parity.mjs, and the spec imports it the same way that one does. It also runs on its own now (`node scripts/i18n-selfhost-wording.mjs`), which is what you want when CI names a line you have to go find. * test(server): repair the call sites typecheck:tests caught tests/ sits outside the build tsconfig, so none of this showed up in a green test run — which is exactly the gap `npm run typecheck:tests` exists to close. Three kinds, all mine: - Seven `import type` paths for RuntimeEnvService carried one `../` too many. Type-only imports are erased, so vitest never resolved them and nothing failed. - VersionCheckJob and PluginsController grew a constructor parameter and eleven hand-wired `new` calls kept passing the old count. The argument arrived as undefined and no assertion happened to read it. - ConditionContext grew `managed`, and the shared context object in the conditions suite did not. The condition also had no test of its own, so it has one now: both directions, since the registry uses `is: false` to keep a notice away and a notice that only belongs on a centrally administered install would use `is: true`.	2026-08-15 16:42:27 +02:00
jubnl	2b2c6462ec	refactor(server): fold the in-container bridge edges	2026-08-11 16:32:02 +02:00
Maurice	49c3c57c31	Give the ephemeral tokens a provider, and clear the next wave of type errors ... ephemeral-tokens.ts was free functions, and AuthService owned the cleanup timer only because it happened to be the domain that mints tokens. Issuing them and sweeping them are different jobs, and FilesService and TokenService mint or consume them too. EphemeralTokenService owns the lifecycle and hands the three operations out. The store and the interval stay module state next door, and that is load-bearing rather than a leftover: src/websocket.ts consumes ws tokens on the upgrade handshake, outside the container, before any injector is in reach. Per-instance state would hand it an empty Map and close every connection with 4001, which no test would catch because the ws suites drive the transport directly. WS-027 through WS-029 pin the session gate that runs through exactly that path. The MAX_STORE_SIZE back-pressure is the second reason: createEphemeralToken returns null at 10,000 live tokens and TokenService turns that into a 503. A second store would raise the real ceiling with nobody noticing. Its own leaf module rather than a provider in AuthModule: TokensModule mints download and ws tokens as well, AuthModule already imports TokensModule, and TokensModule is documented as a deliberate leaf that three graphs reach for. Same shape as MailerModule, which broke AuthModule <-> NotificationsModule. Twelve hand-wired construction sites in tests needed the new collaborator. The typecheck named all twelve; before this branch they would have been undefined at runtime. Sixteen more test files are cleared here too, each at its root cause. Four of them were passing for the wrong reason: files.controller.test.ts drove two handlers with shifted arguments, a string tripId where the trip row belongs and undefined where tripId and id belong. It stayed green because FilesService is fully stubbed and the stubs ignore what they are given, so DELETE /:id/permanent and DELETE /trash/empty never covered that the trip row reaches the permission check. conflictUpdate.test.ts was missing real collaborators on PlacesService and PackingService. None of the exercised paths reach them, so it passed by luck. assignments.service.test.ts builds its service by hand, and the one consumer of the collaborator it was missing swallows every throw in a bare catch. A broken journey reconciliation would still have shown 28 green tests. scheduler.test.ts mocks two modules with paths that resolve one directory above the server root, so they mock nothing at all. Harmless only because src/scheduler.ts imports neither.	2026-08-10 19:54:46 +02:00
Maurice	ff286edc45	Widen the test stubs the typecheck rejected ... conditions.test.ts lost noTrips when the condition kind landed; oauth.test.ts lost the RFC 8707 resource indicator when it became required. Both are fixtures that stopped matching a contract that grew, and both are filled in with the value that keeps every existing case reading as it did. budget.service.calc.test.ts typed its prepare mock from the default implementation rather than from prepare's own signature, so all ten later mockImplementation calls had to reproduce that exact three-member literal. One stmt() helper names the widening instead.	2026-08-10 19:54:46 +02:00
jubnl	5952e02971	feat(system-notices): replace expiresAt with [minVersion, maxVersion) version gate ... Prevents users who upgrade across multiple versions from seeing all interim notices at once. Version bounds are evaluated server-side using semver.coerce so prerelease builds compare as their base release. Range is lower-inclusive, upper-exclusive: maxVersion: '4.0.0' hides the notice once 4.0.0 ships.	2026-04-17 20:03:23 +02:00
jubnl	61b8070626	fix(system-notices): coerce prerelease app version before semver comparison	2026-04-16 14:58:38 +02:00
jubnl	293506217e	feat(notices): add system notice infrastructure ... Server-side notice registry with per-user condition evaluation (firstLogin, existingUserBeforeVersion, addonEnabled, dateWindow, role, custom). Notices are sorted by priority then severity, filtered against dismissals stored in a new user_notice_dismissals table, and served via GET /api/system-notices/active + POST /api/system-notices/:id/dismiss. Client renders notices through a host component that partitions by display type (modal / banner / toast). The modal renderer supports multi-page pagination with directional slide transitions, keyboard navigation, and correct dismiss-all semantics on CTA / X / ESC. Dismissals are optimistic with a single background retry. Includes 3.0.0 upgrade notices (v3-photos, v3-journey, v3-features), onboarding welcome modal, and full i18n coverage across 15 languages. The /journey route is addon-gated on both client and server. Also includes: unit + integration test suites, registry integrity test that validates action CTA IDs against client source, and technical documentation in docs/system-notices.md.	2026-04-16 14:36:33 +02:00