Security that ships from the install itself, no self-hoster setup:
- Egress SSRF/rebinding backstop: the net.Socket connect guard now RESOLVES the
destination and refuses private/loopback/link-local/metadata/CGNAT/ULA
addresses, pinning the resolved IP (a declared host that re-resolves to an
internal address is blocked). Pure policy in egress-policy.ts + tests.
TREK_PLUGIN_ALLOW_PRIVATE_EGRESS=on opts back into internal targets.
- RSS memory reaper: the supervisor now kills a child that blows a real RSS
ceiling (TREK_PLUGIN_MAX_RSS_MB, default 300) — --max-old-space-size only
bounds the V8 heap, so Buffers could OOM the box under it.
- Hash-chained capability audit log (migration 159): every core-data / broadcast
call is recorded at the RPC boundary with the host-bound acting user and a
per-plugin hash chain, so wide grants stay attributable + tamper-evident.
Admin endpoint GET /api/admin/plugins/:id/audit.
- Drop allow-popups from the plugin frame (sandbox + CSP): window.open ignores
connect-src, so it was an egress/phishing bypass.
Server suite 207 green, client + migration reconciliation green.
Maurice