Commit Graph

7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
jubnl b194e8317d feat(pwa): implement real offline mode with IndexedDB sync
Add genuine offline read/write capability for trips:

- Dexie IndexedDB schema (trips, places, packing, todo, budget,
  reservations, files, mutationQueue, syncMeta, blobCache)
- Repo layer for all domains: offline reads from Dexie, writes
  optimistically to Dexie and enqueue mutations for later replay
- Mutation queue with UUID idempotency keys (X-Idempotency-Key),
  FIFO flush, temp-ID reconciliation on 2xx, fail-and-continue on 4xx
- Trip sync manager: caches all trips with end_date >= today or null,
  auto-evicts 7d after end_date, fetches bundle endpoint in one request
- Map tile prefetcher: bbox from place coords, zooms 10-16, 50MB cap,
  warms SW cache via fetch
- Sync triggers: network online → flush + syncAll; WS reconnect →
  flush only (rate-limiter safe); visibilitychange/30s → flush only
- WS remoteEventHandler writes through to Dexie on every event
- Server idempotency middleware + idempotency_keys table (migration 100,
  24h TTL nightly cleanup)
- GET /api/trips/:id/bundle endpoint for efficient single-request sync
- OfflineBanner component: amber (offline) / blue (syncing) / hidden
- OfflineTab in Settings: cached trip list, re-sync and clear actions
- usePendingMutations hook for per-item pending indicators

Closes #505 #541
2026-04-14 23:04:25 +02:00
jubnl 7c0a0d5f39 security(oauth): harden OAuth 2.1/MCP implementation (Critical + High + Medium findings)
Address 14 security findings from internal review of the OAuth 2.1 + MCP layer:

Critical:
- C1: Scope-gate all MCP resources (trips, budget, packing, collab, atlas, vacay, etc.)
- C2: Wire token/session revocation into active MCP session lifecycle per (user, client_id)
- C3: Refresh-token replay detection via parent_token_id chain + cascade revoke on replay

High:
- H1: Validate PKCE code_challenge (43-char base64url) and code_verifier (43–128 chars) format
- H2: Rate-limit /oauth/token (30/min), /authorize/validate (30/min), /oauth/revoke (10/min)
- H3: Strip client metadata from unauthenticated /authorize/validate responses (oracle prevention)
- H4: Constant-time secret comparison via crypto.timingSafeEqual (prevents timing attacks)
- H5: Collapse all invalid_grant cases to a single generic message; log specifics server-side

Medium:
- M1: Set Cache-Control: no-store + Pragma: no-cache on token endpoint responses
- M2: Return 404 (not 200/403) on discovery + revoke endpoints when MCP addon is disabled
- M4: Audit-log all OAuth lifecycle events (create, consent, issue, refresh, revoke, replay)
- M5: Union consent scopes on re-authorization instead of replacing existing grants
- M7: Require httpOnly cookie auth (not Bearer JWT) on all state-mutating OAuth endpoints
- M8: Strict Bearer scheme check in MCP token verification

Refactoring:
- Extract MCP session management (sessions Map, revokeUserSessions, revokeUserSessionsForClient)
  into mcp/sessionManager.ts to break the circular dependency between oauthService and mcp/index
- Extract verifyJwtAndLoadUser helper in auth middleware, shared by authenticate and new
  requireCookieAuth middleware

Tests:
- Fix all existing integration tests broken by the security hardening (OAUTH-019 to OAUTH-032)
- Add 13 new integration tests covering M1, M2, H1, H3, H5, M5, M7, C3
- Add 14 new unit tests covering C2, C3, H1, H3, M5 behaviors in oauthService
2026-04-10 02:03:27 +02:00
Julien G. 905c7d460b Add comprehensive backend test suite (#339)
* add test suite, mostly covers integration testing, tests are only backend side

* workflow runs the correct script

* workflow runs the correct script

* workflow runs the correct script

* unit tests incoming

* Fix multer silent rejections and error handler info leak

- Revert cb(null, false) to cb(new Error(...)) in auth.ts, collab.ts,
  and files.ts so invalid uploads return an error instead of silently
  dropping the file
- Error handler in app.ts now always returns 500 / "Internal server
  error" instead of forwarding err.message to the client

* Use statusCode consistently for multer errors and error handler

- Error handler in app.ts reads err.statusCode to forward the correct
  HTTP status while keeping the response body generic
2026-04-03 13:17:53 +02:00
jubnl 1a4c04e239 fix: resolve Immich 401 passthrough causing spurious login redirects
- Auth middleware now tags its 401s with code: AUTH_REQUIRED so the
  client interceptor only redirects to /login on genuine session failures,
  not on upstream API errors
- Fix /albums and album sync routes using raw encrypted API key instead
  of getImmichCredentials() (which decrypts it), causing Immich to reject
  requests with 401
- Add toast error notifications for all Immich operations in MemoriesPanel
  that previously swallowed errors silently

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-01 21:19:53 +02:00
jubnl add0b17e04 feat(auth): migrate JWT storage from localStorage to httpOnly cookies
Eliminates XSS token theft risk by storing session JWTs in an httpOnly
cookie (trek_session) instead of localStorage, making them inaccessible
to JavaScript entirely.

- Add cookie-parser middleware and setAuthCookie/clearAuthCookie helpers
- Set trek_session cookie on login, register, demo-login, MFA verify, OIDC exchange
- Auth middleware reads cookie first, falls back to Authorization: Bearer (MCP unchanged)
- Add POST /api/auth/logout to clear the cookie server-side
- Remove all localStorage auth_token reads/writes from client
- Axios uses withCredentials; raw fetch calls use credentials: include
- WebSocket ws-token exchange uses credentials: include (no JWT param)
- authStore initialises isLoading: true so ProtectedRoute waits for /api/auth/me

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-01 11:02:45 +02:00
Claude fedd559fd6 fix: pin JWT algorithm to HS256 and harden token security
- Add { algorithms: ['HS256'] } to all jwt.verify() calls to prevent
  algorithm confusion attacks (including the 'none' algorithm)
- Add { algorithm: 'HS256' } to all jwt.sign() calls for consistency
- Reduce OIDC token payload to only { id } (was leaking username, email, role)
- Validate OIDC redirect URI against APP_URL env var when configured
- Add startup warning when JWT_SECRET is auto-generated

https://claude.ai/code/session_01SoQKcF5Rz9Y8Nzo4PzkxY8
2026-03-31 00:33:53 +00:00
Maurice 8396a75223 refactoring: TypeScript migration, security fixes, 2026-03-27 18:40:18 +01:00