The OIDC login route silently fell back to building the redirect URI from
X-Forwarded-Host/X-Forwarded-Proto when APP_URL was not configured. An
attacker could set X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.example.com to redirect the
authorization code to their own server after the user authenticates.
Remove the header-derived fallback entirely. If APP_URL is not set (via env
or the app_url DB setting), the OIDC login endpoint now returns a 500 error
rather than trusting attacker-controlled request headers. Document APP_URL
in .env.example as required for OIDC use.
The oidc_client_secret was written to app_settings as plaintext,
unlike Maps and OpenWeather API keys which are protected with
apiKeyCrypto. An attacker with read access to the SQLite file
(e.g. via a backup download) could obtain the secret and
impersonate the application with the identity provider.
- Encrypt on write in PUT /api/admin/oidc via maybe_encrypt_api_key
- Decrypt on read in GET /api/admin/oidc and in getOidcConfig()
(oidc.ts) before passing the secret to the OIDC client library
- Add a startup migration that encrypts any existing plaintext value
already present in the database
- Add { algorithms: ['HS256'] } to all jwt.verify() calls to prevent
algorithm confusion attacks (including the 'none' algorithm)
- Add { algorithm: 'HS256' } to all jwt.sign() calls for consistency
- Reduce OIDC token payload to only { id } (was leaking username, email, role)
- Validate OIDC redirect URI against APP_URL env var when configured
- Add startup warning when JWT_SECRET is auto-generated
https://claude.ai/code/session_01SoQKcF5Rz9Y8Nzo4PzkxY8
New environment variables:
- OIDC_ADMIN_CLAIM (default: "groups") — which claim to check
- OIDC_ADMIN_VALUE (e.g. "app-trek-admins") — value that grants admin
Admin role is resolved on every OIDC login:
- New users get admin if their claim matches
- Existing users have their role updated dynamically
- Removing a user from the group revokes admin on next login
- First user is always admin regardless of claims
- No config = previous behavior (first user admin, rest user)
Supports array claims (groups: ["a", "b"]) and string claims.
When registration is disabled, users with a valid invite link can now
register via OIDC/SSO. The invite token is passed from the login page
through the OIDC state, validated on callback, and used to bypass the
allow_registration check. Invite usage count is incremented after
successful registration.
jubnl